

A Critical Analysis of Malinowski

BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI--A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

THESIS

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The author would like to express his gratitude to the following people: [...] To Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, of the Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, for his brilliant article in *Philosophy of Science*, which directly stimulated this thesis. (Fox 1944)

This must be "The Place of Theory in Anthropological Studies" ([Kluckhohn 1939](#)).

Statement of the Problem: The purpose of this study is to carefully and critically examine the methodologies and **preconceptions** of Bronislaw Malinowski. [...] I am using "preconceptions" in the Veblenian sense; that is, to de-

note *a priori*, **prejudiced beliefs - beliefs held in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary.** (Fox 1944: 1)

Very well put. Malinowski's "preconceptions" (especially concerning "primitive mentality", moreover in "our own uneducated classes") are a constant source of trouble for anyone attempting a closer examination of his theories.

A brief discussion at this point of Wilhelm Wundt's theories and contributions might possibly clarify some of Malinowski's subsequent viewpoints. Wundt is best known in psychology as the father of "physiological psychology, a new and experimental psychology that should apply the methods of science to the problems of the mind" (Boring). Because "Wundt was probably the most complete expression in [] his time of the scientific forces that were remaking psychology" (Murphy), he "approached the problem of primitive mentality with a far broader and deeper equipment in scientific method than did Spencer, Tylor, or Frazer" (Goldenweiser). **Wundt, foreshadowing the social-psychological behaviorism of G. H. Mead, Dewey, Hull, and others,** "realized that the psychological foundations of civilization cannot be sought in the isolated individual, but that the group always actively co-operates in the production of attitude and ideas" (Goldenweiser). His psychology, however, is broadly classified by Boring as *associationistic sensationism*. **Wundt attacked the "rationalism" of Tylor and others; that is, he attacked the concept that the whole universe is rational and that man's mind is also rational, being a mere reflection of the rational environment.** Wundt escaped the errors of philosophical "individualism," realized that "with reference to the individual, **the group (the 'others')** was the carrier of habit, of traditon. It set the pattern and held the individual to it. And patterns, historically transmitted, are culture. Culture, then Wundt taught, was a group product, a creation of the folk. As a culture-maker the individual was part of

the folk, and only for purposes of analysis could he be separated from it, and then only with difficulty" (Goldenweiser). Wundt, unlike many of the contemporary American and English writers, was never a unilinear social evolutionist, always insisting upon the complexity of evolution. Furthermore, he did a great deal to purge the study of man of mysticism, insisting upon the "folk-psychological nature of language, art, mythology, religion" (Goldenweiser). Wundt's specific contribution to anthropology was, of course, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, published in 1916. (Fox 1944: 7-8; ff)

Not at all surprised to see anti-rationalism pop up yet again (this is a rather frequent occurrence in my recent readings related to Malinowski). Wundt was on my reading plan but now I know specifically [where to begin](#).

In *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*, Malinowski expressed his indebtedness to such Gestalt psychologists as C. Lloyd Morgan and **Köhler**. (Fox 1944: 8)

[Wolfgang Köhler](#), born in Reval (now Tallinn).

In conclusion, let us reiterate the five significant formative influences in Malinowski's life:

1. the influence of **his cosmopolitan and aristocratic background**;
2. the influence of **his scientific training** in physics and mathematics;
3. the early influence of the associationistic-sensationistic psychology of **Wundt**;
4. the influence of comparative economics; and
5. the later influence of the Gestalt school and the behavioristic-functional trend in psychology, as well as the related **pragmatic trend in philosophy**. (This factor, although of the greatest significance, is **almost altogether overlooked** in other criticisms.)

(Fox 1944: 13-14)

The aristocratic background accounts for his classism; his training in physics (e.g. Mach) for his idiosyncratic theory of action, Wundt (alongside McDougall and Shand, no doubt) for his primary interest in social psychology, comparative economics for his interest in the *kula*, and finally... Dewey.

Before discussing Malinowski's contributions to a science of anthropology, let us first question: "What is science to Malinowski?" In the first place, Malinowski does not consider mere fact gathering as science, but conceives of science as being an organized system of relationships. As G. H. Mead brings out in the following quotation:

Science always tries **to state an organized system of relations, but it never states the character of the object in itself apart from its relations.** [...] You cannot deal with a body just by itself and find out what it is and so build up a system; you have to state it in terms of its relation to some system there. Now it is these necessary relations between bodies with which science is occupied. (Mead 1938: 80)

It was such a conceptual basis that led Malinowski to reject the "atomic" or "piecemeal" work of Westermarck, Tylor, and others, and to formulate the so-called "functional" approach. (Fox 1944: 15-16)

This makes a lot of sense in light of how he formulates phatic communion: not as a thing in itself but in relation with (in fact, as a negation of) the pre-existing system of "mental functions", then reformulated as speech functions by Bühler, Ogden & Richards, etc. Mead's *The Philosophy of the Act* still not freely downloadable.

In this thesis, I shall use the term "marginal peoples," "marginal groups," or "marginal societies," rather than the terms "primitive peoples," "savage peoples," etc. **By "marginal peoples" is meant all peoples who have not yet acquired modern western technology to any significant degree.** That is, "marginal peoples" are marginal to modern technological societies. This, I believe, to be the real distinction between the so-called "savage man" and the so-called "civilized man." This same distinction is implicit, although usually unrecognized, in all comparative anthropological works which deal with the subject of man. The term used in this sense does not have "geographical" implications. "Marginal peoples" is a more satisfactory terminology than "primitive peoples," "savage peoples," etc., precisely because it does imply **technological differences rather than psychological differences.** And, of course, the former is the actual locus of the differences. (Fox 1944: 24; ff)

Completely sensible.

The argument that theories are pernicious to valid field-work is repeatedly attacked by Malinowski. He first notes that "the field worker relies entirely upon inspiration from theory," and "foreshadowed problems are the main endowment of a scientific thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies." (Fox 1944: 36)

This, too, bears out in Malinowski's work as far as I'm concerned: for the concept of phatic communion relies less on field-observations (in fact contradicts these in several ways) than on theoretical formulations by the likes of Dewey and Trotter.

The functional approach, as has been noted briefly above, is concerned with the interaction between the organism and the environment. Before systematically analyzing Malinowski's use of functionalism, let us inquire

into the relationship of functionalism in anthropology, as used by Malinowski, to the uses of functionalism in other fields of inquiry. This is important because, I believe, that the concept of functionalism as used by Malinowski was stimulated by fundamental developments in psychology and philosophy. Support for this analysis will not be found in anthropological texts; not because it is untrue, but because the orthodox anthropologist is artificially departmentalized when it comes to philosophical and psychological questions. In other words, although anthropology is in many ways the least provincial [] of the sciences because of its generalized nature, it has purposively overlooked for the most part methodological developments in psychology and philosophy. What were the developments in philosophy and psychology which stimulated the functional method in anthropology? In the first place, **I do not believe that Malinowski's functional beliefs stem, as Lowie suggests Radcliffe-Brown's do, from Durkheim, but from the American school of functional psychology.** (Fox 1944: 63-64)

"Fox specifically denied that Malinowski's functionalism was influenced by Durkheim and tried instead to prove that it was derived from the writings of Dewey and Mead" ([Symmons-Symonolewicz 1959](#): 26; footnote 52).

Malinowski makes repeated reference to the leaders of the "schools" mentioned above - John Dewey, G. H. Mead, Clark Hull, and others - which would substantiate the contention that he was influenced by the American school of functional psychology, and later on by the behaviorists and the pragmatists. The whole thesis of *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* is suggested in Dewey in *Human Nature and Conduct*, from which Malinowski took his frontispiece. In *Coral Gardens and Their Magic*, **reference is made to Dewey's pragmatic treatment of language in Experience and Nature.** Malinowski notes as complementary to his treatment of language that of G. H.

Mead, who "expounds a general theory of language from a moderate behaviouristic point of view." (Malinowski 1935: 60) Mead's whole treatment of language is, incidentally, the most intensive and suggestive of the works in this field, and far exceeds in attainment that of Malinowski. (Fox 1944: 66)

This overview doesn't even include what Malinowski took from [*How We Think* \(Dewey 1910\)](#).

Compare this with Dewey's statement in *Logic*, p. 27: "Hunger, for example, is a manifestation of a state of imbalance between organic and environmental factors in that integration which is life. [...] **A state of tension is set up which is an actual state (not mere feeling) of organic uneasiness and restlessness.** This state of tension (which defines need) passes into **search for material that will restore the condition of balance.** [...] The matter ingested initiates activities throughout the rest of the animal that lead to a restoration of balance, which, as the outcome of the state of previous tension, is fulfilment." (Fox 1944: 69; ff)

Something to add to that "strange and unpleasant tension" which I'm dealing with.

New approaches are being tried in field-anthropology in order to eliminate **the personal friction of a strange observer**. One such approach is that recently used by Leo Simmons in presenting *Sun Chief*. (Fox 1944: 82)

This friction is another significant factor in my own particular research object, and pertains to what I should call the "unreliable informant" hypothesis (or something to this effect).

The historical and field-data act as a check on the introspective nature of the individual's description and interpretation. Material collected in this manner provides a

wealth of knowledge about social-psychological behavior. Simmons could provide, for example, a **"situational analysis" of most [] of Don's actions**. From the autobiographic sketch could be drawn the motivation and "tone" of each act. The *autobiographic approach* is certainly an excellent manner for investigating personality problems - to find out **how an individual feels, thinks, behaves**; the approach will become more valuable as the studies become more numerous. (Fox 1944: 82-83)

Something clearly lacking in the analysis of the "context of situation".

Far more interesting and significant theoreticall than the relationship of language to "Functionalism" is Malinowski's "pragmatic" treatment of language. **The term "pragmatic" as used here by Malinowski means "that words in their primary and essential sense do, act, produce and achieve."** To my knowledge Malinowski's first thorough "pragmatic" treatment of language is found in the Supplement of *The Meaning of Meaning*. Here Malinowski states egotistically that he had arrived at the concept of language "as a mode of action" through separate field inquiry, realizing independently as did "Messrs. Ogden and Richards, Dr. **Head**, Dr. Gardiner" the basic psychological considerations of language and treating it as an "indispensable element of concerted human action." Despite Malinowski's boast, we suspect that he was already under the influence of the pragmatic and functional schools at the time that he wrote the Supplement. (Fox 1944: 94)

Who's Head?

Malinowski, first of all, considers language as an *active mode of human behavior* rather than as **a reflective or cognitive mode**. Words, for example, should be studied for their dynamic rather than for their intellectual

functions. Language is a tool, and like all tools when in use, involves action. Language is primarily an instrument of action. (Fox 1944: 94)

It appears that Fox did not catch that the notion of reflection, too, came from Dewey.

Malinowski states that "the sacredness of words and their socially sanctioned inviolability are absolutely necessary to the existence of social order," and that "**if promises and contracts were not regarded as something more than *flatus vocis***, social order would cease to exist in a complex civilization as well as in a primitive tribe." (Fox 1944: 100)

And "so with equal necessity will he have to heed of his foot ready for the lean and empty jackasses, who promise when they have no business to do so" ([Nietzsche 1921: 43-44](#)).

Malinowski clearly showed the connection between language and activity. "Meaning" arises through doing. **Language is a form of social behavior**. That is, words can be understood only in the stimulus-response situation. (Fox 1944: 107)

A general truism.

Both fundamentally agree that the goal of anthropology is to establish "laws," or generalizations if you wish, about cultural behavior. **Generalizations which will have universal validity**. Malinowski, however, remained an "ethnographic provincial" despite his intentions, while Radcliffe-Brown, at one time or another, formulated many provoking generalizations. It has been suggested that Malinowski's interest in establishing generalizations was stimulated by Radcliffe-Brown. (Fox 1944: 121)

Make generalizations that apply to the savage and civilized alike.

Malinowski, on the contrary, in his early work (consistent with his German philosophical and psychological training) was primarily interested in the "Weltanschauung." **The feelings and opinions of the individual are prominent** in Malinowski's work. This led each to approach a problem in somewhat of a different fashion. (Fox 1944: 124)

I would rather attribute this to his liking of British social psychology (e.g. McDougall and Shand).

However, the psycho-analyst **has not tested his theories comparatively, he has only assumed their universal validity.** (Fox 1944: 133)

Phraseology.

By the objective test of action, we can state that Descartes did not *really* believe what he was saying - he was **merely verbalizing**. Descartes did actually talk to other individuals and enter into activity with them; he did eat, drink, etc.; he did dodge balls, stones, etc. In other words, Descartes behaved as a social being and his own activities are a condemnation of his busy theorizing. If Descartes had really believed his own theory, he would not have ducked in the face of an oncoming blow, but we know that he did. (Fox 1944: 141)


Flatus vocis - uttering words is not really "saying" anything. Austin's speech act theory follows naturally (verbalization has no sense or reference).

Instincts: Because Malinowski was interested in the interactional process between the organism and its environment, he was necessarily led to consider the genetic propulsions of the organism. **His early attempts to describe the genetic characteristics of man were crude and generalized. He utilized the psychological termi-**

nology of his day, which was limited and inadequate. Throughout his work we find Malinowski using such vague phrases as "human impulses," "natural [] propensities," "fundamental tendency," "natural inclinations," "innate desire," "natural sentiments," "natural desires," and "instinctive cores," but **never do we find a clear definition of any of these terms.** However, as modern experimental psychology developed, such loose phraseology as "instinct," etc., was discarded for more specific and meaningful terminology, and Malinowski was able to clarify this genetic aspect of man. (Fox 1944: 160-161)

Very well put. It has been my misfortune to zero in on a piece of his writing that is full of such crudities. Reading McDougall and Shand has only partially ameliorated the situation, for Malinowski is essentially paraphrasing them, retaining an unavoidable a margin of error when approximating his statements to the authorities. All in all, good work.

The Foundations of Character



Shand, Alexander F. 1914. *The Foundations of Character: Being a Study of the Tendencies of the Emotions and Sentiments*. London: Macmillan and Co.

A scientific treatment should not diminish, but increase the general interest taken in character. To bring together the various aspects of the subject, - which, in literature, are treated in isolation from one another; to lead up to a general conception of it; to study the methods by which the knowledge of it may be increased in accuracy and extent; these are to make approaches to **a scientific treatment of character**. (Shand 1914: vii)

Oh lord, what have I gotten myself into. 572 pages!

One of the principal hypotheses in this book is **the theory of the sentiments** which I published in *Mind* nearly twenty years ago. I have to thank Prof. G. F. Stout who was the first to adopt it, and to make it more widely

known in his admirable "Manual of Psychology." Since then it has been accepted, or at least found serviceable, by a number of eminent writers, among whom I may mention Prof. E. Westermarck, [] Prof. James Sully, Mr. W. McDougall, F.R.S., Prof. Boyce Gibson, Prof. A. Caldecott. I have specially to thank Mr. McDougall for the generous praise in his "Social Psychology," of what little I had accomplished, which, coming to me at a time when I was uncertain as to the plan of my book, was a great encouragement and help. (Shand 1914: viii-ix)

I should equally read Trotter's papers before they were made into that book. McDougall is not surprising, but Westermarck is. Increases the probability of reading his book on morals. Others here I would leave for a later date.

In a strict sense we can never isolate the emotions. Each is bound up with others. Each subsists and works in a mental environment in which it is liable to be interfered with by the rest. Nor do these forces keep themselves, like human beings in the social environment, always distinct. On the contrary, they frequently become **blended** together, and often what we feel is a confused **emotion** which we cannot identify. (Shand 1914: 2)

Very much the stuff of Paul Ekman's study of emotions, including the universal basic emotions. On the whole, the fact that emotions are so blended is likely one reason why verbalizing, even theoretically, the stuff of feelings, is so vague and slushy.

The literary observer has to meet a corresponding difficulty. The conduct which he is observing may be variously interpreted; but if he is able to observe the living man he may reach a definite conclusion. He believes that each emotion has its characteristic expression and gestures. He passes from the expression to the emotion and gestures. He passes from the expression to the emotion often with the utmost confidence. What he sees he calls

anger or fear or joy or sorrow. And, besides, **a man's speech betrays his thoughts**, and these his motives. And finally, when he surveys the man's action as a whole, and the ends to which it appears to be directed, he can often judge what are his **dominant sentiments**. And thus from a man's expression and gestures, from his speech and conduct, we may be able to refer results to motives, the ends accomplished to their **determining emotions** and sentiments. (Shand 1914: 3)

That's one way of putting the communication of ideas. I should be happier that this discussion of emotions involves so much nonverbal communication. Maybe I should re-read Darwin's *Expressions of Sentiments*, it would appear, can also be treated as a functional hierarchy.

But setting aside those cases already referred to, in which **one emotion so blends with others as to produce an emotional state that we cannot name or identify**, still, fear, anger and other emotions, though their bodily sensations undergo some change, preserve their identity. (Shand 1914: 3)

I was just thinking that the foregoing spoke a lot about emotion being a process, so what's to make of an expression like "state of mind". Would it be an emotion of duration, i.e. mood?

Yet Lange **confusing the control of emotions**, - which so often strengthens them, as far as their depth or persistence is concerned, - **with their suppression**, looks forward to the day when through "the results of education and the intellectual life," we may end by realising the ideal of Kant of man as a pure intelligence for whom "**all of the emotions**" if he is still subject to them, will be looked upon as "**mental troubles little worthy of him.**" (Shand 1914: 4)

How is this different from Trotter's dynamics between instinct and intelligence? The whole argument is also available in Peirce, i.e. self-control.

If the abstract laws of character were taught in permanent connexion with old and new observations which illustrate them, the knowledge obtainable in youth would not be merely abstract, and would sometimes approximate to the vividness of experience. Great dramatists and novelists impress the experiences of their characters so vividly upon us as almost to seem like our own experiences; and **through the power of imagination**, even in youth, **we may have lived many lives**. (Shand 1914: 8)

O.G. empathy (*Einführung* in German aesthetics). The latter cliché usually comes up in connection with fantasy. It's a staple when relating literature and education. I believe I've heard Stephen Fry say something like it on Q.I.

Mill conceived that the science of Character should be "founded on the laws of Psychology," and should connect the many popular generalisations about character with these laws. He speaks of these generalisations as "**the common wisdom of common life**," and calls them "empirical," because they are based on experience, and distinguishes them from the scientific or "causal laws," because they are not universally true. (Shand 1914: 13)

That's the deal with those big serial tomes, they have chapters on interesting stuff in them but on the whole they're intimidatingly big, and mostly out-dated, sometimes even before they're published. The common wisdom of common life consists of common sense phrases, i.e. folk knowledge or folk psychology.

"The empirical laws," he says, "have been formed in abundance by every successive age of humanity..." Literature is full of them; and the original mind of Goethe, re-

flecting on this common wisdom of life, is compelled to admit that **"Everything that is wise has been thought already; we can only try to think it over again."** (Shand 1914: 15)

Says Gosper in Steven Levy's *Hackers*: "It's your life story if you're a mathematician: every time you discover something neat, you discover that Gauss or Newton knew it in his crib." I've been standing on the balcony and thinking about Baxtin, how every meaning will have its homecoming festival and how good ideas have a habit of returning.

Yet numbers of **books of quotations** have been published and selections of the "wit and wisdom" or "favourite passages" of various authors, wherein we might expect to find a collection of the empirical laws of character ready to hand if not classified on any scientific basis; but they have been compiled without psychological interest, and present a confused mass of prudential maxims, witticisms, moral exhortations, consolations in misfortune, platitude, with only here and there one of those laws of character of which we are in search. (Shand 1914: 16)

I've read one such book of quotations back in '16 in a Latvian *Mājās* store parking lot. It was horridly self-contradictory. "A confused mass" is a perfect description.

Now of what service are these laws of Association for deducing laws of character, and for determining the "limiting principle of our reliance" on the "empirical laws" of popular opinion? **Is the familiar blindness of sexual love due to association by contiguity or to association by similarity?** Does any principle of association raise the empirical law to a scientific truth by revealing the limits of its application? (Shand 1914: 16)

Frisky. *Virk*. The same format can be used to examine someone's knowledge of Jakobson and Peirce, both following the laws of association in their own way (Jakobson through his Polish influences, Peirce by Mill directly).

Shall we be more likely to deduce this uniformity of experience from the law of Association by Similarity? **The law of association by similarity lays it down that where any sensation or idea has some point in common with a second idea, the one has a tendency to arouse the other.** Now we need not concern ourselves with the theory that these two laws of association are reducible to a single law of **Redintegration**; we may take them as they were generally held by the [] older psychologists, as independent laws, and we have only to consider whether any **bond of similarity** can account for the conjunction between love and inattention to defects of its objects? (Shand 1914: 17-18)

Shand wrote many papers about attention so I expect to meet such discussions in more detail. But would it be too much or too slapdash to treat communization as bond of similarity and socialization as bond of contiguity?

No competent person in the present day, would think of applying these laws to such purposes. The extravagant hopes which they once aroused have long since been dissipated. It remains for us only to draw the obvious conclusions: the "laws of mind" which were known to psychologists at the time at which Mill wrote did not suffice to interpret the "empirical laws" or "approximate generalisations" concerning character, to be found in literature and **the common speech of mankind**, or to lead to our [] discovery of "the limiting principle" of their truth. (Shand 1914: 18-19)

Is there something redeeming about incompetence?

There are in all of us two kinds of forces or activities, the one making for **organisation**, the other for **disorganisation**; the one making us free in the higher sense, or free from slavery to impulse, the other making us free in the lower sense, or free from disagreeable restraints. These forces are referred to in the popular distinction between Principle and Inclination. We shall also interpret them by the distinction, to be presently explained, between **Sentiment and Emotion**. Notwithstanding the theoretic distinction between these two kinds of force, and the profound significance of their opposite effects on character, they are in one respect identical: both pursue ends, and select the means to them: **both are systematic**; but the systems of the one and relatively comprehensive and permanent, those of the other relatively restricted and temporary. (Shand 1914: 20)

Something very elementary and fundamental. It looks like he's attempting the distinction between positive and negative freedom. It also looks like sentiments have more to do with the intellect and emotions, of course, with instinct.

We shall now attempt to show that **the most simple and general fact concerning our conative activity, is that it tends in all its manifestation to form some degree of organisation**. For, being directed to ends, neither **the stream of ideas, nor the field of perception**, wholly preserved that chance-order which, apart from this organising activity, it would exhibit, but approximates to a systematic order, as a condition of fulfilling the ends pursued. (Shand 1914: 21)

Maybe this "organisation" is the difference between intention and attention? In any case "the stream of ideas" accompanies the "flow of language", and "the field of perception" encompasses the immediate visual environment.

The organisation of the body and all its parts is reflected in the mind. If **the mind** did not also **tend to organise itself**, how would its development have helped in the struggle for life? The most perfect types of mind and character are the most highly organised. This seems to be the fundamental law underlying all other laws of character: (1) *Mental activity tends, at first unconsciously, afterwards consciously, to produce and to sustain system and organisation*. Let us then adopt this law provisionally as our working conception. (Shand 1914: 21)

Mind is autopoietic. Mind grows.

Why is it that most people find walking without an object so disagreeable? or waiting on a platform for a train that is late, or in an office for an appointment? It is not merely that a previous occupation has been suspended, but also because mind and body cannot, in such situations, readily find a new occupation to replace the former one. **Aimless movements, random thoughts**, turning over the pages of a magazine in which you are not interested, replace the preceding organised activity. **But let a friend be met unexpectedly, and at once his presence excites the sentiment of friendship**, and the mind finds a new occupation in all the fresh facts concerning it. What again is 'ennui' or boredom? It is **the painful fatigue of idleness**, when we will not throw ourselves into the occupations we have, or have not those we want. (Shand 1914: 22)

What about talking without an object?

But these laws of Mind are not ready to hand, like the laws of Association; we have to find them. Still if it is the essential nature of Mind, and the most general fact that we can assert about it, that it tends always to organise its process, then, wherever we examine mental process, we should find some organic law, whether the force present

be that of **the play-impulse**, or one of **the serious sentiments of our life**, as that for our **family or profession**. These organic laws are in fact **the laws of our instinct, emotions and sentiments**. Men considering us from the outside, observe the manifestations of these same systems. They come to the same conclusion that there are forces in us which always pursue some end; and the wisest of them, observing our conduct, formulate empirical laws of our character, as that "Love is blind," or that "Forbidden fruit is sweetest," or disguise these laws in Fables, as that of "the Fox and the sour grapes," or "the Dog in the manger," - which are again and again applied to characterise the same kind of conduct, and to make **men recognise in themselves what is so evident to those who watch them**. (Shand 1914: 24)

Both the play-impulse and the serious sentiments of our life are present in PC. Also, the looking glass self.

Thus we have to seek for two kinds of law about the same kind of force or system: the one [] derived from **popular observation, liable to exceptions, unscientific, but recognised and formulated**; the other, belonging to **the inner nature of these systems, organic laws, not liable to exceptions, for the most part not formulated, either because they elude discovery, or because psychologists have never systematically studied them**. Both kinds of laws are indispensable to a science of character, and the possibility of its foundation depends on the discovery of a sufficient number of them. (Shand 1914: 24-25)

Discourse and empiricism. This problem vexed me when I was dealing with body language in literature. It boils down to what we know and what we don't know. It could be taken further even with Clay's abdication - what we can know and what we can't know. Also, note the similarity with Tynyanov and Jakobson's (1928d) theses with

their historical and comparative literary criticism on the one hand and yet undiscovered "immanent laws" of a literary genre on the other.

These forces which are also systems, these systems which are forces, with their laws and subsidiary components, **constitute our character**. For with them and in them everything else that belongs to it is organised: our thoughts and volitions, even **the virtues and vices that distinguish us**. (Shand 1914: 25)

The systems thinking here is getting awfully tynyanovian.

We may attempt to make this conception clearer by **contrasting character with circumstances**. We see on the one hand the circumstances in which a man is placed, and **a stream of experiences in the mind** corresponding to them; on the other hand, character and its forces. How much of this stream is attended to and gives rise to clear perceptions depends, in great part, on **these forces or systems of the character**. They **control and direct attention**. Hence it is pointed out that the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, and the soldier, **notice different kinds of fact**, because their interests are divergent. (Shand 1914: 25)

Selective attention? Shand took part of a symposium on the contrasting influences of character and circumstances. That people notice different kind of fact is certainly a well-trodden path in social psychology but it is also what makes the study of human *Umwelten*, our *Weltanschauung* so taunting and tacit.

In contrast with this conception it is curious to observe to what a poor collection of detached qualities we often reduce the living characters of men. Such a man we judge, has a strong will, is **energetic, is industrious; but reserved, disobliging, and unsociable**. Another is **complaisant and sociable; but weak and insincere**. These

summaries of men's natures are chiefly of use for practice. For as with those whom we are asked to employ, we want to know first whether they are honest, sober, industrious, and understand the work they profess to do; so **we expect to be helped by knowing something of those with whom we are likely to be brought into contact.** But such lists of qualities do not tell us anything of their inner connection, and to what limitations they are subject, and what are the chief systems of the mind which elicit, develop, and organise them, whilst allowing other qualities to perish. (Shand 1914: 26)

The civilized and the primitive are not alike. The latter portion approaches social information, the currency of social capital, renown.

Now among these lesser systems that are, or may be, organised in greater, are **the primary emotions with their connected instincts.** And here we may refer to the fact, which is well recognised, that the systems of the mind, as mental systems, cannot be separated from certain bodily systems. Every system of the mind is incomplete, and has part of its system in the body, and every system of the body, which is not merely reflex, is also incomplete, and has part of its system in the mind. Whatever stimulus may be given to an instinctive system by an emotion of the mind, **the executive part of it is in the body,** and there also is another or receptive part which arouses the emotion. (Shand 1914: 27)

Mind-body dualism solved.jpg and the receptive part of the mind which arouses emotion sounds like William James running from a bear. Shand wrote lots about emotion so I expect to understand this better by the end of this book.

The appetites and primary impulses, some of which we have noticed, we shall provisionally class with the primary emotions. Their **fellows have not often the individual distinctness of fear and anger;** and there are

other differences which the course of our enquiry will elicit; but they belong to those lesser systems of the mind with which we are here concerned. **They contain instincts, or, at least, innate tendencies.** They are primary, or underived from any other existing impulse or emotion. They, therefore, belong to those fundamental forces of character, without a knowledge of which it were in vain to attempt to understand its later and more complex developments. (Shand 1914: 29)

"Many instincts and innate trends, such as fear or pugnacity" (PC 3.3). Clever Bronio replaced tendencies with trends, and anger with pugnacity.

Of the primary emotions we have as yet noticed only **fear, anger, and disgust**; we must now briefly refer to those which remain; premising only that **the attempt to furnish an exhaustive list must be provisional**, and that we may come to include in the end many impulses or emotions that we overlooked in the beginning. Among those which we have been able to recognise, **Curiously is one of the most important.** It presents more the character of an impulse than of an emotion as generally understood; but it is none the less a primary system, and the basis of the intellectual life. It appears to include a well-formed instinct, and to be susceptible of some degree of emotional excitement. This instinct induces animals to make such movements as are necessary for **a fuller acquaintance with an object**, as to approach it closely, to sniff at it, to regard it with attentive scrutiny. (Shand 1914: 29)

While Malinowski happily lists "all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth" (PC 3.3), he completely neglects both disgust and curiosity. The latter, as "interest", was also excluded by Ekman and Friesen (1969).

The next two systems, **Joy and Sorrow**, in contrast with Curiosity, present rather the character of emotions than that of impulses or wants. They have been commonly regarded as primary, and it is improbable that any one will succeed in deriving them from other existing emotions. They are manifested very early in child-life. They include, if not instincts, at least innate tendencies. **The general innate tendency of all enjoy is directed to maintain some process already existing.** We attend to some stimulus perhaps accidentally, or because of its unusual intensity, but if it gives us joy or delight, **we continue to attend to it.** One of **the earliest joys** common to both men and the higher animals is that of satisfying hunger; as one of **the earliest sorrows** is that caused by the lack of food. Through hunger the young animal seeks the teat, and sucks at it when found: that is the instinct of its hunger. The enjoyment which it feels leads it to suck as long as the enjoyment is felt; that is the innate tendency of the emotion. And **this enjoyment sometimes outlasts the satisfaction** of appetite, and some men continue eating through gluttonous enjoyment. (Shand 1914: 29-30)

Something amazing. The joy of conversation and the purposeless prolongation of an awkward conversation finds an explanation. Note also that joys and sorrows are thymic categories.

Thus the child continues gazing at the light because he enjoys it, and cries to get back to it when he is turned away, because **the gloom in front of him is distasteful**; the cat who has lain curled up on the rug after a little time climbs up on a piece of furniture to look out of the window, where, if not warmth, is compensating cheerfulness. And **we too avoid 'gloomy' people and 'gloomy' parties where the guests sit lost in their own reflections**, and we use the term 'gloomy' to describe these things because they are immediately repugnant to us. (Shand 1914: 31)

Incredible. This passage ties together the disagreeable vices of bad conversation, the unreflective nature of free social intercourse, and even the bright flame of fame (φωτεινά φλόγα). "Let us get nearer to the fire, so that we can see what we are saying." (cf. Ogden & Richards 1923: 1)

But often our repugnance is obstructed. We have to stay in places repugnant to us, or **to live with people repugnant to us**, or to do work repugnant to us. (Shand 1914: 31)

Oww, oof, ouchie, "pidgin-English is a very imperfect instrument for expressing one's ideas [...] free communication in it with the natives will never be attained" (Malinowski 1922: 5).

For as **the stimuli of curiosity and fear often differ only in degree**, - **a slighter degree of strangeness** arousing the former, and a greater, the latter, - so the obstruction of an impulse may arouse either anger or sorrow according to the degree of its strength. (Shand 1914: 31)

Strangeness makes the ethnographer interesting and curious, and unknown people speaking an incomprehensible language is frightful and repugnant. Anxiogenic? I've started thinking of agoraphobia.

The sorrow of children appears to be connected with a peculiar cry, different from that of fear or anger, and one which mothers can distinguish - **the dumb expression of weakness and failure, and of the appeal for help**. This appeal is the essential impulse of sorrow. (Shand 1914: 31)

Expressions of sympathy and the first linguistic function infants acquire blown open. This is an awfully derogatory view to take of the interrogative and directive appeals.

There are two other impulses of great importance which [] Prof. Ribot and Dr. McDougall have the merit of distinguishing as among the primary forces of character. The one is **the impulse of self-display**, the other the impulse of self-abasement. They have been excellently described by Dr. McDougall. The former "is manifested by many of the higher social or gregarious animals, especially, perhaps, though not only, at the time of mating. The muscles of all parts are strongly innervated, the creature holds himself erect, his neck is arched, his tail lifted, his motions become **superfluously vigorous and extensive**, he lifts his hoofs high in air as he **parades before the eyes of his fellows**. Many animals, especially the birds, but also some of the monkeys, are provided with organs of display that are specially disposed on these occasions. Such are the tail of the peacock and the beautiful breast of the pigeon. **The instinct is essentially a social one, and is only brought into play by the presence of spectators.**" (Shand 1914: 31-32)

It is no wonder that Goffman found instant affinity in PC with his theory of self-presentation. Though he admittedly took a narrow, communication theory view of it, something akin to preconceived possibilities and prefabricated representations. Here, "a flow of language" is that superfluously vigorous and extensive stream of communication. On the presence of spectators see how "the hearing given to such utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share [but] it is quite essential for his pleasure" (PC 5.6).

We have called these primary systems impulses rather than emotions. They are at least primary impulses; but they are probably not the emotions with which they are apt to be identified. **The impulse of display cannot be at once both of the emotions of pride and vanity**; nor can the impulse of self-abasement be both of the emotions of humiliation and shame. They seem to belong to an earlier and more [] undifferentiated stage from which

one or other of these later and more definite emotions developed. In respect of this later stage **we notice that vanity only, not pride, can possess the instinct of self-display.** And with respect to the impulse of self-abasement, do we find it present in either humiliation or shame? Humiliation is painful. A sullen anger accompanies the degrading situation; but it has no impulse of self-abasement. Other of our later emotions have this impulse in some cases, notably **awe, admiration, and reverence;** and we notice that in all three the emotion is **pleasant.** (Shand 1914: 32-33)

Vanity, perhaps unsurprisingly, makes a relatively early appearance. We don't parade around things we are proud of. That would be vain. The pleasant emotions are what the audience should feel towards a good conversationalist, according to Mahaffy.

And here also we shall have little opportunity to furnish evidence in support of our several conclusions; our aim throughout this first book being **to carry forward continually to fresh stages of fullness and definiteness the vague and inadequate conception** of character from which we started. (Shand 1914: 35)

Metatheoretical phraseology.

Again there are many animals who play with their young, like the apes and monkeys, and the *Fælidæ*, and this also involves other instincts in the form of play. All of these instincts, **nutritive, offensive, defensive, sportive,** are organised in the so-called 'parental instinct,' making it in fact what it is, - a system of instincts. (Shand 1914: 39)

Compare this list with Trotter's.

But from this point of view we can claim that every primary emotion is an instinct, because innately organ-

ised to pursue a [] certain end, whether or not the behaviour in which it is expressed has that **stereotyped** and **definite** character to which we usually restrict the term '**instinctive**.' (Shand 1914: 39-40)

Simple but insightful word-association. Stereotyped utterances and social automatism are connected with instinctiveness.

A second theory which has often confused with this one, has become more distinct in recent time, - namely that all disinterested actions have their source in tender emotion. **For at first we should naturally, assume that sympathy was tender, and that tender emotion was sympathetic.** Nor should we be likely to form any clear distinction between either of them and love. Thus Bain speaks of "The warm, tender emotion, the reality of love and affection." For love is the principle of disinterestedness; and the source of its disinterestedness is assumed to be sympathy or tender emotion. And thus we make one or other or both the epitome and essence of love. (Shand 1914: 44)

Like C.Z.'s take on the positive bond trope. I have a hunch that interestedness and disinterestedness approximately follow Clay's homogeneous and heterogeneous sympathy.

The other system is that of parental love, called sometimes the 'parental instinct,' sometimes the 'instinct of the preservation of the race.' And we may now contrast the way in which these same emotions function in it with the way in which they function in **what Shaftesbury named the "self-system."** (Shand 1914: 46)

So it is. 'Characteristics,' 'An Enquiry concerning Virtue,' B. ii. pt. i. sec. i.

Yet it is precisely here that the current theory intervenes, and **assumes the presence of another primary**

emotion, Pity, to account for the fact of disinterestedness; and then regards that as the sole source of disinterested action. Yet pity is only a particular kind of sorrow that has become 'tender.' But this theory supposes that sorrow cannot become disinterested until it is first differentiated as pity, connecting, as we have alleged, the source of disinterested action with the particular nature of the emotion, and not with the cause which arouses it and the system to which it belongs. (Shand 1914: 47)

Pity is heterogeneous sympathy.

The way in which **a sympathetic emotion** is produced, namely, by **perceiving the expression of emotion of another mind**, does not make it disinterested. Whether it is disinterested or not depends on the system which it excites. For instance, the signs of fear expressed by one bird in a flock induce **a sympathetic fear** in other birds, which fly away, and secure their own safety; and the depression that we see so marked on some faces induces **a sympathetic depression** in us, so that we turn away from them. (Shand 1914: 48)

Here we have homogeneous sympathy but also what amounts to the suggestion in the protective herd.

Now pity seems to be an essentially disinterested emotion. For pity is the name of **a sorrow that we feel on behalf of another person**; but its disinterestedness is not dependent on the tenderness of this sorrow. There are many aching sorrows felt on behalf of another which are neither sweet nor tender. (Shand 1914: 48)

This "behalfness" Clay would describe as vicarious.

All of the emotions are the same in this respect, and obey the same law; and this law we shall now attempt to formulate: (3) *Every **emotion** has a potential disinterestedness, so far as **among the stimuli which excite it are some***

which excite it on behalf of another individual instead of on behalf of oneself. (Shand 1914: 49)

M. i. r. r. o. r. · N. e. u. r. o. n. s.

These higher systems we shall call "sentiments" to distinguish them from the letter systems of the emotions. All varieties of love belong to the former class. [...] Since 1896 when this theory was first put forward (see 'Mind,' N. S. vol. v. art. 'Character and the Emotions') those who have adopted it have agreed that this term with all its defects is on the whole better than the term 'passion' or any other that could be used to replace it (see 'Manual of Psy.,' by G. F. Stout, bk. iv. ch. ix. 5. Also E. Westermarck, 'Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,' vol. i. ch. v. p. 110, Note. Also W. McDougall, 'Social Psycho.' ch. v. I have only come across one exception. Prof. Boyce Gibson in his account of the theory adopts the term 'passion.' See his 'God with Us,' ch. viii, 'The Passion of Love,' in which a sympathetic and very penetrating study of the theory is given. For the arguments in favour of the term 'sentiment' see 'Mind,' N. S. vol. xvi. 'M. Ribot's Theory of the Passions,' by A. F. Shand. (Shand 1914: 50)

[Character and Emotions](#) (Shand 1896). [Introduction to Social Psychology](#) (McDougall 1908).

While in the last chapter we considered the biological theory that maternal love was a single instinct, in this chapter we shall have to notice, on the psychological side, a complementary theory that Love is a single emotion. This theory which has been generally held by psychologists as well as philosophers, regards Love and Hate as belonging to the same class of feelings as joy, sorrow, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust. **Love and hate were included in Descartes' list of the primary emotions, or "passions," as they were then named.** (Shand 1914: 51)

So they were.

And although it is more frequently sexual love which dramatists refer to, yet **all kinds of love are, in the variety of their emotional constituents, the same.** (Shand 1914: 52)

Much the same as what Freud (1922) wrote about *libido*.

To Coleridge love appears to organise the entire mind and heart:

'All thoughts, all passions, all delight
Whatever stirs this mortal frame
All are but ministers of love
And feed his sacred flame."

A corrective of this too inclusive conception is found in St. Paul's description of love, wher some of the emotions which it excludes are indicated. "Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not provoked, ..." (Shand 1914: 54)

The triad in poetic form. The marriage vow language is also neat.

In all normal individuals, then, there is a love of something to give some order and unity to their lives; and the system which is found generally pre-eminent is **the great principle of self-love or the self-regarding sentiment**, analogous to the chief bodily systems in respect of the number of subsidiary systems which it is capable of containing - not merely emotions not even **sentiments - as pride and vanity, avarice or the love of riches, sensuality or the love of sensual pleasures; of these the self-love of any particular man probably contains several.** And joined to this self-love in subtle and intimate ways which we cannot here attempt to understand, are a **variety of disinterested sentiments: as conjugal and**

parental love, filial affection, friendship, the sentiment for some game or sport, and in the higher characters one or other of the great impersonal sentiments, patriotism and the love for some science or art. (Shand 1914: 57)

Finally, "all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth" (PC 3.3) find an explanation, in self-love and self-regard, no less. And "a tie of some social sentiment or other" (PC 7.8) is a disinterested sentiment.

Among these greater systems must also be classed the opposite of love, hate. Sometimes love develops a complementary hate; as **the love of knowledge, the hatred of ignorance**, the love of beauty, the hatred of ugliness, the love of goodness, the hatred of evil, **the love of country, the hatred of foreign nations**. Whether hate is actually developed depends on the circumstances of the case; but some antagonistic attitude to ignorance, ugliness, baseness, always accompanies the love of their opposites. (Shand 1914: 58)

Shand also wrote a paper on the principle of antithesis.

It has seemed to some that, with the progress of civilisation, hatred is becoming rarer. Tolerance, or indifference, has diminished religious hatred; the knowledge of foreign countries and their abandonment of aggressive policies, have diminished the hatred of foreigners; just laws, and a firm and impartial administration, have diminished the frequency of personal hatreds. But new forms of social hate have sprung up in their place: the hatred of the capitalist and the professional classes by the manual labourers in place of the old respect felt for them. (Shand 1914: 58)

It seemed wrong. This evaluation is disasterously off the mark.

Another of the characteristic oppositions between the systems of love and hate is due to their relation to **the sympathetic emotions**. We observe that where love is the sympathetic emotions are much more frequent than where there is no love; but in hate they are not merely absent in most cases, but replaced by opposite or **antipathetic emotions**. (Shand 1914: 59)

The bonds of antipathy.

The second is the fundamental law of **the growth and decline of character**, and is due to the constant interaction between its greater and its lesser systems. For as in the body there are certain "anabolic," and "katabolic" processes in constant operation, **the one building up and the other breaking down** its organic structure, so in the character there are **certain tendencies working toward a higher form of organisation, and others working toward a lower form of organisation**. (Shand 1914: 62)

Tendencies towards union and disunion, integration and disintegration, communization and differentiation, the Appollonian and the Dionysian, order and disorder, cosmos and chaos.

As we have already noticed, we are so accustomed to regard the emotions as merely feelings, that in taking a comprehensive view of their systems we seem to be attributing to them qualities that only belong to the mind or self as a whole. For we shall assume that **an emotion includes (1) a cognitive attitude - in the sense of a perception or a thought; (2) a conative attitude - in the sense of an impulse and end; and (3) a feeling-attitude of a peculiar kind which we cannot fully analyse**. It has, therefore, the three essential attitudes of the mind as self; while, through the instinct or **innate tendency** connected with it, those bodily actions or behaviour are elicited which are necessary for the attainment of its end. **An emotion is, then, a self, or microcosm, of the entire**

mind; and this, as we shall see hereafter, is still truer of a sentiment. (Shand 1914: 64)

This is elaborated in the second book (the second part of this book). The idea itself is enticing: an emotion is a miniature "mind".

And thus we find that **the will of emotions is always impulsive, that of sentiments more reflective and self-controlled**. In the sentiments alone are resolutions formed, and choice manifested between their sometimes conflicting ends; they only give the will to control emotion, and to be steadfast unto the end. Strength or weakness of will, other things equal, varies with the strength or weakness of the emotion or sentiment to which it belongs; and hence it is that we find the same man strong in some directions and weak in others. (Shand 1914: 65)

One aspect as to why the sentiment is of a higher order than the emotion.

Yet our personality does not seem to be the sum of the dispositions of our emotions and sentiments. These are our many selves; but **there is also our one self**. This enigmatic self which reflects on their systems, estimates them, and, however loath to do it, sometimes chooses between their ends, seems to be the central fact of our personality. (Shand 1914: 66)

Well, I think that the true Self, that original Self, that first Self, is a real, mensurate, quantifiable thing, tangible and incarnate, and I'm going to find the fucker.

Thus the working assumption of our science must be the appearance of this law, even if it be contradicted by certain facts: (6) *All intellectual and voluntary processes are elicited by the system of some impulse, emotion, or sentiment, and subordinated to its end.* (Shand 1914: 67)

Makes sense in the Peircean paradigm, Firstness determining Secondness and Thirdness, though not very frequently instigated by Peirceans.

In fact the laws of association, which he always had in mind, had not the defect of merely approximate truths. Properly expressed, as laws of tendency, they are universally true. **Every idea does tend to revive any other idea with which it has been conjoined in experience**, with a force, other things equal, proportionate to the strength of the preformed bond between them. (Shand 1914: 69)

A brief statement on the laws of association.

Could anyone say at once to what end his love of another human being is directed? It would seem to be governed by different ends, in different situations, and some of them escape our notice. There is the preservation and health of the body; and **the preservation and welfare of the mind** also. And what does such a vague phrase as the welfare of the mind import? In its lowest interpretation it may be identified with **enjoyment**; in its highest with the supremacy of the moral nature. (Shand 1914: 71)

A healthy mind is a joyful one.

The laws of the constitution of love will then have to take into account **the multiplicity of its ends, their vagueness, their plasticity, their incompatibility** in certain situations, so that sometimes one may have to be sacrificed to another. (Shand 1914: 72)

Phraseology.

When we turn to the other side of Mill's method, to consider **the popular or literary generalisations** about character which he remarks have been formed in abundance by every successive age of mankind, we have to notice that he did not himself make a collection of these

laws, and that no one else ever has. The making of such a collection is a much more difficult task than he seems to have anticipated. It is [] not merely, or mainly, **the labour involved in extracting the laws from the literatures of the world**: though this would require the co-operation of many able men; for no index will inform us at what page in a given work we shall find them, and **there is no work of literature in which they may not be found**; and here, the books of quotation will be found of little service. But there is a difficulty which no mere labour can overcome. Literature is full of great thoughts; but these do not often enunciate laws of character: the "common wisdom of common life" to which Mill refers, is not primarily concerned with them. (Shand 1914: 72-73)

I faced similar issues with "body language in literature". There's nary a book in the world that doesn't say *something* about our bodies and their communicative movements.

Rarely is a writer so impressed by one of these laws that he is moved to collect the evidence in its favour, as was **Montaigne** in respect of **the law that difficulty gives all things their value**. (Shand 1914: 73)

Essais, Livre ii. ch. xv.

In the fable of "**A Fox and a Stork**," the fox asks his friend to dinner, which, as it is served on plates, the stork cannot partake of. The latter in return asks the fox to a repast which is served in long glasses. Now if this represents a common type of behaviour of selfish persons who, when they wish to appear generous, offer their friends what these will not accept because they cannot use, still this is only one of the common modes of behaviour of self-love, not the only one. So with regard to the punishment meted out to it; it is sometimes, and most appropriately, 'repaid in its own coin.' (Shand 1914: 75)

Makes me wish to examine such fables in detail to find the basis for the fox's rumoured cleverness.

The conception of character common to those who succeeded Mill in attempting to treat it scientifically, was formed under the influence of **analytical psychology**, and this influence fastened attention on the three abstract elements - **feeling, conation, cognition** - assumed to be united in every state of consciousness, so that **the conception of character** reached along these lines was much the same as that of **mind** in [] general. The problem of a science of character suggested by this conception, will be, therefore, to understand how these **three 'elements,' called also 'aspects,' and sometimes 'functions,'** are related to one another in the different characters of men. Thus arises **the conception of a predominance of one or other of them as furnishing a key to the classification** of characters. (Shand 1914: 82-83)

Analytical philosophy sounds about right when compared to "rational psychology" or "philosophical psychology". That these three aspects constitute the mind is known through A. Bain. And here we also see the beginnings of hierarchical functionalism.

We are taken away from concrete and fruitful **problems** to follow others which are **abstrat and even artificial**, such as is that of **the 'predominance' of one of the fundamental aspects of mind over another from which it is inseparable**; and, meanwhile, pre-occupied with them, we lose sight of the concrete facts, and the power of handling them. (Shand 1914: 83)

A powerful prediction of the folly of functional linguistics, where the inseparable functions are indeed separated for ideal categories.

It seems then grandiose to describe our aim as being to discover and organise the laws of character, since **it is rather to restate and to refine them**; but still we have to

discover those limiting conditions which popular thought is too simple and hasty to discriminate. (Shand 1914: 87)

Phraseology.

It is a fundamental principle of the teaching of Confucius and his disciples that Filial Piety is the basis both of loyalty and of patriotism. "The duty of children to their parents is the fountain whence all other duties spring"; and this duty is centred in that reverential love of [] parents whence this piety proceeds. And we can connect this ancient teaching which has overspread China and Japan with the modern teaching of Darwin. In his "Descent of Man," he says, "**The feeling of pleasure from society is probably an extension of the parental and filial affections**, since **the social instinct** seems to be developed by the young remaining for a long time with their parents; and this extension may be attributed in part to habit, but chiefly to natural selection." (Shand 1914: 91-92)

That's one way to root the social instinct in something more concrete.

It was made a reproach to **the Faculty-psychologists** that they **interpreted the processes of the mind**, such as remembering, reasoning, willing, and the like, **as due to a faculty of the mind to perform them**. Thus, remembering was supposed to be due to a faculty of memory, reasoning to a faculty of reason, willing to a faculty of will. Similarly, the meanness or generosity we observe as a quality of some men's conduct is explained by the meanness or generosity we attribute as a quality to their characters. (Shand 1914: 96)

A brief statement on faculty psychology.

The celebrated "Characters" of Theophrastus are most of them personifications of one or other of these qualities of conduct. He tells us that having lived to the age of

ninety-nine years, he had seen all sorts of persons, and had had time enough to know them. His method is to take some kind of conduct which he has observed, to distinguish the quality of it, to separate that from all other qualities belonging to the same man, and to form a character of it by itself, thereby obtaining both clearness and simplicity for his portrait, and making it life-like by representing its behaviour in a variety of situations. Of its secret springs, he tells us almost nothing. Among his characters are the Boor, the Dissimulator, the Flatterer, the Impertinent, the Complaisant man, the Rascal, **the great Talker, the Newsmonger.** (Shand 1914: 97)

I should revisit Theophrastus' *Characters*.

Why is it that all men who love themselves to excess grow 'hard-hearted,' except that the tender emotions have seldom any function to perform in self-love and **atrophy for want of exercise?** The same is also true of **the sympathetic emotions.** In all our affections they are in [] constant demand, because they **give us that insight into the minds of others** which subserves the good we would do to them; whereas in the sentiments we develop toward impersonal objects, such as the inorganic sciences, **the accumulation of wealth, or the increase of our power,** the tender emotions are absent, and **the sympathetic are present only so far as our end requires us to deal with and to understand human beings.** In hatred not only are the sympathetic and tender emotions absent, or only present if at all under exceptional conditions, but they are replaced by the antipathetic emotions. For if our end requires us to injure, to degrade, to give pain, or to destroy life, it is obvious that to rejoice when the hatred object suffers, to suffer when he rejoices, hinders the incoming of those pitiful emotions that would relieve him in the first case and deter us from pursuing his destruction in the second. Shakespeare makes Richard III. say of himself: "Tear-falling pity dwells not in his eye." Again,

even the various forms of self-love have their distinctive emotional organisations. The pleasure-lover, though he may be as egoistic as **the ambitious man**, does not develop pride, and tends to lose what pride he has. **Nothing more hinders the success of sociable entertainments than an arrogant spirit.** Hence it is a law of all society which organises itself for pleasure that **everyone must endeavour to be amiable**; but amiability and haughtiness are incompatible qualities. On the other hand, the proud man requires a firmer will than the pleasure-lover. The one has to sustain his power or superiority in the face of much opposition and enmity; the other requires only the flexible will to seize the moment's pleasure, and to drop it when it is at an end. **The vain man again must display himself because he delights in applause**; he must court it, and feel it sympathetically: but to court admiration would humiliate the proud man. (Shand 1914: 106-107)

Quite possibly one of the most significant passages in this book, again concerning "all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth" (PC 3.3). A deeper analysis is necessary with the context of the rest of this book in mind.

There is another quality we expect from those who love us: loyalty; we expect that they will defend our reputation and not allow it to be questioned in our absence. There are some natures that have not the courage to fulfil this office of friendship - **weak characters who cannot oppose any strong expression of opinion**; who endeavour to prepossess in their own favour all those with whom they are brought into relation; who fear to offend anyone in position or power. Yet here even, and against the natural bent of their characters, love does what it can, and when it fails makes them ashamed of their cowardice. (Shand 1914: 108)

Malinowski yelling out something to the effect of "why have I such a bad character?" comes to mind.

For from the [] earliest times **virtue has been associated in our thought with what is difficult to attainment, vice, on the contrary, with a rapid decline**, as something into which we 'fall' or 'slide.' (Shand 1914: 111-112)

Good conversation is difficult to attain?

Hence in all sentiments that continue to grow or even to maintain themselves, **a second stage tends to occur in which we become conscious of their qualities**, and reflect on them, and strive after them with effort; because we recognise that these qualities are in danger of not advancing with the growth and needs of the sentiment, or of even falling away. From this cause arise **the Ideals of a sentiment**. [...] When we have a great love of anything, it seems as if we could never do enough for it; and what we actually do seems to us too little. And thus from 'devotion,' which is the quality of love in general, as shown in its behaviour, we form the ideal of perfect devotion. And this ideal is not only or principally fostered by sex-love, which has such a strong, egoistic desire of possession, but conspicuously by the mother's love, and also by **the way men 'devote' themselves to some science or art until their life seems absorbed in it, and other sentiments decay from insufficient exercise**. And all the other qualities of sentiments tend to generate ideals of themselves, and thus we have ideals of constancy, courage, sincerity, perseverance, [] patience, and loyalty. And we, who are engrossed in these sentiments, are induced to form these ideals for our own use, not only through experience of the defects of such qualities in ourselves, but also by observing the superior degree in which other men manifest them. For when we are not intent on distinguishing the vices of men, and are well-disposed toward them, we no-

tice the qualities in which they excel ourselves. (Shand 1914: 112-113)

Something for the age of leisure when mankind should be able to pursue such ideals.

For the pursuit of its ideals the sentiment requires certain special and secondary emotions, and which it therefore tends to develop or acquire. These special emotions which, in addition to the primary emotions, it tends to include in its system, are Aspiration, Admiration, and Remorse, Self-reproach or Shame. Thus the hero reads of the great deeds of the heroes of old, and thirsting for glory admires their indomitable courage, their perseverance and resourcefulness, and aspires after these virtues himself; the lover reads poems of love "faithful unto death," and thrilled with admiration aspires after inviolable constancy, truth, and purity; the friend reads stories of true friendship, and aspires after fidelity and companionship; the father, after wisdom, patience, and self-control; **the lover of knowledge, after intellectual conscientiousness, impartiality, and exactitude**; some pursuing a virtue common to the rest, others one peculiar to themselves; but all, where the love is great, urged to the pursuit of some Ideal. And as these emotions excite them to the pursuit, so for their neglect and backsliding are they punished by remorse, self-reproach, or shame. (Shand 1914: 113)

The admirable qualities of the lover of knowledge (the philosopher).

It is because love develops its own duties, ideals, and virtues that we find them in **the social atmosphere around us**, whence they come back to us with a still stronger voice. If often they are first made known to us through **our social environment**, and being suggested to us on all sides, are naturally accepted, yet it is only when we have developed the sentiments to which they belong,

that we feel and adequately realise their obligations.
(Shand 1914: 114)

It is no great leap to identify the interchangeability of "atmosphere" and "environment" but it's still neat to have it down.

That man only who loves knowledge or truth will **feel the wrong of exaggeration, of loose thinking, of careless work**, as well as the duty of precision of thought, of weighing evidence, of proportioning belief to it; and all these duties are summed up in that intellectual conscientiousness which the true thinker alone recognises.
(Shand 1914: 115)

Reminiscent of Peirce's qualms against "loose thinkers".

The **conscience**, though so detached from the private interests of all other sentiments, **has still its limitations**. How much it depends on **the ethics of a man's own age, country, and sex**, with all their defects, is now recognised. Its "prickings" are largely **confine to a man's dealings with members of his own tribe or nation**; its rules are not extended to protect all men; and few of them are taken to include the lower animals. (Shand 1914: 120)

The ethical dimension of the us/them distinction.

If a man has become a liar through **vanity and desire for applause**, the influence of the habit extends to other systems, and induces him to lie, not only to escape detection and punishment, but when no advantage is to be gained by it. (Shand 1914: 121)

Possibly one explanation as to why vanity is a bad quality in an informant.

Various writers emphasise the general **superficiality of the feelings** in the sanguine type, referring to the

qualities of inconstancy, of lack of perseverance, of impulsiveness. (Shand 1914: 132)

Asymmetry of sympathy.

With regard to the phlegmatic temperament: in any given case slowness usually pervades certain processes, but not all. There are men who walk slowly whose minds are quick and active; and when their thoughts are most active and concentrated, their movements are slowest or stop altogether, when not agitated by emotion. There are men who are slow to form resolutions because their minds are quick to foresee consequences that escape other men; or **who are slow of speech because they think before they speak**; or who appears slow of thought because they discern difficulties and contradictions, and exercise self-control to avoid precipitate judgments. All self-control delays action, and, apart from other influences, those are quickest who are the most impulsive. (Shand 1914: 140)

Reminds me of an interviewee who wishes to read the questions and actually think before answering, yielding the best thought out answers.

We say that a man is **silent, reserved and unsocial**, or that he has little capacity for affection, is ungrateful and an infliction to those who love him. Such statements are not scientific; but they have a certain practical value. (Shand 1914: 145)

Taciturnity.

For whereas we find that **able men congregate together, and lawyers and doctors seek each other's society**, because the joy to which they are sensible is to be found along certain lines of activity, **joyous natures feel joy in all company that is not disobliging**; even with dull

people they can feel joy because, being so sensitive, they can extract it from almost anything. (Shand 1914: 151)

Gregariousness and character. It would appear that "the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company" (PC 3.2) is not as universal as Malinowski purports.

When we are in an irascible mood we are disposed to get angry on the smallest pretext, and to find justifications for our anger on all sides. Our sensibility to anger is increased both in range and in delicacy. Things and persons seem contrary. We are ready to blame them [] and to exaggerate their defects. Our judgment becomes warped and valueless. This diffusiveness of the angry mood is accounted for by the fact that the anger to which it disposes us is not aroused in the ordinary way by some external event, but is inwardly excited. **It has therefore no object already formed, but has to form one for himself.** As this object is more or less artificial, and is not in any case the cause, but only a **specious justification of the emotion**, it has little stability; and having fulfilled its function, after a little time gives place to some new object. Thus in an illtempered mood a man complains of his dinner, of the lack of attention he receives, of violations of his orders, of disagreeable people he has met, passing from one of these objects, when its insufficiency is exposed, to some other. For while the mood persists, **if it can find no single object to justify it, a succession of objects must replace that one.** (Shand 1914: 151-152)

Apt. It is also reminiscent of Lotman's discussion of collective fear, which constructs its fearful object artificially.

It would be difficult or impossible to find anyone capable of experiencing in the presence of human beings a joy as broad and impartial as that which some derive from nature, and some poets and artists from their respective arts. For trees and mountains do not frown at us

and treat us as enemies; and **however wide a man's enjoyment of society, it is inhibited by countenances that express an ill disposition toward him.** Toward them, naturally, there tends to be evoked repugnance or anger. Still, we find that **some individuals and nations are by nature so sociable, that they are inclined to feel enjoyment in the presence of most persons,** and this temper in proportion to the breadth of its sensibility, does tend to efface the sorrow that may be occasioned by absence of any one, and to exclude the repugnance that is so marked in morose and misanthropical natures. (Shand 1914: 156)

National characteristics again. Experience tells that even such a naturally joyous person will seek and easily find escape from an extremely morose and irascible company.

In a great many cases **the emotion of joy is instrumental in effecting this connection** in the first instance, because joy directs or holds attention to the object. This is especially clear in such sentiments as those of maternal and of sexual love. The delight of the mother in the presence of her child, of the lover at the sight of his mistress, not only rouses a wave of emotion which is diffused through the whole system or awakens it to activity, but connects or begins to connect it with a particular object. But **joy alone can never form a durable bond**, so as to render us 'attached' to this person rather than to another. (Shand 1914: 158)

Some justification for the critique of the positive bond hypothesis. Just because someone brings us joy does not mean that we're automatically attached to that person. Like that Facebook slogan to the effect that "friendship is made out of unique moments", whereas here and elsewhere it is *constant* association that makes a friendship, as opposed to mere acquaintance.

Sorrow in absence being eliminated, **the momentary connection formed with an object is quickly obliterated**, and nothing is loved because nothing is "missed." (Shand 1914: 159)

Here, "sorrow in absence or disaster is essential to the formation of a durable connection". It's a variation on the theme of *absence makes the heart grow fonder*.

There are other familiar examples. There are **sociable persons who derive an equal enjoyment from the society of many acquaintances**; who day after day seem open to receive this same enjoyment, and go forward to meet it; who number their friends by hundreds, and find them all 'charming'; but for the same reason **have no particular attachment to any one**; who, if they are rich, live for society so that it becomes their chief delight, and to be separated from it their chief affliction; while yet to be separated from any one person involves no appreciable repugnance or affliction. And thus with them **the love of individuals is as superficial as the love of society is lasting**. (Shand 1914: 161)

What is autophobia?

He who **delights in good conversation**, and, like Madame de Sevigné, thinks that there is no joy equal to it, cannot experience it in ordinary company, or with those who lack **animation, wit, and amiability**. And as our special endowment and training here restrict our sensibility to joy, so they render us more sensitive to repugnance from the common members of the class. (Shand 1914: 164)

Note that animation, wit, and amiability are also parts of Mahaffy's treatment of good conversation, though he goes much deeper.

These two uses of the term 'instinctive' are quite consistent with one another. The same conception penetrates both: that that which is instinctive is not **acquired through experience**, but is **due to inherited endowment**. (Shand 1914: 181)

Nature vs. nurture.

We have distinguished three parts in **the system of an emotion**: (1) that part which is **in consciousness** and is alone the felt emotion; (2) that part which is organised **in the body**; (3) and that part which is present **in our behaviour** and accessible to external observation. (Shand 1914: 185)

Thorough. Though, since the first two follow the mind-body dualism, wouldn't the fourth be how the behaviour is interpreted as an expression of emotion in the observer?

It is because the emotional forces are so organised that they constitute systems, and **the results to which their actions are instrumental we shall call their 'ends.'** In this sense the discovery of the 'end' of an emotion or of an instinct is that which alone enables us to interpret its system. It is the same with the organs of the body. Their activities are coordinated to effect certain results. **Their tendencies to effect them are called 'functions,'** and these functions prevail when their systems are not interfered with or deranged. We cannot understand the organs of the body without a knowledge of their functions, nor the emotions without a knowledge of their ends. (Shand 1914: 198)

So much for "aimlessness". A social function must have an end result if it is to be called a function.

By the term 'object' we shall understand that to which the person who feels the emotion refers it, and by the

term 'cause,' some condition, often merely the most conspicuous, [] condition, which has been instrumental in arousing the emotion, and these are perhaps the most usual meanings of these terms. **There are emotions that in this sense are said to be sometimes objectless. We feel fear, and know not why we feel, nor to what to refer it. It is often caused by some pathological state.** Borrow describes how he was afflicted by it after illness. "Oh, how dare I mention," says he, "the dark feeling of mysterious dread which comes over the mind, and which the lamp of reason, though burning bright the while, is unable to dispel!" (Shand 1914: 198-199)

The exact criticism I had of Brentano's system where emotions necessarily must have an object. He, turns out, confused object and cause.

Man, however, as he evolves, invents other ends than the preservation of life, and develops also sentiments directed to them. Besides the love of life he has **the love of power, the love of property, the love of reputation, the love of pleasure.** Besides thinking of the existence of his offspring, he thinks also of their happiness and welfare. Besides loving them, he loves also his friends and country. In all these sentiments the system of fear is an essential constituent. He can fear on behalf of any one of their objects with a strength, which, if it is not equal to the fear of death, is adequate to **the safeguarding of their interests.** (Shand 1914: 206)

Somehow it feels like Shand is glossing over these as carelessly as Malinowski does. Are they elaborated anywhere within the next three hundred pages? As to safeguarding the interests of the group, see Trotter.

In the love of others there is a corresponding variety: parents in fear for their children, shield them not only from injury to their health, but also from injury to their

character, by **excluding dangerous companions and contaminating literature**; and we fear to lose not only the companionship of those we lose, but also **their belief in us, and reciprocating love**; and the last fear leads to a peculiar mode of behaviour: watchfulness over ourselves, correction of defects, appeals for forgiveness. (Shand 1914: 210)

Censorship and respect.

Something acts as an instinctive stimulus of fear, a loud noise, or **a sudden or rapid approach**. (Shand 1914: 211)

A possibility to reroute "the stranger" episode.

And whether it is **the love of wealth, or power, or position, or pleasure**, these objects can in a sense be also unjured or destroyed; and the fears connected with them further their escape from such injury or destruction. (Shand 1914: 212)

These are beginning to form a definite set.

Again, if we take that variety which is characterised by inhibition, in which the proximate end of fear is to do nothing, the ulterior end is still to escape from some event that may, metaphorically speaking, injure or destroy something we love. For instance, **if we fear to speak in public, that may be because we fear to injure or lower our self-valuation, and both pride and vanity recoil from that**. If we fear sometimes to know the truth, that is because the ulterior result may be to injure the high value we attach to someone we love or, where it refers to our own case, to lower our own. (Shand 1914: 212)

Thus "social pleasure and self-enhancement" have an opposite aspect.

The opinion dates only from modern times; and one of the most remarkable differences between ancient and modern writers on the emotions is the denial by the former that fear and anger are primary emotions. They are found neither in the lists of the primary emotions of **Descartes** and of **Spinoza**, nor, to come to more modern times, in those of **Hutcheson** and **Hume**. But these writers except the last, makes no careful attempt to trace fear to the primitive emotions at its source. A curious error runs through all of them. Too much influenced by introspection, they take into account only the later or ideational fears which spring from derise, and overlook the primitive forms aroused by sensations. (Shand 1914: 220)

Spinoza: 'The Ethics,' part iii. 'The Definitions of the Emotions,' xiii. Hutcheson: 'The Nature and the Conduct of the Passions and Affections,' sect. iii. Hume: 'Essays,' 'A Dissertation on the Passions', sect. 1, 3. Compare also 'A Treatise of Human Nature,' book ii., 'Of the Passions,' part iii. sect. ix. Descartes: 'Les Passions de l'Ame,' 'Troisième Partie,' Art. 165.

And he [Hume] proceeds with a fine psychological observation: "The imagination is extremely quick and agile; but the passions, in comparison, are slow and restive: For which reason, in comparison, are slow and restive: For which reason, when any object is presented, which affords a variety of views to the one and emotions to the other, though the fancy may change its views with great **celerity**, each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of passion, but the one passion will always be mixed and confounded with the other. (Shand 1914: 221)

Swiftness of movement.

It is an anger of **ideas and reflection**, and essentially belongs to the sentiment. (Shand 1914: 245)

These two go organically together.

There is an anger which has a still more chilling effect. It is the anger of pride. Like the former it springs in a world of **ideas, reflection, and self-control**, and is dependent on a performed sentiment, - the self-love which is pride. (Shand 1914: 246)

A novel yet unsurprising addition.

To a subtle mind, dealing with **general terms of loose and flexible meanings**, it is easy to force a definition, designed to apply to certain cases, on others that at first had been overlooked. (Shand 1914: 247-249)

From loose thinkers to loose meanings.

Now whether our definition be broad or narrow, it should not be justified by verbal artifice. We must frame it differently according as our purpose is different. It is not wholly a question of truth. **There is not one answer only that is true. There is not even one answer only that is serviceable or fruitful.** But the answer that we give in our theory of the emotion. (Shand 1914: 249)

Truisms abound.

[...] of the sentiment as moderating its intensity or restraining its **irreflective, spontaneous outbursts**, the emotion, as in the case of fear, comes to assume a position of predominant importance, liking together, as it does, a number of instincts and aquired tendencies. (Shand 1914: 252)

The opposite of reflective thought.

The emotion of pathos is sorrowful; but the joy of beauty is fused with it. In the emotion of reverence two emotions with antagonistic tendencies are blended together. (Shand 1914: 256)

Haven't seen that many definitions of pathos. This is only a proximate analogy of phaticity.

But sexual love cannot be separated from self-love, with which it constantly interacts; and it is due to the desire of self-love to possess certain things exclusively for self, such as **women, power, and reputation**, that jealousy principally arises. (Shand 1914: 258)

Not all that different from what Trotter and Freud say about libido. Compare this set (women, power, reputation) with other similar ones in this book. "Women" is most curious, seeming to replace love of wealth.

In other cases the action of love is not clearly implied. Brave men often endanger their own lives for one whom they do not even know. It is sometimes **pity** which induces them to do this, and sometimes **a disinterested fear**. If we see another in a position of danger, as on the border of a precipice, or too near an approaching train, a sudden fear impels us to rush forward and to pull him back. How do we come to feel this disinterested fear? how do we likewise feel disinterested anger if he is wrongfully attacked? how do we come to feel pity for him in his distress? But if the same man who feels **the disinterested fear for a stranger** would also feel disinterested anger on his behalf (if instead of being in imminent danger, he were unjustifiably attacked), and pity if he saw him in bodily suffering, or overtaken by sudden misfortunes - acting in all cases disinterestedly on his behalf, according to the situation, - then there is already present in that man a system of emotional dispositions that, as inferred from its behaviour, cannot be distinguished from love, - **a kind of love for our fellow-men as such, strangers though they be, - a natural humanity** ready to be evoked under exceptional conditions, though **remaining latent in the ordinary situations of life**. This humanity has not indeed the peculiar characteristics of **sex-love, family**

affection, and friendship, which all imply some familiarity with the loved object, and delight in his presence and companionship, and sadness or sorrow in separation from him, and which [] are not only evoked under exceptional conditions; but it is a kind of love that is even more disinterested. In its later and more reflective development, it is called **universal benevolence;** because it shows no partiality for persons, is **not dependent on acquaintanceship, and a reciprocating affection.** (Shand 1914: 266-267)

Here, "the stranger" episode takes a more civilized and realistic turn. It calls to mind the datum that Malinowski was speaking generally about the "primitive" or "a natural man". Note also that he is describing ordinary life whereas this touches upon exceptional circumstances.

And he concludes that "this evil takes its rise from anger; for anger, after it has by long use and indulgence made a man forget mercy, and driven **all feelings of human fellowship** from his mind, passes finally into cruelty. (Shand 1914: 270)

Could do with a bit more specification on those feelings.

Our general assumption and point of view, that all emotional systems are concrete facts and forces of the mind, and not abstract elements torn from their context, affords us **a preliminary basis for distinguishing between pleasure and joy. Pleasure is an element that we abstract from the total fact to which it belongs: joy is one of the facts from which we abstract it.** Joy is a system which indeed contains pleasure, and if there were no pleasure in it, it would not be joy. But joy has other things in its system. To consider first its emotional side, joy is an emotion, and, like all emotions, is an attitude of mind, - a perception or a thought, - not merely sensation; and its perception or thought is pleasant to us. It is only after-

wards, and through psychological analysis, that we discover that pleasant bodily sensation may be also comprised in it. Thus **the joy of meeting a friend** or of looking at some beautiful scene, includes the perception of the object, and the joy of success includes the thought of it. (Shand 1914: 272)

Enlightening. There's "social pleasure" and "to enjoy each other's company", which amounts to the same but something slightly different.

There are many different pleasant states of mind; and these determine **different varieties of joy**. Pleasure enters into work and into rest, into excitement and into peace. Hence there is a joy of work different from the joy of rest, and a joy of peace different from the joys of excitement. **Thinking has its own pleasures of novelty**, of unimpeded advantage, and of achievement, when the mind is fresh and adapted to its work; and these determine **the joys of the intellectual life**. There is a different joy in physical activities, - in those activities which are predominantly muscular, not nervous. (Shand 1914: 276)

Neat in itself, and tangentially connected, again, with the ages of leisure.

Besides these there are many other varieties, as the joys accompanying the satisfaction of the appetites, the aesthetic joys of beauty, and **the joys of laughter**, some being the mere outburst of health and good spirits, others having **the intellectual element of wit or humour**, all conditioned by their respective sensations. For as the sensations of hearing are different from the sensations of vision, so the joy of music is different from the joy of a landscape. Many of these joys are primary, in [] the sense of being underived from one another or any other emotion; others are late products of evolution. Thus, it is possible that man alone possesses a stream of thoughts in

the mind, which he sometimes distinguishes as representing past occurrences, sometimes as representing possible events in the future. Hence the joys which depend on these new activities are themselves new varieties: **the joy of remembering past joys, the joy of anticipating future achievement or happiness; the one consoling the old, the other inspiring the young.** Some of these later joys are secondary to our acquired sentiments, yet have a uniqueness of their own, as the 'cold' joys of self-love, **the joy of meeting an old friend**, the joy of reconciliation with one whom we love, and the joy of being at length at peace with our conscience. (Shand 1914: 277-278)

Probably because Malinowski held a low opinion of his native subjects, laughter and wit are not included in his treatment of their "convivial gregariousness". Here is also one of the earliest I've found (though it probably reaches to antiquity) of man being elevated as the only species capable of retrospection and propection.

Take, for instance, the most quiescent, the joy of rest. Here it is the pleasant state of our body which attracts attention, and gives rise to this sensuous joy or enjoyment. Now if, after our attention had been attracted to the pleasant sensation of the body, joy were not also felt, we should not continue to attend to it, unless some other emotion replaced the joy. Thus, too, the joy of the lover directs his attention to the beloved, so that he "cannot take his eyes off her"; the joy of the miser, to his money; of **the proud to their own superiority or power.** (Shand 1914: 280)

The "attention" component of vanity. This could be elaborated with examples drawn from the frequent (above) set of sentiments that includes power.

There is a second law which belongs neither to fear nor anger: (51) ***Joy tends to maintain the self in its***

present relation to the object. This law is most clearly exemplified in relation to moving objects. Thus if we take delight in the flight of a bird or the motion of water, we follow it with our eyes. For the object quickly passes out of the field of vision if the eyes and body do not turn to follow its movements. Thus we maintain those bodily processes on which the continued attention to the object is dependent. (Shand 1914: 281)

"Don't go."

There is a third law which brings out still more clearly the characteristic tendency of joy. It is this: (52) **Joy tends to maintain the object itself as it is.** On its negative side this law means that in joy we tend **to avoid altering the object.** When enjoying rest we tend to maintain that state of rest, and not to alter the position of our body. When enjoying exercise we tend to maintain that state of exercise, and **avoid changing it** for some other kind of exercise. (Shand 1914: 281)

That is one way of framing the "prolongation", though communicative incompetence seems to be a better explanation.

The enjoyment of the game comprises a series of enjoyments, that do not seem to be felt in those moments in which we feel a strong impulse or striving, but in the moments of complete or partial success; and in **the enjoyment of the exercise or of muscular sensation, of the air, of the novelty, and of the presence and co-operation of other human beings.** And these fuse in retrospect, in our 'enjoyment on the whole.' (Shand 1914: 285)

That we enjoy cooperation rather than mere presence is a valuable addition to the general scheme of things.

For the difference between play and work or 'serious' activities strikes every one. Spencer goes so far as to call

play a **"tendency to superfluous and useless exercise,"** and Groos, for whom it has a very important use, still speaks of it as "an instinct, producing **activity without serious motive.**" (Shand 1914: 287)

Aimlessness. Futility.

The surprising thing in play is that these instincts, so necessary to the satisfaction of the appetites, to anger and the triumph over enemies, to fear and the escape from all kinds of danger, are found **divorced from the practical ends** of these systems, and apparently obtain no others in exchange for them, but are **exercised merely for their own sake.** (Shand 1914: 290)

Themes already quite familiar.

It is not until the desires of this sentiment, - its **desires of union and companionship, and reciprocating [] sympathy and love,** - are felt to be frustrated that the sorrow arises. (Shand 1914: 313-314)

Right keywords with no sensible connection at hand.

We have now considered the system of Sorrow, and the peculiar instinct which belongs to it, and the utility of this instinct, - the only one that could be of service to it in its situation of weakness, - and how, through experience and the growth of the mind, this instinct acquires a more complex behaviour, and how **the expressions of weakness,** - the tears [] and sighs and sobs, - subserve this instinct, and **move even the stranger to pity and disinterested service;** and yet how often all the means at its disposal, original or acquired, are fruitless, because **the situation does not admit of remedy,** or only with time, **so that we call sorrow 'vain.'** (Shand 1914: 317-318)

Greatly fleshing out the asymmetry of sympathy in pity. Sorrow cries are vain because there is nothing the onlooker can possibly do (except express empty condolences).

Are these tendencies instincts? Our answer will depend on **the latitude of meaning** we attach to the term. (Shand 1914: 332)

A turn of phrase I might re-employ.

And people are aware of this; for when they come **into the presence of anyone afflicted with sorrow, they repress the expression of enjoyment**, and replace it by one of sympathy and sadness. (Shand 1914: 336)

I recently met an interesting argument on reddit: on Facebook, people don't adjust this way. You may be financially crushed and depressed to the bottom but your "friends" post their happy vacation pictures from exotic places. In other words, on Facebook people act in ways they would not, were they face-to-face.

It has been usual in modern times to refer this diminution of sorrow to the influence of sympathy. **Sympathy** in this sense means something more than the mere fact that **the emotion of another corresponds with our own**, though even the knowledge of this correspondence tends, as we have seen, to diminish sorrow. But the sympathy referred to means the disinterested use to which such sympathetic emotion is put, as shown by the readiness of the other to afford us help in misfortune. (Shand 1914: 341)

In E. R. Clay's system this is homogeneous sympathy.

Amiel in his Journal represents himself as casting contempt even on his literary ambition: - "The book would be my ambition [...] **if ambition were not vanity, and vanity of vanities.**" (Shand 1914: 354)

'Journal Intime," quoted by Matthew Arnold, 'Essays in Criticism.'

We commonly distinguish between **intrinsic value and value in use**. There are many things which we only value so far as they are **instrumental to other things**, the furniture of our house, the house itself, health, and even money and power, so far as we do not come to love them. But there are other **things that we value intrinsically because we love them**: our friends, our family, our country. And these two kinds of value, though we distinguish them in analysis, are often united in the same things; and it is a great art of life so to combine them. If workmen are only regarded as instruments, their relation to their employers and social life in general are not likely to be harmonious; but the sentiment of respect confers on them intrinsic value. The craftsmen of the past knew how to impart a charm and beauty to the common utensils of life, and thus gave them an intrinsic value beyond their utility. (Shand 1914: 354b)

A rather primitive theory of value. Recording it in case I should ever take up Morris' other works, particularly those dedicated to value. At base, this is a serviceable distinction for differentiating between aimlessness and social functioning.

We may say that in joy there is present **an implicit valuation of its object**. The tendency of joy to maintain the union with its object implies that this object is valued; and this judgment of valuation, where the mental development is adequate, may always be elicited. The diffused enjoyment due to good health and youth, in making us enjoy even common things, makes us value human life. (Shand 1914: 355)

"Prolonging", thus, contains this element of valuation, of maintaining something intrinsically valuable.

Our natural tendency in respect of things and persons to which we are indifferent is to withdraw attention from them, and not to trouble to form judgments about them; but they are often thrust upon us, and then we **exchange indifference for repugnance or contempt.** Thus when dull persons and places surround us, we abuse them as 'wretched,' 'poor,' 'mean,' 'insignificant,' '**worthless,**' - terms which, in opposition to those which belong to the natural exclamation of joy, indicate that a very low or even a negative value is attributed to their objects. (Shand 1914: 356)

Highly significant for understanding the "pejorative" aspect of PC, that it is a mode of communication which is "thrust upon us" and from which there is little escape. See, for example, "The Phatic Man".

Nothing is commoner than **to hear sorrow spoken of by some as vain and useless,** and as the source of all that is best in us by others. (Shand 1914: 361)

Phraseology

"Scar'd at thy frown terrific, fly
Self-pleasing Folly's idle brood,
With Laughter, noise, and thoughtless Joy
And leave us leisure to be good."

(Shand 1914: 364)

From [Thomas Gray's "Hymn to Adversity"](#).

And, as in the first sorrows of love, which pass when the presence so much desired is restored to us, so sorrow, having formed a new **bond of union,** is effaced or mitigated, In "In Memoriam," Tennyson has returned to this problem. (Shand 1914: 366)

Present but meaningless.

Here we see the wisdom of sorrow is refusing consolation according to the way of the world. For love, accepting its suffering, triumphing over self-love that desires relief from pain, at length, through its sorrow, establishes a new **union of thought** in place of **the sensuous union**, and that which is lacking now it hopes to recover hereafter. (Shand 1914: 366)

What?

For everything that is derived for self, - **existence, wealth, power, reputation, pleasure, and happiness**, - when lost, is loved the more; and its value for self is enhanced, so far as the sorrow at the loss is strong and persistent. (Shand 1914: 367)

This set keeps on shrinking and expanding.

Pride and vanity, - though here we cannot enter upon any analysis of them, **are always concerned with self-valuation**; and sorrow, because it forces a man to recognise his weakness, and urges him to appeal for help, is a profound humiliation for pride. Yet, **loving power and position**, pride must be affected with sorrow, as well as humiliation, at their loss; and if the loss cannot be remedied, sorrow and humiliation persist. How can that **self-valuation**, which is the single preoccupation of pride, be restored? Envy is one solution of the problem. All valuations are relative; and if a man cannot regain his ascendancy, he may secretly aim at **depreciating others**. (Shand 1914: 368)

One possibility as to why "ordinary gossip" is detestable. There is much here that could be developed further.

Enough! we cry out to **the man who repeats again and again the same statement**. Enough! we say in dis-

gust with the factitious amusements which society pours upon us, and turn away for relief to Nature. (Shand 1914: 382)

Stahp.

It is a noteworthy fact that we have no single term to express this emotion, but rather a variety of terms of which we sometimes employ one, sometimes another, according to the situation. These terms are 'displeasure,' 'distaste,' '**antipathy**,' 'aversion,' '**repugnance**,' 'repulsion,' and even sometimes '**dislike**,' where we employ it to express an immediate feeling that we have sometimes in the presence of certain persons and things. (Shand 1914: 396)

Reading this at a time when Youtube is considering removing the dislike button because their rewind video is the most downvoted video on the site. Facebook was wise enough to not even offer an option to express this emotion.

So also people whom we have met, and with whom we have felt ourselves embarrassed, and unable **to engage in an easy conversation**, or people whom we see frequently in some club or other public place without ever accosting, it displeases us to meet again; so that we feign not to recognise them or get away as soon as we can. (Shand 1914: 399)

Avoidance. We cannot engage in easy conversation on such occasions because of psychological interference.

But the term 'antipathy' has another employment to which we shall here confine it. It suggests the opposite of all sympathetic emotions, and its range is coextensive with them. For if **in sympathy there is identity of feeling between two persons**, here there is opposition or an-

tagonism. It is perhaps for this reason that antipathy suggests hate? (Shand 1914: 401)

Thus, "an incidental disagreement [...] creates the bonds of antipathy" (PC 5.3).

From this point of view we cannot confuse the difference between **desiring fame, desiring power, and desiring money**, however alike they are in respect of their impulses. (Shand 1914: 441)

Yet again this set is malleable, even in its descriptors - whereas above they are sentiments, here they are desires.

Inexplicable things and events are the natural objects of astonishment and wonder: **new things, to children and the less reflective minds; old things, to the most thoughtful**. (Shand 1914: 447)

Compare with similar statements concerning the young and the old, above.

If, for instance, we desire **wealth, or power, or fame**, we alternate from time to time between hope and anxiety; we are sometimes confident; we are liable to despondency and despair. (Shand 1914: 462)

Why won't they stand still?

"**Confidence**," La Rouchefoucauld remarks, "**supplies more to conversation than does intellect**." "So soon as you feel confidence in yourself, you know the art of life," observes Goethe. "Reputation," says Alfred de Vigny, "has only one good point, it allows a man to have confidence in himself, and to speak his thought." (Shand 1914: 484)

Interesting suggestions. Though gut feeling says that there are probably better ways to approach the rather complicated matter of renown and its psychological aspects.

Only gradually, and by the accumulation of fresh facts, can all the conditions be brought to light, and successively interpreted. To deal with all of them together, even were they known, might be a problem too complicated for the human mind. Here our method must be that of a **slow advance from the abstract to the concrete, dealing first with those problems which are simplest, and abstracting from many of the operative conditions, until at length we are able to interpret those dynamical relations which are the most complex.** And this seems to be the method which the human mind naturally adopts. (Shand 1914: 504)

Good advice.

The impulse for activity is satisfied by the kind of activity we have found for it. Besides this impulse, there is in an addition a conscious desire which is directed not to this activity as its end, but to some ulterior results to which this activity is instrumental. **We do not care to walk for the sake of walking; and if there is no place to which we must go, we still choose one that will furnish an 'object' for our walk.** Nor do we care to exert our minds without having some aim in view; or, rather, we do not call it exercise unless we have one; since the mind, when awake, is always in some degree active. We must read a book, or, as in day-dreaming, imagine that our desires are fulfilled, or attempt to solve some of the intellectual difficulties that oppress us. (Shand 1914: 513)

Can the same be said of our talk?

And in most cases there is something of both earnest and play; and we remind ourselves in defeat that it is only

a game, and that its end is the exercise, enjoyment, and recreation we have obtained. But the law of these mixed cases appears to be that (143) *In all games, **the less we desire the end, the more we can enjoy the means.*** (Shand 1914: 517)

Very well put, and speaks deeply to the issue of aimlessness.

Yet there are some desires so important that they seem to furnish **the chief characteristics of a man**, as the desire of fame, of power, or of wealth. (Shand 1914: 519)

Pretty bold.

Trotter, Wilfred 1921. *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.
London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd.

Sociology has, of course, often been described as social psychology and has been regarded as differing from ordinary psychology in being [] concerned with **those forms of mental activity which man displays in his social relations**, the assumption being made that society brings to light a special series of mental aptitudes with which ordinary psychology, dealing as it does essentially, with the individual, is not mainly concerned. (Trotter 1921: 11-12)

A reminder that social psychology is still about mental phenomena, applied on special material, "man in society or associated man" (*ibid*, 11).

It is suggested here that the sense of the [] unimaginable complexity and variability of human affairs is derived less than is generally supposed from direct observation and more from this second factor of introspectual interpretation which may be called a kind of anthropomorphism. A reaction against this in human psychology is no less necessary therefore than was in comparative psychology the similar movements the extremer developments of which are associated with the names of Bethe, Beer, **Uexküll** and Nuel. (Trotter 1921: 13-14)

The unexpected Uexküll.

Many attempts have been made to explain the behaviour of man as dictated by instinct. He is, in fact, moved by the promptings of such **obvious instincts as self-preservation, nutrition, and sex** enough to render the enterprise hopeful and its early spoils enticing. So much can be easily be generalized under these three impulses that the temptation to declare that all human behaviour could be resumed under them was irresistible. These early triumphs of materialism soon, however, began to be

troubled by doubt. **Man, in spite of his obvious duty to the contrary, would continue so often not to preserve himself, not to nourish himself and to prove resistant to the blandishments of sex,** that the attempt to squeeze his behaviour into these three categories began to involve an increasingly obvious and finally intolerable amount of pushing and pulling, as well as so much pretence that he was altogether "in," [] when, quite plainly, so large a part of him remained "out," that the enterprise had to be given up, and it was once more discovered that man escaped and must always escape any complete generalization by science. (Trotter 1921: 16-17)

Harkening back to Nietzsche and Dostoevsky on man's ability to act contrary to his self-interests.

But little examination will show that the animals whose conduct it is difficult to generalize under the three primitive instinctive categories are **gregarious**. If then it can be shown that gregariousness is of a biological significance approaching in importance that of the other instincts, we may expect to find in it the source of these anomalies of conduct, and if we can also show [] that **man is gregarious**, we may look to it for the definition of the unknown "x" which might account for the complexity of human behaviour. (Trotter 1921: 17-18)

Hence the fourth, social, instinct.

One of the most familiar attitudes was that which regarded **the social instinct** as a late development. The family was looked upon as the primitive unit; from it developed the tribe, and by **the spread of family feeling to the tribe** the social instinct arose. It is interesting that the psychological attack upon this position has been anticipated by sociologists and anthropologists, and that it is already being recognized that **an undifferentiated**

horde rather than the family must be regarded as the primitive basis of human society. (Trotter 1921: 21)

Freud (1922), too, concludes that the primal horde was probably more important than the tribe.

The case for **the primitiveness of the social habit** would seem to be still further strengthened by a consideration of such **widely aberrant developments as speech and the æsthetic activities**, but a discussion of them here would involve an unnecessary indulgence of biological speculation. (Trotter 1921: 23)

With regard to the similarities between the phatic and the aesthetic functions, it would have been of great help if this "aberration" was more fleshed out.

It is of course clear that no complete review of all that has been said concerning a conception so familiar can be attempted here, and, even if it were possible, it would not be a profitable enterprise, as **the great bulk of writers have not seen in the idea anything to justify a fundamental examination of it**. What will be done here, therefore, will be to mention a few representative writers who have dealt with the subject, and to give in a summary way the characteristic features of their exposition. (Trotter 1921: 23)

Phraseology.

For example may be mentioned the famous antithesis of the "cosmical" and the "ethical" processes expounded in Huxley's Romanes Lectures. It was quite definitely indicated by Pearson that **the so-called ethical process, the appearance, that is to say, of altruism**, is to be regarded as a directly instinctive product of gregariousness, and as natural, therefore, as any other instinct. (Trotter 1921: 24)

The appearance of altruism is another topic subsumed under the more obvious issues involved in phatic communion. It surfaces most obviously in "the communion of food".

"This [...] if it be not an instinct, is at least the human homologue of animal instinct, and served the same purpose *after the instincts had chiefly disappeared*, and when the egotistic reason would otherwise have rapidly carried the race to destruction in its mad pursuit of **pleasure for its own sake**." (Ward 1903: 134) (Trotter 1921: 25)

Quoted from [Lester Ward's Pure Sociology \(1903\)](#).

That gregariousness has to be considered amongst [] the factors shaping the tendencies of the human mind has long been recognized by the more empirical psychologists. In the main, however, it has been regarded as a **quality perceptible only in the characteristics of actual crowds** - that is to say, assemblies of persons being and acting in association. This conception has served to evoke a certain amount of valuable work in the observation of the behaviour of crowds. (Trotter 1921: 25-26)

With footnoted reference, of course, to Gustave Le Bon's *The Crowd*.

There is, however, one exception, in the case of the work of Boris Sidis. In a book entitled "The Psychology of Suggestion" he has described certain psychical qualities as necessarily associated with the social habit in the individual as in the crowd. His position, therefore, demands some discussion. The fundamental element in it is the conception of the normal existence in the mind of a sub-conscious self. This subconscious or subwaking self is regarded as embodying the "lower" and more obviously brutal qualities of man. **It is irrational, imitative, credulous, cowardly, cruel, and lacks all individuality, will, and self-control**. This personality takes the place of the normal personality during hypnosis and when the indi-

vidual is one of an active crowd, as, for example, in riots, panics, lynchings, revivals, and so forth. (Trotter 1921: 26)

Never heard of it, though the argument is fully compatible with Freud's generalities about crowds.

In interpreting into mental terms the consequences of gregariousness, we may conveniently begin with the simplest. **The conscious individual will feel an unanalysable primary sense of comfort in the actual presence of his fellows, and a similar sense of discomfort in their absence.** It will be obvious truth to him that it is not good for the man to be alone. Loneliness will be a real terror, insurmountable by reason. (Trotter 1921: 31)

The full statement from which "the strange and unpleasant tension" appears to be abstracted.

It would seem that the obstacles to rational thought which have been pointed out in the foregoing discussion have received much less attention than should have been directed towards them. To maintain an attitude of mind which could be called scientific in any complete sense, it is of cardinal importance to recognize that **belief of affirmations sanctioned by the herd is a normal mechanism of the human mind**, and goes on however much such affirmations may be opposed by evidence, that reason cannot enforce belief against herd suggestion, and finally that totally false opinions may appear to be holder of them to possess all the characters of rationally verifiable truth, and may be justified by secondary processes of rationalization which it may be impossible directly to combat by argument. (Trotter 1921: 39)

Quite possibly the source of "emphasis on affirmation and consent". The preceding discussion bears some likeness to the later concept of cognitive dissonance and directly calls forth "rationalization", one of the means for reducing cognitive dissonance.

It is obvious that **when free communication is possible by speech**, the expressed approval or disapproval of the herd will acquire the qualities of identity or dissociation from the herd respectively. To know that he is doing what would arouse the disapproval of the herd will bring to the individual the same profound sense of discomfort which would accompany actual physical separation, while to know that he is doing what the herd would approve will give him the sense of rightness, of gusto, and of stimulus which would accompany physical presence in the herd and response to its mandates. In both cases it is clear that no actual expression by the herd is necessary to arouse the appropriate feelings, which would come from within and have, in fact, the qualities which are recognized in the dictates of conscience. Conscience, then, and the feelings of guilt and of duty are the peculiar possessions of the gregarious animal. (Trotter 1921: 40)

Something along the lines of Adam Smith's omniscient observer. The role of speech is here somewhat underpronounced. Does the "herd" first express its approval and disapproval, and the agent store these in his mind, or are they more like imagined responses? In the latter case it could be tied in with Mead's contemporaneous discussion of the generalized other, in the former with the foregoing discussion of tradition and Clay's definition of custom.

With the social animal controlled by herd instinct it is not the actual deed which is instinctively done, but the order to do it which is instinctively obeyed. **The deed, being ordained from without, may actually be unpleasant**, and so be resisted from the individual side and yet be forced instinctively into execution. (Trotter 1921: 48)

The gregarious instinct, thus, is distinct from other instincts. Though one could argue that self-preservation, nutrition, and sex are not absolutely and at all times pleasant (think of the anorexic's aversion to food, the celibate's aversion to sex, and the recent case

of a man on death row hanging himself because his due date was constantly delayed).

Thus far we have seen that the conflict between herd suggestion and experience is associated with the appearance of the great **mental type** which is commonly called **normal**. Whether or not it is in fact to be regarded as such is comparatively unimportant and obviously a question of statistics; what is, however, of an importance impossible to exaggerate is the fact that in this type of mind personal satisfactoriness or adequacy, or, as we may call it, mental comfort, is attained at the cost of an attitude towards experience which greatly affects the value to the species of the activities of minds of this type. **This mental stability, then, is to be regarded as, in certain important directions, a loss; and the nature of the loss resides in a limitation of outlook, a relative intolerance of the new in thought, and a consequent narrowing of the range of facts over which satisfactory intellectual activity is possible.** We may, therefore, for convenience, refer to this type as **the resistive**, a name which serves as a reminder of the exceedingly important fact that, [] however "normal" the type may be, it is one which falls far short of the possibilities of the human mind. (Trotter 1921: 55-56)

The normal mental type is resistant to new information. In this light, Malinowski didn't necessarily have to regard the peoples he spoke about as unintelligent, merely "normal".

When the twenty years just past come to be looked back upon from the distant future, it is probable that their chief claim to interest will be that they saw the birth of the science of abnormal psychology. (Trotter 1921: 56)

Nope. That's not my chief aim and I associate abnormal psychology with William James' British contemporaries.

The success and extent of such development clearly depend on the relation of two series of activities in the individual which may in the most general way be described as **the capacity for varied reaction** and the capacity for communication. The process going on in the satisfactorily developing gregarious animal is the moulding of the varied reactions of the individual into functions beneficial to him only indirectly through the welfare of the new unit - the herd. (Trotter 1921: 61)

The capacity for varied reaction is the exact opposite of mechanization.

What I have called the primitive method of psychological inquiry is also the obvious and natural one. It takes man as it finds him, accepts his mind for what it professes to be, and examines into its processes by **introspection** of a direct and simple kind. It is necessarily subject to the conditions that **the object of study is also the medium through which the observations are made**, and that **there is no objective standard** by which the accuracy of transmission through this medium can be estimated and corrected. (Trotter 1921: 68)

Like Ruesch says, intrapersonal communication on its own has no means of reality check.

In the two earlier essays of this book I attempted to show that the essential specific characteristic of the mind of the gregarious animal is this very capacity **to confer upon herd opinion the psychical energy of instinct**. (Trotter 1921: 82)

It may be argued that this is exactly what Malinowski performs with regard to the opinion of social intercourse shared throughout the Western world.

The actual amount of mental activity which accompanies an instinctive process is very variable; it may be quite small, and then **the subject of it is reduced to a mere automaton**, possessed, as we say, by an ungovernable passion such as panic, lust, or rage; it may be quite large, and sometimes the subject, deceived by his own rationalizations and suppressions, may suppose himself to be a fully rational being in undisputed possession of free will and the mastery of his fate at the very moment when he is showing himself to be **a mere puppet** dancing to the strings which Nature, unimpressed by his valiant airs, relentlessly and impassively pulls. (Trotter 1921: 95)

Or, in the extreme, "nearly the whole of the practical life of man is, has been, and, for an indefinite time to come, threatens to be, transacted by an unconscious force or agent, - that we have been puppets, not personal agents - dupes as well as puppets - and, in view of the prevalence of wretchedness in human life, victims" (Clay 1882).

Once started, however imperfectly, the new habit will have a natural tendency to progress towards **fuller forms of sociality** by reason of special selective forces which it inevitably sets going. The fact that it is valuable to the species in which it develops even in its most larval forms, [] combined with its tendency to progress, no doubt accounts for the wonderful series of **all degrees of gregariousness which the field of natural history presents**. (Trotter 1921: 102-103)

Gregariousness in nature. Something De Laguna and La Barre develop further, mostly towards other primates with regard to vocalizations.

I have pointed out elsewhere that the fundamental biological meaning of gregariousness is that it allows of an indefinite enlargement of the unit upon which the undifferentiated influence of natural selection is allowed to act, so that **the individual merged in the larger unit is**

shielded from the immediate effects of natural selection and is exposed directly only to the special form of selection which obtains within the new unit. (Trotter 1921: 103)

This jibes with the "domestication" of the human animal La Barre speaks of as culture, and possibly Nietzsche on society (concerning asceticism in *Morals*).

In essence the significance of the passage from the solitary to the gregarious seems to be closely similar to that of the passage from the unicellular to the multicellular organism - an enlargement of the unit exposed to natural selection, a shielding of the individual cell from that pressure, an endowment of it with **freedom to vary and specialize in safety**. (Trotter 1921: 103)

Organicism. Also, "Ages of Leisure" (Lloyd 1922) got me thinking if the 21st century might not fulfil the expectations of a century ago, of futuristic teleautomatics doing humanity's work and giving the human species freedom from physical toil. Will the coming era see more people like me who like a nearly aescetic life, lived for the purpose of specializing in something very minute? Will there be a time when most adults are not only literate but published and self-publishing authors? Is this science presumption?

The varying degrees to which **the social habit** has developed among different animals provide a very interesting branch of study. The class of insects is remarkable in furnishing an almost inexhaustible variety of stages to which the instinct is developed. Of these that reached by the humble bee, with its small, weak families, is a familiar example of a low grade; that of the wasp, with its colonies large and strong, but unable to survive the winter, is another of more developed type; while that of the honey bee represents a very high grade of development in which the instinct seems to have completed its cycle and

yielded to the hive the maximum advantages of which it is capable. **In the honey bee, then, the social instinct may be said to be complete.** (Trotter 1921: 104)

Social habit and social instinct are the terms by which this discussion is preceded in *Mind* and the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* the latter decades of the 19th century. The honey bee has complete social instinct because it's a mindless drone, so to say. This discussion might turn productive in discussing the mechanization, routinization or fossilization of communicative signs in both animal and man (e.g. Darwin and his *Expressions*).

The analogy is helpful in the consideration of the mechanisms brought into play by the social habit. **The community of the honey bee bears a close resemblance to the body of a complex animal.** The capacity for actual structural specialization of the individuals in the interests of the hive has been remarkable and has gone far, while at the same time co-ordination has been stringently enforced, so that **each individual is actually absorbed into the community**, expends all its activities therein, and when excluded from it is almost as helpless as a part of the naked flesh of an animal detached from its body. (Trotter 1921: 105)

More on the Leviathan.

Nevertheless, it is not altogether valueless as a hint of what **social unity** might effect in an animal of larger mental life. There can be little doubt that the perfection to which the **communal life** of the bee has attained is dependent on the very smallness of the mental development of which the individuals are capable. Their **capacity to assimilate experience** is necessarily from their structure, and is known by experience to be, small and their path is marked out so plainly by actual physical modifications that the almost miraculous absorption of the worker in the hive is after all perhaps natural enough. If

she were able to assimilate general experience on a larger scale, to react freely and appropriately to stimuli external to the hive, there can be little doubt that the community would show a less concentrated efficiency than it does today. The standard miracle of the bee - her sensitiveness to the voice of the hive and **her capacity to communicate with her fellows** - would undoubtedly be less marvelously perfect if she were not at the same time deaf to all other voices. (Trotter 1921: 107)

Social union (Spencer). Convivial gregariousness (Malinowski). With the assimilation of experience, we're reaching something like a collective *Umwelt*, or group mind, in the hive - brought about by the bee's system of communication (dance, here "voice"). Assimilation, though, likens to central processing in Ruesch's scheme; it's a question about whether the hive can "think" or, to parrot N. Tesla on self-driving cars, perform something analogous to judgment (Ruesch's evaluation).

Among the mammalia other than man and possibly apes and monkeys, **gregariousness** is found in two broadly distinguishable types according to the function it subserves. It may be either **protective** as in the sheep, the deer, the ox, and the horse, **or aggressive** as in the wolf and allied animals. (Trotter 1921: 108)

These grand distinctions are exactly what I'm after. Phatics counterbalanced by minus-phatics.

The quite fundamental characteristic of the social mammal, as of the bee, is **sensitiveness to the voice of his fellows**. He must have **the capacity to react** fatally and without hesitation to an impression coming to him from the herd, and he must react **in a totally different way** to impressions coming to him from without. In the presence of danger his first motion must be, not to fly or to attack as the case may be, but to notify the herd. This

characteristic is beautifully demonstrated in the low growl of a dog will give at **the approach of a stranger**. This is obviously in no way part of the dog's programme of attack upon his enemy - when his object is intimidation he bursts into barking - but his first duty is to put the pack on its **guard**. Similarly the start of the sheep is a **notification** and precedes any motion of flight. (Trotter 1921: 108-109)

This here is the original "the stranger"; not the Dave Chapelle skit on Lil Jon but the case of reacting to the approach of a stranger. This sensitiveness to the voice one's fellows is transformed in Malinowski's essay into the border separating speech communities: whether the stranger speaks the same language as you and responds properly to customary formulae of greeting and approach. In Freud the issue is far too psychoanalysed, as if trying to rationalize why the company of a stranger is not as easy as the company of fellows. The "guard" calls forth association with "being on guard" in unfamiliar company and "letting one's guard down" around strangers; and "notification" calls forth acknowledgment and propitiation (also, for some reason, the case of every person in an enclosed social setting giving a quick glance to register newcomers, as when entering a bar, for example).

In order that the individual shall be sensitive in a special degree to **the voice of the herd**, he must have developed in him an infallible capacity for **recognizing his fellow-members**. In the low mammalia this seems almost exclusively **a function of the sense of smell**, as is natural enough since that sense is as a general rule highly developed in them. The domestic dog shows admirably the importance of the function of recognition in his species. Comparatively few recognize even their masters at any distance by sight or sound, while obviously with their fellows they are practically dependent on smell. The extent to which the ceremonial of recognition has developed in

the dog is, of course, very familiar to every one. It shows unmistakable evidence of the rudiments of social organization, and is not the less illuminating to the student of human society for having **a bodily orientation and technique which at first sight obscures its resemblance to similar, and it is supposed more dignified, mechanisms in man.** (Trotter 1921: 109)

Ah! He is talking of sensations of bodily attributes, such as "the bad odour and flavour which a disordered digestion sometimes occasions" (Clay 1882: 6). The outcome is a rather rude comparison: human formulae of greeting and approach are no less natural than dogs sniffing each others' buttoholes. The difference lies in our recognizing members of our social groups by a variety of semiotic means, including sight, sound, and even tactile interactions (when secret hand-shakes are involved).

Among qualities of restrictive specialization are inability to live satisfactorily apart from the herd or some substitute for it, **the liability to loneliness**, a dependence on leadership, custom, and tradition, **a credulity towards the dogmas of the herd** and an unbelief towards external experience, **a standard of conduct** no longer determined by personal needs but **influenced by a power outside the ego** - a conscience, in fact, and a sense of sin - a weakness of personal initiative and a distrust of its promptings. Expansive specialization, on the other hand, gives the gregarious animal **the sense of power and security in the herd**, the capacity to respond to the call of the herd with a maximum output of energy and endurance, **a deep-seated mental satisfaction in unity with the herd**, and a solution in it of personal doubts and fears. (Trotter 1921: 109-110)

A whole jumble of associations. The closest analogy would be the suggestion that positive emotions are related to belonging and negative emotions with isolation.

All these characters can be traced in an animal such as the dog. **The mere statement of them, necessarily in mental terms, involves the liability to a certain inexactitude** if it is not recognized that **no hypothesis as to the consciousness of the dog is assumed but that the description in mental terms is given** because of its convenient brevity. **An objective description of the actual conduct on which such summarized statements are founded would be impossibly voluminous.** (Trotter 1921: 110)

Orgiastic. *Orgita ohkas täis targutuse peale*. This is the most general statement of the problems I'm dealing with. Malinowski's use of early social psychology terminology (sympathy and sentiments) glosses over large issues, such as "primitive mentality" and the communication of ideas, that a clear elucidation of all of them will necessarily have to be voluminous. The best hypothesis I currently have is that he merely concretized aspects of conversation and communication that were floating around everywhere at the time. I hope to show, in due course, that "phatic communion" was merely his contribution to a discussion diffusely held throughout the field of social psychology at the time, and in many ways still going on today.

Protective gregariousness confers on the flock or herd advantages perhaps less obvious but certainly not less important. A very valuable gain is the increased efficiency of vigilance which is possible. Such efficiency depends on the available number of actual watchers and the exquisite sensitiveness of the herd and all its members to the signals of such **sentries**. No one can have watched a herd of sheep for long without being impressed with **the delicacy with which a supposed danger is detected, transmitted throughout the herd, and met by an appropriate movement.** (Trotter 1921: 110)

Sentries - censors - translation blocks - bifurcation points. Detection, transmission, and reaction also describe the actions of a new text in the semiosphere.

Another advantage enjoyed by the new unit is a practical solution of the difficulties incident upon **the emotion of fear**. Fear is essentially an enfeebling passion, yet in the sheep and such animals it is necessarily developed to a high degree in the interests of safety. The danger of this specialization is neutralized by the implication of so large a part of the individual's personality in the herd and outside of himself. Alarm becomes a passion, as it were, of the herd rather than of the individual, and **the appropriate response by the individual is to an impulse received from the herd and not directly from the actual object of alarm**. It seems to be in this way that the paralysing emotion of fear is held back from the individual, while its effects can reach him only as the active and formidable passion of panic. The gregarious herbivora are in fact timid but not fearful animals. All the various mechanisms in which the social habit shows itself apparently have as their general function a maximal sensitiveness to danger of the herd as a whole, combined with **maintaining with as little interruption as possible an atmosphere of calm** within the herd, so that the individual members can occupy themselves in the serious business of grazing. (Trotter 1921: 111)

The social semiotics of fear and maintaining "a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse" (PC 9.4).

When we come to consider man we find ourselves faced at once by some of the most interesting problems in **the biology of the social habit**. It is probably **not necessary now to labour the proof of the fact that man is a gregarious animal in literal fact**, that he is as essentially gregarious as the bee and the ant, the sheep, the ox, and the horse. **The issue of characteristically gregarious re-**

actions which his conduct presents furnishes incontestable proof of this thesis, which is thus an indispensable clue to an inquiry into the intricate problems of human society. (Trotter 1921: 112)

I am cocksured that some great thinkers have laboured such proofs profusely, and knowledge of such contentions would greatly advance our knowledge of those intricate problems of human society. Trotter's book, thus far, has proved itself as a highlight between Ma-linowski's phaticity and earlier discussions about such matters.

1. He is intolerant and fearful of solitude, physical or mental. This intolerance is the cause of the mental fixity and intellectual incuriousness, which, to a remarkable degree for an animal with so capacious a brain, he constantly displays. As is well known, **the resistance to a new idea is always primarily a matter of prejudice, the development of intellectual objections, just or otherwise; being a secondary process in spite of the common delusion to the contrary**. This intimate dependence on the herd is traceable not merely in matters physical and intellectual, but also betrays itself in the deeper recesses of personality as **a sense of incompleteness which compels the individual to reach out towards some larger existence than his own, some encompassing being in whom his perplexities may find a solution and his longing peace**. Physical loneliness and intellectual isolation are effectually solaced by **the nearness and agreement of the herd**. The deeper personal necessities cannot be met - at any rate, in such society as has so far been evolved - by **so superficial a union**; the capacity for intercommunication is still too feebly developed to bring the individual into **complete and soul-satisfying harmony with his fellows**, to convey from one to another

Thoughts hardly to be packed
Into a narrow act,

Fancies that broke through language and escaped.

Religious feeling is therefore a character inherent in the very structure of the human mind, and is the expression of a need which must be recognized by the biologist as neither superficial nor transitory. (Trotter 1921: 113)

This is the first "more obvious gregarious character" (*ibid*) displayed by man. (1) "There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company" (PC 3.2) and the crowd of course lowers the intellectual level of its constituents, as Freud put it; (2) in free, social intercourse, the speaker affirms the traditions of the herd and rationalizes its aversions to new ideas; (3) we enjoy each other's company and in some sense gain our life-purpose (or, as some would say, life-illusion) from the herd; (4) to be agreeable in conversation is a priority shared throughout the Western world; (5) yet free, social intercourse is aimless and not about the exchange of ideas, thus; (6) unsatisfying or disagreeable (for some); (7) therefore its collective effervescence is a religious affair, a ritual, which; (8) must be recognized as universal.

As long as such a system is compelled to ignore, to depreciate, or to deny the reality of such manifestly important phenomena as **the altruistic emotions, the religious needs and feelings, the experiences of awe and wonder and beauty, the illumination of the mystic, the rapture of the prophet, the unconquerable endurance of the martyr**, so long must it fail in its claims to universality. It is therefore necessary to lay down with the strongest emphasis the proposition that the religious needs and feelings of man are a direct and necessary manifestation of the inherence of instinct with which he is born, and therefore **deserve consideration as respect-**

ful and observation as minute as any other biological phenomenon. (Trotter 1921: 114)

The poetry of content and the content of poetry. Some support for the hunch that a phatic examination of the process of religious proselytization (in *Älskade Terrorist* or *Prohvet Maltsvet*) would be more profitable, in terms of analytic insights, than any other possible course.

2. He is more sensitive to **the voice of the herd** than to any other influence. It **can inhibit or stimulate** his thoughts and conduct. It **is the source of his moral codes, of the sanctions of his ethics and philosophy.** It can endow him with energy, courage, and endurance, and can as easily take these away. [] It **can make him acquiesce** in his own punishment and embrace his executioner, submit to poverty, bow to tyranny, and sink without complaint under starvation. Not merely can it make him accept hardship and suffering unrestingly, but it **can make him accept as truth the explanation that his perfectly preventable afflictions are sublimely just and gentle.** It is in this acme of the power of herd suggestion that is perhaps the most absolutely incontestable proof of the profoundly gregarious nature of man. (Trotter 1921: 114-115)

The power of discourse. Accepting explanation = ideology. The voice of the herd can make you love the big brother.

3. He is subject to **the passions of the pack** in his mob violence and the passions of the herd in his panics. These activities are by no means limited to the outbursts of actual crowds, but are to be seen equally clearly in **the hue and cry of newspapers** and public after some notorious criminal or scapegoat, and in the success of scaremongering by the same agencies. (Trotter 1921: 115)

Emotional contagion in Freud. The quip about newspapers remains true today with fake news, clickbait and moral panics. Recently in Estonia, the Eesti 200 political party effectively memed up a bus stop advertisement that rustled a lot of jimmies ("Estonians stand here" and "Russians stand here").

4. He is remarkably **susceptible to leadership**. This quality in man may very naturally be thought to have a basis essentially rational rather than instinctive if its manifestations are not regarded with a special effort to attain an objective attitude. **How thoroughly reasonable it appears that a body of men seeking a common object should put themselves under the guidance of some strong and expert [] personality who can point out the path most profitably to be pursued, who can hearten his followers and bring all their various powers into a harmonious pursuit of the common object.** The rational basis of the relation is, however, seen to be at any rate open to discussion when we consider the qualities in a leader upon which his **authority** so often rests, for there can be little doubt that **their appeal is more generally to instinct than to reason**. In ordinary politics it must be admitted that the gift of **public speaking** is of more decisive value than anything else. If a man is fluent, dextrous, and ready on the platform, he possesses the one indispensable requisite for statemanship; if in addition he has the gift of **moving deeply the emotions of his hearers**, his capacity for guiding the infinite complexities of national life becomes undeniable. Experience has shown that no exceptional degree of any other capacity is necessary to make a successful leader. **There need be no specially arduous training, no great weight of knowledge either of affairs or the human heart, no receptiveness to new ideas, no outlook into reality.** Indeed, the mere absence of such seems to be an advantage; for originality is apt to appear to the people as flightiness, scepticism as feebleness, caution as doubt of the great political princi-

ples that may happen at the moment to be immutable.
(Trotter 1921: 115-116)

Now reading: *Guidebooks führ Hitler*. Chapter: "A perfect explanation of Trumpism". It is a cosmic coincidence that the furth characteristic of human gregariousness is in correspondence with the so-called fourth function I've been tracing in Malinowski: the man on the soap-box is not addressing your neocortex, he's invoking the reptilian parts that dupe you into believing you have voluntarily decided to become a follower. Recall also the etymological hypothesis of [fame](#), which includes renown. The man on the soap-box, in short, is "shining".

We like to see photographs of him nursing his little grand-daughter, **we like to know that he plays golf badly**, and rides the bicycle like our common selves, we enjoy hearing of "pretty incidents" in which he has given the blind crossing-sweeper a penny or begged a glass of water at a wayside cottage - and there are excellent biological reasons for our gratification. (Trotter 1921: 117)

Or, we count how many times he goes golfing during his time in public office and how many millions of dollars it costs to the taxpayer.

5. His relations with his fellows are dependent upon **the recognition of him as a member of the herd**. It is important to the success of a gregarious species that individuals should be able to move freely within the large unit while strangers are excluded. **Mechanisms** to secure such personal recognition are therefore a characteristic feature of the social habit. The primitive olfactory greeting common to so many of the lower animals was doubtless rendered impossible for man by his comparative loss of the sense of smell long before it ceased to accord with his pretensions, yet in a thriving active species the function of recognition was as necessary as ever. Recognition

by vision could be of only limited value, and it seems probable that **speech** very early became the accepted medium. Possibly **the necessity to distinguish friend from foe** was one of the conditions which favoured the development of articulate speech. Be this as it may, speech at the present time retains strong evidence of the survival in it of **the function of herd recognition**. As is usual with instinctive activities in man, the actual state of affairs is concealed by a deposit of rationalized explanation which is apt to discourage merely superficial inquiry. **The function of conversation is, it is to be supposed, ordinarily regarded [] as being the exchange of ideas and information. Doubtless it has come to have such a function, but an objective examination of ordinary conversation shows that the actual conveyance of ideas takes a very small part in it.** As a rule the exchange seems to consist of **ideas** which are necessarily **common to the two speakers**, and are known to be so by each. The process, however, is none the less **satisfactory** for this; indeed, it seems even to derive its satisfactoriness therefrom. The interchange of **the conventional lead and return** is obviously very far from being **tedious or meaningless** to the interlocutors. They can, however, have derived nothing from it but **the confirmation to one another of their sympathy** and of the class or classes to which they belong. (Trotter 1921: 118-119)

Holy Moly! I hit the mother lode. This is *the* birth of phatic communion. The mechanization of speech with Gardiner. The negation of communicating ideas. The tedious observations known to everyone. The mere exchange of conventional words (stereotyped utterances). The heterogeneous sympathy. The meaninglessness. The most important qualities of phatic communion are all here.

Conversations of greeting are naturally particularly rich in **the exchange of purely ceremonial remarks, ostensibly based on some subject like the weather, in**

which there must necessarily be an absolute community of knowledge. It is possible, however, **for a long conversation to be made up entirely of similar elements, and to contain no trace of any conveyance of new ideas;** such intercourse is probably that which on the whole is most satisfactory to the "normal" man and leaves him more comfortably stimulated than would originality or brilliance, or any other manifestation of the strange and therefore of the disreputable. (Trotter 1921: 119)

Salutations et conversation. This passage is so significant that I've already screencapped it and made it the heading of this post. While C. Z. did recommend keeping my sources close to my chest, I have decided to go the opposite route and put it all out there as much as possible. It seems likely that if I don't carry my analysis far enough, someone else some time later might. Altruism is more calling than the alternative. Also, my fantasy of a diffuse community of researchers simultaneously grappling with the problem of phatic communion and attempting to give it a resolute evaluation by 1923 when it turns a hundred is just that, a fantasy. It seems more likely that I'm the only idiot who finds intellectual satisfaction in puzzling out something so insignificant.

Phatic communion *is* a conversation of greeting! Community of knowledge is often treated as common code or common knowledge. Jakobson is vindicated with a long conversation, and the core issue of prolongation. For it's not simply a neutralizing factor, it shifts the emphasis to the problem of continuation for the sake of continuation, and the communication issues this highlights. Trotter here gives us a better vocabulary to discuss such matters: his satisfactory is Mahaffy's agreeable. Phatic communion in the ideal form is a conversation of greeting that does not exceed that phase in any remarkable way.

Conversation between persons unknown to one another is also - **when satisfactory** - apt to be rich in **the ritual of recognition**. When one hears or takes part in these elaborate evolutions, gingerly proffering one after another of one's **marks of identity, one's views on the weather, on fresh air and draughts, on the Government and on uric acid**, watching intently for the first low hint of a **growl**, which will show one **belongs to the wrong pack** [] and **must withdraw**, it is impossible not to be reminded of **the similar manoeuvres of the dog**, and to be thankful that Nature has provided us with a **less direct**, though perhaps a **more tedious, code**. (Trotter 1921: 119-120)

Identifying the in- and out-groups. Malinowski leaves out marks of identity and political aspects, which would be typical of him, having to negate between British colonial powers and regional administrations, local private business persons and missionaries, and the various tribes of various islands. It would have gotten ugly fast if Malinowski were to analyze identity and politics; he even had very little to say, and if then pejorative, about the public interests of gossip. The latter are remarked upon here and there but apparently never brought together for examination. I have to add that the cowl of the pack makes it quite ugly, reminds me of that compendium on the nonverbal communication of aggression in wolves and primates. Hot damn. At least one thing makes more clear sense now - Mead repeats the dog maneuvers over and over because it's a powerful visual and conveys something more primal than primates. That Trotter finally ties it up with codes is just a beautiful cherry on the cake.

It may appear that we have been dealing here with a far-reaching and laboured analogy, and making much of a comparison of trivialities merely for the sake of compromising, if that could be done, **human pretension to reason**. To show that the marvel of **human communion**

began, perhaps, as **a very humble function**, and yet retains traces of its origin, is in no way to minimize the value or dignity of the more fully developed power. The capacity for **free intercommunication** between individual of the species has meant so much in the evolution of man, and will certainly come in the future to mean so incalculably more, that it cannot be regarded as anything less than **a master element** in the shaping of his destiny. (Trotter 1921: 120)

My eyes may have never gazed upon a more beautiful sight. The "pejorative" aspect signifies the typical attitude towards a subject domain: Malinowski is talking about the "savage" and "primitive" peoples, La Barre about primates, babies, lovers, people who live together, schizophrenics, etc. and Jakobson about incompetent youngsters, babies, parrots, *Naturvolker* and aphasics. There is always some incompetence, primarily some pretension to Reason with a capital letter, of categories of language users who do not meet some invisible criteria of competent, satisfactory, agreeable communication. The ending gets heavy; only dog can know the future.

It is apparent after very little consideration that **the extent of man's individual mental development** is a factor which has produced many novel characters in his manifestations of the social habit, and has even **concealed to a great extent the profound influence this instinct has in regulating his conduct, his thoughts, and his society**. (Trotter 1921: 120)

The extent of man's pretension to reason is revealed in the influence of his social instinct upon his thought and conduct. A suitable third, actually First, would be "senses", which would require an examination of the influence of "instincts" on sense and perception, possibly found even in social perceptions. Man is so rational that he has rationalized away his instinctive baseline.

Large mental capacity in the individual, as we have already seen, has the effect of providing a **wide freedom of response to instinctive impulses**, so that, while the individual is no less impelled by instinct than a more primitive type, the manifestations of these impulses in his conduct are very varied, and his conduct loses the appearance of a narrow concentration on its instinctive object. It needs only to pursue this reasoning to a further stage to reach the conclusion that mental capacity, while in no way limiting **the impulsive power of instinct**, may, by providing **an infinite number of channels into which the impulse is free to flow**, actually prevent the impulse from attaining the goal of its normal object. **In the ascetic the sex instinct is defeated, in the martyr that of self-preservation**, not because these instincts have been abolished, but because the activity of the mind has found new channels for them to flow in. As might be expected, the much more labile herd instinct has been still more subject to this deflection and dissipation without its potential impulsive strength being in any way impaired. It is this process which has enabled primitive psychology so largely to ignore the fact that man still is, as much as ever, endowed with **a heritage of instinct** and incessantly subject to its influence. (Trotter 1921: 120-121)

Self-control. The neocortex. Delayed desires. Self-conditioning. Above: "think of the anorexic's aversion to food, the celibate's aversion to sex, and the recent case of a man on death row hanging himself because his due date was constantly delayed".

Man's mental capacity, again, has enabled him as a species to flourish enormously, and thereby to increase to a prodigious extent **the size of the unit in which the individual is merged**. The nation, if the term be used to describe every organization under a completely independent, supreme government, must be regarded as the smallest unit on which natural selection now unrestrictedly acts. Between such units there is free competition,

and the ultimate regulators of these relations is physical force. This statement needs the qualification that the delimitation between two given units may be much sharper than that between two others, so that in the first case the resort to farce is likely to occur readily, while in the second case it will be brought about only by the very ultimate necessity. **The tendency to the enlargement of the social unit** has been going on with certain temporary relapses throughout human history. [] Though repeatedly **checked by the instability of the larger units**, it has always resumed its activity, so that it should probably be regarded as a **fundamental biological drift** the existence of which is a factor which must always be taken into account in dealing with the structure of human society. (Trotter 1921: 121-122)

Disregarding the natural selection, this passage appears to claim that it "a fundamental biological drift" for humans to assimilate into greater and greater units. We may be *the* species of the planet who can either destroy or take care of all other creatures on the same chunk of space rock, or, if there were someone out there to do so with, make contact and contracts with extraterrestrial intelligence.

The gregarious mind shows certain characteristics which throw some light on this phenomenon of the progressively enlarging unit. The gregarious animal is different from the solitary in the capacity to become conscious in a special way of the existence of other creatures. This specific **consciousness of his fellows** carries with it a **characteristic element of communion with them**. The individual knows another individual of the same herd as **a partaker in an entity of which he himself is a part**, so that the second individual is in some way and to a certain extent **identical with himself** and part of his own personality. He is able **to feel with the other** and **share his pleasures and sufferings** as if they were an attenuated

form of his own personal experiences. The degree to which this **assimilation of the interests of another person** is carried depends, in a general way, on **the extent of the intercommunication** between the two. In human society a man's **interest in his fellows** is distributed about him concentrically according to **a compound of various relations they bear** to him which we may call in a broad way their **nearness**. The centrifugal fading of interest is seen when we compare the man's feeling towards one near to him with his feeling towards one farther off. He will be disposed, other things being equal, **to sympathize with a relative** as against a fellow-townsmen, with a **fellow-townsmen** as against **a mere inhabitant** of the same county, with the latter as against **the rest of the country**, with an Englishman as against a European, with a European as against an Asiatic, and so on until **a limit is reached beyond [] which all human interest is lost**. The distribution of interest is of course never purely geographical, but is modified by, for example, **trade and professional sympathy**, and by special cases of intercommunication which bring topographically distant individuals into **a closer grade of feeling** than their mere situation would demand. The essential principle, however, is that **the degree of sympathy with a given individual varies directly with the amount of intercommunication with him**. The capacity to assimilate the interests of another individual with one's own, to allow him, as it were, to partake in one's own personality, is what is called **altruism**, and might equally well perhaps be called **expansive egoism**. It is a characteristic of the gregarious animal, and is a perfectly normal and necessary development in him of his instinctive inheritance. (Trotter 1921: 122-123)

The life of consciousness of others (Clay). The meaning of communion. Mutual recognition and identification appear to be most important aspects. Sympathy in the sense of *Gemütsbewegung*, of the harmonizing or pullulating movements of the soul. In Morris's

sharp and succinct terminology, this is *communization*. That's perhaps the most interesting metatheoretical aspect of Trotter's contribution - it simultaneously ties together the American off-shoot of "common experience" with Jakobson's purported prolonging. The thing that fails in phatic communication is most likely exactly this herd-recognition, this recognition and identification with each others interests, which can only borne out of constant association, of ties of union. The concentric nearness ordeal presented here could very well be slided into Ruesch's matrix, but so can many things. In any case achieving "a closer grade of feeling" might be *that* social sentiment which binds the hearer to the speaker. But it could also shed light on *those* social sentiments which make sociability a necessity (ambition, vanity, will to power, greed, etc.). For the degree of sympathy being dependent upon the amount of inter-communication I have numerous later paraphrases, such as my own frequent and loose dictum that human relationships are constituted by constant association - which I've blended from Laver, La Barre, and Blumer. Lastly, a reiteration and confirmation: The appearance of altruism is another topic subsumed under the more obvious issues involved in phatic communion. I believe the philosophers are still banging on about altruism everywhichway they can. There's probably a wealth of discussion in this key about the more economic aspects of Malinowski's fieldwork (isn't *Kula* a circulation characterised by expansive egoism?). But it might be some time before I train my sights on Edvard Westermarck.

"Teine Maroko vang on kuulus soome teadusemees, professor Edward Westermarck. Ka tema saabus Maroko rannikule esimest korda kolmkümmend aastat tagasi, kui praegused eeskujulikud teed olid vaid hobueeslite radu, ja ainuke võimalik reisimisviis oli palgata terve kaamelikaravan juhtidega ja kaitsesalgaga ning taluda ühes oma telgid. Fezis Westermarck sai loa püstitada oma kaks telki kesk medina turgu! Ja Marrakech'is ei olnud tol ajal veel teisi

eurooplasi, pääle kahe misjonäri, kes, nagu Westermarck tähendas, ei suutnud küll kedagi ristiuskusse pöörata, aga sellevastu tõmbasid hambaid ja tohterdasid moslemisid menuga ja olid hästi sallitud rahva seas." ([Kallas, Aino 1930. Tangeri vangis. Olion 6: 14-16; lk 14-15.](#))

In recent times, freedom of **travel**, and the development of the resources rendered available by **education**, **have increased the general mass of intercommunication to an enormous extent**. Side by side with this, altruism has come more and more into recognition as a supreme moral law. There is [] already a strong tendency to accept **selfishness as a test of sin**, and **consideration for others as a test of virtue**, and this has influenced even those who by public profession are compelled to maintain that right and wrong are to be defined only in terms of an arbitrary extra-natural code. (Trotter 1921: 123-124)

Reminiscent of how both Ruesch & Bateson (1951) and La Barre (1954) begin their respective books, by admonishing the technological advances in transportation and communication. What I'd add to this now would be a short history of how communication was derived from transportation - the *channel* referred to water communications, and telegraph wires indeed followed rail communication. This knowledge becomes unavoidable when looking up how the word "communication" was used at the very beginning of the 20th century. From what I've gathered it appears to give way to communication in our modern sense of sharing information after WWI, with Franz Boas perhaps standing as a pivotal turning point. As to sin and virtue, see the duty of agreeable conversation and the vices of disagreeable conversation.

As intercommunication tends constantly to widen the field of action of altruism, a point is reached when the individual becomes capable of some kind of **sympathy**,

however attenuated, with being outside the limits of the biological unit within which the primitive function of altruism lies. This extension is perhaps possible only in man. In a creature like the bee the rigidly limited mental capacity of the individual and the closely organized society of the hive combine to make the boundary of the hive correspond closely with the uttermost limit of the field over which altruism is active. The bee, capable of great sympathy and understanding in regard to her fellow-members of the hive, is utterly callous and without understanding in regard to any creature of external origin and existence. Man, however, with his infinitely greater capacity for **assimilating [] experience**, has not been able to maintain the rigid limitation of sympathy to the unit, the boundaries of which tend to acquire **a certain indefiniteness** not seen in any of the lower gregarious types. (Trotter 1921: 124)

Humans are uniquely brainy, got it. What is truly meritorious here is the assimilation of experience, which sounds like a window into the *Umwelten* of other species. Though, to be fair, even the arm-chair phogeys of *Mind* wrote tediously lengthy argumentations about human capacity for sympathy with the life and consciousness of other species, the most common examples involving dogs, but also Peirce with "The microscopist looks to see whether the motions of a little creature show any purpose. If so, there is mind there" (PC 1.269).

Hence tends to appear **a sense of international justice**, a vague feeling of being responsibly concerned in all human affairs and by a natural consequence the ideas and impulses denoted under the term "pacifism." (Trotter 1921: 125)

Something to connect with [James Slotta's \(2015\)](#) examination of the voice of the community (compare to the gregarious attribute of being responsive to the voice of the herd, here, above).

One of the most natural and obvious consequences of war is **a hardening of the boundaries of the social unit and a retraction of the vague feelings towards international sympathy** which are a characteristic product of peace and intercommunication. Thus it comes about that pacifism and internationalism are in great disgrace at the present time; they are regarded as the vapourings of cranky windbags who have inevitably been punctured at the first touch of the sword; they are, our political philosophers tell us, but products of the miasm of sentimental fallacy which tends to be bred in **the relaxing atmosphere of peace**. Perhaps no general expressions have been more common since the beginning of the war, in the mouths of those who have undertaken our instruction in the meaning of events, than the propositions that pacifism is now finally exploded and shown always to have been nonsense, that war is and always will be an inevitable necessity in human affairs as **man is** what is called **a fighting animal**, and that not only is the abolition of war an impossibility, but should the abolition of it unhappily prove to be possible after all and be accomplished, the result could only be degeneration and disaster. (Trotter 1921: 125)

It is difficult to express how disheartening it is to read such pronouncements during a time when it looks like global international relations are hardening and the world appears to be veering towards replaying the previous century. On the theoretical side, pugnacity is indeed another underlying theme which should be examined more closely, along perhaps with the significant distinction between lead and leaderless groups, collectives, masses, etc. Humans, though, "commune" during both peace and war.

It is impossible to leave this subject without some comment on the famous doctrine that war is a biological necessity. Even if one knew nothing of those who have enunciated this proposition, its character would enable

one to suspect it of being the utterance of a soldier rather than a biologist. There is about it a confidence that the vital effects of war are simple and easy to define and a cheerful contempt for the considerable biological difficulties of the subject that remind one of the bracing **military atmosphere, in which a word of command is the supreme fact**, rather than that of the laboratory, [] where facts are the masters of all. It may be supposed that even in the country of its birth the doctrine seemed more transcendently true in times of peace amid a proud and brilliant regime than it does now after more than twelve months of war. (Trotter 1921: 126-127)

Thanks for not specifying who enunciates such propositions or what country gave it birth. Otherwise we could examine authoritarianism, command economy, and the post-communist mafia state.

War and war only had produced the best and greatest and strongest State - indeed, the only State worthy of the name; therefore war is the great creative and sustaining force of State, **or the universe is a mere meaningless jumble of accidents**. (Trotter 1921: 127)

"You know, Rothman... When I came back from this war, I came back to nothing. Really nothing. No homeland, no home, no parents, no family, no fiancée, no profession, no job, no food, no closet full of old hockey sticks and tennis rackets. Not even an address. All I have in this world is the conviction that I am a great artist and a master builder."

Man is unique among gregarious animals in the size of the major unit upon which natural selection and its supposedly chief instrument, war, is open to act unchecked. There is no other animal in which the size of the unit, however laxly held together, has reached anything even remotely approaching the inclusion of one-fifth or one-quarter of the whole species. It is plain that a

mortal contest between two units of such a monstrous size introduces an altogether new mechanism into the hypothetical "struggle for existence" on which the conception of the biological necessity of war is founded. (Trotter 1921: 128)

Here I must agree with Yuval Noah Harari in *21 Lessons for the 21st Century* (2018) on the global population of humanity facing a struggle for existence in which isolationism offers no benefits and only international cooperation between all nations capable of contributing must do so in order to avoid drowning, scorching, thirst and hunger, and general destruction by unstoppable natural forces. Is man-made climate change a means of natural selection?

It may be objected, however, that **anything approaching extermination** could obviously not be possible in a war between such immense units as those of modern man. (Trotter 1921: 129)

Hey, throw me that nuclear football!

Nevertheless, the object of each of the two adversaries would be **to impose its will on the other, and to destroy** in it all that was especially individual, all the types of activity and capacity which were the most characteristic in its civilization and therefore **the cause of hostility**. The effect of success in such an endeavour would be an enormous impoverishment of the variety of the race and a corresponding effect on progress. (Trotter 1921: 129)

In other words, destroy all cultural diversity in order to homogenize everyone and establish a world government which could not engage in war because it would be waging war against itself. This only calls to mind how Russia did go to war against itself in Chechnya, and how the U.S. has a history of military engagements taken up in complete disregard of the will of the people (Vietnam,

Iraq). On the same page, though, Trotter insists that such forceful spread of uniformity is practically impossible because every civilization regards itself as the penultimate amongst all civilizations (one is unable to estimate the value of one's own civilization), and doing so would impede progress. I may be misreading things because the discussion is rather unpleasant.

Man's complete conquest of the grosser enemies of his race has allowed him **leisure** for turning his **restless pugnacity** - a quality no longer fully occupied upon his non-human environment - against his own species. (Trotter 1921: 130)

How grim! When humans get bored they make war.

It can scarcely be questioned that the organization of a people for war tends to encourage unduly a type of individual who is **abnormally insensitive to doubt, to curiosity, and to the development of original thought**. (Trotter 1921: 130)

In a later portion of the book (pp. 167-168) he describes three types of social habits to produce national unity. The purely aggressive or protective form, he writes, views fighting as man's supreme activity, and travelled and explored "less out of curiosity than in search of prey". This is illustrated by the northern barbarians who profited from the disintegration of the Roman Empire. This attitude would also describe the post-communist mafia state.

It is the business of an Empire not to encounter overwhelming enemies. Declaring itself to be the most perfect example of its kind and the foreordained heir of the world will remain no more than a pleasant - and dangerous - indulgence, and will not prevent it showing by its fate that the fruits of perfection and the promise of permanence are not demonstrated in the wholesale [] manufacture of enemies and in the combination of them into

an alliance of unparalleled strength. (Trotter 1921: 131-132)

Hence, the U.S. has been reduced to bombing the deserts and mountains, and Russia picks on its neighbours.

It may well, therefore, be removed to the lumber-room of speculation and stored among the other pseudo-scientific dogmas of political "biologists" - the facile doctrines of degeneracy, **the pragmatic lecturings on national characteristics**, on Teutons and Celts, and Latins and Slavs, on pure races and mixed races, and all the other **ethnological conceits** with which the ignorant have gulled the innocent so long. (Trotter 1921: 132)

Well, now I know how to call the whole "national characteristics" ordeal. Good to know that Trotter regarded it as the dribble it was.

The study of man as a gregarious animal has not been pursued with the thoroughness and objectivity it deserves and must receive if it is to yield its full value in illuminating his status and in the management of society. The explanation of this comparative neglect is to be found in **the complex irregularity which obscures the social habit as manifested by man.** Thus it comes to be believed that gregariousness is no longer a fully functional and indispensable inheritance, but **survives at the present day merely in a vestigial form as an interesting but quite unimportant relic of primitive activities.** We have already shown that man is ruled by instinctive impulses just as imperative and just as [] characteristically social as those of any other gregarious animal. A further argument that he is to-day as actively and essentially a social animal as ever is furnished by the fact that he suffers from the disadvantages of such an animal to a more marked degree perhaps than any other. In physical matters he owes to his gregariousness and its uncontrolled tendency to **the formation of crowded communi-**

ties with enclosed dwellings, the seriousness of many of his worst diseases, such as tuberculosis, typhus, and plague; there is no evidence that these diseases effect anything but an absolutely indiscriminate destruction, killing the strong and the weakly, the socially useful and the socially useless, with equal readiness, so that they cannot be regarded as even of the least selective value to man. The only other animal which is well known to suffer seriously from disease as a direct consequence of its social habit is the honey bee - as has been demonstrated by recent epidemics of exterminating severity. (Trotter 1921: 132-133)

Here the discussion gets really interesting. Are the above-enumerated characteristics of gregariousness outdated relics of the human context of evolution? I.e. 21st century software running on 50 000 year old hardware. This passage certainly adds something to Malinowski's attitude towards primitive people as dark-skinned [Phemes](#) and his admonition that he could have just as well performed such an analysis on examples drawn from Western civilization, particularly European drawing rooms, i.e. living room conversations and cocktail parties (Cf. Goffman 1953). In the latter portion about the disadvantages of modern civilization, particularly the disease, calls to mind how schizophrenia was thought of as a Western disease, and Malcolm Gladwell in *What the Dog Saw* (2009) on breast cancer and baby pills, how anthropologists have found that among remaining primitive peoples there is a later onset, and systemic infrequency of menstruation due to poor nutrition, frequent pregnancies and breast feeding. In other words, it might not be natural nor healthy for women *not* to have children. The general ethos towards society is also reminiscent of John Cowper Powys's philosophy of solitude and Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit*, both of which decried the very technological advances in transportation and communication others above praise.

It is a commonplace of human affairs that **combined action is almost invariably less intelligent than individual action**, a fact which shows how very little the members of the species are yet capable of combination and co-ordination and how far inferior - on account, no doubt, of his greater mental capacity - man is in this respect to the bee. (Trotter 1921: 135)

I shall have to collect such pronouncements and ultimately compare them to other opinions and modern propositions on the same subject.

There is abundant specialization of a sort; but it is inexact, lax, wasteful of energy, and often quite useless through being on the one hand superfluous or on the other incomplete. **We have large numbers of experts in the various branches of science [] and the arts, but we insist upon their adding to the practice of their specialisms the difficult task of earning their living in an open competitive market.** The result is that we tend to get at the summit on our professions only those rare geniuses who combine real specialist capacity with the arts of the bagman. An enormous proportion of our experts have to earn their living by teaching - an exhausting and exacting art for which they are not at all necessarily qualified, and one which demands a great amount of time for the earning of a very exiguous pittance. (Trotter 1921: 135-136)

That is indeed the case. Think of student study loans. An enlightened open society of the future should do best to increase the ranks of its specialists and insist upon the significance of producing knowledge for the sake of producing knowledge as the universal role of human species in this dumb (archaic: silent, incommunicative) and inhospitable universe.

The teaching of our best schools, a task so important that it should be entrusted to none but those highly qualified by nature and instruction in the art, is almost entirely in the hands of **athletes and grammarians of dead languages**. (Trotter 1921: 136)

Saucy. A contrast to those bemoaning the eradication of classical liberal humanitarian education (e.g. Margaret Mead and J. P. Postgate).

The moral homogeneity so plainly visible in the [[]] society of the bee is replaced in man by **a segregation into classes which tends always to obscure the unity of the nation** and often is directly antagonistic to it. The readiness with which such segregation occurs seems to be due to the invincible strength of the gregarious impulse in the individual man and to the immense size and strength of the modern major unit of the species. [...] Segregation in itself is always dangerous in that it provides the individual with a substitute for **the true major unit - the nation** - and in times when there is an urgent need for national homogeneity may prove to be a hostile force. (Trotter 1921: 136-137)

Is the nation the true major unit? Why not humanity? Curiously, this is the exact political discussion some people are having right now, e.g. [Ruuben Kaalep: inimsuse dogma](#) (*Postimees* online opinion piece, accessed Jan. 19, 2019).

The maintenance of the social system - that is, of the segregation of power and prestige, of ease and leisure, and the corresponding segregations of labour, privation, and poverty - depends upon an enormously elaborate system of rationalization, tradition, and morals, and upon almost innumerable indirect mechanisms ranging from the drugging of society with alcohol to **the distortion of religious principle in the interests of the established order**. (Trotter 1921: 138)

Perhaps the most profound and productive full sentence in any book I've ever read. I had to mark nearly the whole of it as important, barring the drugging of society with alcohol - many believe U.S. government agencies routed addictive narcotics to certain communities for the same purpose, and there are probably innumerable easily demonstrable examples of such means all over the world. What is relevant for my research is the light this sentence throws on the "social system" and its segregation of exactly these listed items. When they say socialism for the rich and capitalism for the poor, this is what I think they mean. The rich and powerful live in an age of leisure and luxury while the powerless working poor suffer all sorts of privations upon their time, energy, comfort, and rights. What are modern prisons in the U.S. and Russia if not slave labour camps?

Such a new principle is **the conscious direction of society by man**, the refusal by him to submit indefinitely to the dissipation of his energies and the disappointment of his ideals in **inco-ordination and confusion**. Thus would appear a function for that individual mental capacity of man which has so far, when limited to local and personal ends, tended but to increase the social confusion. (Trotter 1921: 139)

Made me think of the failure of mental communion in Durkheim. That's the basic critique Malinowski makes of Durkheim's examination of the religious life of Australian aborigines in anthropological literature is that they do not congregate to establish common sentiments, that is, to harmonize their feelings about certain ideas, but that on such occasions as a public speaker addressing a mass of listeners does not really establish a communication of ideas with others but instead just creates a situation for people to spend time together and exchange social niceties with no promise of an orderly co-ordination of collective action.

Expression, of course, has been found for the usual view that **primitive instincts normally vestigial or dormant are aroused into activity by the stress of war**, and that there is a process of rejuvenation of "lower" instincts at the expense of "higher." All such views, apart [] from their theoretical unsoundness, are uninteresting because they are of no practical value. (Trotter 1921: 139-140)

The usual view is represented, no doubt, by Herbert Spencer. Note the collective nature of the iprimitive instincts. Whole groups of people are being aroused into activity. Would a study of phatic communion have practical value? It doesn't seem so. But it would definitely introduce some soundness into our understanding of theoretically unsound views. The self-contradictions of past views can help the consistency of emerging views.

The war that began in August 1914 was of a kind peculiarly suitable to produce **the most marked and typical psychological effects**. It has long been foreseen as no more than a mere possibility of immense disaster - of disaster so outrageous that by that ver yfact it had come to be regarded with a passionate incredulity. **It had loomed before the people**, at any rate of England, as an event almost equivalent to the ultimate overthrow of all things. It had been led up to be **years of doubt and anxiety**, sometimes rising to apprehension, sometimes lapsing into unbelief, and culminating in **an agonized period of suspense**, while the avalance tottered and muttered on its base before the final and still incredible catastrophe. Such were the circumstances which no doubt led to the actual outbreak producing a remarkable series of typical psychological reactions. **The first feeling of the ordinary citizen was fear** - an immense, vague, aching anxiety, perhaps typically vague and unfocused, but naturally tending soon to localize itself in channels customary to the individual and leading to fears for his future, his food supply, his family, his trade, and so forth. Side by side

with fear there was **a heightening of the normal intolerance of isolation. Loneliness became an urgently unpleasant feeling**, and the individual experienced **an intense and active desire for the company and even physical contact of his fellows**. In such company he was **aware of a great accession of confidence, courage, and moral power**. It was possible for an observant person to trace the actual [] influence of his circumstances upon his judgment, and to notice that **isolation tended to depress his confidence while company fortified it. The necessity for companionship** was strong enough to break down the distinctions of class, and **dissipate the reserve between strangers** which is to some extent a concomitant mechanism. The change in **the customary frigid atmosphere** of the railway train, the omnibus, and all such meeting-places was a most interesting experience to the psychologist, and he could scarcely fail to be struck by its obvious biological meaning. Perhaps the most striking of all these early phenomena was **the strength and vitality of rumour**, probably because it afforded by far the most startling evidence that some other and stronger force than reason was at work in the formation of opinion. It was, of course, in no sense an unusual fact that **non-rational opinion should be so widespread**; the new feature was that such opinion should be able to spread so rapidly and become established so firmly altogether regardless of the limits within which a given opinion tends to remain localized in times of peace. Non-rational opinion under normal conditions is as a rule limited in its extent by a very strict kind of segregation; the successful rumours of the early periods of the war invaded all classes and showed **a capacity to overcome prejudice, education, or scepticism**. The observer, clearly conscious as he might be of the mechanisms at work, found himself irresistibly drawn to the acceptance of the more popular beliefs; and even the most convinced believer in the normal prevalence of non-rational belief could scarcely have exaggerated the actual state of affairs. Closely allied with

this **accessibility to rumour** was the readiness with which suspicions of treachery and active hostility grew and flourished about any one of even foreign appearance or origin. **It is not intended to [] attempt to discuss the origin and meaning of the various types of fable which have been epidemic in opinion**; the fact we are concerned with here is their immense vitality and power of growth. (Trotter 1921: 140-142)

Absolutely amazing. Finally "the strange and unpleasant tension" (PC 4.6) finds an explanation. So does coming "together, to enjoy each other's company" (PC 3.2) and "the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man" (PC 3.3). The psychological effects of company bears some likeness to "all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth" (PC 3.3). The reserve between strangers concerns taciturnity, and it may be realized that the "atmosphere of sociability" (PC 7.5) and "a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse" (PC 9.4) are opposed to the customary frigid atmosphere of everyday life. These are the collective psychological effects of an emergency situation. And finally, PHEME gains strength and vitality. Non-rational opinion (gossip) becomes widespread, attractive, and accessible. People become disinterested in the sources of various sentiments, preferring instead to reaffirm folk knowledge and become incurious towards new ideas.

The characteristic feature of **a really dangerous national struggle for existence is the intensity of the stimulus it applies to the social instinct**. It is not that it arouses "dormant" or decayed instincts, but simply that it applies maximal stimulation to instinctive mechanisms which are more or less constantly in action in normal times. In most of his reactions as a gregarious animal in times of peace, man is acting as a member of one or another class upon which the stimulus acts. **War acts upon him as a member of the greater herd, the nation, or, in**

other words, the true major unit. As I have repeatedly pointed out, the cardinal mental characteristics of the gregarious animal is his sensitiveness to his fellow-members of the herd. **Without them his personality is, so to say, incomplete; only in relation to them can he attain satisfaction and personal stability.** Corresponding with his dependence on them is his **openness** towards them, his specific **accessibility** to stimuli coming from the herd. (Trotter 1921: 142)

The emergenci situation. Reaffirming the nation the true major unit (see Ward 1894). What is especially meritorious here is the inclusion of personality and selfhood as an important component of the recognition function. Belonging.

It puts him on the alert, sets him looking for guidance, prepares him to receive commands, but almost all draws him to the herd in the first instinctive concentration against the enemy. In the presence of this stimulus even such partial and temporary isolation as was possible without it becomes intolerable. The physical presence of the herd, **the actual contact** and recognition of its members, becomes indispensable. This is no mere functionless desire, for re-embodiment in the herd at once fortifies courage and fills the individual with moral power, enthusiasm, and fortitude. The meaning that **mere physical contact with his fellows** still has for man is conclusively shown in the use that has been made of attacks in close formation in the German armies. It is perfectly clear that **a densely crowded formation has psychological advantages in the face of danger**, which enable quite ordinary beings to perform what are in fact prodigies of valour. Even undisciplined civil mobs have, on occasion, proved wonderfully valorous, though their absence of unity often causes their enterprise to alternate with panic. (Trotter 1921: 143)

Alertness and receptivity surely tie in with attention and suggestion. I am amazed to see actual/mere physical contact with fellows here. And "psychological advantages"! A repetition of physical channel and psychological connection. And bound up with the "sentiments", and sense of unity, no less.

Correspondingly the activity and vitality of rumour were enormously less than they have been in the present war. The weaker stimulus is betrayed throughout the whole series of events by the weakness of all the characteristic **gregarious responses**. (Trotter 1921: 143; ff)

An explanation for "conviviality". In other words, Durkheim's collective effervescence is Trotter's gregarious response.

The psychological significance of the enormous activity of rumour in this war is fairly plain. That rumours spread readily and are tenacious of life is evidence of **the sensitiveness to herd opinion which is so characteristic of the social instinct**. The gravity of a threat to the herd is shown by nothing better than by the activity of rumour. The strong stimulus to herd instinct produces the characteristic response in the individual of **a maximal sensitiveness to his fellows - to their presence or absence, their alarms and braveries, and in no less degree to their opinions**. With the establishment of this state of mind the spread and survival of rumours become inevitable, and will vary directly with the seriousness of the external danger. Into the actual genesis of the individual rumours and the meaning of their **tendency to take a stereotyped form** we cannot enter here. (Trotter 1921: 144)

Concerning the second gregarious characteristic of man. Presence and absence become clearly defined; safety and danger; positive and negative emotions. Stereotyped form is surprising in this context

but not surprising in general. Rumours are stereotyped utterances, they're a genre.

The establishment of homogeneity in the herd is the basis of morale. From homogeneity proceed moral power, enthusiasm, courage, endurance, enterprise, and all the virtues of the warrior. The peace of mind, happiness, and energy of the soldier come from his feeling himself to be a member in a body solidly united for a single purpose. **The impulse towards unity** that was so pronounced and universal at the beginning of the war was, then, a true and sound **instinctive movement of defence**. It was prepared to sacrifice all social distinctions and local prejudices if it could liberate by doing so Nature's inexhaustible stores of moral power for the defence [] of the herd. Naturally enough its significance was misunderstood, and a great deal of its beneficent magic was wasted by the good intentions which man is so touchingly ready to accept as a substitute for knowledge. Even **the functional value of unity** was, and still is, for the most part ignored. We are told to weariness that the great objection to disunion is that it encourages the enemy. (Trotter 1921: 144-145)

Very curious that he takes the point of view of the warrior. It's probably part of the prehistoric vision of society shared with Spencer, that nature is red in tooth and claw, and so is natural man. The functional value of unity is sentimental?

It was towards this object that we dimly groped when we felt in the early weeks of the war **the impulses of friendliness, tolerance, and goodwill towards our fellow-citizens**, and the readiness to sacrifice what privileges the social system had endowed us with in order to enjoy the power which a perfect homogeneity of the herd would have given us. (Trotter 1921: 146)

Maybe there is still something to Aristotle's goodwill? Perfect homogeneity, on the other hand, would have nothing to communicate.

Similar though less conspicuous manifestations are **the delighted circulation of rumours**, the wild scandal-mongering, the eager dissemination of pessimistic inventions which are the pleasure of the smaller amongst these moral waifs. (Trotter 1921: 149)

In Malinowski's *Argonauts*, this circulation of rumours serves "the psychological needs of the community".

In getting work out of a living organism it is necessary to determine what is the most efficient stimulus. One can make a man's muscles contract by stimulating them with an electric battery, but one can never get so energetic a contraction with however strong a current as can be got by the natural stimulus sent out from the man's brain. Rising to a more complex level, we find that a man does not do work by order so well or so thoroughly as he does work that he desires to do voluntarily. **The best way to get our work done is to get the worker to want to do it.** The most urgent and potent of all stimuli, then, are those that come from within the man's soul. (Trotter 1921: 150)

Stimulating motivation. How should the Governments social psychology department stimulate the population to the point of self-sacrifice? And how to keep "their souls full of a burning passion of service" (*ibid*, 150).

Such a supply of mental energy can issue only from a [[]] truly homogeneous herd, and it is therefore to the production of such **a homogeneity of feeling** that we come once more as the one unmistakable responsibility of the civilian. (Trotter 1921: 150-151)

Homogeneous sympathy!

We have seen reason to believe that there was a comparatively favourable opportunity of **establishing such a national unity** in the early phases of the war, and that the attainment of the same result at this late period is likely to be less easy and more costly of disturbance to the social structure. (Trotter 1921: 151)

The tropes of establishing and maintaining appear more and more like ahistorical universals.

A state of mind directed more to the nation and less immediately to the war is what is needed; the good soldier absorbed in his regiment has little indication to concern himself with the way the war is going, and the civilian should be similarly absorbed in the nation. To attain this he must **feel that he belongs to the country and to his fellow-citizens, and that it and they also belong to him**. The established social system sets itself steadily to deny these propositions, and not so much by its abounding material inequalities as by the moral inequalities that correspond with them. The hierarchies of rank, prestige, and consideration, at all times showing serious inconsistencies with functional value, and in war doing so more than ever, are denials of **the essential propositions of perfect citizenship**, not, curiously enough, through their arbitrary distribution of wealth, comfort, and leisure, but through their persistent, assured, and even unconscious assumption that there exists a gradation of moral values equally real and, to men of inferior station, equally arbitrary. (Trotter 1921: 152)

Thus, La Barre was correct to tie the process phatic communication with individual states of mind instead of the vague atmosphere of a situation. Here's the emotional statement of belonging, "the essential proposition of perfect citizenship".

Psychological considerations thus appear to indicate a very plain duty for **a large class of civilians** who have complained of and **suffered patriotically [] from the fact that the Government has found nothing for them to do**. Let all those of superior and assured station make it a point of honour and duty to abrogate the privileges of consideration and prestige with which they are arbitrarily endowed. Let them persuade the common man that they also are, in the face of national necessity, common men. (Trotter 1921: 152-153)

An argument that should be examined in relation with the ages of leisure.

A further contribution to the establishment of a national unity of this truly **Utopian** degree might come from a changed **attitude of mind towards his fellows** in the individual. There would have to be **an increased kindness, generosity, patience, and tolerance in all his relations with others**, a deliberate attempt to conquer prejudice, irritability, impatience, and self-assertiveness, **a deliberate encouragement of cheerfulness, composure, and fortitude**. (Trotter 1921: 153)

Nice. But the truly utopian vision would extend beyond any national unity and include and embrace all of our species, and, as there are "tediously lengthy argumentations about human capacity for sympathy with the life and consciousness of other species" (infra), possibly the whole of our living planet. The phrase "Earth's gentle custodian" pops into mind.

The official loses his grasp of the fact that the mechanism of the State is established in the interests of the citizen; **the citizen comes to regard the State as a hostile institution, again which he has to defend himself**, although it was made for his defence. It is a crime for him to cheat the State in the matter of taxpaying, it is no

crime for the State to defraud him in excessive charges.
(Trotter 1921: 155)

The militarization of U.S. police service?

The slighter kinds of aloofness, of **inhuman etiquette**, of legalism and senseless dignity, of indifference to the individual, of **devotion to formulæ and routine** are no less powerful agents in depriving the common man of the sense of intimate reality in his citizenship which might be so valuable a source of national unity. If the official machine through its utmost parts were animated by an even moderately human spirit and used as **a means of binding together the people**, instead of as an engine of moral disruption, it might be of incalculable value in the strengthening of morale. (Trotter 1921: 155)

The negative side-effects of mechanization. Brazil (1985) comes to mind.

Germany affords a profoundly interesting study for the biological psychologist, and it is very important that we should not allow what clearness of representation we can get into our picture of her mind to be concluded by **the heated atmosphere of national feeling** in which our work must be done. (Trotter 1921: 156)

Awaiting the analysis of atmospheres, which I only now realize can indeed be discerned and associated with different theoretical interests. Here, it's almost as if various atmospheres were associated with the types of social habits of gregariousness (aggressive, protective, socialized). In that case, this "heated atmosphere" would be aggressive, of course.

I have already tried to show that the acquirement of the social habit by man - though in fact there is reason to believe that the social habit preceded and made possible his **distinctively human characters** - has committed him

to an evolutionary process which is far from being completed yet, but which [] nevertheless must be **carried out to its consummation** if he is to escape increasingly severe disadvantages inherent in that biological type. In other words, **the gregarious habit in an animal of large individual mental capacity** is capable of becoming, and indeed must become a handicap rather than a bounty unless the society of the species undergoes **a continuously progressive co-ordination** which will enable it to attract and absorb the energy and activities of its individual members. We have seen that in a species such as man, owing to **the freedom from the direct action of natural selection within the major unit**, the individual's capacity for varied reaction to his environment has undergone an enormous development, while at the same time **the capacity for intercommunication** - upon which the co-ordination of the major unit into **a potent and frictionless mechanism** depends - has lagged far behind. (Trotter 1921: 157-158)

Here's that tedious "capacity for sympathy with the life and consciousness of others" (infra) again. The nationalist-globalist agendas set the point of consummation for this capacity on different units (part vs whole). Usefully, this passage reaffirms Trotter's earlier statement that "the degree of sympathy with a given individual varies directly with the amount of intercommunication with him" (p. 123; above). Neglecting the difference between "capacity for" and "amount of", we are still dealing with a (social) "relation". The "State", so to say, is the third, the transcommunicative partner, a transcendental entity.

The term "**intercommunication**" is here used in the very widest sense to indicate **the ties that bind the individual to his fellows and them to him**. It is not a very satisfactory word; but as might be expected in attempting to express a series of functions so complex and so unfamiliar to generalization, it is not easy to find an exact ex-

pression ready made. Another phrase applicable to a slightly different aspect of the same function is "**herd accessibility**," which has the advantage of suggesting by its first constituent the limitation, primitively at any rate, an essential part of the capacities it is desired to denote. The conception of herd accessibility includes **the specific sensitiveness of the individual to the existence, presence, thought, and feelings of his fellow-members of the major unit**; the power he possesses of reacting in an altruistic and social mode to stimuli which would necessarily evoke a merely egoistic response from a non-social animal - that is to say, the power to deflect and modify egoistic [] impulses into a social form without emotional loss or dissatisfaction; the capacity to derive from the impulses of the herd a moral power in excess of any similar energy he may be able to develop from purely egoistic sources. (Trotter 1921: 158-159)

And phatic communion is "a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words" (PC 6.1), a linguistic situation in which "Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other" (PC 7.8). It would appear, then, that Malinowski's "some social sentiment or other" = Trotter's "feelings of his fellow-members". One cannot help but to notice the dismissive undertone that surfaces in comparison. Hopefully Alexander Shand will provide an explanation for that.

Intercommunication, the development of which of course depends upon herd-accessibility, enables the herd **the act as a single creature** whose power is greatly in excess of the sum of the powers of its individual members. (Trotter 1921: 159)

A more realistic, even pragmatic, view of group mind.

Such a possible **fixative action** of natural selection is suggested by the fact that the appearance of mechanisms whereby the individual is protected from the direct action of natural selection seems to have led to an outburst of variation. (Trotter 1921: 160)

Neat **click** - cf. the fixation of belief (Peirce).

The actual mechanism by which society, while it has grown in strength and complexity, has also grown in confusion and disorder, is that peculiarity of the gregarious mind which automatically brings into the monopoly of power the mental type which I have called the **stable and common opinion** calls normal. This type supplies our most trusted politicians and officials, our bishops and headmasters, our successful lawyers and doctors, and all their trusty deputies, assistants, retainers, and faithful servants. **Mental stability is their leading characteristic, they "know where they stand" as we say, they have a confidence in the reality of their aims and their position, an inaccessibility to new and strange phenomena, a belief in the established and customary, a capacity for ignoring what they regard as the unpleasant, the undesirable, and the improper, and a conviction that on the whole a sound moral order is perceptible in the universe and manifested in the progress of civilization. Such characteristics are not in the least inconsistent with the highest intellectual capacity, great energy and perseverance as well as kindness, generosity, and patience, but they are in no way redeemed in social value by them.** (Trotter 1921: 160-161)

As with the political process portions of La Barre's (1954) book, this appears to serve as a near-universal descriptor. La Barre described Bernie Sandes, here we find the McDonald Trump with his unshakeable confidence in his art of the deal (really, bare opportunism), inability to read any length of text or suffer boring people

to lecture, and a worldview that appears to have changed little since the 1960s when the rest of the world progressed and he was failing military academy and hustling real-estate or something.

Such a direct intelligence would take into account before all things the biological character of man, would understand that his condition is necessarily progressive along the lines of his natural endowments or downward to destruction. **It would abandon the static view of society as something merely to be maintained, and adopt a more dynamic conception of statesmanship as something active, progressive, and experimental, reaching out towards new powers for human activity and new conquests for the human will.** [] It would discover what natural inclinations in man must be indulged, and would make them respectable, what inclinations in him must be controlled for the advantage of the species, and make them insignificant. **It would cultivate intercommunication and altruism** on the one hand, and bravery, boldness, pride, and enterprise on the other. **It would develop national unity to a communion of interest and sympathy far closer than anything yet dreamed of as possible,** and by doing so would endow the national unit with a self-control, fortitude, and moral power which would make it so obviously unconquerable that war would cease to be possibility. To a people magnanimous, self-possessed, and open-eyed, **unanimous in sentiment** and aware of its strength, the conquest of fellow-nations would present its full futility. They would need for the acceptable exercise of their powers some more difficult, more daring, and newer task, something that stretches the human will and the human intellect to the limit of their capacity; **the mere occupation and re-occupation of the stale and blood-drenched earth would be to them barbarians' work; time and space would be to them barbarians' work; time and space would be their quarry, destiny and the human soul the lands they would invade; they would sail their ships into the gulps**

of the ether and lay tribute upon the sun and stars.
(Trotter 1921: 162-163)

The utopian vision of social control again. Notice "communion of interest and sympathy", where interest can stand for sentiments. These kinds of statements I shall have to compare with ones about religious or spiritual communion with the transcendental. Unanimous sentiment = establishing common sentiments (PC). The ending is particularly beautiful and visionary. Sentimental, even. This is how we can feel in the 21st century, after we've seen Earth from space, after we can Google Earth most streets on the planet, after we've invented the cultural Pandora's box and found innumerable virtual ways of laying tribute upon the sun and stars.

Germany in some ways resembles a son who has been educated at home, and has taken up the responsibilities of the adult, and becomes bound by them without ever tasting **the free intercourse of the school and university**. She has never tasted the heady liquor of political liberty, she has had no revolution, and the blood of no political martyrs calls to her disturbingly from the ground.
(Trotter 1921: 164)

The highest ideal of free intercommunication. All of society should look like a campus - everyone has affordable housing and communal amenities, free high-speed internet, near-unlimited access to scientific publications, and free time to discover and develop oneself. The eternally coming age of leisure.

Generalizations about national characteristics are notoriously fallacious, but it seems that with a certain reserve one may fairly say that there is a definite contrast in this particular between the Germans and, let us say, the English. (Trotter 1921: 164b)

A simple truism.

A further and enormously potent factor in the progress of the idea was **an immense accession of national feeling**, derived from three almost bewilderingly successful wars, accomplished at surprisingly small cost, and culminating in a grandiose and no less successful scheme of unification. (Trotter 1921: 165)

define:accession - the attainment or acquisition of a position of rank or power (succession, elevation, assumption of, attainment of, inheritance of); a new item added to an existing collection of books, paintings, or artefacts (addition, acquisition, new item, gift, purchase, adjunct, add-on, gain). Rahvustunne on lisand, mitte põhiroog. "Alone, amongst the peoples of Europe, Germany saw herself a nation with a career" (*ibid*, 165). Oh, good. /s

To a nation with a purpose and a consciously realized destiny some principle of national unity is indispensable. **Some strand of feeling which all can share, and in sharing which all can come into communion with one another**, will be the framework on which is built up the structure of national energy and effort. (Trotter 1921: 166)

Communion? Communion! Communion...

The hive is no mere herd or pack, but **an elaborate mechanisms for making use by co-ordinate and unified action** of the utmost powers of the individual members. It is something which appears to be a complete substitute for individual existence, and as we have already said, seems like **a new creature rather than a congeries united for some comparatively few and simple purposes**. (Trotter 1921: 166b)

Mechanization? Mechanization! Mechanization...

The wolk is united for attack, the sheep is united for defence, but **the bee is united for all the activities and feelings of its life.** (Trotter 1921: 167)

The faint crispy smell of totalitarianism.

Socialized gregariousness is the goal of man's development. **A transcendental union with his fellows is the destiny of the human individual**, and it is the attainment of this towards which the constantly growing altruism of man is directed. (Trotter 1921: 167)

"Socialized gregariousness is the goal of man's development." [Citation needed] - *Boy, go get the Bible.*

The aggressive type was illustrated very fully by the peoples who profited by the disintegration of the Roman Empire. These northern barbarians showed in the most perfect form the lupine type of society in action. The ideals and feelings exemplified by their sagas are comprehensible only when one understands the biological significance of them. It was a society of wolves marvelously indomitable in aggression but fitted for no other activity in any corresponding degree, and always liable to absorption by the peoples they had conquered. They were physically brave beyond belief, and made a religion of violence and brutality. To fight was for them man's supreme activity. **They were restless travellers and explorers, less out of curiosity than in search of prey**, and they irresistibly overran Europe in the missionary zeal of the sword and torch, each man asking nothing of Fate but, after a career of unlimited outrage and destruction, to die gloriously fighting. It is impossible not to recognize the psychological identity of these ideals with those which we might suppose a highly developed breed of wolves to entertain. (Trotter 1921: 168)

The described situation calls to mind a Youtube video about Turks invading Byzantine Empire in which the narrator compares to the way Islam worked in the caliphate to the way roman and catholic christianity worked with the vikings. Or, how Herman Sergo put it in *Vihavald* (1973), with swords first, missionaries after, and traders after them.

Herd instinct is manifested in three distinct types, the aggressive, the protective, and the socialized, which are exemplified by Nature by the wolf, the sheep, and the bee respectively. Either type can confer the advantages of the social habit, but **the socialized is that upon which modern civilized man has developed**. It is maintained here that the ambitious career consciously planned for Germany by those who had taken command of her destinies, and **the maintenance at the same time of her social system**, were inconsistent with the further development of gregariousness of the socialized type. New ideals, new motives, and new sources of moral power had therefore to be sought. They were found in a [] recrudescence of the aggressive type of gregariousness - in a reappearance of the society of the wolf. (Trotter 1921: 171-172)

The maintenance of the social system makes the role of socialization very apparent. But it is hard to shake the feeling that this kind of systematizing is too "ideal", as in Max Weber. Aren't the wolf, the sheep, and the bee hive very arbitrary examples? Wouldn't we get a clearer picture from primate studies and social anthropology?

The carrying out of the commands of the herd must be in itself an absolute satisfaction in which there can be no consideration of self. **Towards anything outside the herd he will necessarily be arrogant, confident, and inaccessible to the appeals of reason or feeling**. This tense bond of instinct, constantly keyed up to the pitch of action, will give him a certain simplicity of character and even ingeniousness, a [] coarseness and brutality in his

dealings with others, and **a complete failure to understand any motive unsanctioned by the pack.** (Trotter 1921: 172-173)

What appears to be the final analysis of incuriosity.

Since the beginning of this war attracted a really concentrated attention to the psychology of the German people, it has been very obvious that one of the most striking feelings amongst Englishmen has been bewilderment. They have found an **indescribable strangeness in the utterances of almost all German personages and newspapers**, in their diplomacy, in their **friendliness** to such as they wished to **propitiate**, in their **enmity** to those they wished to **alarm and intimidate**. This **strange quality** is very difficult to define or even to attempt to describe, and has very evidently perplexed almost all writers on the war. The only thing one can be sure of is that it is there. It shows itself at times as a simplicity or even childishness, as a boorish cunning, as **an incredible ant-like activity**, as a sudden blast of maniacal boasting, a reckless savagery of gloating in blood, **a simple-minded sentimentality**, as outbursts of idolatry, not of the pallid, metaphorical, modern type, but the full-blooded African kind, with all the apparatus of idol and fetish and tomtom, and with it all a steady confidence that these are the principles of civilization, of truth, of justice, and of Christ. (Trotter 1921: 173)

When I type into Google search, "russia is acting like", it gives the following suggestions for the search string: "like something struck in throat", "like he doesn't care", "like he has a hairball", "like a child", "like it wants to stall", "like enter key", "like it's out of gas", "like he can't breathe", "like a boyfriend", and "like a victim".

The incomprehensibility to the English of the whole trend of German feeling and expression suggests that there is some deeply rooted instinctive conflict of attitude

between them. One may risk the speculation that **this conflict is between socialized gregariousness and aggressive gregariousness**. As the result of the inculcation of national arrogance and aggression, Germany has lapsed into a special type of social instinct which has opened **a gulf of separation in feeling** between her and other civilized peoples. Such an effect is natural enough. Nothing produces **the sense of strangeness** so much as differences of instinctive reaction gives to us the appearance of strangeness and queerness in the behaviour of the cat as contrasted with the dog, which is so much more nearly **allied in feeling to ourselves**. (Trotter 1921: 174)

That famous sympathetic closeness extended from cats and dogs to the level of nationalities.

An intense but often ingenious and even childish national arrogance is a character that strikes one at once. It seems to be a serious and often a solemn emotion impregnably armoured against the comic sense, and expressed with a childlike confidence in its justness. **It is usually associated with a language of metaphor, which is almost always florid and banal, and usually grandiose and strident**. This fondness for metaphor and inability to refer to common things by plain names affects all classes, from Emperor to journalist, and gives an impression of peculiar childishness. **It reminds one of the primitive belief in the transcendental reality and value of names**. (Trotter 1921: 176)

Sounds like pathos.

It is quite unable to understand that to be moved to rage by an enemy is as much **a proof of slavish automatism** as to be moved to fear by him. The really extraordinary hatred for Englnd is, quite apart from the obvious association of its emotional basis with fear, a most interesting phenomenon. The fact that it was possible **to orga-**

nize so unanimous a howl shows very clearly how fully **the psychological mechanisms of the wolf** were in action. It is most instructive to find eminent men of science and philosophers bristling and baring their teeth with the rest, and would be another proof, if such were needed, of the infinite insecurity of **the hold of [] reason** in the most carefully cultivated minds when it is **opposed by strong herd feeling**. (Trotter 1921: 176-177)

Similar extension is applied on automatism and mechanization. In Malinowski's treatment, the issue pretends to be about speech and language when in context it has more to do with the sentiments and bonds of union ("a normal mechanism for inciting national enthusiasm and unity", *ibid*, 177).

In her negotiations with other people, and her estimates of national character, Germany shows the characteristic features of her psychological type in a remarkable way. It appears to be a principal thesis of hers that **altruism is, for the purposes of the statesman, non-existent, or if it exists in an evidence of degeneracy and a source of weakness**. The motives upon which a nation acts are, according to her, **self-interest and fear**, and in no particular has her "strangeness" been more fully shown than in the frank way in which she appeals to both, either alternatively or together. (Trotter 1921: 179)

America first, and the so-called border crisis. It is becoming clearer every day why so many have pointed towards Trump and uttered the F word.

How grossly, in fact, they conflict with **the biological theory of gregariousness** is clear enough. (Trotter 1921: 180)

I am beginning to realize that Trotter cites almost no authors. It may be that he does, in fact, rely on some earlier sources, but it is

not at all clear, and, if finding some of Malinowski's sources, it could take several years before I chance upon them. So, the biological theory of gregariousness. Certainly there are theories of human as a social animal (La Barre being a very obvious example), but it is not at all clear if Trotter's biological analogies are substantiated enough to encourage any comparison.

Most external commentators on modern German life have called attention to **the harshness which is apt to pervade social relations**. They tell us of **an atmosphere of fierce competition**, of **ruthless scandalmongering** [] and espionage, of insistence upon minute distinctions of rank and title, of **a rigid ceremonious politeness** which obviously has little relation to courtesy, of a deliberate cultivation by superiors of a domineering harshness towards their inferiors, of habitual cruelty to animals, and indeed of the conscious, deliberate encouragement of harshness and hardness of manner and feeling as laudable evidences of virility. The statistics of crime, the manners of officials, the tone of newspapers, the ferocious discipline of the Army, and the general belief that personal honour is stained by endurance and purified by brutality are similar phenomena. (Trotter 1921: 182-183)

Another atmosphere. Curiously, it draws in several aspects of PC (rumour and politeness, for example).

Horrible as has been the crime to which we have been recalled by each of these phrases, there has never been the slightest sign that the memory of it could acquire **a general currency of quotation**, and by that mechanism become a stronger factor in unity determination or endurance. (Trotter 1921: 185)

An early account of memes. Discussing so-called "war cries".

The biological meaning of these peculiarities renders them intelligible and consistent with one another. **The**

predaceous social animals in attack [] or pursuit are particularly sensitive to the encouragement afforded by one another's voices. The pack gives tongue because of the functional value of the exercise, which is clear of importance in **keeping individuals in contact with one another**, and in stimulating in each the due degree of aggressive rage. (Trotter 1921: 185-186)

Maintaining contact, huh. The whole situation appears as a spin on the growling dogs, now in a pack.

As long as such a nation is active and victorious in war, its moral resources cannot fail, and it will be capable of an indefinite amount of self-sacrifice, courage, and energy. Take away from it, however, the opportunities of continued aggression, interrupt the succession of victories by a few heavy defeats, and it must inevitably lose the perfection of its working as an engine of moral power. The ultimate and singular source of *inexhaustible* moral power in a gregarious unit is **the perfection of communion amongst its individual members.** (Trotter 1921: 187)

A high evaluation of communion.

The individual is gregarious by inheritance; the type according to which his gregarious reactions are manifested is not inherited, but will depend upon the form current in the herd to which he belongs, and handed down in it from generation to generation. (Trotter 1921: 197)

Nature and nurture solved.

A psychological hint of great value may be obtained from our knowledge of those animals whose gregariousness, like that of the Germans, is of the aggressive type. When it is thought necessary **to correct a dog by corporal measures**, it is found that the best effect is got by

what is rather callously called a **"sound" thrashing**. The animal must be left in no doubt as to who is the master, and his punishment must not be diluted by hesitation, nervousness, or compunction on the part of the punisher. The experience then becomes one from which the dog is capable of learning, and if the sense of mastery conveyed to him is unmistakable, he can assimilate the lesson without reservation or the desire for revenge. **However repulsive the idea may be to creatures of the socialized type, no sentimentalism and no pacifism theorizing can conceal the fact that the respect of a dog can be won by violence.** If there is any truth in the view I have expressed that the moral reactions of Germany follows the gregarious type which is illustrated by the wolf and the dog, it follows that **her respect is to be won by a thorough and drastic beating, and it is just that elementary respect for other nations, of which she is now entirely free, which it is the duty of Europe to teach her.** If she is allowed to escape under conditions which in any way can be sophisticated into a victory, or, at any rate, not a defeat, she will continue to hate us as she continued to hate her victim France. (Trotter 1921: 200)

What a great narrative. In WWII, Germany finally learned that lesson, and consequently mastered the European Union. But, then, another aggressive nation was left unpunished in that conflict, and now demonstrates its lack of respect for other nations by infringing upon their sovereignty. Russian unity definitely merits an examination. I saw a thread on rutracker where a Russian speaker living in Estonia shared pictures of her capital, Tallinn. The immediate response was, "how can you speak Russian and call anything but Moscow your capital?" The questioner ignores the fact that the Russian government has made little effort to serve its citizens, instead, it has scared away its brightest people to other parts of the world.

One of the most striking phenomena which observers of the bee have noticed is the absence of any obvious means of direction or government in the hive. **The queen seems to be valued merely for her functions, which are in no way directive.** Decisions of policy of the greatest moment appear, as far as we can detect, to arise spontaneously among the workers, and whether the future is to prove them right or wrong, are carried out without protest or disagreement. This capacity for unanimous decisions is obviously connected with the limited mental development of the individual, as is shown by the fact that in man it is very much more feeble. In spite of this, the unanimity of the hive is wonderfully effective and surprisingly successful. Speculators upon the physiology and psychology of bees have been forced - very tentatively of course - to imagine that **creatures living in such intensely close communion are able to communicate to one another, and, as it were, to a common stock**, such extremely [] simple conceptions as they can be supposed to entertain, and produce, so to say, **a communal mind** which comes to have, at any rate in times of crisis, **a quasi-independent existence.** The conception is difficult to express in concrete terms, and even to grasp in more than an occasional intuitive flash. Whether we are to entertain such a conception or are to reject it, the fact remains that societies of **a very closely communal habit** are apt to give **the appearance of being ruled as by a kind of common mind** - a veritable spirit of the hive - although no trace of any directive apparatus can be detected. (Trotter 1921: 203-204)

The mysterious, unempirical nature of common or communal mind.

Such deeply buried combined national impulses as we are here glancing at are far removed from the influence of pacifist or jingo. **Any attempt to define them must be a matter of guesswork and groping, in which**

the element of speculation is far in excess of the element of ascertained fact. (Trotter 1921: 206)

The collective mind is more fiction than fact.

In normal times a modern nation is made up of a society in which no regard is paid to moral unity, and in which therefore **common feeling is to [] a great extent unorganized and inco-ordinate.** In such a society the individual citizen cannot derive from the nation as a whole the full satisfaction of the needs special to him as a gregarious animal. The national feeling he experiences when at home among his fellows is too vague and remote to call forth the sense of moral vigour and security that his nature demands. As has already been pointed out the necessary consequence is the segregation of society into innumerable minor groups, each constituting in itself a small herd, and dispensing to its members the moral energy that in a fully organized society would come from the nation as a whole. Of such minor herds some are much more distinct from the common body than others. Some engage a part only of the life of their members, so that the individual citizen may belong to a number of groups and derive such moral energy as he possesses from a variety of sources. Thus in a fully segregated society in time of peace the moral support of the citizen comes from his social class and his immediate circle, his professional associations, his church, his chapel, his trade union and his clubs, rather than directly, from the nation in which he is a unity. (Trotter 1921: 214-215)

Thus, it must be remembered nearly the whole of the foregoing was considered from a special point of view.

First among such principles is the recognition of the fact that prejudice does not display itself as such to direct introspection. **One who is being [] influenced by prejudice will never be able to detect his biased judgments**

by an apparent defect in their plausibility or by any characteristic logical weakness. **Agreement or disagreement with common option** will as such be no help, since prejudice infests minorities no less than majorities. To suppose that when one has admitted the liability to prejudice one can free oneself from it by a direct voluntary effort is a common belief and an entirely fallacious one. (Trotter 1921: 220-221)

Another iteration of the reality check missing from introspection. See similar pronouncements by Peirce, Ruesch, and others. "Agreement and disagreement" appear in PC but now it can be connected with herd recognition.

The historical scale of events, with its narrow range, its reckoning by dynasties and parliaments, its judgments in terms of tribal censure and approbation, was found momentarily to march with the biological scale where events are measured by the survival or extinction of species, where time acquires a new meaning, and the individual man, [] however conspicuous historically, takes on **the insectlike sameness of his fellows**. (Trotter 1921: 231-232)

Gross homogeneity.

The essential factor in society, is **the subordination of the individual will to social needs**. Our statescraft is still ignorant of how this can be made a fair and honest bargain to the individual and to the state, and recent events have convinced a very large proportion of mankind that accepted methods of **establishing this social cohesion** have proved to them at any rate the worst of bargains. (Trotter 1921: 241)

This looks like what Malinowski began with.

The endowment of instinct that man possesses is in every detail cognate with that of other animals, provides no element that is not fully represented elsewhere, and above all - however little the individual man may be inclined to admit it - **is in no degree less vigorous and intense or less important in relation to feeling and activity than it is in related animals**. This supremely important side of mental life, then, will be capable of continuous illustration and illumination by biological methods. It is on the intellectual side of mental life that man's congruity with other animals is least obvious at first sight. The departure from type, however, is probably a matter of degree only, and not of quality. Put in the most general terms, the work of the intellect is to cause delay between stimulus and response, and under circumstances to modify the direction of the latter. We may suppose all stimulation to necessitate response, and that such response must ultimately occur with undiminished total energy. The intellect, however, is capable of delaying such response, and within limits of directing its path so that it may superficially show no relation to the stimulus of which it is the discharge. (Trotter 1921: 243)

Biosemioticians would agree. Although theoretically it introduces nothing but delay between *Merk* and *Wirk*.

The significance of this rich instinctive endowment lies in the fact that mental health depends upon instinct finding a balanced but vigorous expression in functional activity. The response to instinct may be infinitely varied, and may even, under certain circumstances, be not more than symbolic without harm to the individual as a social unit, but there are limits beyond which the restriction of it to indirect and symbolic modes of expression cannot be carried without serious effects on personality. **The individual in whom direct instinctive expression is unduly limited acquires a spiritual meagreness which makes**

him the worst possible social material. (Trotter 1921: 244)

Sounds like Herbert Spencer and "exact meaning" again.

It is the common character of large societies to suffer heavily from the restrictive effect on personality of the social instinct, and at the same time to suffer in the highest degree from the debilitation of the common social impulse. **Only in the smallest groups, such as perhaps way early republican Rome, can the common impulse inform and invigorate the whole society.** As the group expands and ceases to feel the constant pressure of an environment it no longer has to fear, the common impulse droops, and the society becomes segregated into classes, each of which a lesser herd within the main body and under **the reciprocated pressure of its fellows**, now yields to its members the social feeling which the main body [] can no longer provide. The passage of the small, vigorous, homogeneous and fiercely patriotic group into the large, lax, segregated and ultimately decadent group is a commonplace of history. (Trotter 1921: 245-246)

It would appear that this is the public that Durkheim is thinking of (a small homogeneous group). It looks like Le Bon is unavoidable.

No nation has even succeeded in liberating the personality of its citizens from the restrictive action of the social instinct and at the same time in maintaining national homogeneity and common impulse. **In a small community intercommunication among its individual members is free enough to keep common feeling intense and vigorous.** As the community increases in size the general intercommunication becomes attenuated, and with this common feeling is correspondingly weakened. If there were no other mechanism capable of inducing common action than the faint social stimulus coming

from the nation at large, **a segregated society would be incapable of national enterprise.** (Trotter 1921: 246)

This must be what Malinowski is getting at: free intercourse is no guarantee of establishing common sentiments.

Now leadership, potent as it undoubtedly is in calling forth the energy of the social instinct, is essentially a limited and therefore an exhaustible force. It depends for continued vigour upon successful enterprise. While it is succeeding there are only wide limits to the moral power it can set free and command, but in the face of misfortune and disaster its limitations become obvious, and its power inevitably declines. On the other hand, the moral power yielded by **a true community of feeling**, and not imposed by leadership, is enormously more resistant and even indestructible by failure and defeat. History gives many examples of the encounters of communities of these two types - the led society and the homogeneous society - and in spite of the invariably greater size and physical power of the former, frequently records the astoundingly successful resistance its greater moral vigour has given to the latter. (Trotter 1921: 247)

A theoretical abstraction of the foregoing discussion of WWI from the perspectives of England and Germany. Germany might have had aggressive and disciplined leadership but England unified more effectively against its foe.

During the war itself the submission to leadership that England showed was characteristic of the socialized type. It was to a great extent spontaneous, voluntary, and undisciplined, and gave repeated evidence that **the passage of inspiration was essentially from the common people to its leaders rather than from the leaders to the common people.** When the current of inspiration sets persistently in this direction, as it unquestionably did in England, it is very plain that the primitive type of

leadership that has led so many civilizations to disaster is no longer in unmodified action. (Trotter 1921: 149)

Top-down and bottom-up.

Perhaps most important of all, a scientific statecraft would understand that the social instinct itself is as deep and powerful as any, and hungrily demands intense and positive gratification and expression. **The social instinct drives the individual to seek union with some community of his fellows.** The whole national body is in the present state of society the smallest unit in which the individual can find complete and permanent satisfaction. As long as the average man's sense of possession in the state is kept so low as it is at present, as long as the sense of moral inequality between himself and his fellows is so vigorously maintained, so long will he continue to make his class rather than his nation the object of social passion, and so long will society continue to breed within itself a principle of death. (Trotter 1921: 253)

Again, the whole national body is IMO not the smallest unit in which the individual can find complete and permanent satisfaction. Some would argue that the smallest unit would be the family. But then what is complete and permanent satisfaction? Is there such a thing?

Let us consider, for example, **the intuitional doctrine of philosophic anarchism.** The nucleus of truth in this is the series of perfectly sound psychological conceptions that **all social discipline should be**, as experienced by the individual, **spontaneous and voluntary**, that man possesses the instinctive endowment which renders possible a voluntary organization of society, and that in such a society order would be more effectively maintained than under our present partially compulsory system. (Trotter 1921: 253)

In the index this is marked down as the psychological basis of anarchism.


The examination of **the functional satisfactoriness of society**, which has been a chief object of this book, has yielded a certain general body of conclusions. (Trotter 1921: 254)

Malinowski, then, examined the functional satisfactoriness of public conversation.

Such ostensible direction as societies obtain derives its sanction from one or more of three [] sources - the hereditary, the representative, and the official. No direction can be effective in the way needed for the preservation of society unless it comes from **minds broad in outlook, deep in sympathy, sensitive to the new and strange in experience, capable of resisting habit, convention, and the other sterilizing influences of the herd**, deeply learned in the human mind and vividly aware of the world. (Trotter 1921: 256-257)

Worldview, altruism, curiosity, and novelty. A brief summary of what I'll be paying attention to next.

An Introduction to Social Psychology



McDougall, William 1916. *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. Tenth Edition. London: Meuthen & Co.

I would not be taken to believe that my utterances upon any of the questions dealt with are **infallible or incapable of being improved upon**; but repeated expressions of deference and of the sense of my own uncertainty would be out of place in a semi-popular work of this character and would obscure the course of my exposition. (McDougall 1916: vi)

Good start. When reading such an old book on psychology one begins with the assumption that most of it would not hold up to modern views.

I would, therefore, repair what now seems to me a serious omission from the preface to the first edition, by indicating my friends Professor William James, Lloyd Mor-

gan, and **G. F. Stont** as the writers from whose works I have acquired my notions as to the nature of instinct and conation and their role in mental life, and whom I would like to claim as spiritual fathers of whatever is of value in this book. (McDougall 1916: x)

If you turn *u* upside down, it becomes an *n*. The typesetter must have used a mirror.

It is, then, a remarkable fact that psychology, the science which claims to formulate **the body of ascertained truths about the constitution and working of the mind**, and which endeavours to refine and to add to this knowledge, has not been generally and practically recognised as the essential common foundation on which all the social sciences - **ethics, economics, political science, philosophy of history, sociology, and cultural anthropology**, and the more special social sciences, such as the sciences of religion, of law, of education, and of art - must be built up. (McDougall 1916: 1)

Semiotics, likewise, cannot do without some psychology. In fact, some psychology (e.g. the laws of association) is an implicit and inextricable part of most semiotic theories.

A certain number, perhaps the majority, of recent writers on social topics recognise the true position of psychology, but in practice are content to take as their psychological foundations **the vague and extremely misleading psychology embodied in common speech**, with the addition of a few hasty assumptions about the mind made to suit their particular purposes. (McDougall 1916: 2)

This must be "the common speech of mankind" ([Shand 1913: 18-19](#)).

The answer to such problems as the proper classification of conscious states, the analysis of them into their el-

ements, the nature of these elements and the laws of the compounding of them, have but little bearing upon the social sciences; the same may be said of the range of problems connected with the relations of soul and body, of psychical and physical process, of consciousness and brain processes; and also of the discussion of the more purely intellectual processes, of the way we arrive at the perception of relations of time and place or of likeness and difference, of the classification and description of **the intellectual processes of ideation, conception, comparison, and abstraction**, and of their relations to one another. (McDougall 1916: 3)

More inclusive than mere "ideas and reflection" ([Shand 1914: 245](#)).

The cognitive or intellectual processes, on the other hand, present a rich and varied content of consciousness which lends itself well to introspective discrimination, analysis, and description; in comparison with it, **the emotional and conative consciousness** has but little variety of content, and that little is extremely obscure and elusive of introspection. (McDougall 1916: 7)

"These three 'elements,' called also 'aspects,' and sometimes 'functions,'" ([Shand 1914: 82-83](#)) are now types of consciousness.

First in importance perhaps as a topic for controversy was the doctrine known as **psychological hedonism**, the doctrine that the motives of all human activity are the desire of pleasure and the aversion to pain. Hand in hand with this went the false assumption that happiness and pleasure are synonymous terms. (McDougall 1916: 8)

The pleasure principle. The difference between happiness and pleasure may follow along the lines of the difference between joy and pleasure (cf. [Shand 1914: 272](#)).

Many of those who adopted some form of this last assumption were in the habit of supplementing it by similar assumptions hastily made to afford explanations of any tendencies they noted in human conduct which their master principle was inadequate to meet; they postulated strange instincts of all kinds **as lightly and easily as a conjurer produces eggs from a hat or a phrenologist discovers bumps on a head.** (McDougall 1916: 8)

Phraseology. Could be said about the way new terminology is produced in some quarters (e.g. phaticisms).

It is instructive to note that as recently as the year 1893 the late Professor H. Sidgwick, one of the leaders of the ethical thought of his time, still inverted the problem; like his predecessors he assumed that moral or reasonable action is normal and natural to man in virtue of some vaguely conceived principle, and in all seriousness wrote an article **to prove that "unreasonable [] action" is possible and is actually achieved occasionally**, and to explain if possible this strange anomalous fact. He quotes Bentham's dictum that "on the occasion of every act he exercises every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness." He points out that, although J. S. Mill admitted certain exceptions to this principle, his general view was that "to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical impossibility." So that, according to this school, any action of an individual that does not tend to produce for him the maximum of pleasure can only arise from an error of judgment as to the relative quantities of pleasure that will be secured by different lines of action. And, since, according to this school, all actions ought to be directed to securing a maximum of pleasure, action of any other kind is not only unreasonable action, but also immoral action; for it is action in a way other than the way

in which the individual knows he ought to act. Sidgwick then goes on to show that the doctrine that unreasonable action (or wilful action not in accordance with what the individual knows that he ought to do) is exceptional, paradoxical, or abnormal is not peculiar to the utilitarians, but is common also to their opponents; he takes as an example T. H. Green, who "still lays down as broadly as Bentham that every person in every moral action, virtuous or vicious, presents to himself some possible state or achievement of his own as for the time his greatest good, and acts for the sake of that good, and that this is how he ought to act." (McDougall 1916: 8-9)

This is Sidgwick's "[Unreasonable Action](#)" (1893), and the exact polemic in Dostoevsky's *Notes from the Underground*.

For, as Dr. Rashdall well says, "the raw material, so to speak, of Virtue and Vice is the same - *i.e.*, desires which in themselves, abstracted from their relation to the higher self, are not either moral or immoral but simply non-moral." That is to say, the fundamental problem of social psychology is the moralisation of the individual by the society into which he is born as a creature in which the non-moral and purely egoistic tendencies are so much stronger than any altruistic tendencies. This **moralisation or socialisation of the individual** is, then, the essential theme of this section. (McDougall 1916: 18)

The problem of the looking glass self, of the origin or emergence of the superego, or the socialized "me".

The human mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action, whether individual or collective, and are the bases from which the character and will of individuals and of nations are gradually developed under the guidance of the intellectual faculties. **These primary innate tendencies have different relative**

strengths in the native constitutions of the individuals of different races, and they are favoured or checked in very different degrees by the very different social circumstances of men in different stages of culture; but they are **probably common to the men of every race and of every age**. If this view, that human nature has everywhere and at all times this **common native foundation**, can be established, it will afford a much-needed basis for speculation on the history of the development of human societies and human institutions. (McDougall 1916: 19)

Nature vs. nurture, national characteristics and human nature.

Contemporary writers of all classes make frequent use of the words "instinct" and "instinctive," but, with very few exceptions, they use them so loosely that they have almost spoilt them for scientific purposes. On the one hand, the adjective "instinctive" is commonly applied to every human action that is performed without deliberate reflexion; on the other hand, the actions of animals are popularly attributed to instinct, and in this connexion instinct is vaguely conceived as a mysterious faculty, utterly different in nature from any human faculty, which Providence has given to the brutes because the higher faculty of reason has been denied them. Hundreds of passages might be quoted from contemporary authors, even some of considerable philosophical culture, to illustrate how these two words are used with **a minimum of meaning**, generally with the effect of disguising from the writer the obscurity and incoherence of his thought. (McDougall 1916: 20-21)

Hence why Gregory Bateson, in his metalogue on "What is an instinct?" (1969) likens instincts to black boxes in engineering, which "really explains nothing".

These are favourable examples of current usage, and they justify the statement that these words "instinct" and

"instinctive" are commonly used as **a cloak for ignorance** when a writer attempts to explain any individual or collective action that he fails, or has not tried, to understand. (McDougall 1916: 22)

Exactly. Though, if fingers need pointing, this very book inspired many writers, Malinowski included, to cover themselves in this cloak.

There is every reason to believe that even the most purely instinctive action is the outcome of a distinctly mental process, one which is incapable of being described in purely mechanical terms, because it is a psycho-physical process, involving psychical as well as physical changes, and one which, like every other mental process, has, and can only be fully described in terms of, **the three aspects of all mental process - the cognitive, the affective, and the conative aspects**; that is to say, every instance of instinctive behaviour involves **a knowing of some thing or object, a feeling in regard to it, and a striving towards or away from that object**. (McDougall 1916: 26)

"Striving" is an adequate equivalent for conation. Otherwise this is standard tax.

The impression must be supposed to excite, not merely detailed changes in **the animal's field of sensation**, but a sensation or complex of sensations that has **significance or meaning for the animal**; hence we must regard the instinctive process in its cognitive aspect as distinctly of the nature of perception, however rudimentary. (McDougall 1916: 28)

What is an *Umwelt*?

The behaviour of some of the lower animals seems to be almost completely determined throughout their lives

by instincts modified but very little by experience; they **perceive, feel, and act** in a perfectly definite and invariable manner whenever a gives instinct is excited - i.e., whenever the presence of the appropriate object coincides with the appropriate organic state of the creature. (McDougall 1916: 30)

Cognition replaced by perception. *Animals don't think, don't you know?*

Now, the innate psycho-physical disposition, which is an instinct, may be regarded as consisting of three corresponding parts, **an afferent, a central, and a motor or efferent part**, whose activities are the cognitive, the affective, and the conative features respectively of the total instinctive process. The afferent or receptive [] part of the total disposition is some organised group of nervous elements or neurones that is specially adapted to receive and to elaborate the impulses initiated in the sense-organ by the native object of the instinct; its constitution and activities determine the sensory content of the psycho-physical process. From the afferent part the excitement spreads over to the central part of the disposition; the constitution of this part determines in the main the distribution of the nervous impulses, especially of the impulses that descend to modify the working of the visceral organs, the heart, lungs, blood-vessels, glands, and so forth, in the manner required for the most effective execution of the instinctive action; the nervous activities of this central part are the correlates of the affective or emotional aspect or feature of the total psychical process. The excitement of the efferent or motor part reaches it by way of the central part; its constitution determines the distribution of impulses to the muscles of the skeletal system by which the instinctive action is effected, and its nervous activities are the correlates of the conative element of the psychical process, of the felt impulse to action. (McDougall 1916: 32-33)

Just like I thought, the affective, cognitive, and conative aspects are comparable to Ruesch's scheme of input, central processing, and output (or perception, evaluation, and action; see his "Synopsis of the Theory of Human Communication", [Ruesch 1953a](#)).

The answer to the second question is that pleasure and pain are not in themselves springs of action, but at the most of undirected movements; they serve rather to modify instinctive processes, **pleasure tending to sustain and prolong any mode of action**, pain to cut it short; under their prompting and guidance are effected those modifications and adaptations of the instinctive bodily movements which we have briefly considered above. (McDougall 1916: 43)

Remarkable affinity between maintaining, sustaining, and prolonging, as "Joy tends to maintain the self in its present relation to the object" ([Shand 1914: 281](#)).

It has often been remarked that **the emotions are fluid and indefinable, that they are in perpetual flux and are experienced in an infinite number of subtle varieties**. This truth may be used as an argument against the propriety of attempting to exhibit all the many varieties of our emotional experience as reducible by analysis to a small number of distinct primary emotions. (McDougall 1916: 45)

I tend to agree with this, and have trouble comprehending new philosophical approaches to emotion which take them to be concrete items readily available to introspection.

The word "emotion" is used [[]] of course in popular speech loosely and somewhat vaguely, and **psychologists are not yet completely consistent in their use of it**. But all psychological terms that are taken from common speech have to undergo **a certain specialisation and more rigid definition** before they are fit for scientific

use; and in using the word "emotion" in the restricted sense which is indicated above, and which will be rigidly adhered to throughout these pages, I am but carrying to its logical conclusion a tendency displayed by the majority of recent English writers on psychology. (McDougall 1916: 46-47)

A terminological dictum.

Of all the excitants of this instinct the most interesting, and the most difficult to understand as regards its mode of operation, is **the unfamiliar or strange as such**. Whatever is totally strange, whatever is violently opposed to the accustomed and familiar, is apt to excite fear both in men and animals, if only it is capable of attracting their attention. It is, I think, doubtful whether an eclipse of the moon has even excited the fear of animals, for the moon is not an object of their attention; but for savage men it has always been an occasion of fear. (McDougall 1916: 54)

Fear and strangeness still going hand in hand. But how does the author know what has *always* occasioned fear in savage men?

But fear, once roused, haunts the mind; it comes back alike in dreams and in waking life, bringing with it vivid memories of the terrifying impression. It is thus **the great inhibitor of action**, both present action and future action, and becomes in primitive human societies **the great agent of social discipline through which men are led to the habit of control of the egoistic impulses**. (McDougall 1916: 55)

Is it fear, which, as [Spencer \(1876: 12-13\)](#) puts it, "checks impulsiveness"?

The manners or speech of an otherwise presentable person may excite the impulse of shrinking in virtue of

some subtle suggestion of **sliminess**. Or what we know of a man's character - that it is noxious, or, as we significantly say, is of evil odour - may render the mere thought of him an occasion of disgust; we say, "It [] makes me sick to think of him"; and at the same time the face exhibits in some degree, however slight, the expression produced by the act of rejection of some evil-tasting substance from the mouth. In these cases we may see very clearly that this extension by resemblance or analogy does not take place in any roundabout fashion; it is not that the thought of the noxious or "slippery" character necessarily reproduces the idea of some evil-tasting substance or of some slimy creature. (McDougall 1916: 56-57)

There is a great leap between the instinctive repulsion from actual slime and the theophrastian character of sliminess.

Who has not seen a horse, or other animal, alternately approach in curiosity, and flee in fear from, some such object as an old coat upon the ground? (McDougall 1916: 58)

Everyone after the automobile revolution. [Viimane Ratsu](#) (Estonian language song, youtube).

This instinct, being one whose exercise is not of prime importance to the individual, exhibits **great individual differences as regards its innate strength**; and these differences are apt to be increased during the course of life, the impulse growing weaker for lack of use in those in whom it is innately weak, stronger through exercise in those in whom it is innately strong. (McDougall 1916: 59)

"Innate tendency" thus varies individually, as opposed to some universal innateness which today would be read along the lines of "hardwiredness".

To raise this objection would be to ignore **my consciousness of the personal relation and my personal attitude towards the striker**. The impulse, the thwarting of which in this case provokes my anger, is the impulse of self-assertion, which is habitually in play during **personal intercourse**. That this is the case we may see on reflecting the anger would not be aroused if the blow came from a purely impersonal source - if, for example, it came from a falling branch, or if the blow received from a person were clearly quite accidental and unavoidable under the circumstances. (McDougall 1916: 60)

Moving images of people, particularly male youth in asia, energetically kicking and punching a street light pole they themselves blindly bumped into. [/r/IdiotsFightingThings](#) provedis endless illustrations.

Ribot names the two emotions negative and positive **self-feeling** respectively, but since these names are **awkward in English**, I propose, in the interests of a consistent terminology, to call them the emotions of subjection and elation. (McDougall 1916: 62)

Not so in Estonian: *enesetunne* is literally self-feeling. This may account for why Estonian folk-psychology is difficult to translate into English - in all likelihood it originates from germanic and franco-phone sources (more probably the latter with its *Selbstgefühl*). [*The Psychology of the Emotions* \(1896\)](#).

The instinct of self-display is manifested by many of the higher **social or gregarious animals**, especially, perhaps, though not only, at the time of mating. Perhaps among mammals the horse displays it most clearly. The muscles of all parts are strongly innervated, the creature holds himself erect, his neck is arched, his tail lifted, his motions become **superfluously vigorous and extensive**, he lifts his hoofs high in air, as he parades before the eyes

of his fellows. [...] The **instinct** is essentially a **social** one, and is only brought into play [] by **the presence of spectators. Such self-display is popularly recognised as implying pride**; we say "How proud he looks!" and the peacock has become the symbol of pride. (McDougall 1916: 62-63)

Could "a flow of language" (superfluously vigorous and extensive speech) be a form of self-display? What is the social function of vanity?

Many children clearly exhibit this instinct of self-display; before they can walk or talk the impulse finds its satisfaction in **the admiring gaze and plaudits of the family circle** as each new acquirement is practiced; a little later it is still more clearly expressed by the frequently repeated command, "See me do this," or "See how well I can do so-and-so"; and for many a child more than half the delight of riding on a pony, or [] of wearing a new coat, consists in the satisfaction of this instinct, and vanishes if there be no spectators. A little later, with the growth of self-consciousness the instinct may find expression in **the boasting and swaggering of boys, the vanity of girls**; while, with almost all of us, it becomes the most important constituent of the self-regarding sentiment and plays an all-important part in the volitional control of conduct, in the way to be discussed in a later chapter. (McDougall 1916: 63-64)

Vanity makes an appearance just as anticipated. Define:swaggering - "walk or behave in a very confident and arrogant or self-important way".

For in certain mental diseases, especially in the early stages of that most terrible disorder, general paralysis of the insane, exaggeration of this emotion and of its **impulse of display** is the leading symptom. The unfortunate patient is perpetually in **a state of elated self-feeling**,

and his behaviour corresponds to his emotional state; he struts before the world, boasts of **his strength, his immense wealth, his good looks, his luck, his family**, when, perhaps, there is not the least foundation for his boastings. (McDougall 1916: 64)

Note that the list roughly corresponds to the all too familiar one found in Spencer, Trotter, Shand, and Malinowski. In *The Foundation of Character* there are numerous such lists: women, power, and reputation; superiority and power; existence, wealth, power, reputation, pleasure, and happiness; fame, power, and money.

The view of the origin of parental tenderness here adopted compares, I think, very favourably with other accounts of its genesis. Bain taught that it is generated in the individual by the frequent repetition of the intense pleasure of contact with the young; though **why this contact should be so highly pleasurable he did not explain**. (McDougall 1916: 70)

Analogous to Zuckerman's critique of Malinowski's positive bonds. It is not readily apparent why constant association alone should foster amiable relations between people.

Long ago the Roman moralists were perplexed by it. They noticed that in the Sullan prosecutions, **while many sons denounced their fathers, no father was ever known to denounce his son**; and they recognised that this fact was inexplicable by their theories of conduct. For their doctrine was like that of Bain, who said explicitly: "Tender feeling is as purely self-seeking as any other pleasure, and makes no inquiry as to the feelings of the beloved personality. It is by nature pleasurable, but does not necessarily cause us to seek the good of the object farther than is needful to gratify ourselves in the indulgence of the feeling." (McDougall 1916: 71)

This may be part of why the Latvian movie "Ausma" (2015, [trailer](#)) was so off-putting; in it, a father kills his son for betraying him to the communists (because he killed the mother). Bain appears to be anticipating Dawkins' selfish gene theory.

In a similar direct fashion the distress of any adult (towards whom we **harbour no hostile sentiment**) evokes the emotion; but in this case it is more apt to be complicated by sympathetic pain, when it becomes **the painful, tender emotion we call pity**; whereas the child, or any other helpless and delicate thing, may call it out in the pure form without alloy of sympathetic pain. (McDougall 1916: 74)

Phraseology for the bonds of antipathy. Malinowski's whole point appears to be that in expressions of sympathy we don't *really* feel any painful, tender emotions but fulfill a social obligation.

For, as was said above, this **disinterested indignation** is the ultimate root of justice and of public law; without its support law and its machinery would be most inadequate safeguards of personal rights and liberties; and, in opposition to the moral indignation of a majority of members of any society, **laws can only be very imperfectly enforced by the strongest despotism, as we see in Russia at the present time.** (McDougall 1916: 75)

Russia was and continues to be a lawless, despotic state. Disinterested indignation, on the other hand, could well describe the modern online obsession of getting deeply offended on behalf of marginalized people groups (e.g. unmerited cries of cultural appropriation).

His statement is that **sympathy is the prompting to take on the pains and pleasures of another being**, and to endeavour to abolish that other's pain and to prolong his pleasure. [[] But, if we use more accurate language, we

shall have to say that the sympathetic pain or pleasure **we experience is immediately evoked in us by the spectacle of pain or of pleasure**, and that we then act on it because it is our own pain or pleasure; and the action we take (so long as no other principle is at work) is **directed to cut short our own pain and to prolong our own pleasure, quite regardless of the feelings of the other person**. (McDougall 1916: 77-78)

Psychological hedonism indeed. Expressions of sympathy (condolences) have no magic capability to reduce another's sufferings.

Our susceptibility to sympathetically induced pain or pleasure, operating alone, simply inclines us, then, **to avoid the neighbourhood of the distressed and to seek the company of the cheerful**; but tender emotion draws us near to the suffering and the sad, seeking to alleviate their distress. (McDougall 1916: 78)

Another way of saying no-one likes being around downers. Misery may love company but company does not love misery.

The gregarious instinct is one of the human instincts of greatest social importance, for it has played a great part in moulding societal forms. The affective aspect of the operation of this instinct is not sufficiently intense or specific to have been given a name. The instinct is displayed by many species of animals, even by some very low in the scale of mental capacity. Its operation in its simplest form implies none of the higher qualities of mind, neither sympathy nor capacity for mutual aid. Mr. Francis Galton has given the classical description of the operation of the crude instinct. Describing the South African ox in Damaraland, he says he **displays no affection for his fellows**, and hardly seems to notice their existence, so long as he is among them; but, if he becomes separated from the herd, he displays an extreme distress that will not let him rest until he succeeds in rejoining it,

when he hastens to bury himself in the midst of it, **seeking the closest possible contact with the bodies of his fellows**. There we see the working of the gregarious instinct in all its simplicity, **a mere uneasiness in isolation and satisfaction in being one of a herd**. Its utility to animals liable to the attacks of beasts of prey is obvious. (McDougall 1916: 84)

Mere copresence. See also notes marked with autophobia.

The instinct is commonly strongly confirmed by habit; the individual is born into a society of some sort and grows up in it, and the **being with others and doing as they do** becomes a habit deeply rooted in the instinct. It would seem to be a general rule, the explanation of which is to be found in the principle of sympathetic emotion to be considered later, that the more numerous **the herd or crowd or society** in which the individual finds himself the more complete is the satisfaction of this impulse. (McDougall 1916: 84)

Imitation enters the picture: "The real rule guiding human behaviour is this: "what everyone else does, what appears as norm of general conduct, this is right, moral and proper. Let me look over the fence and see what my neighbour does, and take it as a rule for my [[] behaviour." So acts every 'man-in-the-street' in our own society" ([Malinowski 1922](#): 326-327).

The gregarious instinct is no exception to the rule that the human instincts are liable to **a morbid hypertrophy** under which their emotions and impulses are revealed with exaggerated intensity. The condition known to alienists as **agoraphobia** seems to result from the morbidly intense working of this instinct - the patient will not remain alone, will not cross a wide empty space, and seeks always to be surrounded by other human beings. But of the normal man also it is true that, as Professor James says: "To be alone in one of the greatest of evils for

him. Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilised countries to adopt. To one long pent up on a desert island the sight of a human footprint or a human form in the distance [] would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences." (McDougall 1916: 85-86)

Didn't know agoraphobics don't want to "remain alone". The hypertrophy of the social instinct is illustrated these days by the army of NEETs living in basements, attics, or shut in their room for decades. As to James's quote, solitary confinement has been known to cause irreparable psychological damage.

In civilised communities we may see evidence of the operation of this instinct on every hand. For all but a few exceptional, and generally highly cultivated, persons **the one essential condition of recreation is the being one of a crowd**. The normal daily recreation of the population of our towns is to go out in the evening and to walk up and down the streets in which the throng is densest [...] (McDougall 1916: 86)

"Recreation" has indeed been floating around for a while. Like the rest of this page, Malinowski also addresses "organized recreation" (cf. [Malinowski 1942](#): 1239).

The possession of this instinct, even in great strength, does not necessarily imply **sociability of temperament**. Many a man leads in London a most solitary, unsociable life, who yet would find it hard to live far away from the thronged city. Such men are like Mr. Galton's oxen, **unsociable but gregarious**; and they illustrate the fact that **sociability**, although it has the gregarious instinct at its foundation, **is a more complex, more highly developed, tendency**. As an element of this more complex tendency to sociability, the instinct largely determines the forms of the recreations of even the cultured classes, and is the root of no small part of **the pleasure we find in atten-**

dance at the theatre, at concerts, lectures, and all such entertainments. How much more satisfying is a good play if one sits in a well-filled theatre than if half the seats are empty; especially if the house is unanimous and loud in the expression of its feelings! But this instinct has in all ages produced more important social effects that must be considered in a later chapter. (McDougall 1916: 87)

That's a good point - collective activities are not necessarily social. The cinema is a suitable illustration in place of the theater; the experience is greatly improved if the crowd laughs together at a joke, for example.

The three most important of these pseudo-instincts, as they might be called, are **suggestion, imitation, and [] sympathy**. They are closely allied as regards their effects, for in each case the process in which the tendency manifests itself involves an interaction between at least **two individuals, one of whom is the agent, while the other is the person acted upon or patient**; and in each case the result of the process is some degree of assimilation of the action and mental state of the patient to those of the agent. They are **three forms of mental interaction of fundamental importance for all social life**, both of men and animals. These processes of **mental interaction, of impression and reception**, may involve chiefly the cognitive aspect of mental process, or its affective or its conative aspect. In the first case, when **some presentation, idea, or belief of the agent directly induces a similar presentation, idea, or belief in the patient, the process is called one of suggestion**; when an affective or emotional excitement of the agent induces a similar affective excitement in the patient, the process is one of sympathy or **sympathetic induction of emotion or feeling**; when the most prominent result of the process of interaction is **the assimilation of the bodily movements of the pa-**

tient to those of the agent, we speak of imitation. (McDougall 1916: 90-91)

Suggestion, thus is the communication of ideas. Sympathy is the communization of emotions. And imitation concerns bodily movements. A very natural extension of the triad to dyadic interaction. Malinowski's apophaticity can now be scrutinized more closely.

The word "sympathy," as popularly used, generally implies **a tender regard for the person with whom we are said to sympathise.** But such sympathy is only one special and complex form of sympathetic emotion, in the strict and more general sense of the words. The fundamental and primitive form of sympathy is exactly what the word implies, **a suffering with,** the experiencing of any feeling or emotion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion. (McDougall 1916: 92)

Exactly the reason why "pity" comes up so frequently in connection with sympathy. "Sympathy is emotion caused by what seems to be the emotion or sensation of another, and having a tendency to dispose to kindness; e.g. pity, and convivial emotion" ([Clay 1882](#): 141). McDougall gives the source as Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 563.

Sympathy of this crude kind is **the cement that binds animal societies together,** renders the actions of all members of a group harmonious, and allows them to repeat some of the prime advantages of social life in spite of lack of intelligence. (McDougall 1916: 93)

One of the earliest instance of this trope that I have on record.

Their sympathetic sensibility merely leads them to avoid all contact with distressful persons, books, or scenes, and **to seek the company of the careless and the gay.** (McDougall 1916: 96)

And "joyous natures feel joy in all company that is not disobliging" ([Shand 1914: 151](#)).

"Suggestion" is a word that has been taken over from popular speech and been specialised for psychological use. But even among psychologists it has been used in two rather different senses. A generation ago it was used in a sense very similar to that which it has in common speech; **one idea was said to suggest another**. But this purpose is adequately served by the word "reproduction," and there is a growing tendency to use "suggestion" only in a still more technical and strict manner, and it is in this stricter sense that it is used in these pages. Psychologists have only in recent years begun to realise the vast scope and importance of suggestion and suggestibility in social life. Their attention was directed to the study of suggestion by the recognition that the [] phenomena of hypnotism, so long disputed and derided, are genuine expressions of a peculiar abnormal conditions of the mind, and that the leading symptom of this condition of hypnosis is **the patient's extreme liability to accept with conviction any proposition submitted to him**. This peculiar condition was called one of suggestibility, and **the process of communication between agent and patient which leads to the latter's acceptance of any proposition was called suggestion**. There was for some time a tendency to regard suggestibility as necessarily an abnormal condition and suggestion as a psychological curiosity. But very quickly it was seen that **there are many degrees of suggestibility**, ranging from the slight degree of the normal educated adult to the extreme degree of the deeply hypnotised subject, and that suggestion is a process constantly at work among us, the understanding of which is of extreme importance for the social sciences. (McDougall 1916: 96-97)

Thus, not simply communication of ideas but an *uncritical* one. Today, this is a problem we're facing with fake news and memes -

even if the content shared is manifestly false and easily disprovable, the effects are still lasting. "Anyone who wishes to produce an effect upon it needs no logical adjustment in his arguments; he must paint in the most forcible colours, he must exaggerate, and he must repeat the same thing again and again" ([Freud 1922: 16-17](#)).

The following definition will, I think, cover all varieties: *Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance.* The measure of the suggestibility of any subject is, then, the readiness with which he thus accepts propositions. Of course, the proposition is not necessarily communicated in formal language, it may be implied by a mere gesture or interjection. (McDougall 1916: 97)

This meaning has been retained in the common expression that someone is extremely "suggestible", i.e. gullible.

A few words must be said about *contra-suggestion*. By this word it is usual to denote the mode of action of one individual on another which results in the second accepting, in the absence of adequate logical grounds, the contrary of the proposition asserted or implied by the agent. There are persons with whom this result is very liable to be produced by any attempt to exert suggestive influence, or even by the most ordinary and casual utterance. **One remarks to such a person that it is a fine day, and, though, up to that moment, he may have formulated no opinion about the weather, and have been quite indifferent to it, he at once replies, "Well, I don't agree with you. I think it is perfectly horrid weather."** Or one says to him, "I think you ought to take a holiday," and, though he had himself contemplated this course, he replies, "No, I don't need one," and becomes more immovably fixed in this opinion and the corresponding course of action the more he is urged to adopt their opposites.

Some children display this contra-suggestibility very strongly for a period and [] afterwards return to a normal degree of suggestibility. But in some persons it becomes habitual or chronic; they take a pride in doing and saying nothing like other people, in dressing and eating differently, in defying all the minor social conventions. Commonly, I believe, **such persons regard themselves as displaying great strength of character and cherish their peculiarity.** In such cases the permanence of the attitude may have very complex mental causes; but in its simpler instances, and probably at its inception in all instances, contra-suggestion seems to be determined by the undue dominance of the impulse of self-assertion over that of submission, owing to the formation of some rudimentary sentiment of dislike for personal influence resulting from an unwise exercise of it - a sentiment which may have for its object the influence of some one person or personal influence in general. (McDougall 1916: 101)

The attitude of a man who dislikes talking about weather. For my purposes it is important that talking about weather can be an illustration of suggestion.

We owe to Mr. A. F. Shand the recognition of features of our mental constitution of a most important kind that have been strangely overlooked by other psychologists, and the application of the word "sentiments" to denote features of this kind. Mr. Shand points out that our emotions, or, more strictly speaking, our emotional dispositions, tend to become organised in systems about the various objects and classes of objects that excite them. Such an organised system of emotional tendencies is not a fact or mode of experience, but is a feature of the complexly organised structure of the mind that underlies all our mental activity. To such **an organised system of emotional tendencies centred about some object** Mr. Shand proposes to apply the name "sentiment." This application of the word is in fair accordance with its usage in popular

speech, and there can be little doubt that it will rapidly be adopted by psychologists. (McDougall 1916: 122)

This definition is all well and good but I don't see one could reconcile this with Malinowski's use of the word, lest the various objects of desire (e.g. power, wealth, women, etc.) are the objects meant here, which does not appear to be the case. In any case the trouble is explaining how such objects act as social stimuli, i.e. how and why they should bring people into social union.

The conception of a sentiment, as defined by Mr. Shand, enables us at once to reduce to order many of the facts of the life of impulse and emotion, a province of psychology which hitherto has been **chaotic and obscure**. (McDougall 1916: 122)

This may have appeared to be the case at the time but after this type of psychology became unfashionable the sentiments have returned to chaotic obscurity.

Thus, as Shand points out, when a man has acquired the sentiment of love for a person or other object, he is apt to experience tender emotion in its presence, fear or anxiety when it is in danger, anger when it is threatened, sorrow when it is lost, joy when the object prospers or is restored to him, gratitude towards him who does good to it, and so on; and, when he hates a person, **he experiences fear or anger or both on his approach**, joy when that other is injured, anger when he receives favours. (McDougall 1916: 124)

The situation described by Malinowski, thus, assumes that natural man *hates* the members of surrounding tribes.

The act that, more certainly than any other, provokes vengeful emotion is **the public insult, which, if not immediately resented, lowers one in the eyes of one's fellows**. Such an insult calls out one's positive self-feeling,

with its impulse to assert oneself and to make good one's value and power in the public eye. If the insult is at once avenged, the emotion is perhaps properly called *resentment*. It is when immediate satisfaction of the impulse of angry self-assertion is impossible that it gives rise to a painful desire; it is then the insult rankles in one's breast; and this desire can only be satisfied by an assertion of one's power, by returning an equally great or greater insult or injury to the offender - by "getting even with him." (McDougall 1916: 140)

A more powerful stimulus to antipathy than mere disagreement.

Though the emotion is most easily evoked, perhaps, by public insult, it may arise also from **injury deliberately done to any part of the larger self**, any part of that large sphere of objects to which one's self-regarding sentiment extends - *e.g.*, injury or insult to one's **family or tribe, or to any larger society with which a man identifies himself**; [] this we see in the case of the blood-feuds, where the killing of one member of a family or tribe excites this emotion in all its other members, who continue to harbour it until they have "got even" with the family of the slayer by killing him or another of its members. On a still greater scale **it may be provoked as a collective emotion throughout a nation by defeat in war**. In this case the painful conation or desire that arises from the checked impulse of positive self-feeling is apt to predominate greatly over the element of anger. (McDougall 1916: 140-141)

Hence "watching intently for the first low hint of a growl, which will show one belongs to the wrong pack and must withdraw" ([Trotter 1921: 119-120](#)).

We are now in a position to inquire into the nature of sorrow and joy, which we have rejected from our list of primary emotions, because, as was said, they are **alge-**

donic or pleasure-pain qualifications of emotional states rather than emotions capable of standing alone. (McDougall 1916: 149)

Pertaining to both pleasure and pain.

Pity in its simplest form is tender emotion tinged with sympathetically induced pain. It differs from sorrow, which also is essentially a painful tender emotion, in the sympathetic character of the pain, and in that **it does not imply the existence of any sentiment of affection or love**, as sorrow does, and is therefore a more transient experience, and one with less tendency to look before and after. There is also, of course, a sorrowful pity, as when one watches the painful and mortal illness of a dear friend. In this case there is tender emotion and there is sympathetically induced pain which makes the state one of pity; but there is also pain arising from the prospect of the loss of the object of our sentiment of love, which makes the emotion a sorrowful one. That sorrow does not necessarily include an element of sympathetic pain is clearly shown by the sorrow of those who have lost a loved one whom they sincerely believe to have entered on a happier life. The pain of sorrow is, then, a **self-regarding** pain, whereas **the pain of pity is not**; hence pity is rightly regarded as the nobler emotion. (McDougall 1916: 153)

All this proceeds happily with the premise that pity must include sympathetically induced pain and expressions of sympathy have, in this sense, a self-regarding aspect.

It may be asked - If respect is thus a sentiment that has for its most essential constituents these self-regarding emotions, how can we properly be said to entertain respect for others? The answer is, I think, that **we respect those who respect themselves**, that our respect for another is a sympathetic reflexion of his self-respect; for

unless a man shows self-respect we never have respect for him, even though we may admire some of his qualities, or like, or even love, him in a certain degree. (McDougall 1916: 161)

My mind echoes rap lyrics to the effect that *you can't expect respect if you don't respect yourself*.

The older moralists frequently made use of the expression "self-love," and in doing so generally confounded under this term two different sentiments, self-love and self-respect. **Self-love** is fortunately a comparatively rare sentiment; it **is the self-regarding sentiment of the thoroughly selfish man, the meaner sort of egoist**. Such a man feels a tender emotion for [] himself, he indulges in self-pity; he may have little positive self-feeling and may be **incapable of shame**. (McDougall 1916: 161-162)

Today self-love is frequently understood in the sense of "the care of the self" ([Foucault 2005](#): 195), i.e. something to do with personal or spiritual growth. It's the stuff of unimaginative ladies of psychology who append a big bold PhD to their name on the cover of a book without a bibliography section.

The sentiment of affection for an equal generally takes its rise, not in simple tender emotion, but in admiration, or gratitude, or pity, and is especially developed by active sympathy. By **active sympathy** I mean sympathy in the fuller, more usual, sense of the word; we must carefully distinguish it from the simple, primitive, or passive sympathy discussed in Chapter IV. Active sympathy plays, or may play, a minor part in the genesis of the parental sentiment, but it **is of prime importance for the development of the sentiment of affection between equals**; for while the the former may be wholly one-sided, the latter can hardly become fully formed and permanent without **some degree of reciprocation** and of sympathy in this fuller sense. (McDougall 1916: 168)

How does this active sympathy compare to homogeneous sympathy, which "enhances a feeling of fellowship" ([Clay 1882](#): 142)?

Active sympathy presents a difficult problem, which we may consider in this connexion. It involves a reciprocal relation between at least two persons; **either party to the relation not only is apt to experience the emotions displayed by the other**, but he desires also that the other shall share his own emotions; he actively seeks the sympathy of the other, and, when he has **communicated his emotion** to the other, he attains a peculiar satisfaction which greatly enhances his pleasure and his joy, or, in the case of painful emotion, diminishes his pain. (McDougall 1916: 168)

What makes active sympathy active, then, is the establishment of homogeneous feelings, or, to use Malinowski's phrasing, establishment of common sentiments?

This relation of active sympathy is apt to grow up between any two persons who are **Thrown much together**, if they are **commonly stirred to similar emotions by similar objects**; and that can only be the case if they have **similar sentiments**. Two persons may live together for years, and, if their sentiments are very different, if one of them likes and dislikes the things that are for the most part indifferent to the other, there will be no habitual sympathy established between them. (McDougall 1916: 168)

Thus, active sympathy is premised on constant association and, as "habitual sympathy" hints, formation of common habits, as with "a constant companion like a college room-mate - who has attended the same classes, read the same books, seen the same entertainments, and knows the same people" ([La Barre 1954](#): 168).

The blind impulse of the gregarious animal to seek the company of his fellows, whenever one of his other

instincts is excited, becomes in us the desire of seeing ourselves surrounded by others who share our emotion; and it is apt to become directed to seeking the sympathetic response of some one person in whom we are sure of evoking it; and then, having become habitually directed to that person, it finds a more certain and complete and detailed satisfaction than is possible if it remains unspecialised. (McDougall 1916: 171)

A blunt paraphrase: "the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company" ([PC](#) 3.2) is a blind impulse shared by all gregarious species.

On the other hand, the person in whom this impulse is strong can find, when alone, no enjoyment in the things that give him, when in sympathetic company, the keenest delight. He may, for example, be an [\[\]](#) enthusiastic admirer of natural beauty; but if, by some strange chance, **he takes a walk alone through the most beautiful scenes, his emotional stirrings, which, if shared by others, would be a pure delight, are accompanied by a vague though painful desire**, whose nature he may or may not clearly recognise. And the chances are that he occupies himself in making mental notes of the scenes before him and hurries home to give a glowing description of them to some friend who, he knows, will be stirred in some degree to share his emotions. Some persons, in whom this impulse is but little specialised though strong and whose emotions are quick and vivid, are not satisfied until all about them share their emotions; they are pained and even made angry by the spectacle of any one remaining unmoved by the objects of their own emotions. (McDougall 1916: 172-172)

There is a modern analogue to be found in the case of laughing at a comedy movie or show - arguably laughter is a social affair, making it a rare case to laugh out loud when alone. This is why social

watching is so much an improved experience: alone, a good joke may induce a smirk, whereas in company it could induce roaring laughter.

But, although it is not in itself an altruistic impulse and is not in any sense the root of altruism, it is a most valuable adjunct to the tender emotion in the formation of altruistic sentiments and in **stimulating social co-operation for social ends**. The man that has it not at all, or in whom it has become completely specialised (*i.e.*, directed to some one or few persons only), will hardly become a leader and inspirer of others in the reform of social abuses, in the public recognition of merit, in public expression of moral indignation, or in any other of those collective expressions of emotion which do so much to **bind societies together**, even if they fail of achieving their immediate ends. (McDougall 1916: 173)

Bonds. "A surprisingly large part of every culture is merely the phatic sharing of common emotional burdens, and has no relevance at all to the outside world" ([La Barre 1954](#): 306).

Now, volition or voluntary control proceeds from the idea of the self and from the sentiment, or organised system of emotions and impulses, centred about that idea. Hence the study of **the development of self-consciousness** and of [] the self-regarding sentiment is an important part of the preparation for the understanding of social phenomena. And these two things, the idea of the self and the self-regarding sentiment, develop in such intimate relations with each other that they must be studied together. **This development is, as we shall see, especially a social process**, one which is dependent throughout upon the complex interactions between the individual and the organised society to which he belongs. (McDougall 1916: 174-175)

Although this book is not included in [The Mead Project](#), the phraseology and general idea here is clearly one Mead espoused in numerous iterations.

For we find that **the idea of the self and the self-regarding sentiment are essentially social products**; that their development is **effected by constant interplay between personalities, between the self and society**; that, for this reason, the complex conception of self thus attained implies **constant reference to others and to society in general**, and is, in fact, not merely **a conception of self**, but always of one's self **in relation to other selves**. This social genesis of the idea of self lies at the root of morality, and it was largely because this social origin and character of the idea of self was ignored by so many [] of the older moralists that they were driven to postulate a special moral faculty, the conscience or moral instinct. (McDougall 1916: 180-181)

The looking glass self and [the generalized other](#).

The word "self" or "ego" is used in several different senses in philosophical discourse, the clearest and most important of these being **the self as logical subject** and **the empirical self**. In considering the genesis of moral conduct and character, we need concern ourselves with the empirical self only. We may have a conception of the self as a substantial or enduring physical entity or soul whose states are our states of consciousness. Or we may hold that, **by the very nature of our thought and language, we are logically compelled to conceive, and to speak of, the self as one pole of the subject-object relation in terms of which alone we are able to describe our cognitive experience**, the knowing or being aware of anything. But such conceptions are products of reflexion arrived at comparatively late, if at all, in the process of individual mental development, long after the complex conception of the empirical self has been [] formed through

a multitude of experiences of a less reflective character.
(McDougall 1916: 181-182)

These seem to follow, roughly, the mind-body distinction. See also [Larry Holmes \(1966\)](#) views on this matter.

Now, the attitude of other persons towards him are more or less freely expressed by them in praise, reproof, gratitude, reproach, anger, pleasure or displeasure, and so forth. Hence, as he rapidly acquires insight into the meaning of these attitudes, **he constantly sees himself in the reflected light of their ideas and feelings about him, a light that colours all his idea of his self and plays a great part in building up and shaping that idea;** that is to say, he gets his idea of his self in large part by accepting the ideas of himself that he finds expressed by those about him. The process is well illustrated by the case of the unfortunate child who is constantly scolded and told that he is a naughty boy. (McDougall 1916: 186)

[The looking glass self](#), point blank.

The child comes gradually to understand his position as a member of a society indefinitely larger and more powerful than any circle of his acquaintances, a society which with **a collective voice** and irresistible power distributes rewards and punishments, praise and blame, and formulates its approval and disapproval in universally accepted maxims. This collective voice appeals to the self-regarding sentiment, humbles or elates us, calls out our shame or self-satisfaction, with even greater effect than the personal authorities of early childhood, and gradually supplants them more and more. (McDougall 1916: 196)

Analogous to "the voice of the herd" ([Trotter 1921: 109](#)).

It might well be contended that **positive self-feeling seeks merely to draw the attention of others to the self**, no matter what be the nature of the regards attracted;

that it finds its satisfaction simply in the fact of the self being noticed by others. There is much in the behaviour of human beings to justify this view - for example, the large number of **men who seek, and who are gratified by, mere notoriety**, some of whom will even commit criminal acts in order to secure notoriety; or again, the large number of people whose dress is clearly designed to attract attention, but which, even by the most disordered imagination, can hardly be supposed to excite admiration or approval; or again, **the curiously great satisfaction most of us find in seeing our names in a newspaper or in print of any kind.** (McDougall 1916: 197)

The function of renown. What is typomania? Apparently it is not merely an obsession with seeing one's own name in print but "an obsession with being published".

To many children this sense of isolation, of being cut off from the habitual **fellowship of feeling and emotion**, is, no doubt, the source of the severest pain of punishment; and moral disapproval, even though not formally expressed, soon begins to give them this painful sense of isolation; while approval gratifies the impulse of active sympathy and makes them **feel at one with their fellows**. And, as their **social circle widens** more and more, so the approval and disapproval of each wider circle give greater zest to their elation and a deeper pain to their shame, and are therefore more eagerly sought after or shunned in virtue of this impulse of active sympathy. (McDougall 1916: 201)

This is how, at least affectively, a person's social circle is "a sort of loosely compacted person" (CP 5.421).

There are, of course, great differences between men as regards **the delicacy with which they apprehend the attitudes of others towards them**. These differences are due in part to differences of intellectual power, but in

greater part to differences in the degree of development of the self-regarding sentiment. Any man in whom this sentiment is well developed will be **constantly observant of the signs of others' feelings in regard to him, and so will develop his powers of perceiving and interpreting the signs of the more delicate shades of feeling that do not commonly find deliberate expression.** On the other hand, one whose perceptions are dull and whose self-regarding sentiment is not strong will be moved only by the coarser expressions of general approval and disapproval, by open praise and blame. Of two such men, the one will be said in common speech to have a **sensitive conscience**, and the other to have a less delicate, or a relatively defective, conscience. (McDougall 1916: 202)

Sociosemiotics of the conscience. The difference is vaguely reminiscent of "Internalization of conflicts and blame on fate or self" and "Internalization of conflicts and blame on fate or self" ([Ruesch, Jacobson & Loeb 1972\[1948\]](#): 186), or, more bluntly, between character and circumstance.

These quasi-altruistic extensions of the egoistic sentiment constitute a very important part of the moral equipment of the individual; for they lead to the subjection of immediate personal ends in the service of social co-operation undertaken to secure the collective ends that individual action is powerless to achieve. They enrich our emotional life and raise our emotions and conduct to **an over-individual plane**. (McDougall 1916: 208)

The *supra*-individual plane, i.e. "the theoretical expression of the individual's submission to a larger community" ([Bauman 2010](#): 24).

No man could acquire by means of his own **unaided reflections** and unguided emotions any considerable array of moral sentiments; still less could he acquire in that way any consistent and lofty system of them. In the first place, **the intellectual process of discriminating and**

naming the abstract qualities of character and conduct is quite beyond the unaided power of the individual; in this process he finds indispensable aid in the language that he absorbs from his fellows. But he is helped not by language only; every civilised society has a more or less highly developed moral tradition, consisting of a system of traditional abstract sentiments. This moral tradition has been slowly formed and improved by the influence of the great and good men, the moral leaders of the race, through many generations; it has been **handed on from generation to generation in a living form** in the sentiments of the *élite*, the superior individuals of each generation, and has been embodied in literature, and, in partial fashion, in a variety of institutions, such as the Church. And every great and organised department of human activity, each [] profession and calling of a civilised society, has its own specialised form of the moral tradition, which in some respects may sink below, in other respects may rise above, the moral level of the unspecialised or general tradition. (McDougall 1916: 219-220)

The same exact arguments are employed when it comes to the question of "private signs" or how "there is no private property in language". "This is the truth expressed by T. H. Green when he wrote: "No individual can make a conscience for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him." (*ibid*, 220).

Rigid custom is **the cement of society** in the ages preceding the formation of a moral tradition, and the breaking of **the rigid bonds of custom**, bonds which were probably essential for the preservation of primitive societies, was the prime condition of the growth of the moral tradition of the progressive nations. In the same way, it is a prime condition of the moral progress of individuals; the individual also must not be bound in absolute obedience to any system of rules of conduct prescribed by custom or in any other manner. (McDougall 1916: 220)

The connection between the cement metaphor and the "bonds".

Among all these persons some will impress their abstract sentiments upon him more than others; and, in the main, those that so impress him will be those whose **power, or achievements, or position**, evoke his admiration. Of all the affective attitudes of one man towards another, admiration is that which renders him most susceptible [] to the other's influence; and it is easy to see why this should be so, if our analysis of admiration was correct. (McDougall 1916: 222-223)

Yet another list of *desiderata*. Power seems to be the most common item in such lists.

It was, I think, in the main because the older moralists neglected to take sufficiently into account the moral [] tradition and the way in which it becomes impressed upon us, and because **they treated of the individual in artificial abstraction from the social relations through which his moral sentiments are formed**, that they were led to maintain the hypothesis of some special faculty, the conscience, or the moral sense or instinct, or the moral consciousness, in seeking to account for moral conduct. (McDougall 1916: 228-229)

Older moralists, in other words, neglected the social construction of the conscience.

Once more, in volitional recollection of some fact we have forgotten, *e.g.*, the name of a man of whom we are thinking, our **volition merely holds the idea of this man before consciousness**, so thta it has the opportunity to develop its various aspects, its associative setting, the place and time and company in which we have seen the man; all of which, of course, increases the chance that his name will be reproduced or recollected. (McDougall 1916: 243)

Remembering itself is thus an unconscious process?

Moral advance and the development of volition consist, then, not in the coming into play of factors of a new order, whether called the will or the moral instinct or conscience, but in the development of the self-regarding sentiment and in the improvement or refinement of **the "gallery" before which we display ourselves, the social circle that is capable of evoking in us this impulse of self-display**; and this refinement may be continued until the "gallery" becomes an ideal spectator or group of spectators or, in the last resort, **one's own critical self standing as the representative of such spectators**. (McDougall 1916: 257)

"When one reasons it is that critical self [that internalized *other*] that one is trying to persuade" (PC 5.421).

One essential condition of strong character seems to be the organisation of the sentiments in some **harmonious system or hierarchy**. The most usual or readiest way in which such **systematisation of the sentiments** can be brought about, is the predominance of some one sentiment that in all circumstances is capable of supplying **a dominant motive, that directs all conduct towards the realisation of one end to which all other ends are subordinated**. The dominant sentiment may be a concrete or an abstract sentiment; it may be the love of money, of home, of country, of justice. When any such sentiment acquires decided predominance over all others, we call it **a ruling passion**; whenever other motives conflict with the motives arising within the system of a ruling passion, they go to the wall, they are powerless to oppose it. (McDougall 1916: 259)

Even McDougall can't escape functional hierarchization. "And, besides, a man's speech betrays his thoughts, and these his motives. And finally, when he surveys the man's action as a whole, and the

ends to which it appears to be directed, he can often judge what are his dominant sentiments. And thus from a man's expression and gestures, from his speech and conduct, we may be able to refer results to motives, the ends accomplished to their determining emotions and sentiments." ([Shand 1914: 3](#))

There is only one sentiment which by becoming the master-sentiment can generate strong character in the fullest sense, and that is the self-regarding sentiment. There is a **lower imperfect form of the sentiment, ambition or the love of fame, the ambition to become publicly recognised as a man of this or that kind of ability or power**. When this sentiment becomes a ruling passion it may cover almost the whole of conduct, may supply a dominant motive for almost every situation, a motive which arising within the self-regarding sentiment determines volition in the strict sense in which we have defined it. But it is not properly a moral sentiment, and, though it may generate character, the character formed through its agency is not moral character. (McDougall 1916: 261)

Vanity may be a sign of strong character but not a moral character. For public recognition see *renown*.

The cult of the ancestor and of the family, with the *patria potestas*, **the immense authority given by law and [] custom to the head of the family**, counted for much in the strength and stability of ancient Rome. In fact, the high civilisations of ancient Greece and Rome rested on a firm basis of this kind until their decline began. (McDougall 1916: 274-275)

Actual patriarchy.

The races of men certainly differ greatly in respect to the innate strength of this instinct; but there is no reason to think that it has grown weaker among ourselves under

centuries of civilisation; rather, it is probable, as we shall see presently, that it is stronger in the European peoples than it was in primitive man. But its modes of expression have changed with the growth of civilisation; and the development of law and custom discourages and renders unnecessary the bodily combat of individuals, this gives place to the collective combat of communities and to the more refined forms of combat within communities. It is observable that, when **a pugnacious people** is forcibly brought under a system of civilised legality, its members are apt to display **an extreme and, to our minds, absurd degree of litigiousness**. (McDougall 1916: 279)

This very week saw the premier of a new movie based on A. H. Tammsaare's, which is mainly about the quarrels of overly litigious peasants.

In our own age the same instinct makes of Europe an armed camp occupied by twelve million soldiers, the support of which is a heavy burden on all the peoples; and we see how, more instantly than ever before, a whole nation may be moved by the combative instinct - a slight to the British flag, or an insulting remark in some foreign newspaper, sends **a wave of angry emotion sweeping across the country, accompanied by all the characteristics of crude collective mentation**, and two nations are ready to rush into a war that cannot fail to be disastrous to both of them. The most serious task of modern statesmanship is, perhaps, to discount and to control these outbursts of **collective pugnacity**. (McDougall 1916: 281)

As with [Trotter](#), what Malinowski deals with on the level of the individual, his apparent source deals with on the level of collectives. It is very likely due to Malinowski's early and thorough reading of Nietzsche.

It was said above that the earliest form of human society was in all probability the family, and, indeed, it is

probable that in this respect primitive man did but continue **the social life of his prehuman ancestors**. But what form the primitive family had, and **in what way more complex forms of society were developed from it**, are obscure and much-disputed questions. Hence any attempt to show how the human instincts played their parts in the process must be purely speculative. Nevertheless it is a legitimate and fascinating subject for speculation, and we may attempt to form some notion of **the socialising influence of the instinct of pugnacity** among primitive men by adopting provisionally one of the most ingenious of the speculative accounts of the process. Such is the account offered by Messrs. Atkinson and Andrew Lang, which may be briefly sketched as follows. The primitive society was a polygamous family consisting of a patriarch, his wives and children. The young males, as they became full-grown, were driven out of the community by the patriarch, who was jealous of all possible rivals to his marital privileges. They formed semi-independent bands hanging, perhaps, on the skirts of the family circle, from which they were jealously excluded. From time to time the young males would be brought by their sex-impulse into deadly strife with the patriarch, and, when one of them succeeded in overcoming him, this one would take his place and rule in his stead. A social system of this sort obtains among some of the animals, and it seems to be just such a system as the fierce sexual jealousy of man and his polygamous capacities and tendencies would produce in the absence of any [] modifying law or moral tradition. This prohibition enforced by the jealousy of the patriarch is the *primal law*, the first example of a general prohibition laid upon the natural impulse of a class of human beings and **upheld by superior force for the regulation of social relations**. (McDougall 1916: 282-283)

Thus, sociability follows pugnacity in a more complex manner than I had anticipated. [Social Origins and Primal Law](#) (1903). Malinowski

would of course have been all into this book, marked with keywords like totemism, marriage, and genealogy.

But it is not at first sight obvious how it should operate as **a great socialising force**. If we would understand how it may have done so, we must bear in mind the fact, so strongly insisted on by Walter Bagehot in his brilliant essay, "Physics and Politics," that the first and most [] momentous step of primitive men towards civilisation must have been **the evolution of rigid customs, the enforced observance of which disciplined men to the habit of control of the immediate impulses**. (McDougall 1916: 283-284)

Though a very small step, this is a great leap forward from Spencer's rather primitive notion that social union as such checks impulsiveness. I shall have to examine what role he ascribes to custom.

A leader whose followers were bound to him by fear of punishment only would have no chance of success against **a band of which the members were bound together** and to their chief by a true conscientiousness arising from a more developed self-consciousness, from **the identification of the self with the society**, and from **a sensitive regard on the part of each member for the opinion of his fellows**. (McDougall 1916: 287)

"The quite fundamental characteristic of the social mammal, as of the bee, is sensitiveness to the voice of his fellows" ([Trotter 1921: 108-109](#)). "Perhaps it may best be characterized as "phatic" communication, that is, it succeeds in spreading information about an individual animal's state of mind, or it communicates a generalized emotional tone through the band so that all its members come to have the same attitude toward a situation" ([La Barre 1954: 57](#)).

It may also have involved a relative increase of **strength of the more specifically social tendencies**, namely, the gregarious instinct, the instincts of self-assertion and subjection, and the primitive sympathetic tendency; the increase of strength of these tendencies in the members of any social group would render them **capable of being more strongly swayed by regard for the opinions and feelings of their fellows**, and so would **strengthen the influence of the public opinion of the group** upon each member of it. (McDougall 1916: 288)

"Tendencies", *Being the Keyword to How Emotions and Sentiments Constitute the Character*, usually goes with the context "instincts and innate tendencies" (cf. e.g. [Shand 1914: 190](#)), and becomes "instincts and innate trends" ([PC 3.3](#)). Tendency is "an inclination towards a particular characteristic or type of behaviour" (propensity, proclivity, proneness, aptness, likelihood, inclination, disposition, predisposition, bent, leaning, penchant, predilection, susceptibility, liability); trend is "a general direction in which something is developing or changing" (tendency, movement, drift, swing, shift, course, current, run, direction, inclination, leaning). Clearly, they are near-synonymous, with tendency secondarily "a group within a larger political party or movement" and trend "a fashion". Etymologically, *tendere* is "to stretch, extend, aim" from Medieval Latin 1620s; whereas *tendentious*, "expressing or intending to promote a particular cause or point of view, especially a controversial one" or "having a definite purpose" from 19th Century German equivalent of "tendency". Where the river stretches, eh?

As so the core of the argument, this again presents "the purpose of establishing a common sentiment" (PC 2.3) as a function of the voice of the herd. "In fact, if left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are closed to each other; they can communicate only by means of signs which express their internal states. If the communication established between them is to become a real commu-

nion, that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments into one common sentiment, the signs expressing them must themselves be fused into one single and unique resultant. It is the appearance of this that informs individual that they are in harmony and makes them conscious of their moral unity. It is by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or performing the same gesture in regard to some object that they become and feel themselves to be in unison." ([Durkheim 1915](#): 230) - Thus, the crux of the question is, what is the difference between a real communion and a phatic communion? According to the *sympathy minus symmetry* hypothesis, a real communion is sympathetic, a phatic communion is unsympathetic.

Where this takes an ugly turn is the "atmosphere" spin Malinowski puts on it in his review of Durkheim, and how Trotter used these words: "The incomprehensibility to the English of the whole trend of German feeling and expression suggests that there is some deeply rooted instinctive conflict of attitude between them" ([Trotter 1921](#): 174), and "the heated atmosphere of national feeling in which our work must be done" ([Trotter 1921](#): 156). Especially troubling is the preceding page: "The slighter kinds of aloofness, of inhuman etiquette, of legalism and senseless dignity, of indifference to the individual, of devotion to formulæ and routine are no less powerful agents in depriving the common man of the sense of intimate reality in his citizenship which might be so valuable a source of national unity. If the official machine through its utmost parts were animated by an even moderately human spirit and used as a means of binding together the people, instead of as an engine of moral disruption, it might be of incalculable value in the strengthening of morale." ([Trotter 1921](#): 155), because it gives the secondary meaning of *phatikos* ("affirming") a highly loaded significance.

As an aside, I've been thinking about how perfectly suitable the title of "On the Origin of Phatic Communion" would be, as it would offer preliminary notes on how a specific terminological invention evolved in the social thought around WWI and also hint at how this brand of early social psychology implicitly attempted an alternative theory as to how human groups, e.g. nations and races, must have formed. How does a nation come about? Is it, as the analytical psychology of 19th Century Europe suggests, a social union of the feelings, thought, and action of a collection of people? The problem of Group Mind looms large behind this facade of analogies, as the three aspects of Mind. Apollo and Dionysus demand attention.

In this connection it is interesting to compare the Japanese with the Chinese people. Whether **the strain of Malayan blood in the Japanese** has endowed them from the first with a stronger instinct of pugnacity than their cousins the Chinese, it is impossible to say. But it is certain that the people, in spite of the fact that they have long recognised in their Emperor **a common spiritual head of the empire**, have been until very recently divided into numerous clans that have been almost constantly at war with one another, society being organised on a military system not unlike that of feudal Europe. Hence the profession of the soldier has continued to be held in the highest honour, and the fighting qualities, as well as **the specifically social qualities of the people**, have been brought to a very high level. (McDougall 1916: 292)

Today I stumbled upon Sanjay Upadhyia's *Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India* (Routledge, 2012). It would appear that these peoples themselves feel an affinity: "The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894 fuelled rumors that Nepal was about to Attack Tibet, taking advantage of Beijin's preoccupation" (p. 49). These so-called "cousins" of China was qualms over terri-

tory. Recently I realized that I may never get to fulfil my dream of visiting a Chinese university where semiotics is taught in English, because the way that country is going (the way its water is bending), its social automation (see Bosanquet) might repress me for having once in my youth read [a Tibetan pamphlet about human rights](#) or have ever [engaged in acts of humour](#).

It is among the peoples of Western Europe, who, as we have seen, have been moulded by a prolonged and severe process of military selection, that **the emulative impulse** is most active. With us it **supplies the zest and determines the forms of almost all our games and recreations**; and Professor James is guilty of picturesque exaggeration only, when he says "nine-tenths of the work of our world is done by it." Our educational system is founded upon it; it is the social force underlying an immense amount of strenuous exertion; to it we owe in a great measure even our science, our literature, and our art; for it is **a strong, perhaps an essential, element of ambition**, that last infirmity of noble minds, in which it operates through, and under the direction of, a highly developed social self-consciousness. (McDougall 1916: 294)

Define:emulation - "effort to match or surpass a person or achievement, typically by imitation". No wonder I thought it didn't match up with [the above-given trichotomy](#).

To this stage the most highly civilised communities are tending, in accordance with the law that **the collective mind follows in the steps of evolution of the individual mind at a great interval of time**. (McDougall 1916: 295)

Social progress recapitulates ontogeny?

It was pointed out in Chapter III. that **the gregarious instinct plays a great part in determining the forms of our recreations**; and in Chapter VI. it was shown how, in

co-operation with the primitive sympathetic tendency, it **leads men to seek to share their emotions, with the largest possible number of their fellows.** Besides determining the forms of recreations, this instinct **plays a much more serious part in the life of civilised societies.** (McDougall 1916: 296)

The social instinct then also determines small or idle talk as a form of recreation. That it leads men to seek "establishing common sentiments" is a counterpoint to Malinowski's negation of it. And that it plays a much more serious part in our society makes Malinowski's remark, to the effect that his discussion would have been more interesting if conducted on modern examples, all the more sour.

It is sometimes assumed that the monstrous and disastrous growth of London and of other large towns is the result of some obscure economic necessity. But, as a matter of fact, London and many other large towns have for a long time past far exceeded the proportions that conduce to economic efficiency and healthy social life, just as the vast herds of bison, or other animals, referred to in Chapter II., greatly exceed the size necessary for mutual defence. We are often told that the dulness of the country drives the people to the towns. But that statement inverts the truth. **It is the crowd in the towns, the vast human herd, that exerts a baneful attraction on those outside it. People have lived in the country for hundreds of generations without finding it dull.** It is only the existence of the crowded towns that creates by contrast [] the dulness of the country. As in the case of the animals, the larger the aggregation the greater is its power of attraction; hence, in spite of high rents, high rates, dirt, disease, congestion of traffic, ugliness, squalor, and sooty air, the large towns continue to grow at an increasing rate, while the small towns diminish and the country villages are threatened with extinction. (McDougall 1916: 296-297)

That's a very good point about urbanization. I wonder if we're seeing a modest "back to nature" movement or at least oftly expressed desire to return to the countryside because we're no longer got off from civilization when far from towns?

In England we must attribute this tendency chiefly to the fact that the spread of elementary education and **the greer intercourse** between the people of the different parts of the country have broken down the bonds of custom which formerly kept each man to the place and calling of his forefathers; for **custom, the great conservative force of society, the great controller of the individual impulses**, being weakened, the deep-seated instincts, especially the gregarious instinct, have found their opportunity to determine the choices of men. (McDougall 1916: 297)

Is that what is meant by "free" in "free, aimless, social intercourse"? Custom is a conservative force due to its connection with habits.

The administrative authorities have shown of late years a disposition to encourage in every possible way this gregarious tendency. On the slightest occasion they organise some show which shall **draw huge crowds to gape**, until now a new street cannot be opened without the expenditure of thousands of pounds in tawdry decorations, and a foreign prince cannot drive to a railway station without drawing any thousands of people from their work to spend the day in **worse than useless idleness**, confirming their already overdeveloped gregarious instincts. There can be no doubt that the excessive indulgence of this impulse is one of **the greatest demoralising factors of the present time** in this country, just as it was in Rome in the days of her declining power and glory. (McDougall 1916: 298)

The first is a possible connection with Durkheim's example of communion. The second is moral indictment of crowd gatherings. Prob-

ably the greatest demoralising factors of the present time is social media.

In this connection we may briefly consider the views of Professor Giddings on "**the consciousness of kind**," which he would have us regard as the basic principle of social roganisation. He writes, "In its widest extension the consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the inanimate. Within the wide class of the animals it marks off species and races. Within racial lines the consciousness of kind underlies the more definite ethnical and political groupings, it is the basis of class distinctions, of innumerable forms of alliance, of **rules of intercourse**, and of peculiarities of policy. Our conduct towards **those whom we feel to be most like ourselves** is instinctively and rationally different from our conduct towards others, whom we believe to be less like ourselves. (McDougall 1916: 298)

I really need to continue reading Giddings' book (*The Principles of Sociology*).

The working man joins a strike of which he does not approve **rather than cut himself off from his fellows**. For a similar reason the manufacturers who questions the value of protection to his own industry yet pays his contribution to the protectionist campaign fund. The Southern gentleman, who believe in the cause of the Union, none the less threw in his fortunes with the Confederacy, if **he felt himself to be one of the Southern people and a stranger** to the people of the North. The liberalising of creeds is accomplished by the efforts of men who are no longer able to accept the traditional dogma, but who desire **to maintain associations** which it would be painful to sever. In a word, it is about the consciousness of kind that all other motives organise themselves in the evolution of social choice, social volition, or social policy." (McDougall 1916: 299)

Conforming rather than being the "scab". Yet another take on the "stranger". "Maintaining" is still a common trope.

If we would state more accurately the facts vaguely implied by this phrase, we must say that **the gregarious impulse of any animal receives satisfaction only through the presence of animals similar to itself, and the closer the similarity the greater is the satisfaction.** (McDougall 1916: 299)

Communization. Consciousness of kind.

Just so, in any human being the instinct operates most powerfully in relation to, and receives the highest degree of satisfaction from **the presence of, the human beings who most closely resemble that individual, those who behave in like manner and respond to the same situations with similar emotions.** (McDougall 1916: 300)

Thus, "the mere presence of others [is] a necessity for man" (PC 3.3) and the presence of likeminded people a desire for man.

The one kind of causation with which the uncultured man is thoroughly familiar is his own **volitional action, issuing from feeling, emotion, and desire**; and this naturally and inevitably becomes for him the type on which he models his theories of the causation of terrible events. (McDougall 1916: 304)

The primacy of firstness.

The importance of the social operation of these instincts was, then, very great; for the first requisite of society, the prime condition of **the social life of man, was, in the words of Bagehot, a hard crust or cake of custom.** In the struggle for existence only those societies survived which were able to evolve such a hard crust of custom, **binding men together**, assimilating their actions to the

accepted standards, compelling control of the purely egoistic impulses, and exterminating the individuals incapable of such control. (McDougall 1916: 307)

"Mmm," drools Homer, "the cake of custom".

But enough is now known of the primitive age of ancient Greece and Rome to show that the great civilisations of these states took their rise among peoples **bound hand and foot by religious custom and law** as rigidly as any savages, and to show also that the dominant religious emotion was fear. (McDougall 1916: 308)

From bonds to bondage.

We may assume with confidence that the formation [] of a mass of customary observance and prohibition was a principal feature of the evolution of all human societies that have risen above the lowest level and have survived through any considerable period of time; not only because the existence of such **a crust of custom** is observable in all savage and barbarous communities, but also because in its earlier stage the process must have so strengthened the societies in which it took place that rival societies in which it failed could not have stood up against them in the struggle for existence. (McDougall 1916: 308-309)

The implication in such choice of words is of course that that crust can very easily crumble.

For the essence of moral conduct is the performance of social duty, the duty prescribed by society, as opposed to **the mere following of the promptings of egoistic impulses**. If we define moral conduct in this broad sense, and this is the only satisfactory definition of it - then, no matter how grotesque and, from our point of view, how immoral the prescribed codes of conduct of other societies may appear to be, we must admit conformity to the

code to be moral conduct; and we must admit that religion from its first crude beginnings was bound up with morality in some such way as we have briefly sketched; that the two things, religion and morality, were not at first separate and later fused together; but that they were always intimately related, and have reciprocally acted and reacted upon one another throughout the course of their evolution. (McDougall 1916: 313)

A line of argument that can be followed if Mahaffy's ramblings about civil conversation being a duty were taken seriously.

The instinct of curiosity is at the base of many of man's most splendid achievements, for rooted in it are his speculative and scientific tendencies. It has been justly maintained by J. S. Mill, by T. H. Buckle, and others, that **the free and effective operation of these tendencies in any society is not only the gauge of that society's position in the scale of civilisation**, but also the principal condition of the progress of a people in all that constitutes civilisation. (McDougall 1916: 315)

I'm reminded of a fairly recent report about how Russian science on the whole is some half a century behind the West. I've read some umpteen recent papers from India and China, whereas in connection with Russia I can only recall anthropologists studying Russia or its diaspora. I think I've read more from Swedes than I have from post-communist Russians.

How few men are content with the possession of what they need for the satisfaction of all other desires than this desire for **possession for its own sake!** It is this **excess of activity** beyond that required for the satisfaction of all other material needs, that results in the accumulation of the capital which is a necessary condition of the development of civilisation. (McDougall 1916: 323)

This was a common theme in the *Argonauts*, and an "excess of activity" strikes me as an applicable phrase for describing "a flow of language" that goes beyond communicating ideas (excessive as in "tedious").

"Suggest" denotes the part of the agent in **assimilating the cognitive state of the patient** to his own; but we have no word for the part played by the patient in the process, unless we adopt the ugly expression - "to be **suggested**." "Imitate" and "sympathise" denote the part of the patient in the process of assimilation of his actions and of his affective state to those of the agent; but we have no words denoting the part of the agent in these processes. Since these three processes co-operate intimately in social life, we may avoid the difficulty arising from this lack of terms by following M. Tarde, who extends the meaning of the word "imitation" to cover all three processes as viewed from the side of the patient. If we do that, we still need a correlative word to denote all three processes viewed from the side of the agent. I propose to use the words **"impress" and "impression"** in this sense. We may also follow M. Tarde in using "contra-imitation" to denote the process of contra-suggestion viewed from the side of the patient. (McDougall 1916: 325-326)

Some issue with "communicants". I'd go for "suggestee" but this is a legal term with connotations unknown to me.

Imitation is the prime condition of all collective mental life. I propose a reserve for another volume the detailed study of collective mental processes. Here I would dismiss the subject by merely pointing out that when men **think, feel, and act** as members of a group of any kind - whether a mere mob, a committee, a political or religious association, a city, a nation, or any other social aggregate - their collective actions show that **the mental processes of each man have been profoundly modified in virtue of the fact that he thought, felt, and acted as**

one of a group and in reciprocal mental action with the other members of the group and with the group as a whole. In the simpler forms of social grouping, imitation (taken in the wide sense defined above) is the principal condition [] of this profound alteration of the individual's mental processes. And, even in the most developed forms of social aggregation, it plays a fundamental part (although greatly complicated by other factors) in rendering possible the existence and operation of the collective mind, its collective deliberation, emotion, character, and volition. (McDougall 1916: 326-327)

Here, I think, is the crux of Malinowski's whole apophatic polemic: in crowd gatherings where free social intercourse takes place, the modification of mental processes cannot be said to be taken place. Note that "modification" is used in the archaic sense in which it probably appeared in Descartes, e.g. "that the immediate object of the perception must be unreal, must be a mental modification serving as vicar or symbol of a remote object" ([Clay 1882: 152](#)).

This great brain, and the immense capacity for mental adaptation and acquisition implied by it, must have been evolved hand in hand with the development of man's social life and with that of **language, the great agent and promoter of social life**. For to an individual living apart from any human society the greater part of this brain and of this capacity for acquisition would be useless and would lie dormant for lack of any store of knowledge, belief, and [] custom to be acquired or assimilated. (McDougall 1916: 327-328)

Reminds me a title in r/Philosophy, "Language is not an accessory to perception, argues Stanley Fish, it is perception". People have some very odd thoughts about the nature of language sometimes. Here, too, I think, [Alan Gardiner \(1932\)](#) would object that McDougall really means *speech*, not language.

All that constitutes culture and civilisation, all, or nearly all, that distinguishes the highly cultured European intellectually and morally from the men of the stone age of Europe, is then summed up in the word "tradition," and all tradition exists only in virtue of imitation; for it is only by imitation that each generation takes up and makes its own the tradition of the preceding generation; and it is only by imitation that any improvement, conceived by any mind endowed with that rarest of all things, a **spark of originality**, can become embodied within the tradition of his society. (McDougall 1916: 328)

I think I've written something commonsensical here to the same effect, that original thought requires familiarization with or exposure to a long and expansive tradition.

The similarities obtaining between the individuals of any one country, any one county, social class, school, university, profession, or community of any kind, and distinguishing them from the members of any other similar community, are in the main due to **the more intimate intercourse with one another of the members of the one community**, to their consequent imitation of one another, and to their acceptance by imitation of the same tradition. Under this head fall similarities of language, of religious, political, and moral convictions, habits of dressing, eating, dwelling, and of recreation, all those routine activities which make up by far the greatest part of the lives of men. (McDougall 1916: 329)

"Let me look over the fence and see what my neighbour does, and take it as a rule for my behaviour" ([Malinowski 1922: 326](#)).

There is widely current a **vague belief that the national characteristics of the people of any country are in the main innate characters**. But there can be no serious question that this popular assumption is erroneous and that national characteristics, at any rate all those that

distinguish the peoples of the European countries, are in the main the expressions of different traditions. (McDougall 1916: 329)

"It may well, therefore, be removed to the lumber-room of speculation and stored among the other pseudo-scientific dogmas of political "biologists" - the facile doctrines of degeneracy, the pragmatic lecturings on national characteristics" ([Trotter 1921: 132](#)).

The dominance of the traditional characters, acquired by each generation through imitation, over innate characters holds good not only in respect to the characters mentioned above, but also, though perhaps in a smaller degree, in respect to those modes of activity which are regarded as **essentially the expressions of individuality**, namely, **the various forms of art-production, of science, of literature, of conversation**. The immensely increased intercourse of peoples characteristic of the present age has already done much to obscure these national differences and peculiarities, but we have only to go back to earlier ages to see that the force of imitation is in these fields of human activity, as well as in all others, immensely greater than the force of individuality or of innate peculiarities. (McDougall 1916: 331)

Is a style or manner of conversation thus an expression of individuality or a national characteristic?

This impossibility of class-imitation under a strict caste system is, no doubt, one of the principal conditions of the stagnation of the Brahmanic civilisation of India. And **the backwardness of Russia** may be ascribed in large measure to the same condition; for there the conquering northmen, the Varegs, established a military and bureaucratic aristocracy which has remained relatively **ineffective in civilisin the masses of Slav peasantry**, owing to the lack of any middle classes by whom the aristocrats might have been imitated. (McDougall 1916: 344)

I recall a news report from my childhood where an anglophone lady who was on a quest to ride across the globe with a cart made it through Russia into Estonia and, when giving an interview to Estonian media, expressed her happiness at arriving back to civilization. From what anyone can tell, Russia is still uncivilized, and has only swapped its military and bureaucratic aristocracy from time to time. Currently it's ruled by Putin the First.

Most Englishmen would scorn to kiss and embrace one another or to gesticulate freely, if only because Frenchmen do these things; they would not wear their hair either long or very closely cropped, because Germans do so; they would not have a conscript army or universal military training, because nearly every other European nation has them. The Chinese people shows how **contra-imitation** may operate as a considerable conservative power in a people among whom it is strongly developed. (McDougall 1916: 345)

As a staunch contrarian, several such examples of "contra-imitation" come to mind in my own life. For example, even though I'm an entrenched hip-hop head, I have have given my best not to give away my musical preferences with my outward appearance, i.e. not to look like a typical hip-hop head. Even in my intellectual pursuits I tend to avoid books and authors who are too popular, which is why I've read as little of Umberto Eco as I have managed. It feels liberating to finally have a term for this behaviour.

In the collective thought and action of societies this tendency appears even more strongly than in private conduct, and for this reason - while a man may question the usefulness of any particular mode of activity that is practiced by a few of his fellows only, he is less likely to raise any such question in regard to any practice that he finds faithfully observed by all his fellows. **The fact that all his fellows observe the practice is sufficient to put it be-**

yond criticism and to lead him to regard it as an end in itself. And this is one of the principal bases of custom. The ends or purposes of many customs are lost in the mists of antiquity. In some cases, perhaps, the end has never been clearly defined in any one man's mind. The custom may have arisen as a compromise or fusion between diverse customs, or through some purely instinctive mode of reaction, or through perverted imitation of some foreign model. But, however and for whatever purpose instituted, a custom once established, the practice of it always becomes in some degree an end in itself, and men are prepared to maintain it, often at great cost of effort or discomfort, long after it serves any useful end. Hence **the fact that meaningless formalities and rites continue to surround almost all ancient institutions.** (McDougall 1916: 350)

Strong stuff. The first emphasized instance pertains to Mahaffy's "duty", the second to Malinowski's critique - given further emphasis by Gardiner and later Jakobson - of formalities ("sociabilities").

In the three and a half years which have elapsed since the appearance of its first edition, I have **discerned here and there in subsequent publications what seem to be traces of its influence.** (McDougall 1916: 352)

Phraseology.

I will first state dogmatically and explicitly **the theory of action which is implied throughout this volume**, and will then justify it by showing the inadequacy of the other theories of action that have been most widely accepted. Human conduct, which in its various spheres is the topic with which all the social sciences are concerned, is a species of a wider genus, namely, behaviour. **Conduct is the behaviour of self-conscious and rational beings;** it is the highest type of behaviour; and, if we desire to understand conduct, we must first achieve some adequate

conception of behaviour in general and must then discover in what ways conduct, the highest type, differs from all the lower types of behaviour. (McDougall 1916: 353)

This theory must be pretty subtle because I've not noticed it. Could it be the source for Malinowski's pragmatism, which, according to at least one source, inspired Wittgenstein's? In the second instance I'm reminded of Mead (or was it someone else?) writing that nearly the whole of his (their?) work was a study of (rational) conduct. For me, when I studied nonverbal communication, this was the exact kind of behaviour I had no interest in. Still don't, I guess.

It is generally recognized that the word "behaviour" implies certain peculiarities which are only found in **the movements of living things. These peculiarities are the marks of life; wherever we observe them, we confidently infer life.** We form our notion of behaviour by the observation of the movements of living things; and, in order to explicate this notion, we must discover by what marks behaviour is distinguished [] from all merely physical or mechanical movements. (McDougall 1916: 353-354)

"The microscopist looks to see whether the motions of a little creature show any purpose. If so, there is mind there" (CP 1.269).

When we survey the whole world of material things accessible to our perception, these seem, as a matter of immediate observation and apart from all theories of the relation of mind to matter, to fall into two great classes, namely, (1) a class consisting of those things whose changes seem to be **purely physical happenings**, explicable by mechanical principles; (2) a class of things whose changes exhibit the marks of behaviour and seem to be incapable of mechanical explanation, but rather to be always directed, however vaguely, towards an end - that is

to say, are teleological or purposive; and this class constitutes **the realm of life**. (McDougall 1916: 355)

In agreement with Kalevi Kull's distinction between physical and semiotic realities (cf. [Kull, Emmeche & Favareau 2008](#)).

The four peculiarities which, as we have seen, characterize behaviour are purely objective or outward marks presented to the observation of the onlooker. But to say that behaviour is purposive is to imply that it has [] also an inner side or aspect which is analogous to, and of the same order as, our immediate experience of our own purposive activities. We are accustomed to accept as the type of purposive action our own most decidedly volitional efforts, in which we deliberately choose, and self-consciously strive, to bring about some state of affairs that we clearly foresee and desire. And it has been the practice of many writers, accepting such volitional effort as the type of purposive activity, to **refuse to admit to the same category any actions that do not seem to be prompted and guided by clear foresight of the end desired and willed**. When purposive activity is conceived in this very restricted way, and is set over against mechanical processes, as process of a radically different type, there remains the difficulty of assigning the place and affinities of the lower forms of behaviour. (McDougall 1916: 355-356)

I have a distinct memory of reading something like this but am unable to find the quote. The point was that it is not easy to accept absolute purposelessness, there's always some inkling towards teleological explanations.

The creation of this second difficulty has naturally resulted in the attempt to solve it by forcing the truly purposive type of process into the mechanical category; that is, by regarding as wholly illusory the consciousness of striving towards an end which every man has [] when

he acts with deliberate purpose; by **assuming that we are deceived when we believe ourselves to be real agents striving more or less effectively to determine the course of events and to shape them to our will and purpose.** The demonstration that this view is untenable requires a very long and intricate argument, which cannot be presented here even in briefest outline. It must suffice to say that the acceptance of this view would be subversive of all moral philosophy, would deprive ethical principles and ethical discussion of all meaning and value; for if our consciousness of striving to achieve ends, to realize ideals, to live up to standards of conduct, if all this is illusory, then, to seek to determine what we ought to do and to be, or to set up standards or norms or ideals, is wholly futile; such endeavours can at best only serve to make us more acutely aware of our impotence in face of such ideals. (McDougall 1916: 356-357)

Thus, "we have been puppets, not personal agents - dupes as well as puppets - and, in view of the prevalence of wretchedness in human life, victims [of unconscious forces]" ([Clay 1882: 5](#)). McDougall expands on this topic in his *Body and Mind* (1911).

Mental process seems to be always a process of striving or conation initiated and guided by a process or act of knowing, of apprehension; and this knowing or cognition is always a becoming aware of something, or of some state of affairs, as given or present, together with an anticipation of some change. That is to say, **mental life does not consist in a succession of different states of the subject, called states of consciousness or ideas of the subject, called states of consciousness or ideas or what not; but it consists always in an activity of a subject in respect of an object apprehended, an activity which constantly changes or modifies the relation between subject and object.** Now this change which is to be effected, and which is the goal or end of action, is anticipated with very different degrees of clearness and ade-

quacy at different levels of mental life. (McDougall 1916: 358)

Something along the lines of Peirce's thinking, e.g. abduction. Also made me recall Pjatigorski and Mamardašvili's ramblings about states of consciousness (*mittemõistmise situatsioonist mõistmise situatsiooni jõudmine ei ole kontinuaalne, sest need on diskreetsed "teadvuse seisundid", aga mõtlemine ise on protsessuaalne, [siin](#)*).

The theoretical lower limit of this series would be what has been well called (by Dr. Stout) **anæ tic sentience; a mere feeling or sentience involving no objective reference** and giving rise only to movement or effort that is completely undirected. This lower limit is approached in our own experience when we stir uneasily or writhe or throw ourselves wildly about, under the stimulus of some vaguely localized internal pain. But we do not ourselves experience the limiting case, and it is questionable whether we can properly suppose it to be realized in the simplest instances of animal behaviour; it seems probable that the actions of even the lowliest animals imply a vague awareness of something, together with some vague forward reference, some vague anticipation of a change in this something. (McDougall 1916: 360)

Firstness? Evidently Stout discusses it somewhere in his [Analytic Psychology](#).

At the standpoint of empirical science, we must accept these conative dispositions as ultimate facts, **not capable of being analyzed or of being explained** by being shown to be instances of any wider more fundamental notion. (McDougall 1916: 361)

An *arbitrium* ([Clay 1882: 10](#)).

If we consider the animals, we shall again be led to the true view. It is now generally admitted that we cannot

attribute to the lower animals "ideas," or any power of clearly representing, or thinking of, **things not present to the senses**; therefore we cannot attribute their actions to the pleasure of the idea of attaining [[]] the end pursued; yet such animals strive under the spur of hunger, as we say, and of other appetites. (McDougall 1916: 367-368)

Phraseology: "some supremely obvious state of things" *present to the senses*.

When, for example, we **desire the applause of our fellows**, when we are consumed with what is called disinterested curiosity, when we desire to avenge ourselves or vent our wrath on one who has insulted us, when we desire to relieve distress, when we are impelled by sexual desire; in all these cases the state of desiring is painful in so far as efforts are unavailing or attainment appears impossible, and pleasurable in so far as we are able to anticipate success or take effective steps towards the desired end. (McDougall 1916: 369)

"The vain man again must display himself because he delights in applause; he must court it, and feel it sympathetically: but to court admiration would humiliate the proud man." ([Shand 1914: 106-107](#)).

Both answers are true if the "self" and "attention" are understood in the true sense; that is, if **the self is understood as the vast organization of conative dispositions which is the character**, and if attention is understood as conation revealing itself in cognition. (McDougall 1916: 377)

I'm collecting such definitions of the self.

Like other instincts it is a complex, innately organized, psycho-physical disposition, consisting of three parts, each subserving one of **the three phases that we**

distinguish in every complete mental or psycho-physical process, namely the cognitive, the affective, and the conative; three parts which from the point of view of nervous function and structure, we may call the afferent or sensory, the central, and the efferent or motor. (McDougall 1916: 387)

These "three 'elements,' called also 'aspects,' and sometimes 'functions'" ([Shand 1914: 82-83](#)) are now "phases".

In order that the sperm cells may be brought into such a position that they may or their own feeble powers of locomotion reach the egg in the womb, the male is provided with **the organ of intromission**, the penis, and the female with the vagina or sheath, **the antechamber to the womb**. (McDougall 1916: 390)

Define:intromission - "the action or process of inserting the penis into the vagina in sexual intercourse". Define:antechamber - "a small room leading to a main one."

This brief and general description of the nature and operation of the sex instinct in mammals holds good for the human species; and, although the operation of the instinct is often (especially among persons of culture and refinement) very much complicated and obscured by the influence of the will, and of personal sentiments and ideals, it nevertheless is often displayed in relatively uncomplicated and direct fashion. Indeed, a principal source of the difficulties and dramas of civilized life is to be found in the fact that, owing to the great strength of the impulse of this instinct, men, and even women, who have attained a high level of character and culture are liable to be swept away by a flood of sexual passion, and, the restraints [[] normally maintained by their higher sentiments being temporarily broken through, to be impelled to yield to the prompting of the instinct in a man-

ner almost as simple and direct as **the mating of the animals**. (McDougall 1916: 392-392)

Pretty much how I think about sex. The reptilian brain takes over. Humans *are* animals.

That sex love should thus combine the most purely altruistic with the most ruthlessly egoistic tendency of human nature, seems sufficiently accounted for in the case of the woman by the great strength of the maternal impulse and the ease with which it is aroused in her in all personal relations; and in the man it is perhaps sufficiently accounted for by the fact that **woman, especially at the age at which she is most strongly attractive to man, resembles in many respects, [] both mental and physical, the child, the normal object of the parental or protective impulse.** (McDougall 1916: 394-395)

Neoteny and [Born Sexy Yesterday](#).

If we adopt this relatively restrictive view of the scope of the sex instinct in man, it still appears as one of considerable complexity on its **executive side**; and on its **perceptual side** it is certainly more complex than has commonly been assumed. (McDougall 1916: 396)

Merk and Wirk.

Secondly, the social consequences of the sexual act are so serious that great hindrances are opposed to its completion, both by the constitution of human nature (especially female nature) and by the customs and conventions, the traditions and ideals which a moralized society imposes upon its developing members. Yet the conditions that tend to excite the instinct are very frequently realized in **normal social intercourse**. [] Hence it follows that in most members of a civilized society (especially in the younger celibate members) the instinct is frequently excited in some degree, but only comparatively rarely (in

some cases never) permitted to accomplish its end. **The impulse of this instinct** therefore, in addition to subserving the primary function of reproduction of the species, **plays a large part** (in co-operation with other tendencies) **in determining the forms and maintaining the activities of social intercourse.** In the games of children and young people, in their **dances and social gatherings**, the mingling of the sexes gives a zest to the enjoyment and adds to the vigour of both bodily and mental activity, through the appeal to the sex instinct; even though the gathering be of the most decorous and no single participant be capable of defining the end of the instinct or be aware of the source of his special animation. And in such games as kiss-in-the-ring, in the sophisticated dances of modern society, in **flirtations of all degrees**, and in the more or less self-conscious efforts of deliberate courtship, the operation of the sex impulse is obvious enough. (McDougall 1916: 400-401)

An extremely interesting spin on the topic. In Malinowski's own writings I've noticed only a feeble connection, as in rumours revolving around "courtly drama".

For the sex impulse necessarily intensifies self-consciousness, at the same time that it **impels the individual to seek the presence of his or her fellows and to become attentive to their regards**; that is to say, it brings members of the two sexes into just such relations to one another as are best fitted to lead to the excitement of the instincts of self-display and self-abasement. (McDougall 1916: 414)

Thus, "the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man" (PC 3.3) may include the sex instinct.

There is among us a considerable number of persons who would defend the practice of sexual love between persons of the same sex; asserting that this is purely a


private concern of individual taste and feeling; and that the present state of the law and of public opinion in this country inflicts grievous hardship upon **a number of persons whose sex impulse is innately directed to their own sex**. The answer to all such pleas must be that, while we may pity the misfortune of such persons, they must, like others born with mental and bodily malformations still harder to bear, learn to adapt themselves as best they may to the social institutions formed for the regulation of the lives of normally constituted men and women, and **must**, if necessary, **suffer in silence**. (McDougall 1916: 417)

"If ya'll can just suffer in silence that'll be greeaat." - Bill Lumbergh, probably.

I see no evidence that any further changes occur in those communities and in those individuals (*e.g.* **The savages of our great cities**) in which the repressive influences are not brought to bear. (McDougall 1916: 423)

Hence, "the primitive mind, whether among savages or our own uneducated classes" (PC 4.3).

How We Think



Dewey, John 1910. *How We Think*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co.

This scientific attitude of mind might, conceivably, be quite irrelevant to teaching children and youth. But this book also represents the conviction that such is not the case; that the native and unspoiled attitude of childhood, marked by **ardent curiosity, fertile imagination, and love of experimental inquiry**, is near, very near, to the attitude of the scientific mind. (Dewey 1910: iii)

What do children and science have in common?

In the first place *thought* is used broadly, not to say loosely. Everything that comes to mind, that "goes through our heads," is called a thought. To think of a thing is just to be conscious of it in any way whatsoever. Second, **the term is restricted by excluding whatever is directly presented**; we think (or think of) only such things as we do not directly see, hear, smell, or taste.

Then, third, the meaning is further limited to beliefs that rest upon some kind of evidence or testimony. Of this third type, two kinds - or, rather, two degrees - must be discriminated. In some cases, a belief is accepted with slight or almost no attempt to state the grounds that support it. In other cases, the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its [] adequacy to support the belief examined. This process is called **reflective thought; it alone is truly educative in value**, and it forms, accordingly, the principal subject of this volume. We shall now briefly describe each of the four senses. (Dewey 1910: 1-2)

Thus, "affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things" ([PC](#) 2.2) is not thinking on the grounds that the thing thought about is perceivable in the immediate environment. On "educative" see how communication models imply a teacher-student relation, one has information and the other will receive it.

In its loosest sense, thinking signifies everything that, as we say, is "in our heads" or that "goes through our minds." **He who offers "a penny for your thoughts" does not expect to drive any great bargain.** In calling the objects of his demand *thoughts*, he does not intend to ascribe to them dignity, consecutiveness, or truth. **Any idle fancy, trivial recollection, or flitting impression will satisfy his demand. Daydreaming, building of castles in the air, that loose flux of casual and disconnected material that floats through our minds in relaxed moments are, in this random sense, *thinking*.** More of our waking life than we should care to admit, even to ourselves, is likely to be whiled away in this inconsequential trifling with idle fancy and unsubstantial hope. (Dewey 1910: 2)

Hence "a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious" ([PC](#) 5.1).

Now reflective thought is like this **random coursing of things through the mind** in that it consists of a succession of things thought of; but it is unlike, in that the mere chance occurrence of any chance "something or other" in an irregular sequence does not suffice. **Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a consequence** - a consecutive ordering in such a way that [] each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each in turn leans back on its predecessors. The successive portions of the reflective thought grow out of one another and support one another; they do not come and go in a **medley**. Each phase is a step from something to something - technically speaking, it is a term of thought. Each term leaves a deposit which is utilized in the next term. **The stream or flow becomes a train, chain, or thread.** (Dewey 1910: 2-3)

I noticed that somewhere Malinowski mentions consecutiveness. "Chance and idle thinking", in other words, don't form trains of thought but constitutes a medley ("a varied mixture of people or things").

The imaginative stories poured forth by children possess all degrees of internal congruity; some are disjointed, some are articulated. When connected, they simulate reflective thought; indeed, they usually occur in minds of logical capacity. These imaginative enterprises often precede thinking of the close-knit type of prepare the way for it. But *they do not aim at knowledge, at belief about facts or in truths*; and thereby they are marked off from reflective thought even when they most resemble it. Those who express such thoughts do not expect credence, but rather credit for **a well-constructed plot or a well-arranged climax**. They produce **good stories**, not - unless by chance - [] knowledge. **Such thoughts are an efflorescence of feeling; the enhancement of a mood or sentiment is their aim; congruity of emotion, their binding tie.** (Dewey 1910: 3-4)

Note how closely Malinowski discusses narrative (story-telling) and phatic communion. In some sense the distinctions he draws between them are arbitrary - small talk very often includes story-telling.

*Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of **the grounds that support it**, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought. Any one of the first three kinds of thought may elicit this type; but once begun, **it is a conscious and voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of reasons.*** (Dewey 1910: 6)

It is amazing how compatible Dewey's remarks on the matter of reflective thinking are with Peirce's treatment of thinking.

Let us now reverse this operation; let us consider a rudimentary case of thinking, lying between careful examination of evidence and **a mere irresponsible stream of fancies**. A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it is probabl going to [[]] rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything, in such a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting are other modes of activity. **The likelihood that it will rain is, however, something suggested.** The pedestrian *feels* the cold; he *thinks of* clouds and a coming shower. (Dewey 1910: 6-7)

Again, a Peircean movement from Firstness to Thirdness. This, of course, skips Secondness, which is perhaps justified, seeing the complications involved with the "otherness" - what "resistance", indeed, does the cold and sight of clouds offer? In any case, it is re-

markable how frequently something like "comments on weather" (PC 2.2) appear in my recent readings. Note also that Dewey develops the theory of suggestion.

The danger of rain, on the contrary, presents itself to us as a genuine possibility - as a possible fact of the same nature as the observed coolness. Put differently, we do not regard the cloud as meaning or indicating a face, but merely as suggesting it, while we do consider that the coolness may mean rain. In the first case, **seeing an object, we just happen, as we say, to think of something else**; in the second, we consider the *possibility and nature of the connection between the object seen and the object suggested*. **The seen thing is regarded as in some way the ground or basis of belief in the suggested thing**; it possesses the quality of *evidence*. (Dewey 1910: 7)

How is this different from *semiosis*?

This function by which **one thing signifies or indicates another**, and thereby leads us to consider how far one may be regarded as warrant for belief in the other, is, then, **the central factor in all reflective or distinctively intellectual thinking**. By calling up various situations to which such terms as *signifies* and *indicates* apply, the student will best realize for himself the actual facts denoted by the words *reflective thought*. Synonyms for these terms are: **points to, tells of, betokens, prognosticates, represents, stands for, implies**. We also say one thing portends another; is ominous of another, or a symptom of it, or a key to it, or (if the connection is quite obscure) that it gives a hint, clue, or intimation. (Dewey 1910: 8)

Sidemarked with "Various synonymous expressions for the function of signifying" or, in Peircean idiom, *standing for*, or, in Jakobsonian idiom, *renvoi*. Here, "neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener" (PC 6.4) finds a semiotic explanation: phatic communion is not an ex-

change of signs in the sense that the sender is not forming a train of thought and the receiver does not engage in interpretation. When Malinowski says that "language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought" (PC 6.5), he is contrasting his social function of language to Dewey's signifying function of language.

To expatiate upon the importance of thought would be absurd. The traditional definition of man as "the thinking animal" fixes thought as **the essential difference between man and the brutes**, - surely an important matter. More relevant to our purpose is the question *how* thought is important, for an answer to this question will throw light upon the kind of training thought requires if it is to subserve its end. (Dewey 1910: 14)

When McDougall writes that Providence has denied the higher faculty of reason to brutes ([1916: 20-21](#)), and when Malinowski affirms that "The aborigenes are not able to think exactly, and their beliefs do not possess any "exact meaning."" ([1913: 213](#)), the implication is an equivalence between savages and brutes, or aborigenes and animals. Empirical evidence does not bear this out but that's the sign of the times.

Thought affords the sole method of **escape from purely impulsive or purely routine action**. A being without capacity for thought is moved only by instincts and appetites, as these are called forth by outward conditions and by the inner state of the organism. A being thus moved is, as it were, pushed from behind. This is what we mean by **the blind nature of brute actions**. The agent does not see or foresee the end for which he is acting, nor the results produced by his behaving in one way rather than in another. He does not "know what he is about." **Where there is thought, things present act as signs or tokens of things not yet experienced. A thinking being can, accordingly, act on the basis of the absent and the**

future. Instead of being pushed into a mode of action by the sheer urgency of forces, whether [\[\]](#) instincts or habits, of which he is not aware, a reflective agent is drawn (to some extent at least) to action by some remoter object of which he is indirectly aware. (Dewey 1910: 14-15)

Again a nice congeniality with Peirce, as well as with Clay and his "self-denial" (practical life initiated and controlled by conscious mind). As to "the blind nature of brute actions" see "blind impulse" ([McDougall 1916: 171](#)). This "blindness" is a vivid metaphor but requires further examination. As to the *in absentia* and *in futuro*, these are the exact qualities Jakobson attributes to symbols, probably with good justification.

By thought man also develops and arranges artificial signs to remind him in advance of consequences, and of ways of securing and avoiding them. As the trait just mentioned makes the difference between savage man and brute, so this trait makes **the difference between civilized man and savage.** A savage who has been shipwrecked in a river may note certain things which [\[\]](#) serve him as signs of danger in the future. But **civilized man deliberately makes such signs;** he sets up in advance of wreckage warning buoys, and builds lighthouses where he sees signs that such events may occur. **A savage reads weather signs with great expertness; civilized man institutes a weather service by which signs are artificially secured and information is distributed in advance of the appearance of any signs that could be detected without special methods.** A savage finds his way skillfully through a wilderness by reading certain obscure indications; civilized man builds a highway which shows the road to all. The savage learns to detect the signs of fire and thereby to invent methods of producing flame; civilized man invents permanent conditions for producing light and heat whenever they are needed. (Dewey 1910: 15-16)

Once again we see how Peirce's self-communication and Morris's self-conditioning collapse into each other. The illustrations offer, in some sense, an aspect of collective self-conditioning, though the difference between the savage and the civilized once again follows the line of thought afforded by a variant of "delayed gratification" that, paradoxically (if sticking to this metaphor) cuts short natural signs in favour of artificial sign mechanisms.

A chair is a **different object** to a being to whom it consciously suggests **an opportunity for sitting down, repose, or sociable converse**, from what it is to one to whom it presents itself merely as a thing to be smelled, or gnawed, or jumped over; a stone is different to one who knows something of its past history and its future use from what it is to one who only feels it directly through his senses. It is only by courtesy, indeed, that we can say that an unthinking animal experiences an *object* at all - so largely is anything that presents itself to us as an object made up by the qualities it possesses as a sign of other things. (Dewey 1910: 17)

Something of an amalgamation of Uexküllian *Umwelten* and Gibsonian *affordances*.

The **signs of enemies**, of shelter, of food, of the main social conditions, have to be correctly apprehended. (Dewey 1910: 20)

The "signs of enemies" called to mind "watching intently for the first low hint of a growl" ([Trotter 1921: 119-120](#)). Otherwise, this list of basic needs is not all that different from Trotter's instincts (self-preservation, nutrition, and sex), Shand's ends of sentiments (the love of power, the love of property, the love of reputation, the love of pleasure), and, a bit later down the line, Maslow's pyramid.

Both Bacon and Locke make it evident that over and above the sources of misbelief that reside in the natural

tendencies of the individual (like those toward hasty and too far-reaching conclusions), social conditions tend to instigate and confirm wrong habits of thinking by authority, by conscious instruction, and by the even more insidious half-conscious influences of language, **imitation, sympathy, and suggestion**. (Dewey 1910: 25)

"The three most important of these pseudo-instincts, as they might be called, are suggestion, imitation, and sympathy" ([McDougall 1916: 90-91](#)). The fact that Dewey includes language in this list may very possibly hold a very significant theoretical kernel. All three are means of communication between an agent and a patient, and language fits rather neatly into the scheme, if it were not subsumed by suggestion.

With many, **curiosity is arrested on the plane of interest in local gossip** and in the fortunes of their neighbors; indeed, so unusual is this result that very often the first association with the word *curiosity* is **a prying inquisitiveness into other people's business**. (Dewey 1910: 33)

I've made notes on curiosity but this is the closest to Malinowski's understanding of gossip. Spot on.

Out of the subject-matter, whether rich or scanty, important or trivial, of **present experience issue suggestions, ideas, beliefs as to what is not yet given**. The function of suggestion is not one that can be produced by teaching; while it may be modified for better or worse by conditions, it cannot be destroyed. (Dewey 1910: 34)

Gossip is trivial. "Present experience" can be read as immediate environment.

Primarily, naturally, **it is not we who think, in any actively responsible sense; thinking is rather something that happens in us**. Only so far as one has acquired

control of the method in which the function of suggestion occurs and has accepted responsibility for its consequences, can one truthfully say, "I think so and so." (Dewey 1910: 34)

"It's wrong to say: I think. Better to say: I am thought. [...] *I is an other*" (Rimbaud 1871: 100; in [Macke 2008](#): 141).

We speak truly, in some cases, of the flood of suggestions; in others, there is but **a slender trickle**. (Dewey 1910: 35)

"A flow of language" vs. "a slender trickle".

A conclusion reached after consideration of a few alternatives may be formally correct, but it will not possess **the fullness and richness of meaning** of one arrived at after comparison of a greater variety of alternative suggestions. On the other hand, suggestions may be too numerous and too varied for the best interests of mental habit. So many suggestions may rise that the person is at a loss to select among them. He finds it difficult to reach any definite conclusion and wanders more or less helplessly among them. So much suggests itself *pro* and *con*, one thing leads on to another so naturally, that he finds it difficult to decide in practical affairs or to conclude in matters of theory. There is such a thing as too much thinking, as when action is paralyzed by the multiplicity, of views suggested by a situation. Or again, the very number of suggestions may be hostile to tracing logical sequences among them, for it may tempt the mind away from the necessary but trying task of search for real connections, into the more congenial occupation of embroidering upon the given facts **a tissue of agreeable fancies**. The best mental habit involves **a balance between paucity and redundancy of suggestions**. (Dewey 1910: 36)

A meta-theoretical insight. I am exactly at this point where I need to consider whether I've perhaps accumulated too much material for what might eventually end up a meagre clarification upon a widely held misconception. I'm quite happy with the fact that these recent readings constitute an interrelated network - these authors refer to each other, borrow each others terminology and insights, and develop them with their own interests in mind. But I am vexed by whether the material accumulated might not lead me to erroneous judgments due to an overflow of information. In what amount of detail, for example, should I treat of the sentiments, given that Malinowski glosses over them without making a true argument? I'm a bit afraid that if I were to explicate everything [those damned four pages](#) summarized, it would yield a tome no-one would have patience to read.

One man's thought is **profound** while another's is **superficial**; one goes to the roots of the matter, and another **touches lightly its most external aspects**. This phase of thinking is perhaps that most untaught of all, and the least amenable to external influence whether for improvement or harm. Nevertheless, the conditions of the pupil's contact with subject-matter may be such that he is compelled to come to quarters with its more significant features, or such that he is encouraged to deal with it upon the basis of what is trivial. The common assumptions that, if the pupil only thinks, one thought is just as good for his mental discipline as another, and that the end of study is the amassing of information, both tend to foster superficial, at the expense of significant, thought. Pupils who in matters of ordinary practical experience have a ready and acute perception of **the difference between the significant and the meaningless**, often reach in school subjects a point where all things seem equally important or equally unimportant; where one thing is just as likely to be true as another, and where intellectual effort is expended not in discriminating between things,

but in trying to make verbal connections among words.
(Dewey 1910: 37)

Superficial, insignificant, trivial, meaningless. Lack of depth or profundity.

Intellectual organization originates and for a time grows as an accompaniment of the organization of **the acts required to realize an end**, not as the result of a direct appeal to thinking power. The need of thinking to accomplish something beyond thinking is more potent than **thinking for its own sake**. All people at the outset, and the majority of people probably all their lives, attain ordering of thought through ordering of action. (Dewey 1910: 41)

The opposite of talking for the sake of talking.

The so-called **faculty-psychology** went hand in hand with the vogue of the formal-discipline idea in education. **If thought is a distinct piece of mental machinery, separate from observation, memory, imagination, and common-sense judgments of persons and things**, then thought should be trained by special exercises designed for the purpose, as one might devise special exercises for developing the biceps muscles. Certain subjects are then to be regarded as intellectual or logical subjects *par excellence*, possessed of a predestined fitness to exercise the thought-faculty, just as certain machines are better than others for developing arm power. (Dewey 1910: 45)

The primary folly of faculty psychology. Now looking forward to someone summarizing the follies of instinct psychology (e.g. [Mace 1931?](#)).

He needs to recognize that method covers not only what he intentionally devises and employs for the purpose of mental training, but also what he does without

any conscious reference to it, - anything in **the atmosphere and conduct of the school** which reacts in any way upon the curiosity, the responsiveness, and the orderly activity of children. (Dewey 1910: 46)

Does conduct make atmosphere? If "Conduct is the behaviour of self-conscious and rational beings" ([McDougall 1916: 353](#)) then probably not.

As the child's response is *toward* or *away from* anything presented, he keeps up **a running commentary**, of which he himself is hardly distinctly aware, **of like and dislike, of sympathy and aversion**, not merely to the acts of the teacher, but also to the subject with which the teacher is occupied. (Dewey 1910: 48)

Thus, "purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings" (PC 5.1).

Most persons are quite unaware of the distinguishing peculiarities of their own mental habit. They **take their own mental operations for granted, and unconsciously make them the standard for judging the mental processes of others**. (Dewey 1910: 48b)

What is idiomorphizing?

The pupil is enjoined to do this and that specific thing, with no knowledge of any reason except that by so doing he gets his result most speedily; his mistakes are pointed out and corrected for him; he is kept at **pure repetition of certain acts till they become automatic**. (Dewey 1910: 51)

Phraseology.

Much the same sort of thing is to be said regarding studies where emphasis traditionally falls upon bulk and accuracy of information. The distinction between infor-

mation and wisdom is old, and yet requires constantly to be redrawn. **Information is knowledge which is merely acquired and stored up; wisdom is knowledge operating in the direction of powers to the better living of life.** Information, merely as information, implies no special training of intellectual capacity; wisdom is the finest fruit of that training. In school, amassing information always tends to escape from the ideal of wisdom or good judgment. The aim often seems to be - especially in such a subject as geography - to make the pupil what has been called a "**cyclopedia of useless information.**" (Dewey 1910: 52)

Information, turns out, is inert.

In this sense, the word *logical* is synonymous with wide-awake, thorough, and careful reflection - thought in its best sense (*ante*, p. 5). (Dewey 1910: 57)

"above, p. 5"

It is thought that there are certain steps arranged in a certain order, which expresses preëminently an understanding of the subject, and the pupil is made to "analyze" his procedure into these steps, *i.e.* to learn **a certain routine formula of statement.** (Dewey 1910: 60)

Phraseology.

At present, the notion is current that **childhood is almost entirely unreflective** - a period of mere sensory, motor, and memory development, while adolescence suddenly brings the manifestation of thought and reason. (Dewey 1910: 65)

Define:unreflective - "not engaged in or characterized by reflection or thought". Ironically, my comment itself is unreflective. "Unreflective" has passed through these recent readings and I'm just not-

ing down that this is thought of children as well as brutes and savages - in other words the whole set of language users ascribed with phaticity. Dewey is making me reflect on how unreflective my comments are.

Since suspended belief, or the postponement of a final conclusion pending further evidence, depends partly upon the presence of rival conjectures as to the best course of pursue or the probable explanation to favor, ***cultivation of a variety of alternative suggestions is an important factor in good thinking.*** (Dewey 1910: 75)

Phraseology for the etymological question.

There is thus a double movement in all reflection: **a movement from the given partial and confused data to a suggested comprehensive (or inclusive) entire situation**; and back from this suggested whole - which as suggested is a *meaning*, an idea - to the particular facts, so as to connect these with one another and with additional facts to which the suggestion has directed attention. Roughly speaking, **the first of these movements [] is inductive**; the second deductive. A complete act of thought involves both - it involves, that is, a fruitful interaction of observed (or recollected) particular considerations and of inclusive and far-reaching (general) meanings. (Dewey 1910: 79-80)

The movement from Firstness to Thirdness is inductive; movement from Thirdness to Firstness deductive. The comprehensive situation here is the equivalent of legisign.

The state of his room is perceived and is particular, definite, - exactly as it is; burglars are inferred, and have a general status. The state of the room is a *fact*, certain and **speaking for itself**; the presence of burglars is a possible *meaning* which may explain the facts. (Dewey 1910: 82)

Thus, "affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things" (PC 2.2) are superficial and superfluous because those things *speaking for themselves*, they are self-evident. According to Trotter, there is already a *community of knowledge* about those facts.

Consider, for example, how a physician makes his diagnosis - his inductive interpretation. If he is scientifically trained, he suspends - postpones - reaching a conclusion in order that he may not be led by superficial occurrences into a snap judgment. Certain conspicuous phenomena may forcibly suggest typhoid, but he avoids a conclusion, or even any strong preference for this or that conclusion until he has greatly (i) **enlarged the scope of his data**, and (ii) **rendered them more minute**. (Dewey 1910: 85)

These two operations are equally present in my current research. In other words, it's another meta-theoretical insight.

In object lessons in elementary education and in laboratory instruction in higher education, the subject is often so treated that the student fails to "see the forest on account of the trees." Things and their qualities are **re-tailed** and detailed, without reference to a more general character which they stand for and mean. (Dewey 1910: 97)

Define: retail - "relate or repeat (a story) in detail".

The final point of the deductive devices lies in their use in assimilating and comprehending individual cases. No one understands a general principle fully - no matter how adequately he can demonstrate it, to say nothing of repeating it - till he can employ it in the mastery of new situations, which, if they *are* new, differ in manifestation from the cases used in reaching the generalization. Too often the textbook or teacher is contented with a series of somewhat perfunctory examples and illustrations, and

the student is not forced to carry the principle that he has formulated over into further cases of his own experience. In so far, **the principle is inert and dead**. (Dewey 1910: 99)

The opposite case, with similar results, is also possible: if a principle is given only a superficial interpretation it is easy enough to find endless further examples but these end up as perfunctory as the original.

This brings us to the question of *ideas in relation to judgments*. Something in an obscure situation [] suggests something else as its meaning. **If this meaning is at once accepted, there is no reflective thinking, no genuine judging**. Thought is cut short uncritically; dogmatic belief, with all its attending risks, takes place. **But if the meaning suggested is held in suspense, pending examination and inquiry, there is true judgment**. We stop and think, we *de-fer* conclusion in order to *in-fer* more thoroughly. In this process of being only conditionally accepted, accepted only for examination, **meanings become ideas**. *That is to say, an idea is a meaning that is tentatively entertained, formed, and used with reference to its fitness to decide a perplexing situation, - a meaning used as a tool of judgment*. (Dewey 1910: 107-108)

Define:idea - "a thought or suggestion as to a possible course of action". All this is heavily muddled. At the very least I can accept that unreflective thinking does not produce meaning; as to the relation between meaning and judgment, I shall have to postpone acceptance of the thesis.

Let us recur to our instance of a blur in motion appearing at a distance. We wonder what *the thing is*, i.e. what the *blur means*. A man waving his arms, a friend beckoning to us, are suggested as possibilities. To accept at once either alternative is to arrest judgment. But if we

treat what is suggested as only a suggestion, a supposition, a possibility, it becomes an idea, having the following traits: (a) As merely a suggestion, it is a **conjecture, a guess**, which in cases of greater dignity we call a hypothesis or a theory. That is to say, it is *a possible but as yet doubtful mode of interpretation*. (b) Even though doubtful, it has an office to perform; namely, that of **directing inquiry and examination**. If this blur means a friend beckoning, then careful observation should show certain other traits. If it is a man driving unruly cattle, certain other traits should be found. (Dewey 1910: 108)

"Imagine yourself seeing at a distance a person who so affects your faculty of identification as to beget in you a faint opinion that he is your father, imagine that the opinion alternates for a time with the opposite opinion until, getting near to the object, you become certain that it is your father" ([Clay 1881: 32](#)).

As analysis is conceived to be a sort of picking to pieces, so synthesis is thought to be a sort of physical piecing together; and so imagined, it also becomes a mystery. In fact, synthesis takes place wherever we grasp the bearing of facts on a conclusion, or of a principle on facts. As analysis is *emphasis*, so synthesis is *placing*; the one causes the emphasized fact or property to stand out as significant; the other gives what is selected its **context, or its connection with what is signified**. (Dewey 1910: 114)

Hence why the referential function (connecting the sign with what is signified) is tied with the factor of context.

For one thing to *mean, signify, betoken, indicate, or point to*, another we saw at the outset to be the essential mark of thinking. To find out what facts, just as they stand, mean, is the object of all discovery; to find out what facts will carry out, substantiate, support a given meaning, is the object of all testing. **When an inference reaches a satisfactory conclusion, we attain a goal of**

meaning. The act of judging involves both the growth and the application of meanings. (Dewey 1910: 116)

In other words, to arrive at a meaning there must be "a real doubt" (cf. [Savan 1965: 37](#)).

If a person comes suddenly into your room and calls out "Paper," various alternatives are possible. If you do not understand the English language, there is simply **a noise which may or may not act as a physical stimulus [] an irritant**. But the noise is not an intellectual object; it does not have intellectual value. To say that you do not understand it and that it has no meaning are equivalents. If the cry is the usual accompaniment of the delivery of the morning paper, the sound will have meaning, intellectual content; you will understand it. Or if you are eagerly awaiting the receipt of some important document, you may assume that the cry means an announcement of its arrival. If (in the third place) you understand the English language, but no context suggests itself from your habits and expectations, the *word* has meaning, but not the whole event. You are then perplexed and incited to think out, to hunt for, some explanation of the apparently meaningless occurrence. If you find something that accounts for the performance, it gets meaning; you come to understand it. As intelligent beings, we presume the existence of meaning, and its absence is an anomaly. Hence, if it should turn out that the person merely meant to inform you that there was a scrap of paper on the sidewalk, or that paper excited somewhere in the universe, you would think him crazy or yourself the victim of a poor joke. **The grasp a meaning, to understand, to identify a thing in a situation in which it is important, are thus equivalent terms**; they express the nerves of our intellectual life. Without them there is (a) **lack of intellectual content**, or (b) intellectual confusion and perplexity, or else (c) intellectual perversion - nonsense, insanity. (Dewey 1910: 116-117)

Oddly similar to the illustration of a red gas bill (cf. [Žegarac & Clark 1999](#)).

All judgment, all reflective inference, presupposes **some lack of understanding**, a partial absence of meaning. We reflect in order that we may get hold of the full and adequate significance of what happens. Nevertheless, *something* must be already understood, the mind must be in possession of some meaning which it has mastered, or else thinking is impossible. (Dewey 1910: 119)

A real doubt.

Similarly, conceptions are general because of their use and application, not because of their ingredients. The view of the origin of conception in an impossible sort of analysis has as its counterpart the idea that the conception is made up out of all the like elements that remain after dissection of a number of individuals. Not so; the moment a meaning is gained, it is a working tool of further apprehensions, an instrument of understanding other things. Thereby the meaning is *extended* to cover them. **Generality resides in application to the comprehension of new cases**, not in constituent parts. A collection of traits left as the common residuum, the *caput mortuum*, of a million objects, would be merely a collection, an inventory or aggregate, not a *general idea*; a striking trait emphasized in any one experience which then served to help understand some one other experience, would become, in virtue of that service of application, in so far general. Synthesis is not a matter of mechanical addition, but of application of something discovered in one case to bring other cases into line. (Dewey 1910: 129)

In this sense, phatic communion is general, as discussed above. At the core of it is incommunicability. The folly consists in "very cleverly" applying it on phenomena naturally uncommunicative (e.g.

fountains). That is, communicationalize something and identify its dysfunction - ingenious!

A constant source of misunderstanding and mistake is indefiniteness of meaning. Through vagueness of [] meaning we misunderstand other people, things, and ourselves; through its ambiguity we distort and pervert. Conscious distortion of meaning may be enjoyed as nonsense; erroneous meanings, if clear-cut, may be followed up and got rid of. **But vague meanings are too gelatinous to offer matter for analysis, and too pulpy to afford support to other beliefs.** They evade testing and responsibility. Vagueness disguises the unconscious mixing together of different meanings, and facilitates the substitution of one meaning for another, and covers up the failure to have any precise meaning at all. It is the aboriginal logical sin - the source from which flow most bad intellectual consequences. Totally **to eliminate indefiniteness** is impossible; to reduce it in extent and in force requires sincerity and vigor. (Dewey 1910: 129-130)

"Gelatinous" here could very well describe the ignored portions of PC, which are vague because they have lost their original context (McDougall, Durkheim, Shand, and Trotter).

The maxim enjoined upon teachers, "**to proceed from the concrete to the abstract**," is perhaps familiar rather than comprehended. Few who read and hear it gain a clear conception of the starting-point, the concrete; of the nature of the goal, the abstract; and of the exact nature of the path to be traversed in going from one to the other. At times the injunction is positively misunderstood, being taken to mean that education should **advance from things to thought** - as if any dealing with things in which thinking is not involved could possibly be educative. So understood, the maxim encourages mechanical routine or sensuous excitation at one end of the

educational scale - the lower - and academic and unapplied learning at the upper end. (Dewey 1910: 135)

"Traditionally, the word *concrete* characterizes a material object, something that can be perceived by at least one of our senses" ([Buyssens 1988: 191](#)), and *abstract* a part or quality, something akin to general law, for example this concrete table, and "what is common to all tables" (*ibid*, 192). In broad outline this follows advancing from things to thought, yes, but the misconception about how this should apply to teaching is unique to Dewey and his particular interest towards thinking in the context of education. Buyssens, too, has his particular interest in the minutiae of language philosophy. This distinction, on the whole, seems to be so abstract and heuristic that it can be exemplified without stumbling upon the explicator's own thesistic affections.

Yet the maxim has a meaning which, understood and supplemented, states the line of development of logical capacity. What is this signification? Concrete denotes a meaning definitely marked off from other meanings so that it is readily apprehended by itself. When we hear the words, *table, chair, stove, coat*, **we do not have to reflect in order to grasp what is meant. The terms convey meaning so directly that no effort at translating is needed.** The meanings of some terms and things, however, are **grasped only by first calling to mind more familiar things and then tracing out connections between them and what we do not understand.** Roughly speaking, the former kind of meanings is concrete; the latter abstract. (Dewey 1910: 136)

Apt. On the object level I have the concrete side of phatic communion - a type of languaging that is not the outcome and does not arouse reflection, does not require translation or interpretation; in other words, the social automatism of language in greetings and small talk. On the meta-level I have the terminological invention,

phatic communion - an abstract signifier that's poorly understood and requires finding concrete illustrations and using common speech equivalent (small talk, chit chat) to call instances or examples into mind. The theoretical side of phatic communion in Malinowski's formulation is rarely visited with any thoroughness; only portions are quoted from it often, and a proportionally overwhelming part of it is completely neglected, never even mentioned, possibly because it appears to be "mostly nonsense, linguistically, psychologically, psychiatrically, and anthropologically" ([La Barre 1954](#): 349). Once again, this situation is largely so due to Malinowski obfuscating his sources, divorcing his "invention" from those who gave it its substance. In a broader theoretical context phatic communion represents a line of thinking in social psychology that is no longer affordable to social science, it is formulated in an antiquated metalanguage and bears many marks of nationalist and supremacists over-, and undertones. Had his diary been translated a mere decade earlier, "phatic" might have gone the way of "ratiocination" and "anoetic sentience" instead of littering my inbox with a Google Scholar Alert with 10 new results every few days.

The difference as noted is purely relative to the intellectual progress of an individual; what is abstract [] at one period of growth is concrete at another; or even the contrary, as one finds that **things supposed to be thoroughly familiar involve strange factors and unsolved problems.** (Dewey 1910: 136-137)

"Lotman rõhutab seal muuhulgas semiootika kuulumist tavaliste teaduste hulka, kusjuures selle "tavalisuse" juurde kuulub ka *püüd avastada selgetes ja lihtsates asjades arusaamatuid ja keerulisi aspekte*" ([Torop 2010](#): 10-12; minu rõhk).

We are acquainted with a thing (or it is familiar to us) when we have so much to do with it that its strange and unexpected concerns are rubbed off. **The necessities of**

social intercourse convey to adults a like concreteness upon such terms as *taxes, elections, wages, the law*, and so on. Things the meaning of which I personally do not take in directly, appliances of cook, carpenter, or weaver, for example, are nevertheless unhesitatingly classed as concrete, since they are so **directly connected with out common social life**. (Dewey 1910: 137)

Are social intercourse and social life equivalent?

By contrast, **the abstract is the *theoretical***, or that **not intimately associated with practical concerns**. The abstract thinker (**the man of pure science** as he is sometimes called) deliberately abstracts from application in life; that is, he leaves practical uses out of account. This, however, is a merely negative statement. What remains when connections with use and application are excluded? *Evidently only what has to do with **knowing considered as an end in itself***. Many notions of science [] are abstract, not only because they cannot be understood without a long apprenticeship in the science (which is equally true of technical matters in the arts), but also because **the whole content of their meaning has been framed for the sole purpose of facilitating further knowledge, inquiry, and speculation**. *When thinking is used as a means to some end, good, or value beyond itself, it is concrete; when it is employed simply as a means to more thinking, it is abstract*. **To a theorist an idea is adequate and self-contained just because it engages and rewards thought**; to a medical practitioner, an engineer, an artist, a merchant, a politician, it is complete only when employed in the furthering of some interest in life - **health, wealth, beauty, goodness, success**, or what you will. (Dewey 1910: 147-148)

That is, "the lover of knowledge [desires] intellectual conscientiousness, impartiality, and exactitude" ([Shand 1914: 113](#)). I finally figured out how to use this contrapoint, the reflexiveness of thought

vs speech. It can be employed to characterise the differing ends of an ethnographer and the native informant. The ends of practical uses of thought are not that different from all the social sentiments, e.g. "the love of power, the love of property, the love of reputation, the love of pleasure" ([Shand 1914: 206](#)).

For the great majority of men under ordinary circumstances, **the practical exigencies of life** are almost, if not quite, **coercive**. Their main business is **the proper conduct of their affairs**. (Dewey 1910: 138)

By coincidence I was just thinking of how to connect PC with power. It is implicit here that the social life and intercourse of common people depends much on the proper navigation of the social world in a manner that avoids direct coercion. Proper conduct, that is, amounts to self-censorship.

Power in action requires some largeness and imaginativeness of vision. **Men must at least have enough interest in thinking for the sake of thinking to escape the limit of routine and custom**. Interest in knowledge for the sake of knowledge, in thinking for the sake of **the free play of thought**, is necessary then to **the emancipation of practical life - to make it rich and progressive**. (Dewey 1910: 139)

By analogy, social automatism can enrich life if it yields to good conversation and creates new social bonds of union. Free and aimless conversation can be an escape from idleness, for example.

Appropriate continuous occupations or activities involve the use of natural materials, tools, modes of energy, and do it in a way that compels thinking as to what they mean, how they are related to one another and to the realization of ends; while **the mere isolated presentation of things remains barren and dead**. A few generations ago the great obstacle in the way of reform of primary ed-

ucation was **belief in the almost magical efficacy of the symbols of language (including number) to produce mental training**; at present, belief in the efficacy of objects just as objects, blocks the way. (Dewey 1910: 140)

Against superficiality. Simultaneously, use of language is not automatically a transmission of ideas.

The outcome, the *abstract* to which education is to proceed, is an interest in intellectual matters for their own sake, **a delight in thinking for the sake of thinking**. It is an old story that acts and processes which at the outset are incidental to something else **develop and maintain an absorbing value of their own**. So it is with thinking and with knowledge; at first incidental to results and adjustments beyond themselves, they attract more and more attention to themselves till

Old story indeed, as something becomes "divorced from the practical ends [and] are exercised merely for their own sake" ([Shand 1914: 290](#)). I am happy that I haven't undertaken writing about this process of functional autonomization on the basis of Malinowski's publications only, because so many earlier instances would have been *uncluded, exformed*. It is one of those modes of thought that go *waay* back.

Engineers, lawyers, doctors, merchants, are much more numerous in adult life than scholars, scientists, and philosophers. (Dewey 1910: 143)

A ratio that can reverse in the coming age of leisure when automation takes over the former fields and humans will be left with the latter. If nothing else, it is a constant source of utopian visions and hope to imagine such a future. There will be no such thing as overspecialization. There will be people who dedicate years upon years towards making sense of something extremely minute and trivial;

that is, there will be a before unseen mass of such people. Occupations and practical matters will be to them machines' work; they would dig the archives of human knowledge and lay tribute upon the ingenuity of our sapient species.

When men lived in the open and got their living by hunting, fishing, or [[]] pasturing flocks, **the detection of the signs and indications of weather changes was a matter of great importance.** A body of proverbs and maxims, forming an extensive section of traditional folklore, was developed. But as long as there was no understanding *why* or *how* certain events were signs, as long as foresight and weather shrewdness rested simply upon repeated conjunction among facts, beliefs about the weather were thoroughly empirical. (Dewey 1910: 145-146)

A familiar enough note about the importance of weather. The promising part of it is the mechanization of semiosis, to borrow from above, that human beings create artificial means to take control of such realities. In my own utopian visions this includes the control of weather, whether by "doming" cities and dwellings or regulating natural forces beyond capabilities currently imaginable.

Our **beliefs about human nature in individuals (psychology) and in masses (sociology)** are still very largely of a purely empirical sort. (Dewey 1910: 146)

I recall A. R. asking the difference between psychology and sociology, which I gave as a correlation between interest in the behaviour of individuals and the actions of groups. Not that far off the mark but I may be beautifying it in hindsight.

The technical designation for **one of the commonest fallacies** is *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*; the belief that because one thing comes *after* another, it comes *because of* the other. (Dewey 1910: 147)

A fallacy I've committed numerous times with regard to publication dates, whereas later on I've discovered more complex interrelations and more pertinent antecedents. Chronology is not a reliable indicator of unidirectional influence. *Correlation does not imply causation.*

But even the most reliable beliefs of this type fail when they confront the *novel*. Since they rest upon past uniformities, they are useless when further experience departs in any considerable measure from ancient incident and wonted precedent. **Empirical inference follows the grooves and ruts that custom wears**, and has no track to follow when the groove disappears. (Dewey 1910: 148)

Here Dewey appears to invoke William James's metaphor of vinyl record groove for habits.

Beliefs that perhaps originally were the products of fairly extensive and careful observation are **stereotyped into fixed traditions** and semisacred dogmas accepted simply upon authority, and are mixed with fantastic conceptions that happen to have won **the acceptance of authorities**. (Dewey 1910: 149)

Where the traditions of the herd meet the production of knowledge.

One of these facts, **the weight of the atmosphere**, is then selectively seized upon as the key to the entire phenomenon. (Dewey 1910: 152)

Phraseology for making discussion of social atmosphere more vivid. What is the weight of small talk?

The empirical method says, "*Wait* till there is a sufficient number of cases;" the experimental method says, "*Produce* the cases." The former depends upon nature's ac-

cidentally happening to present us with certain conjunctions of circumstances; the latter deliberately and intentionally endeavors to bring about the conjunction. (Dewey 1910: 154)

I'll have to remember this distinction because I tend to conflate empirical, analytical, experimental, and positivist in different measures. Roughly, on the very theoretical level I'm operating, the empirical method would be to read on and hoping to discover what else I might have missed, and experimental would be to do some thinking myself and lead already sure arguments to their logical ends, whatever they appear to be at the moment.

Customary experience tends to the control of thinking by considerations of *direct and immediate strength* rather than by those of importance in the long run. Animals without **the power of forecast and planning** must, upon the whole, respond to the stimuli that are most urgent at themoment, or cease to exist. These stimuli lose nothing of their direct urgency and clamorous insistency when the thinking power develops; and yet thinking [] demands **the subordination of the immediate stimulus to the remote and distant**. The feeble and the minute may be of much greater importance than the glaring and the big. The latter my be signs of a force that is already exhausting itself; the former may indicate **the beginnings of a process** in which the whole fortune of the individual is involved. The prime necessity for scientific thought is that **the thinker be freed from the tyranny of sense stimuli and habit**, and this emancipation is also the necessary condition of progress. (Dewey 1910: 154-155)

Symbols are used to predict the future, [as noted above](#); "delayed gratification" is involved. I might need to add Levi-Bruhl to my reading list. Attending to the immediately perceived stimuli of ongoing processes is "barbarian's work", suitable for brutes and sav-

ages but not to the ideational civilized *Übermensch*, whose science accurately predicts the future. I still don't know how to excise this image from the discussion of PC - this worldview taints the theory.

In connection with parents, nurse, brother, and sister, the child learns the signs of satisfaction of hunger, of removal of discomfort, of the approach of agreeable light, color, sound, and so on. **His contact with physical things is regulated by persons, and he soon distinguishes persons as the most important and interesting of all the objects with which he has to do.** Speech, the accurate adaptation of sounds heard to the movements of tongue and lips, is, however, **the great instrument of social adaptation**; and with the development of speech (usually in the second year) adaptation of the baby's activities to and with those of other persons gives **the keynote of mental life.** (Dewey 1910: 159)

Getting Meadian again.

Imitation is one (though only one, see p. 47) of the means by which the activities of adults supply stimuli which are so interesting, so varied, so complex, and so novel, as to occasion a rapid progress of thought. **Mere imitation, however, would not give rise to thinking; if we could learn like parrots by simply copying the outward acts of others, we should never have to think**; nor should we know, after we had mastered the copied act, what was **the meaning of the thing we had done.** Educators (and psychologists) have often assumed that acts which reproduce the behavior of others are acquired merely by imitation. But a child rarely learns by conscious imitation; and to say that his imitation is unconscious is to say that it is not from his standpoint imitation at all. **The word, the gesture, the act, the occupation of another, falls in line with some impulse already active and suggests some satisfactory mode of expression, some end in which it may find fulfillment.** Having this

end of his own, the child then notes other persons, as he notes natural events, to get further suggestions as to means of its realization. (Dewey 1910: 160)

Imitation is indeed one, but in McDougall it has to do with bodily action, whereas the communication of ideas proceeds through "suggestion" (as with feelings and sympathy). The really remarkable thing is that this gives credence for my idea of treating Dewey's "fourth" in that series, language, under the guise of Jakobson's "imputed similarity". I should be more surprised that talking birds are illustrative of perfunctory use of language. What Dewey says about children's imitation on the other hand appears to fall into the same pit as Lamarkians did, assuming that some traits are inheritable which now seem very dubitable. A faint anticipation of Chomsky's deep structure is in the air.

When things become signs, when they gain a representative capacity as standing for other things, play is transformed from mere physical exuberance into an activity involving a mental factor. A little girl who had broken her doll was seen to perform with the leg of the doll all the operations of washing, putting to bed, and fondling, that she had been accustomed to perform with the entire doll. The part stood for the whole; she reacted not to the stimulus sensibly present, but to the meaning suggested by the sense object. So children use a stone for a table, leaves for plates, acorns for cups. So they use their dolls, their trains, their blocks, their other toys. In manipulating them, they are living not with the physical things, but in **the large world of meanings, natural and social, evoked by these things.** So when children play horse, play store, play house or making calls, they are **subordinating the physically present to the ideally signified.** In this way, a world of meanings, a store of concepts (so fundamental to all intellectual achievement), is defined and built up. (Dewey 1910: 161)

Semiotic reality or semiosphere?

Moreover, not only do **meanings** thus become familiar acquaintances, but they **are organized, arranged in groups, made to cohere in connected ways**. A play and a store blend insensibly into each other. The most fanciful plays of children rarely lose all touch with the mutual fitness and pertinency of various meanings to one another; the "freest" plays observe some principles of coherence and unification. They have a beginning, middle, and end. **In games, rules of order run through various minor acts and bind them into a connected whole**. The rhythm, the competition, and coöperation involved in most plays and games also introduce organization. (Dewey 1910: 162)

Signs organize reality? The statement about the rules of the game could become profound if there was certitude to Malinowski's influence on Wittgenstein.

Playfulness is a more important consideration than play. The former is an attitude of mind; the latter is a passing outward manifestation of this attitude. **When things are treated simply as vehicles of suggestion, what is suggested overrides the thing**. Hence the playful attitude is one of freedom. The person is not bound to the physical traits of things, **nor does he care whether a thing really means (as we say) what he takes it to represent**. (Dewey 1910: 162)

"Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs?" (PC 6.3) - Thus far only Dewey has given real substance to this part of the argument. When the referential function lapses, the thing - speech as a mode of action - overrides what ever is suggested by the "mental factor" or representation suggested. *Tere* loses its connection with health (*tervis*) and becomes a meaningless greeting.

What is work - work not as mere external performance, [[]] but as attitude of mind? **It signifies that the person is not content longer to accept and to act upon the meanings that things suggest, but demand congruity of meaning with the things themselves.** In the natural course of growth, children come to find irresponsible make-believe plays inadequate. A fiction is too easy a way out to afford content. There is not enough stimulus to call forth satisfactory mental response. When this point is reached, the ideas that things suggest must be applied to the things with some regard to **fitness**. (Dewey 1910: 162-163)

A semiotic definition of work? What? Where this could turn useful is Uexküll's *Umwelt* to give more substance to *Wirk*. Contained in this is the implication that our human species specific *Umwelt*, unlike, or at least more so than, that of other living beings, we can organize our environment; i.e. instead of looking at the sky and feeling the cold, we open a weather app and get accurate information about the physical atmosphere outside our artificial caves called houses (wouldn't a careful examination of human *Umwelten* be an experiment in estrangement, defamiliarization, *остранение*?).

The point of this distinction between play and work may be cleared up by comparing it with a more usual way of stating the difference. **In play activity, it is said, the interest is in the activity for its own sake;** in work, it is in the product or result in which the activity terminates. Hence the former is purely free, while the latter is tied down by the end to be achieved. When the difference is states in this sharp fashion, there is almost always introduced **a false, unnatural separation between process and product, between activity and its achieved outcome.** The true distinction is not between an interest in activity for its own sake and interest in the external result of that activity, but between **an interest in an activity just as it flows on from moment to moment, and an**

interest in an activity as tending to a culmination, to an outcome, and therefore possessing a thread of continuity binding together its successive stages. Both may equally exemplify interest in an activity "for its own sake"; but in one case the activity in which the interest resides is more or less casual, following the accident of circumstance and whim, or of dictation; in the other, **the activity is enriched by the sense that it leads somewhere, that it amounts to something.** (Dewey 1910: 164)

Consummation! I'm so thankful I haven't written about futility to any great extent yet - this passage sets autonomy and the means-ends model in an orderly relief unlike anything I've read thus far.

Just as the opponents of play in education always conceive of play as **mere amusement**, so the opponents of **direct and useful activities** confuse occupation with labor. The adult is acquainted with responsible labor upon which serious financial results depend. Consequently he seeks **relief, relaxation, amusement**. Unless children have prematurely worked for hire, unless they have come under the blight of child labor, no such division exists for them. Whatever appeals to them at all, appeals directly on its own account. **There is no contrast between doing things for utility and for fun.** Their life is more united and more wholesome. To suppose that activities customarily performed by adults only under the pressure of utility may not be done perfectly freely and joyously by children indicates a lack of imagination. Not the thing done but the quality of mind that goes into the doing settles what is utilitarian and what is constrained and educative. (Dewey 1910: 167)

In what way are savages childlike? The fact that Malinowski subsumed most of tribal life and labour under something like playfulness or, Dorothy Lee ([1940](#), [1950](#)) would put it, futility.

In turn, modern industry is almost wholly a matter of applied science; year by year the domain of routine and crude empiricism is narrowed by the translation of scientific discovery into industrial invention. **The trolley, the telephone, the electric light, the steam engine, with all their revolutionary consequences for social intercourse and control, are the fruits of science.** (Dewey 1910: 168)

The same goes for social media. We've already seen its effects on social intercourse but, as "Exploring the Utility of Memes for U.S. Government Influence Campaigns" ([Zamek, McBride & Hammerberg 2018](#)) shows, is only beginning to be understood as a means of social control (one may object to the conflation of memes and social media but that study is about DARPA's new initiative SMISC, Social Media in Strategic Communications).

Seech has such a peculiarly intimate connection with thought as **to require special discussion**. Although the very word logic comes from logos (λόγος), meaning indifferently both word or speech, and thought or reason, **yet "words, words, words" denote intellectual barrenness, a sham of thought**. Although schooling has language as its chief instrument (and often as its chief matter) of study, educational reformers have for centuries brought their severest indictments against the current use of language in the schools. **The conviction that language is necessary to thinking (is even identical with it) is met by the contention that language perverts and conceals thought.** (Dewey 1910: 170)

This is why "The case of language used in free, aimless, social intercourse requires special consideration" (PC 1.1). "Words may be used to record and conceal" (Lecky 1955: 29).

Three typical views have been maintained regarding the relation of thought and language: first, that they are

identical; second, that **words are the garb or clothing of thought, necessary not for thought but only for conveying it**; and third (the view we shall here maintain) that while language is not thought it is necessary for thinking as well as for its communication. When it is said, however, that thinking is impossible without language, we must recall that language includes much more than oral and written speech. Gestures, pictures, monuments, visual images, finger movements - **anything consciously [] employed as a sign is, logically, language**. To say that language is necessary for thinking is to say that **signs are necessary**. Thought deals not with bare things, but with their *meanings, their suggestions*; and meanings, in order to be apprehended, must be embodied in sensible and particular existences. **Without meaning, things are nothing but blind stimuli or chance sources of pleasure and pain**; and since meanings are not themselves tangible things, they must be anchored by attachment to some physical existence. Existences that are especially set aside **to fixate and convey meanings are signs or symbols**. If a man moves toward another to throw him out of the room, his movement is not a sign. **If, however, the man points to the door with his hand, or utters the sound *go***, his movement is reduced to a vehicle of meaning: it is a sign or symbol. In the case of signs we care nothing for what they are in themselves, but everything for what they signify and represent. *Canis, hund, chien*, dog - it makes no difference what the outward thing is, so long as the meaning is presented. (Dewey 1910: 170-171)

Peirceans would concur. The illustration (throwing someone out) concurs with the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic coding (cf. [Ekman & Friesen 1969](#)). How could I make use of this to counterpose *go* with "Don't go!"?

Their production is under our direct control so that they may be produced when needed. **When we can make the word *rain***, we do not have to wait for some physical

forerunner of rain to call out thoughts in that direction.
(Dewey 1910: 172)

"It rains."

Individual Meanings. A verbal sign (a) selects, detaches, a meaning from what is otherwise **a vague flux and blur**; (b) it retains, registers, stores that meaning; and (c) applies it, when needed, to the comprehension of other things. Combining these various functions in a mixture of metaphors, we may say that a linguistic sign is **a fence, a label, and a vehicle** - all in one. (Dewey 1910: 173)

De Saussure's "vague uncharted nebula".

Every one has experienced **how learning an appropriate name for what was dim and vague cleared up and crystallized the whole matter**. Some meaning seems almost within reach, but is elusive; it refuses to condense into definite form; **the attaching of a word somehow** (just how, it is almost impossible to say) **puts limits around the meaning, draws it out from the void, makes it stand out as an entity on its own account**. When Emerson said that he would almost rather know the true name, the poet's name, for a thing, than to know the thing itself, he presumably had this irradiating and illuminating function of language in mind. (Dewey 1910: 173)

I've noticed people online expressing their joy at finding out that there's a label, "phatic communion", for this common experience.

Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that whenever there is a definite word or form of speech there is also a definite idea; while, as a matter of fact, adults and children alike are capable of **using even precise verbal formulæ [] with only the vaguest and most confused sense of what they mean**. Genuine ignorance is more

profitable because likely to be accompanied by humility, curiosity, and open-mindedness; while **ability to repeat catch-phrases, cant terms, familiar propositions, gives the conceit of learning and coats the mind with a varnish waterproof to new ideas.** (Dewey 1910: 177)

That is to say, "set phrases" are not necessarily tied to a definite idea (cf. [Gardiner 1932](#): 46).

Again, although new combinations of words without the intervention of physical things may supply new ideas, there are limits to this possibility. **Lazy inertness causes individuals to accept ideas that have currency about them without personal inquiry and testing. A man uses thought, perhaps, to find out what others believe, and then stops.** The ideas of others as embodied in language become substitutes for one's own ideas. (Dewey 1910: 177)

An unreflective use of language; is this a transmission of ideas or something else?

Finally, words that originally stood for ideas come, with repeated use, to be **mere counters**; they become physical things to be manipulated according to certain rules, or reacted to by certain operations without consciousness of their meaning. Mr. Stout (who has called such terms "**substitute signs**") remarks that "algebraical and arithmetical signs are to a great extent used as mere substitute signs. [...] It is possible to use signs of this kind whenever fixed and definite rules of operation [] can be derived from the nature of the things symbolized, so as to be applied in manipulating the signs, **without further reference to their signification.** A word is an instrument for thinking about the meaning which it expresses; **a substitute sign is a means of not thinking about the meaning which it symbolizes.**" The principle applies, however, to **ordinary words**, as well as to algebraic signs; they also enable us to use meanings so as to get results without

thinking. In many respects, **signs that are means of not thinking** are of great advantage; standing for the familiar, **they release attention for meanings that, being novel, require conscious interpretation.** Nevertheless, the premium put in the schoolroom upon attainment of technical facility, upon skill in producing external results, often changes this advantage into a positive detriment. In manipulating symbols so as to recite well, to get and give correct answers, to follow prescribed formulæ of analysis, **the pupil's attitude becomes mechanical,** rather than thoughtful; verbal memorizing is substituted for inquiry into the meaning of things. (Dewey 1910: 177-178)

Mechanization and post-language symbols. The thinking is exactly that of "social automatism": habituation is useful because it facilitates conservation of energy for the novel.

The common statement that "language is the expression [] of thought" conveys only a half-truth, and a half-truth that is likely to result in positive error. Language does express thought, but not primarily, nor, at first, even consciously. The primary motive for language is to influence (through the expression of desire, emotion, and thought) the activity of others; **its secondary use is to enter into more intimate sociable relations with them;** its employment as a conscious vehicle of thought and knowledge is a tertiary, and relatively late, formation. The contrast is well brought out by the statement of John Locke that words have a double use, - **"civil" and "philosophical."** "By their civil use, I mean such a **communication of thoughts and ideas** by words as may serve for **the upholding of common conversation** and commerce about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life. [...] By the philosophical use of words, I mean such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths." (Dewey 1910: 178-179)

Amazing. When Malinowski writes about the intellectual use of language being a higher and later development, this must be what he was referring to. Absolutely incredible discovery.

The distinction of **the practical and social** from **the intellectual use of language** throws much light on the problem of the school in respect to speech. That problem is *to direct pupils' oral and written speech, used primarily for practical and **social ends**, so that gradually it shall become a conscious tool of conveying knowledge and assisting thought.* How without checking the spontaneous, natural motives - motives to which language owes its vitality, force, vividness, and variety - are we to modify speech habits so as to render them accurate and flexible *intellectual* instruments? It is comparatively easy to encourage **the original spontaneous flow** and not make language over into **a servant of reflective thought**; it is comparatively easy to check and *[[]* almost destroy (so far as the schoolroom is concerned) native aim and interest, and to set up artificial and formal modes of expression in some isolated and technical matters. (Dewey 1910: 179-180)

Aand we're back to this. Whereas Russian formalists distinguished between practical and literary language, here we have practical and intellectual, *plus* social.

Enlargement of vocabulary. This takes place, of course, by wider intelligent contact with things and persons, and also **vicariously, by gathering the meanings of words from the context** in which they are heard or read. (Dewey 1910: 180)

Elaborating vicariousness.

While a limited vocabulary may be due to a limited range of experience, to **a sphere of contact with persons and things** so narrow as not to suggest or require a full store of words, it is also due to carelessness and vague-

ness. A happy-go-lucky frame of mind makes the individual averse to clear discriminations, either in perception or in his own speech. **Words are used loosely in an indeterminate kind of reference to things**, and the mind approaches a condition where practically everything is just a thing-um-bob or a what-do-you-call-it. (Dewey 1910: 181)

Another tirade against loose thinking.

We must note also the great difference between **flow of words and command of language**. Volubility is not necessarily a sign of a large vocabulary; **much talking or even ready speech is quite compatible with moving round and round in a circle of moderate radius**. (Dewey 1910: 181)

Is "a flow of language" contrasted with a command of words? Note that "purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious" are exactly what one may readily move round and round of.

Accuracy of vocabulary. One way in which the fund of words and concepts is increased is by **discovering and naming shades of meaning** - that is to say, by making the vocabulary more precise. Increase in definiteness is as important relatively as in the enlargement of the capital stock absolutely. (Dewey 1910: 182)

Phraseology for the etymological task.

Such vagueness tends to persist and to become a barrier to the advance of thinking. **Terms that are miscellaneous in scope are clumsy tools at best**; in addition they are frequently treacherous, for **their ambiguous reference causes us to confuse things that should be distinguished**. (Dewey 1910: 182)

Pretty much the exact situation with *phatic communion*; modern researchers don't understand Malinowski's vague archaic language and put forth definitions that go against what he wrote (e.g. on the matter sympathy).

The term *vernacular*, now meaning mother speech, has been generalized from the word *verna*, meaning a slave born in the master's household. (Dewey 1910: 183)

I will never see this word the same way again.

All persons have a natural desire - akin to curiosity - **for a widening of their range of acquaintance with persons and things.** The sign in art galleries that forbids the carrying of canes and umbrellas is obvious testimony to the fact that simply to see is not enough for many people; there is a feeling of lack of acquaintance until some direct contact is made. This demand for fuller and closer knowledge is quite different from any conscious interest in observation for its own sake. Desire for expansion, for "self-realization," is its motive. **The interest is sympathetic, socially and aesthetically sympathetic, rather than cognitive.** While the interest is especially keen in children (because their actual experience is so small and their possible experience so large), it still characterizes adults when routine has not blunted its edge. This sympathetic interest provides the medium for carrying and binding together what would otherwise be a multitude of items, diverse, disconnected, and of no intellectual use. (Dewey 1910: 189)

At first sight it looked to be heading towards what "makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man" (PC 3.3), but the use of "sympathetic" is odd here, pertaining more to the aesthetic rather than moral use of the word.

Material should be supplied by way of stimulus, not with dogmatic finality and rigidity. When pupils get the

notion that any field of study has been definitely surveyed, that knowledge about it is exhaustive and final, they may continue decile pupils, but they cease to be students. **All thinking whatsoever - so be it is thinking - contains a phase of originality.** This originality does not imply that the student's conclusion varies from the conclusions of others, much less that it is a radically novel conclusion. His originality is not incompatible with large use of materials and suggestions contributed by others. **Originality means personal interest in the question, personal initiative in turning over the suggestions furnished by others, and sincerity in following them out to a tested conclusion.** Literally, the phrase "Think for yourself" is tautological; any thinking is thinking for one's self. (Dewey 1910: 198)

Recall that "it was Malinowski's practice "to have works read to and discussed with him"" (Firth; in [Symmons-Symonolewicz 1958](#): 67).

The material furnished by way of information should be relevant to **a question that is vital in the student's own experience.** What has been said about the evil of observations that begin and end in themselves may be transferred without change to communicated learning. **Instruction in subject-matter that does not fit into any problem already stirring in the student's own experience, or that is not presented in such a way as to arouse a problem, is worse than useless for intellectual purposes.** In that it fails to enter into any process of reflection, it is useless; in that it remains in the mind as so much lumber and débris, it is a barrier, an obstruction in the way of effective thinking when a problem arises. (Dewey 1910: 199)

A real doubt, again. In my own experience, I've noticed how the problem I'm working on at the time colours everything I read and comment. Some of these problems have become so ingrained that it

takes little effort to switch to an earlier problem if something I read offers a hint of solution. Recently, I've been thinking about what I'm going to deal with next, after I'm done with phaticity. Ideally, it should be connected to my earlier interests enough to offer continuity. This is so, I think, because phaticity appears to be coming to a close - what else is there to discover?

In comparing, the mind does not naturally begin with objects *a, b, c, d*, and try to find the respect in which they agree. It begins with **a single object or situation more or less vague and inchoate in meaning**, and makes excursions to other objects in order to render understanding of the central object consistent and clear. The mere multiplication of objects of comparison is adverse to successful reasoning. **Each fact brought within the field of comparison should clear up some obscure feature or extend some fragmentary trait of the primary object.** (Dewey 1910: 210)

A practicable suggestion for the next phase in my research on phaticity.

A true conception is a *moving* idea, and it seeks outlet, or application to the interpretation of particulars and the guidance of action, as naturally as water runs downhill. In fine, just as reflective thought requires particular facts of observation and events of action for its origination, so it also requires particular facts and deeds for its own consummation. "Glittering generalities" are inert because they are **spurious**. Application is as much an intrinsic part of genuine reflective inquiry as is alert observation or reasoning itself. (Dewey 1910: 213)

Define:spurious - "not being what it purports to be; false or fake"; "(of a line of reasoning) apparently but not actually valid"; "(of offspring) illegitimate". (Cf. PC 2.3)

It is significant that one meaning of the term *understood* is something so thoroughly mastered, so completely agreed upon, as to be *assumed*; that is to say, taken as a matter of course without explicit statement. The familiar "goes without saying" means "it is understood." If two persons can converse intelligently with each other, it is because **a common experience supplies a background of mutual understanding upon which their respective remarks are projected.** To dig up and to formulate this common background would be imbecile; it is "understood"; that is, it is silently supplied and implied as **the taken-for-granted medium of intelligent exchange of ideas.** (Dewey 1910: 214)

Community of knowledge and communization of experience.

A like balance in mental life characterizes process and product. We met one important phase of this adjustment in considering play and work. **In play, interest centers in activity, without much reference to its outcome.** The sequence of deeds, images, emotions, suffices on its own account. In work, the end holds attention and controls the notice given to means. Since the difference is one of direction of interest, the contrast is one of emphasis, not of cleavage. When comparative prominence is consciousness of activity or outcome is transformed into isolation of one from the other, **play degenerates into fooling, and work into drudgery.** (Dewey 1910: 217)

A restatement of the distinction made above. The "centering" (in other words, dominance) of interest (in other words, function), determines the nature of the activity.

By "fooling" we understand a series of disconnected temporary overflows of energy dependent upon whim and accident. When all reference to outcome is eliminated from the sequence of ideas and acts that make play, each member of the sequence is cut loose from every

other and becomes fantastic, arbitrary, **aimless**; mere fooling follows. (Dewey 1910: 217)

"But what can we consider as situation when a number of people *aimlessly* gossip together?" (PC 7.4). It is most certainly not a coincidence that "free, aimless, social intercourse" should have that exact wording, with Dewey using both adjectives in relation with play.

Exclusive interest in the result alters work to drudgery. For by drudgery is meant those activities in which the interest in the outcome does not suffuse the means of getting the result. Whenever a piece of work becomes drudgery, the process of doing loses all value for the doer; **he does solely for what is to be had at the end of it**. The work itself, the putting forth of energy, is hateful; **it is just a necessary evil, since without it some important end would be missed**. Now it is a commonplace that in the work of the world many things have to be done the doing of which is not intrinsically very interesting. (Dewey 1910: 218)

The communion of food! - that is what is had at the end of a communion of words. In the end, the play of good conversation can become the drudgery of phatic communion if it is employed as a means to an end and not an end in itself.

That teaching is an art and the true teacher an artist is a familiar saying. Now the teacher's own claim to rank as an artist is measured by his ability to foster the attitude of the artist in those who study with him, whether they be youth or little children. Some success in **arousing enthusiasm, in communicating large ideas, in evoking energy**. So far, well; but the final test is whether the stimulus thus given to wider aims succeeds in transforming itself into power, that is to say, into the attention to detail that ensures mastery over means of execution. If not, **the zeal flags, the interest dies out, the ideal becomes a clouded memory**. (Dewey 1910: 220)

I appreciate that these follow the familiar scheme: feeling - enthusiasm, zeal; action - energy, interest; thought - ideas and ideals.

When fractions have become thoroughly familiar, his perception of them acts simply as a signal to do certain things; they are a **"substitute sign," to which he can react without thinking**. If, nevertheless, the situation as a whole presents something novel and hence uncertain, the entire response is not mechanical, because this mechanical operation is put to use in solving a problem. There is no end to this spiral process: foreign subject-matter transformed through thinking into a familiar possession becomes a resource for judging and assimilating additional foreign subject-matter. (Dewey 1910: 223)

When I read these books I attend to verbiage that I'm already familiar, but this does not hinder attaining new ideas. I have a real problem to deal with, and this has been the right spot to reach for answers.

A final exemplification of the required balance between near and far is found in the relation that obtains between the narrower field of experience realized in an individual's own contact with persons and things, and **the wider experience of the race that may become his through communication**. Instruction always runs the risk of swamping the pupil's own vital, though narrow, experience under masses of communicated material. The instructor ceases and the teacher begins at the point where communicated matter stimulates into fuller and more significant life that which has entered by the strait and narrow gate of sense-perception and motor activity. **Genuine communication involves contagion; its name should not be taken in vain by terming communication that which produces no community of thought and purpose between the child and the race of which he is the heir.** (Dewey 1910: 244)

This has been an exceedingly good book.

The Genealogy of Morals



Nietzsche, Friedrich 1921. *The Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by Horace B. Samuel. New York: Boni and Liveright.

We are unknown, we knowers, ourselves to ourselves: this has its own good reason. **We have never searched for ourselves** - how should it then come to pass, that we should ever *find* ourselves? Rightly has it been said: "Where your treason is, there will your heart be also." *Our* treasure is there, where stand **the hives of our knowledge**. It is to those hives that we are always striving; as born creatures of flight, and as **the honey-gatherers of the spirit**, we care really in our hearts only for one thing - to bring something "home to the hive!" (Nietzsche 1921: i)

Soul searching or just looking for fights? I have been looking for myself for nearly a decade. Implicit in this is the gregariousness of beehives (cf. [Trotter 1921: 203-204](#)).

Of necessity we remain **strangers to ourselves**, we understand ourselves not, in ourselves we are bound to be mistaken, for of us holds good to all eternity to motto, "Each one is the farthest away from himself" - as far as ourselves are concerned we are not "knowers." (Nietzsche 1921: ii)

Beautiful, if unsubstantiated. It sounds like a reversal of "know thyself" - such a slogan would be unnecessary if we already knew ourselves or if it were as easy a task as glancing in the mirror.

The issue was, strangely enough, **the value of the "unegoistic" instincts, the instincts of pity, self-denial, and self-sacrifice** which Schopenhauer had so persistently painted in golden colours, deified and etherealised, that eventually they appeared to him, as it were, high and dry, as "intrinsic values in themselves," on the strength of which he uttered both to Life and to himself his own negation. But against *these very* instincts there voiced itself in my soul a more and more fundamental mistrust, a scepticism that dug ever deeper and deeper: and in this very instinct I saw the *great* danger of mankind, its most sublime temptation and seduction - seduction to what? to nothingness? - in these very instincts I saw the beginning of the end, stability, the exhaustion that gazes backwards, the will turning *against* Life, the last illness announcing itself with its own mincing melancholy: I realised that **the morality of pity** which spread wider and wider, and whose grip infected even philosophers with its disease, was the most sinister symptom of our modern European civilisation; I realised that it was the route along which that civilisation slid on its way to - a new Buddhism? - a European Buddhism? - *Nihilism*? **This exaggerated estimation in which modern philosophers have held pity, is quite a new phenomenon: up to that time philosophers were absolutely unanimous as to the worthlessness of pity.** I need only mention Plato, Spinoza, La Rouchefoucauld, and Kant - four minds [] as mutually

different as is possible, but united on one point; their **contempt of pity**. (Nietzsche 1921: vii-viii)

Durkheim and Malinowski appear to share in this contempt for pity: "mourning is not the spontaneous expression of individual emotions" ([Durkheim 1915](#): 397); "where [the purpose of establishing a common sentiment] purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly spurious on one side" ([PC](#) 2.3).

Enough, that after this vista had disclosed itself to me, I myself had reason to search for learned, bold, and industrious colleagues (I am doing it even to this very day). (Nietzsche 1921: ix)

The loneliness of industrious minds.

I, on the other hand, think that there are no subjects which *pay* better for being taken seriously; part of this payment is, that perhaps eventually they admit of being taken *gaily*. This gaiety, indeed, or, to use my own language, this **joyful wisdom**, is a payment; a payment for a protracted, brave, laborious, and burrowing seriousness, which, it goes without saying, is the attribute of but a few. (Nietzsche 1921: x)

Moral problems should not be taken seriously, they should be taken *gaily*.

Those **English psychologists**, who up to the present are the only philosophers who are to be thanked for any endeavour to get as far as a history of the origin of morality - these men, I say, **offer us in their own personalities no paltry problem**; - they even have, if I am to be quite frank about it, in their capacity of living riddles, an advantage over their books - **they themselves are interesting!** These English psychologists - what do they really mean? We always find them voluntarily or involuntarily at the same task of pushing to the front the *partie hon-*

teuse of our inner world, and looking for the efficient, governing, and decisive principle in that precise quarter where the intellectual self-respect of the race would be the most reluctant to find it (for example, in **the vis inertiae of habit, or in forgetfulness, or in a blind and fortuitous mechanism and association of ideas, or in some factor that is purely passive, reflex, molecular, or fundamentally stupid**) - what is the real motive power which always impels these psychologists in precisely *this* direction? (Nietzsche 1921: 1)

So it is. The examples constitute a rundown of common tropes in early British psychology.

Now the first argument that comes ready to my hand is that the real homestead of the concept "good" is sought and located in the wrong place: the judgment "good" did *not* originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Much rather has it been the good themselves, that is, **the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the high-minded**, who have felt that they themselves were good, and that their actions were good, that is to say of the first order, in cotradistinction to all **the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian**. (Nietzsche 1921: 3-4)

The aristocracy vs. the "uneducated classes" (PC 4.3).

The standpoint of utility is as alien and as inapplicable as it could possibly be, when we have to deal with so volcanic an effervescence of supreme values, creating and demarcating as they do a hierarchy within themselves: it is at this juncture that one arrives at an appreciation of the contrast to that tepid temperature, which is the presupposition on which every combination of worldly wisdom and every calculation of practical expediency is always based - and not for one occasional, not for one exceptional instance, but chronically. **The pathos of**

nobility and distance, as I have said, the chronic and despotic *esprit de corps* and fundamental instinct of a higher dominant race coming into association with a mean race, an "under race," this is the origin of the antithesis of good and bad. (Nietzsche 1921: 4)

A crucial piece of the puzzle, "The importance of the *esprit de corps*, of the interaction of various group-loyalties within the same individual, and of the hierarchy of groups and group-loyalties is very well brought out" ([Malinowski 1921b](#): 107).

The masters' right of giving names goes so far that it is permissible to look upon **language itself as the expression of the power** of the masters: they say "this is that, and that," they seal finally every object and every event with a sound, and thereby at the same time take possession of it. (Nietzsche 1921: 4)

The power of naming, something familiar enough from Foucault's oeuvre.

It is because of this origin that the word "good" is far from having any necessary connection with altruistic acts, in accordance with the superstitious belief of these moral philosophers. On the contrary, it is on the occasion of the *decay* of aristocratic values, that [[]] the antitheses between "egoistic" and "altruistic" presses more and more heavily on the human conscience - **it is, to use my own language, the herd instinct which finds in this antithesis an expression in many ways**. And even then it takes a considerable time for this instinct to become sufficiently dominant, for the valuation to be inextricably dependent on this antithesis (as is the case in contemporary Europe); for to-day the prejudice is predominant, which, acting even now with all the intensity of an obsession and brain disease, holds that "moral," "altruistic," and *désintressé* are concepts of equal value. (Nietzsche 1921: 4-5)

Sadly this is not the work wherein he clarifies his conception of herd instinct. "Yet it is precisely here that the current theory intervenes, and assumes the presence of another primary emotion, Pity, to account for the fact of disinterestedness; and then regards that as the sole source of disinterested action" ([Shand 1914: 47](#)).

Who can guarantee that modern democracy, still more modern anarchy, and indeed that tendency to **the "Commune," the most primitive form of society**, which is now common to all the Socialists in Europe, does not in its real essence signify a monstrous reversion - and that the conquering and *master* race - the Aryan race, is not also becoming inferior physiologically? (Nietzsche 1921: 9)

Just recently I worried about the relation of "commune" and "communion". Recall that the "primitive [...] is surpassed by no others in simplicity" (Durkheim 1915: 1). Is the commune the most *simple* form of society?

Moreover, care should be taken not to take these ideas of "clean" and "unclean" too seriously, too broadly, or too symbolically: **all the ideas of ancient man have**, on the contrary, got to be understood in their initial stages, in a sense which is, to an almost inconceivable extent, **crude, coarse, physical, and narrow, and above all essentially unsymbolical**. The "clean man" is originally only a man who washes himself, who abstains from certain foods which are conducive to skin diseases, who does not sleep with the unclean women of the lower classes, who has a horror of blood - not more, not much more! (Nietzsche 1921: 10)

For all intents and purposes, "The aborigenes are not able to think exactly, and their beliefs do not possess any "exact meaning."" ([Malinowski 1913: 213](#)).

While every aristocratic morality springs from a triumphant affirmation of its own demands, **the slave morality says "no" from the very outset to what is "outside itself," "different from itself," and "not itself"; and this "no" is its creative deed.** (Nietzsche 1921: 17)

"The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy" (PC 4.2). In comparison, there is a certain *reversal* in this, again, as one would expect from Foucault or Freud. The latter employs this in an especially odd fashion, writing that empathy, instead of "sembling" (manifesting what is common to ourselves and others; i.e. communization), plays on "our understanding of what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people" ([Freud 1922: 66](#)).

Granted the truth of the theory now believed to be true, that the very *essence of all civilisation* is to *train out* of man, the beast of prey, **a tame and civilised animal, a domesticated animal**, it follows indubitably that we must regard as the real *tools of civilisation* all those instincts of reaction and resentment, by the help of which the aristocratic races, together with their ideals, were finally degraded and overpowered; though that has not yet come to be synonymous with saying that the bearers of those tools also *represented* the civilisation. (Nietzsche 1921: 24)

"Humans alone are fetalized, domesticated hyper-mammals with the necessary oral-dependent and intensified sexual traits" ([La Barre 1954: 166-167](#)).

And is that our fate? What produces to-day **our repulsion towards "man"? - for we suffer from "man," there is no doubt about it.** It is not fear; it is rather that we have nothing more to fear from men; it is that **the worm "man" is in the foreground and pullulates**; it is that the "tame man," the wretched mediocre and unedi-

fying creature, has learnt to consider himself a goal and a pinnacle, an inner meaning, an historic principle, a "higher man"; yes, it is that he has a certain right so to consider himself, in so far as he feels that in contrast to that excess of deformity, disease, exhaustion, and effete-ness whose odour is beginning to pollute present-day Europe, he at any rate has achieved a relative success, **he at any rate still says "yes" to life.** (Nietzsche 1921: 25)

"The first time it happened I was waiting for a bus to take me home from Fleet Street. Thousands upon thousands of people, all on the move, and each of them unique, each of them the center of the universe. Then the sun came down out from behind a cloud. Everything was extraordinarily bright and clear; and suddenly, with an almost audible click, they were all maggots." (Huxley's *Island*). As to "saying "yes" to life", this must have inspired the grandfather of biosemiotics to formulate "affirmation of life" (see Andrews in *SSS* about the guy who studied symmetry and asymmetry in the body).

For the position is this: in the dwarfing and levelling of the European man lurks *our* greatest peril, for it is this outlook which fatigues - we see to-day nothing which wishes to be greater, we surmise that the process is always still backwards, still backwards towards something more attenuated, more inoffensive, more cunning, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian man, there is no doubt about it, grows always "better" - **the destiny of Europe lies even in this** - that in losing the fear of man, we have also lost the hope in man, yea, the will to be man. The sight of man now fatigues. - What is present-day Nihilism if it is not *that?* - **We are tired of man.** (Nietzsche 1921: 26)

I have to say it because it cannot be steadily ignored: Nietzsche's general positions are detestably edgy. How long is the step from discussing the [social disintegration](#) of Western civilization with

such self-assuredness (ignoring all empirical data of social progress, as proper conservatives should) to [conspiratorial theories of white genocide](#)? It certainly seems that he's pandering to the same intellectualized sense of fear for the herd subscribed and evoked by neo-Nazis and the alt-right. I wonder if I should take a look at Nikolai II's [favourite night-cubboard book](#), or [Trump's](#), for that matter?

Oh no, I must now affirm that other, critical self of future me that I am not virtue-signalling but merely researching the uglier side of the history of ideas in social philosophy. "I *had* to read Spencer, despite *no-one*, I was is affirmed, reading Spencer by the 1920s," I plead to no significant avail. I sometimes think of that *smooth* fellow who goes to an academic library to borrow *Mein Kampf* "for research purposes", simultaneously arousing and alarming the librarian. Was it a sign of the times? What is the extent of U.S. right wing activist's influence in my country's modern history?

To require of strength that it should *not* express itself as strength, that it should not be a wish to overpower, a wish to overthrow, a wish to become master, **a thirst for enemies and antagonisms and triumphs**, is just as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength. (Nietzsche 1921: 27)

Yuup. Some themes are just self-evident.

And just exactly as the people separate the lightning from [] its flash, and interpret the latter as a thing done, as the working of a subject which is called lightning, so also does the popular morality **separate strength from the expression of strength**, as though behind the strong man there existed some indifferent neutral *substratum*, which enjoyed a *caprice and option* as to whether or not it should express strength. But **there is no such substratum, there is no "being" behind doing, working, becoming; "the doer" is a mere appanage to the action. The**

action is everything. In point of fact, the people duplicate the doing, when they make the lightning lighten, that is a "doing-doing"; they make the same phenomenon first a cause, and then, secondly, the effect of that cause. The scientists fail to improve matters when they say. "Force moves, force causes," and so on. Our whole science is still, in spite of all its coldness, of all its freedom from passion, **a dupe of the tricks of language**, and has ever succeeded in getting rid of that superstitious changeling "the subject" (the atom, to give another instance, is such a changeling, just as the Kantian "Thing-in-itself"). (Nietzsche 1921: 27-28)

The complications of power and possibly a pragmatic theory stemming from physics, à la Mach and Avenarius. Wittgenstein, in the same sequence (i.e. congenially with Malinowski), also ascribes such philosophical problems to the tricks of language, as I've heard and will hopefully find out soon enough. "The will of language"

All the sciences have now to pave the way for the future task of **the philosopher**; this task being understood to mean, that he **must solve the problem of value**, that he has to fix the *hierarchy of values*. (Nietzsche 1921: 39)

And that philosopher's name? [Charles Morris](#).

The "free" man, the owner of **a long unbreakable will**, finds in this possession his *standard of value*: looking out from himself upon the others, he honours or **he despises**, and just as necessarily as he honours his peers, the strong and the reliable (those who can bind themselves by promises), - that is, every one who promises like a sovereign, with difficulty, rarely and slowly, who is sparing with his trusts but confers *honour* by the very fact of trusting, who gives his word as something that can be relied on, because **he knows himself strong enough to keep it even in the teeth of disasters, even in the "teeth of fate,"** - so with equal necessity will he have to

heed of his foot ready for the **[[** lean and empty jackasses, who promise when they have no business to do so, and his rod of chastisement ready for the liar, who already breaks his word at the very minute when it is on his lips. The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of *responsibility*, the consciousness of this rare freedom, of this **power over himself and over fate**, has sunk right down to his innermost depths, and has become an instinct, a dominating instinct - what name will he give to it, to this dominating instinct, if he needs to have a word for it? But there is no doubt about it - the sovereign man calls it his *conscience*. (Nietzsche 1921: 43-44)

The pathos of nobility and distance sure is not respectful of the uneducated poor underclasses, emaciated and offering empty promises of return. There's a distinct substratum of aristocratic economic thinking noticeable throughout the works of Malinowski and his peers. See all the ravings about altruism and utilitarianism, the latter possibly having to do with the destable notion of acting for the greater good, paying one's taxes, and so on. How can you possibly understand disinterestedness if you are thinking only of self-interest?

In a certain sense the whole of asceticism is to be ascribed to this: certain ideas have got to be made inextinguishable, omnipresent, "fixed," with the object of hypnotising the whole nervous and intellectual system through these "**fixed ideas**" - and the ascetic methods and modes of life are the means of freeing those ideas from the competition of all other ideas so as to make them "unforgettable." **The worse memory man **[[** had, the ghastlier the signs presented by his customs**; the severity of the penal laws affords in particular a gauge of the extent of man's difficulty in conquering forgetfulness, and in keeping a few primal postulates of social intercourse ever present to the minds of those who were the slaves of every mo-

mentary emotion and every momentary desire. (Nietzsche 1921: 45-46)

"Rigid custom is the cement of society in the ages preceding the formation of a moral tradition, and the breaking of the rigid bonds of custom, bonds which were probably essential for the preservation of primitive societies, was the prime condition of the growth of the moral tradition of the progressive nations" ([McDougall 1916: 220](#)).

Alas! **reason, seriousness, mastery over the emotions, all these gloomy, dismal things which are called reflection**, all these privileges and pageantries of humanity: how dear is the price that they have exacted! How much blood and cruelty is the foundation of all "good things"! (Nietzsche 1921: 47)

"In some cases, a belief is accepted with slight or almost no attempt to state the grounds that support it. In other cases, the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy to support the belief examined. This process is called reflective thought; it alone is truly educative in value, and it forms, accordingly, the principal subject of this volume. We shall now briefly describe each of the four senses." ([Dewey 1910: 1-2](#)) - Why must Nietzsche be so gloomy?

In my opinion it is repugnant to the delicacy, and still more to the hypocrisy of tame domestic animals (that is, modern men; that is, ourselves), to realise with all their energy the extent to which *cruelty* constituted the great joy and delight of ancient man, was an ingredient which seasoned nearly all his pleasures, and conversely the extent of the naïveté and innocence with which he manifested his need for cruelty, when he actually made as a matter of principle "**disinterested** malice" (or, to use Spinoza's expression, the ***sympathia malevolens***) into a *normal* characteristic of man - as consequently some-

thing to which the conscience says a hearty yes. (Nietzsche 1921: 52)

My first thought was, if sympathy has something to do with disinterestedness for Nietzsche or his translator to make these equivalents. Evidently this is something that requires me, happily to undertake [Human, All Too Human](#) - "In social dialogue, three-quarters of all questions and answers are framed in order to hurt the participants a little bit; this is why many men thirst after society so much: it gives them a feeling of their strength. In these countless, but very small doses, malevolence takes effect as one of life's powerful stimulants, just as goodwill, dispensed in the same way throughout the human world, is the perennially ready cure." (p. 50). - This discovery also affirms my conviction that this is a book I need to read different translations of (e.g. [see here](#)).

Sale and purchase, together with their psychological concomitants, are **older than the origins of any form of social organisation and union**: it is rather from the most rudimentary form of individual right that the budding consciousness of exchange, commerce, debt, right, obligation, compensation was first transferred to the rudest and most elementary of the social complexes (in their relations to similar complexes), the habit of comparing force with force, together with that of measuring, of calculating. (Nietzsche 1921: 58)

A wrench in the theories of social origin, or, an improvement upon "the socialising influence of the instinct of pugnacity" ([McDougall 1916: 282-283](#)) and yet another example of "aristocratic economic thinking" (cf. [above](#)).

Man lives in a community, man enjoys the advantages of a community (and what advantages! we occasionally underestimate them nowadays), **man lives protected, spared, in peace and trust, secure from certain**

injuries and enmities, to which the man outside the community, the "peaceless" man, is exposed, - a German understands the original meaning of "Êlend" (*êlend*), - secure because he has entered into pledges and obligations to the community in respect of these very injuries and enmities. (Nietzsche 1921: 59)

Body politick and sovereignty over violence.

The creditor has always grown more humane proportionately as he has grown more rich; finally the amount of injury he can endure without really suffering becomes the criterion of his wealth. It is possible to conceive of a society blessed with so great a *consciousness of its own power* as to indulge in the most aristocratic luxury of letting its wrong-doers go *scot-free*. - **"What do my parasites matter to me?" might society say. "Let them live and flourish! I am strong enough for it."** (Nietzsche 1921: 61)

And argument favoring taxes, and quite relevant to our coming ages of leisure. Can we afford the masses of people living on the earth and continuing to multiply to such an extent? Or should we do with a world government and 500 million people living well, with islands of isolated barbarians in places lacking resources?

Perhaps there is no more pregnant principle for any kind of history than the following, which, difficult though it is to master, *should* none the less be *mastered* in every detail. - The origin of the existence of a thing and its final utility, its practical application and incorporation in a system of ends are *toto cælo* opposed to each other - everything, anything, which exists and which prevails anywhere, will always be put to new purposes by a force superior to itself, will be commandeered afresh, will be turned and transformed to new uses; **all "happening" in the organic world consists of overpowering and dominating is a new interpretation and adjustment**, which must necessarily obscure or absolutely extinguish the

subsisting "meaning" and "end." [] The most perfect comprehension of the utility of any physiological organ (or also of a legal institution, social custom, political habit, form in art or in religious worship) does not for a minute imply any simultaneous comprehension of its origin: this may seem uncomfortable and unpalatable to the older men, - for **it has been the immemorial belief that understanding the final cause or the utility of a thing, a form, an institution, means also understanding the reason for its origin:** to give an example of this logic, the eye was made to see, the hand was made to grasp. So even punishment was conceived as invented with a view to punishing. **But all ends and all utilities are only signs that a Will to Power has mastered a less powerful force, has impressed thereon out of its own self the meaning of a function;** and the whole history of a "Thing," an organ, a custom, can on the same principle be regarded as a continuous "sign-chain" of perpetually new interpretations and adjustments, whose causes, so far from needing to have even a mutual connection, sometimes follow and alternate with each other absolutely haphazard. (Nietzsche 1921: 66-67)

The second page of this excerpt is fully quotable, and will serve as a place to begin discussing hierarchical functionalism. It helps that this is by far the most semiotic passage in this book. I'm beginning to notice how loaded or pregnant with meaning "origin" has become to appear; Darwinian connotations always loom behind it.

With regard to the other element in *punishment*, **its fluid element, its meaning**, the idea of punishment in a very late stage of civilisation (for instance, contemporary Europe) is not **content with manifesting merely one meaning, but manifests a whole synthesis "of meanings."** The past general history of punishment, the history of its employment for the most diverse ends, crystallises eventually into a kind of unity, which is difficult

to analyse into its parts, and which, it is necessary to emphasise, absolutely defies definition. (Nietzsche 1921: 70)

Tähendus an voolav. What he is saying here is nearly the same as what he said of lightning ([above](#)), that is, that there is no *substratum* of ideation attached to action, action and its potential are identified, which anyone can realise, amounts to saying that punishment and the threat of punishment are the same, too. Of course one could object that the difficulty of disentangling the semiotics of power does not mean that it is impossible or fruitless to attempt to do so.

This list is certainly not complete; it is obvious that punishment is **overloaded with utilities of all kinds**. This makes it all the more permissible to eliminate one *supposed* utility, which passes, at any rate in the popular mind, for its most essential utility, and which is just what even now provides the strongest support for that faith in punishment which is nowadays for many reasons tottering. (Nietzsche 1921: 72)

Made me realise that the various "ends" or outcomes, whether desirable or not (as in the case of antipathy, though even this is debatable, given that *malice* is not an artifact but an essential factor in PC), could be itemized this way. This would be best achieved, I believe, when contemporaneous (JSTOR) articles were read to find other opinions about the functions of social conversation, so as not to limit the outlook to or colour it with the anthropologist's special interests and aversions towards the native informant.

But thereby he introduced that most grave and sinister illness, from which mankind has not yet recovered, the suffering of man from the disease called man, as the result of **a violent breaking from his animal past**, the result, as it were, of a spasmodic plunge into a new environment [] and new conditions of existence, the result of

a declaration of **war against the old instincts**, which up to that time had been the staple of his power, his joy, his formidableness. Let us immediately add that this fact of **an animal ego turning against itself**, taking part against itself, produced in the world so novel, profound, unheard-of, problematic, inconsistent, and *pregnant* a phenomenon, that the aspect of the world was radically altered thereby. (Nietzsche 1921: 77-78)

What is self-denial?

I used the word "State"; my meaning is self-evident, namely, **a herd of blonde beasts of prey**, a race of conquerors and masters, which with all its warlike organisation and all its organising power pounces with its terrible claws on a population, in numbers possibly tremendously superior, but as yet formless, as yet nomad. **Such is the origin of the "State."** That fantastic theory that makes it begin with a contract is, I think, disposed of. He who can command, he who is master by "nature," he **who comes on the scene forceful in deed and gesture** - what has he to do with contracts? Such beings defy calculation, they come like fate, without cause, reason, notice, excuse, they are there as the lightning is there, too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too "different," to be personally even hated. (Nietzsche 1921: 79)

Perhaps one of the ugliest possible turns on "the stranger": he comes at you with an axe in his hand. While urinating on Voltaire, he fails to do more than affirm the *bellum omnium contra omnes* (in [Hobbes](#)).

What is the meaning of ascetic ideals? In artists, nothing, or too much; in philosophers and scholars, a kind of "flair" and instinct for **the conditions most favourable to advanced intellectualism**; in women, at best an *additional* seductive fascination, a little *morbidezza* on a fine piece of flesh, an angelhood of a fat,

pretty animal; **in physiological failures and whiners** (in the *majority* of mortals), **an attempt to pose as "too good" for this world, a holy form of debauchery**, their chief weapon in the battle with lingering pain and ennui; in priests, the actual priestly faith, their best engine for power, and also the supreme authority for power; in saints, finally a pretext for hibernation, their *novissima gloriæ cupido*, their peace in nothingness ("God"), their form of madness. (Nietzsche 1921: 94)

Perhaps "communion" was chosen consciously in order to give PC the subtext of holy communion consisting of *flatus vocis*, a pathetic, pityful, grovelling, and self-serving form of discourse? See *vanity*.

This brings us, to the more serious question: What is the meaning of a real *philosopher* paying homage to the ascetic ideal, a really self-dependent intellect like Schopenhauer, a man and knife with a glance of bronze, **who has the courage to be himself, who knows how to stand alone without first waiting for men who cover him in front, and the nods of his superiors?** (Nietzsche 1921: 101)

Is superman a philosopher? Or a philosopher-king? The pioneering sentiment is admirable but all too idealistic. I'd prefer the democratic sense of being philosopher, having only to produce a body of work with some increase of knowledge or wisdom as its goal.

In particular, Wagner from that time onwards (and this is the *volte-face* which alienates us the most) had no scruples [||] about changing his judgment concerning the value and position of music itself. What did he care if up to that time he had made of music a means, a medium, a "woman," that in order to thrive needed an end, a man - that is, the drama? He suddenly realised that *more* could be effected by the novelty of the Schopenhauerian theory in *majorem musicæ floriam* - that is to say, by means of

the sovereignty of music, as Schopenhauer understood it; music **abstracted from and opposed to all the other arts**, music as **the independent art-in-itself**, *not* like the other arts, affording reflections of the phenomenal world, but rather than language of the will itself, speaking straight out of the "abyss" as its most personal, original, and direct manifestation. (Nietzsche 1921: 101-102)

Sovereignty stands here as an equivalent of Mukařovský's autonomy. This is the exact intellectual trickery I aim to expose with regard to what I call hierarchical functionalism and the peripatetic triad. / Väga huvitav on võimalus, et [peripateetiline koolkond](#) sai oma nime samast tüvest, sest *pátos* on "rada" (*path*) Serbia-Horvaatia keeltes ka põrand või veranda, millest vb ka "poodium" (vt [patos](#)). Seos tekkis sõnaga "hingeliigutus" (*Gemütsbewegung*). Pity tundub sellegipoolest pädevam kaasosaline, sest paatos "puudutab tundeid või eritab emotsioone ja kirgi, eriti kui neid, mida äratatakse hellade tunnetega, nagu kaastunne, kahetsus, jne. sooja või haleda tunde omadus" (vt [pathos](#)).

Schopenhauer has described one effect of the beautiful, - the calming of the will, - but is this effect really normal? As has been mentioned, Stendhal, an equally sensual but more happily constituted nature than Schopenhauer, gives prominence to another effect of the "beautiful." "The beautiful *promises* happiness." To him it is just **the excitement of the will (the "interest") by the beauty that seems the essential fact**. (Nietzsche 1921: 105)

Or, as Jakobson once put it in Polish, a work of art "works" if it grabs and arrests your attention with its beauty. Look up the etymological bifurcation of intention and attention (will and interest).

For we must certainly not underestimate the fact that Schopenhauer, who in practice treated sexuality as a personal enemy (including its tool, woman, that "*instrumentum diaboli*"), **needed enemies to keep him in a good**

humour; that he loved grim, bitter, blacking-green words; that **he raged for the sake of raging, out of passion**; that he would have grown ill, would have become a pessimist (for he was not a pessimist, however much he wished to be), without his enemies, without Hegel, woman, sensuality, and the whole "will for existence" "keeping on." Without them Schopenhauer would not have "kept on," that is a safe wager; he would have run away: but his enemies held him fast, his enemies always enticed him back again to existence, his wrath was just as theirs was to the ancient Cynics, his balm, his recreation, his recompense, his *remedium* against disgust, his *happiness*. (Nietzsche 1921: 106)

Is this not an extension of *sympathia malevolens*?

These philosophers, you see, are by no means uncorrupted [!] witnesses and judges of the *value* of the ascetic ideal. They think of *themselves* - what is the "saint" to them? They think of that which to them personally is most indispensable; **of freedom from compulsion, disturbance, noise; freedom from business, duties, cares; of a clear head; of the dance, spring, and flight of thoughts; of good air** - rare, clear, free, dry, as is the air on the heights, in which every animal creature becomes more intellectual and gains wings; they think of peace in every cellular; all the hounds neatly chained; no baying of enmity and uncouth rancour; no remorse of wounded ambition; quiet and submissive internal organs, busy as mills, but unnoticed; the heart alien, transcendent, future, posthumous - to summarise, they mean by the ascetic ideal the joyous asceticism of a deified and newly fledged animal, sweeping over life rather than resting. (Nietzsche 1921: 108-109)

Freedom from psychological interference and quasi-attention.

But that which Heracleitus shunned is still just what we too avoid nowadays: **the noise and democratic babble of the Ephesians, their politics, their news from the "empire"** (I mean, of course, Persia), their market-trade in "the things of to-day" - for there is one thing from which we philosophers especially need a rest - from the things of "to-day." **We honour the silent, the cold, the noble, the far, the past**, everything, in fact, at the sight of which the soul is not bound to brace itself up and defend itself - as something with which one can speak without *speaking aloud*. Just listen now to the tone of a spirit when it speaks; **every spirit has its own tone and loves its own tone**. That thing yonder, for instance, is bound to be an agitator, that is, a hollow head, a hollow mug: whatever may go into him, everything comes back from him dull and thick, heavy with the echo of the great void. That spirit yonder nearly always speaks hoarse: has he, perchance, *thought* himself hoarse? It may be so - ask the physiologists - but **he who thinks in words, thinks as a speaker and not as a thinker (it shows that he does not think of objects or think objectively, but only of his relations with objects - that, in point of fact, he only thinks of himself and his audience)**. This third one speaks aggressively, he comes too near our bod, his breath blows on us - we shut our mouth involuntarily, although he speaks to us through a book: the tone of his style supplies the reason - he has no time, he has small faith in himself, he finds expression now or never. But a spirit who is sure of himself speaks softly; he seeks secrecy, he lets himself be awaited. (Nietzsche 1921: 111)

Is that Uexküll's *Ego-Ton*? Looking up *The Meaning of Meaning*, I caught myself reflecting that language can be used "as an instrument for thinking" and "for the communication of ideas", but these are not necessarily simultaneous processes, one does not have to communicate to operate language in the service of rational reflection, nor necessarily use language for it, as nonverbal and private

signs as well as and post-language symbols suggest. Richards manages to put the stuff of thinking about oneself and one's audience into his interpretation of the social function (in [*Practical Criticism*](#)).

As for his humility, he endure, as he endures darkness, a certain dependence and obscurity: further, he is afraid of the shock of lightning, he shudders at the insecurity of a tree which is too isolated and too exposed, on which every storm vents its temper, every temper its storm. His "maternal" instinct, his secret love for that which grows in him, guides him into states where he relieved from **the necessity of taking care of himself**, in the same way in which the "*mother*" instinct in woman has thoroughly maintained up to the present woman's dependent position. After all, they demand little enough, do these philosophers, their favourite motto is, "**He who possesses is possessed.**" All this is *not*, as I must say again and again, to be attributed to a virtue, to a meritorious wish for **moderation and simplicity**; but because their supreme lord so demands of them, demands wisely and inexorably; their lord who is eager only for one thing, for which alone he musters, and for which alone he hears everything - **tim, strength, love, interest**. This kind of man **likes not to be disturbed by enmity, he likes not to be disturbed by friendship**, it is a type which **forgets or despises easily**. (Nietzsche 1921: 112)

Self-care postulated as the extreme of selfishness? I do like the anti-materialist attitude of the "homeless philosopher" trope. Makes me think of the hypnopædic proverb, "ending is better than mending, ending" in Huxley's *BNW*, and P.O.S.'s "new shit - or fix what I have?" The point being that aescetic philosophers don't live a simple and moderate life because it's a virtue but because that's the easiest way to hoard time, strength, love, and interest for oneself. The last sentence, I must wonder, sounds like a more-or-less straightforward description of the pathos of nobility and distance,

perhaps noble in not making enemies and distant in being disinterested in sociabilities and despising other people easily. There's enough known about Malinowski to make his own life an illustration, but then again, those English psychologists sure are interesting in themselves!

Just enumerate in order the particular tendencies and virtues of the philosopher - his tendency to doubt, his tendency to deny, his tendency to wait (to be "**ephectic**"), his tendency to analyse, search, explore, dare, his tendency to compare and to equalise, his will to be neutral and objective, his will for everything which is "*sine ira et studio*": has it yet been realised that for quite a lengthy period these tendencies went counter to the first claims of morality and conscience? (Nietzsche 1921: 115)

Define:ephectic - [Wiki](#), school of skeptical thought in Classical antiquity, "given to suspense of judgment", "holding back". The Wikipedia article even contains a paragraph about Nietzsche criticizing the concept as a flaw in early philosophers prone to overindulging in doubting and negative drive that goes against the first demands of morality and conscience. If put like that it's a self-description, no? In other words, the Wiki paragraph quotes this very passage. The [*sine ira et studio*](#), means "without anger and fondness" or "without hate and zealousness". As I put it when reading Senft (2009), the superficial relation with "emphasis" is far from being even a significant part of the whole etymological background of phatic communion. The Latin [studio](#), 1. study; 2. eagerness, zeal; 3. **desire, fancy**; 4. **pursuit** is especially promising in the latter senses. Lack of desire or fancy mesh with the pathos of distance, but pursuit is more interesting, having a secondary meaning of "A hobby or recreational activity, done regularly." As I understand from French films, it is also used in the sense of "seeking contact" implied by the third sense, "(cycling) A discipline in track cycling where two opposing teams start on opposite sides of the track and

try to catch their opponents", though this may be a bit of a stretch of the imagination. Latin [ira](#) is self-evident from English ire, it's a Proto-Indo-European word, e.g. Lithuanian *aistrà* ("violent passion"); it is anger and wrath, aggressive emotions. From both of these being, in a sense, extremes, I would guess the Latin proverb implies the pathos of nobility and distance in the sense of the golden mean, i.e. don't let your judgment be dictated by violent passions nor too much rumination, ideation, and ratiocination to make the judgment a PhD thesis. Maybe Nikomachus knows more. See als: "But if the meaning suggested is held in suspense, pending examination and inquiry, there is true judgment" ([Dewey 1910: 107-108](#)).

The soft, benevolent, yieding, sympathetic feelings
- eventually valued so highly that they almost became "intrinsic values," were for a very long time actually despised by their possessors: **gentleness was then a subject for shame, just as hardness is now** (compare *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 260). (Nietzsche 1921: 116)

The gentleness/hardness dialectic could actually work for distinguishing malevolent sympathy from active sympathy. Yielding to what? The other's feelings. Soft ~ tender = sentiments. Something relevant from *Human, All Too Human*, [Aph. 632](#): "If one has not passed through various convictions, but remains caught in the net of his first belief, he is in all events, because of just this unchangeability, a representative of backward cultures; in accordance with this lack of education (which always presupposes educability), he is harsh, injudicious, unteachable, without gentleness, eternally suspect, a person lacking scruples, who reaches for any means to enforce his opinion because he simply cannot understand that there have to be other opinions. In this regard, he is perhaps a source of power, and even salutary in cultures grown too free and lax, but only because he powerfully incites opposition: for in that way the

new culture's more delicate structure, which is forced to struggle with him, becomes strong itself." - The gentle yields to various beliefs, the hard has ossified beliefs; unchangeability ~ lack of mental modification, unreceptive to new information, incurious; backward culture (circumstance) and lack of education (character) → the uneducated classes are unteachable, harsh, suspicious, without conscience, have an overall "bad character"; note the most important, enforcing one's own opinion by any means necessary because when the other person of speaking, the fool is thinking about what he is going to say next - it is a form of unreflexive communication with no mutual mental modification, no damn consensus, no mental communion, only that of speaking in each other's direction.

It must be a necessity of the first order which makes [] this species, *hostile*, as it is, to *life*, always grow again and always thrive again. - ***Life itself must certainly have an interest in the continuance of such a type of self-contradiction.*** For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here rules resentment without parallel, **the resentment of an insatiate instinct and ambition**, that would be master, not over some element in life, but over life itself, over life's deepest, strongest, innermost conditions; here is **an attempt made to utilise power to dam the sources of power**; here does the green eye of jealousy turn even against physiological well-being, especially **against the expression of such well-being, beauty, joy**; while a sense of pleasure is experienced and *sought* in abortion, in decay, in pain, in misfortune, in ugliness, in voluntary punishment, in the exercising, flagellation, and sacrifice of the self. (Nietzsche 1921: 121-122)

"Helmholtz listened to his boastings in a silence so gloomily disapproving that Bernard was offended." James Porter ([2017](#)) suggested that the explanation to phatic communion is to be found in Aristotelian goodwill (*eunoia*), but here we find support for pushing the indicator to the other extreme of the thymic scale.

The ascetic priest is the incarnate wish for an existence of [[]] another kind, an existence of another plane, - he is, in fact, the highest point of the wish, its official ecstasy and passion: but *power* of this wish which is the fetter that binds him here; it is just that which makes him into a tool that must labour to create more favourable conditions for earthly existence, for existence on the human plane - it is with this very *power* that he keeps the whole herd of failures, distortions, absorptions, unfortunates, *sufferers from themselves* of every kind, fast to existence, while he as the herdsman goes instinctively on in front. You understand me already: this ascetic priest, this apparent enemies of life, this denier - he actually belongs to the really great *conservative* and *affirmative* forces of life. (Nietzsche 1921: 125-126)

Define:fetter - "a chain or manacle used to restrain a prisoner, typically placed around the ankles". Something more "harsh" and "hard" than the cement of society, the glue or lubricant of social interaction, even the more abstract fixative action of custom and tradition.

...And therefore good air! good air! and away, at any rate, from the neighbourhood of all the madhouses and hospitals of civilisation! And therefore **Good company, our own company, or solitude, if it must be so!** but anyway, at any rate, from the evil fumes of internal corruption [[]] and the secret worm-eaten state of the sick! (Nietzsche 1921: 131-132)

Society is mad, I tell you! madly. Only good society is homogeneous society, I tell you! as an eccentric.

The ascetic priest must be accepted by us as the predestined saviour, herdsman, and champion of the sick herd: thereby do we first understand his awful historic mission. The *lordship over sufferers* is his kindgom, to that points his instinct, in that he finds his own special art, his

master-skill, his kind of happiness. He must himself be sick, he must be kith and kin to the sick and the abortions so as to understand them, so as to arrive at an understanding with them; but he must also be strong, even more **mastr of himself** than of others, impregnable, forsooth, in **his will for power**, so as to acquire the trust and the awe of the weak, so that he can be their hold, bulwark, prop, compulsion, overseer, tyrant, god. (Nietzsche 1921: 132)

Now I wonder if the "ascetic priest" is not an oxymoron; how can one simultaneously be a recluse hermit and a religious leader of a community? Both ancient and modern cults could make this apparent enough, as does *Prohvet Maltsvet* to a degree, but this is something I'd like to read more about, should I ever reach the sociology of religion. The philosopher's ramblings, in other words, are not enough.

He will not be spared the waging of war with the beasts of prey, a war of guile (of "spirit") rather than of force, as is self-evident - he will in certain cases find it necessary to conjure up out of himself, or at any rate to represent practically a new type of the beast of prey - a new animal monstrosity in which the **polar bear**, the supple, cold, crouching **panther**, and, not least important, **the fox**, are joined together in a trinity as fascinating as it is fearsome. (Nietzsche 1921: 133)

Mis selle bändi nimi on? Polaarkaru, panter ja rebane. I am so far down the rabbit hole that the panther's swiftness, the polar bear's force, and the fox's cleverness immediately organize themselves into Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.

He protects, in sooth, his sick herd well enough, does this strange herdsman; he protects them also against themselves, against the sparks (even in the centre of the herd) of wickedness, knavery, malice, and all the other ills

that [[]] the plaguey and the sick are heir to; **he fights with cunning, hardness, and stealth against anarchy and against the ever imminent break-up inside the herd**, where *resentment*, that most dangerous blasting-stuff and explosive, ever accumulates and accumulates. Getting rid of this blasting-stuff in such a way that it does not blow up the herd and the herdsman, that is his real feat, his supreme utility if you wish to comprise in the shortest formula the value of the priestly life, it would be correct to say the priest is the *diverter of the course of resentment*. (Nietzsche 1921: 133-134)

Something tells me this is about constructing an external enemy to avoid internal ruptures. This is the stuff of fear-mongering.

In one case the object is to prevent being hurt any more; in the other case the object is to *deadens* a racking, insidious, nearly unbearable pain by a more violent emotion [[]] of any kind whatsoever, and at any rate for the time being to drive it out of the consciousness - for this purpose an emotion is needed, as wild an emotion as possible, and to excite that emotion **some excuse or other is needed. "It must be somebody's fault that I feel bad"** - this kind of reasoning is peculiar to all invalids, and is but the more pronounced, the more ignorant they remain of the real cause of their feeling bad, the physiological cause (the cause may lie in a disease of the *nervous sympathicus*, or in an excessive secretion of bile, or in a want of sulphate and phosphate of potash in the blood, or in pressure in the bowels which stops the circulation of the blood, or in degeneration of the ovaries, and so forth). (Nietzsche 1921: 134-135)

"When we are in an irascible mood we are disposed to get angry on the smallest pretext, and to find justifications for our anger on all sides. Our sensibility to anger is increased both in range and in delicacy. Things and persons seem contrary. We are ready to blame

them and to exaggerate their defects." ([Shand 1914: 151-152](#)) - The difference lies in Shand describing the emotion, and Nietzsche the character defect as a physiological illness. Hyperbole, right?

Let me elaborate this hypothesis: I do not for a minute accept the very "pain in the soul" as a real fact, but only as an explanation (a casual explanation) of facts that could not hitherto be precisely formulated; I regard it therefore as something as yet absolutely in the air and devoid of **scientific cogency** - just a **nice fat word in the place of a lean note of interrogation**. (Nietzsche 1921: 137)

Phraseology.

A strong and well-constituted man digests his experiences (deeds and misdeeds all included) just as he digests his meats, even when he has some tough morsels to swallow. (Nietzsche 1921: 137)

"The memory, however, the store of formulæ and traditions learned by heart, resider deeper, in the belly. A man will be said to have a good *nanola*, when he can acquire many formulæ, but though they enter through the larynx, naturally, as he learns them, repeating word for word, he has to stow them away in a bigger and more commodious receptacle; they sink down right to the bottom of his abdomen." ([Malinowski 1922: 408-409](#))

But is he really a *physician*, this ascetic priest? We already understand why we are scarcely allowed to call him a physician, however much he likes to feel a "saviour" and let himself be worshipped as a saviour. (Nietzsche 1921: 138)

I have a nagging suspicion that he is speaking about something very specific to the ancient world, i.e. the very first jewish rabbis

were essentially "therapeuds" (cf. [therapeía](#), "service, medical treatment"). Foucault, perhaps, discussed it [in his lectures](#)).

Such a feeling of depression can have the most diverse origins; it may be the result of the crossing of too heterogeneous races (or of classes - genealogical and racial differences are also brought out in the classes: the European "Weltschmerz," the "Pessimism" of the nineteenth century, is really the result of **an absurd and sudden class-mixture**); it may be brought about by a mistaken emigration - a race falling into a climate for which its power of adaptation is insufficient [...] (Nietzsche 1921: 139)

Let us recall who these days rage against desegregation and mud-bloods. Though La Barre has his own well-merited accusations, it was [Meltzer & Musolf \(2003: 147\)](#) who proposed that Malinowski's statements on this topic were "classist".

Similarly it is improper to consider such a plan for starving the physical element and the desire, as in itself a symptom of insanity (as a clumsy species of roast-beef-eating "freethinkers" and Sir Christophers are fain to do); all the more certain is it that their method can and does pave the way to all kinds of mental disturbances, for instance, "inner lights" (as far as the cases of Hesychasts of Mount Athos), auditory and visual hallucinations, voluptuous ecstasies and **effervescences of sensualism** (the history of St. Theresa). The explanation of such events given by the victims is always **the acme of fanatical falsehood**; this is self-evident. (Nietzsche 1921: 141)

How sensual is Durkheim's collective effervescence?

Note well, however, the tone of implicit gratitude that rings in the very *will* for an explanation of such a character. **The supreme state, salvation itself, that final goal of universal hypnosis and peace, is always regarded by**

them as the mystery of mysteries, which even the most supreme symbols are inadequate to express; it is regarded as an entry and homecoming to the essence of things, as a liberation from all illusions, as "knowledge," as "truth," as "being," as an escape from every end, every wish, every action, as something even beyond Good and Evil. (Nietzsche 1921: 141b)

Here I have to agree with the notion that religious connotations blur the significance of "communion"; how, indeed, can we speak of communion without religious connotations?

"For those who know, there is no duty." "Redemption is not attained by the acquisition of virtues; for redemption consists in being one with Brahman, who is incapable of acquiring any perfection; and equally like does it consist in the *giving up of faults*, for the Brahman, **unity with whom is what constitutes redemption, is eternally pure**" (these passages are from the Commentaries of the Cankara, quoted from the first real European expert of the Indian philosophy, my friend Paul Deussen). (Nietzsche 1921: 142)

The really troubling thought is that the "spiritual" is the *fourth* in [Fiordo's scheme](#). Where Malinowski places social union and Mukařovský beauty, so many place spirituality. If the first three constitute the mind (cf. [Stout, Bourgh & Bain 1889-1890](#)), the fourth appears in these cases to be the "outlet".

We wish, therefore, to pay honour to the idea of "redemption" in the great religions, but it is somewhat hard to remain serious in view of the appreciation meted out to the *deep sleep* by these exhausted passimists who are too tired even to dream - to the deep sleep considered, that is, as already a fusing into Brahman, as **the attainment of the *unio mystica* with God**. (Nietzsche 1921: 142)

"This is because we are dealing with a very complex notion, into which a multitude of badly analysed impressions enter, whose elaboration has been carried on for centuries, though men have had no clear consciousness of it" (Durkheim 1915: 241).

"When he has completely gone to sleep," say son this point the oldest and most venerable "script," "and come to perfect rest, so that [] he sees no more any vision, oh dear one, is he united with Being, he has entered into his own self - encircled by the Self with its absolute knowledge, he has no more any **consciousness of that which is without or of that which is within**. Day and night cross not these bridges, nor age, nor death, nor suffering, nor good deeds, nor evil deeds." (Nietzsche 1921: 142-143)

Self and non-self; internal and external; familiar and strange; friend and foe, communization and differentiation.

The alleviation consists in the attention of the sufferer being absolutely diverted from suffering, in the incessant **monopoly of the consciousness by action, so that consequently there is little room left for suffering** - for narrow is it, this chamber of human consciousness! Mechanical activity and its corollaries, such as **absolute regularity, punctilious unreasoning obedience, the chronic routine of life, the complete occupation of time**, a certain liberty to be impersonal, nay, a training in "impersonality," **self-forgetfulness**, "*incuria sui*" - with what thoroughness and expert subtlety have all these methods been exploited by the ascetic priest in his war with pain! (Nietzsche 1921: 144)

Manual work shuts off the default mode network? See. ["Thought Bubbles" in Crazy Ex-Girlfriend](#) - are your bad thoughts more swole and hit the gym more often than you do?.

When he has to tackle sufferers of the lower orders, slaves, or prisoners (or **women, who for the most part**

are a compound of labour-slave and prisoner), all he has to do is to juggle a little with the names, and to rechristen, so as to make them see henceforth a benefit, a comparative happiness, in objects which they hated - the slave's discontent with his lot was at any rate *not* invented by the priests. (Nietzsche 1921: 144)

Oh boy. This book really has not aged well.

An investigation of the origin of Christianity in the Roman world shows that **co-operative unions for poverty, sickness, and burial sprang up in the lowest stratum of contemporary society**, amid which the chief antidote against depression, **the little joy experienced in mutual benefits, was deliberately fostered**. Perchance this was then a novelty, a real discovery? This conjuring up of the will for cooperation, for family organisation, for **communal life**, for "*Cænacula*," necessarily brought the Will for Power, which had been already infinitesimally stimulated, to a new and much fuller manifestation. The **herd organisation** is a genuine advance and triumph in the fight with depression. With the growth of the community there matures even to individuals a new interest, which often enough takes him out of the more personal element in his discontent, his aversion to himself, the "*despectus sui*" of Geulincx. All sick and diseased people strive [[]] instinctively after a herd-organisation, out of **a desire to shake off their sense of oppressive discomfort and weakness**; the ascetic priest divines this instinct and promotes it; wherever a herd exists it is the instinct of weakness which has wished for the herd, and the cleverness of the priests which has organised it, for, mark this: by an equally natural necessity **the strong strive as much for isolation as the weak for union**: when the former bind themselves it is only with **a view to an aggressive joint action and joint satisfaction of the Will for Power**, much against the wishes of the individual conscience; the latter, on the contrary, range themselves to-

gether with positive *delight* in such a muster - their instincts are as much gratified thereby as the instincts of the "born master" (that is, the solitary beast-of-prey species of man) are disturbed and wounded to the quick by organisation. (Nietzsche 1921: 145-146)

Another interpretation of communion. Caenaculum (attic, garret) is an upstairs dining room, the top/upper story; perhaps the "European drawing-room"? This passage provides an alternative simultaneously to taciturnity (discomfort) and the purposes of establish social communion - what's more, in relation to pugnacity!

The methods employed by the ascetic priest, which we have already learnt to know - stifling of all vitality, mechanical energy, the little joy, and especially the method of "**love your neighbour**" **herd-organisation**, the awaking of **the communal consciousness of power**, to such a pitch [|] that the individual's disgust with himself becomes eclipsed by his **delight in the thriving of the community** - these are, according to modern standards, the "innocent" methods employed in the fight with depression; let us turn now to the more interesting topic of the "guilty" methods. (Nietzsche 1921: 146-147)

My questions receive answers; I didn't think this book would go that much into the herd instinct. It is not surprising to see it in relation with the Will to Power. What is somewhat surprising is the clarity of this relation after the fact. For Trotter might have thought this all too self-evident.

For, do not deceive yourself: what constitutes the chief characteristic of modern souls and of modern books is not the lying, but the *innocence* which is part and parcel of their intellectual dishonesty. The inevitable running up against this "innocence" everything constitutes the most distasteful feature of the somewhat dangerous business which a modern psychologist has to undertake: it is a

[] part of *our* great danger - it is a road which perhaps leads us straight to the great nausea - I know quite well the purpose which all modern books will and can serve (granted that they last, which I am not afraid of, and granted equally that there is to be at some future day a generation with **a more rigid, more severe, and healthier taste**) - the *function* which all modernity generally will serve with posterity: that of an emetic, - and this by reason of its moral sugariness and falsity, its **ingrained feminism**, which it is pleased to call "Idealism," and at any rate believes to be idealism. Our cultured men of to-day, our "good" men, do not lie - that is true; but it does *not* redound to their honour! (Nietzsche 1921: 147-148)

Listening to anti-feminist youtube commentary circa 2016, and finding out Nietzsche's "hard" understanding of health. "All modern books" is an especially silly generalization. I'm willing to bet that there's a generous share of such conspiratorial thinking in the late 19th century. The consternation is a typical symptom of the downfall-ist outlook shared by Camille Paglia and many right-wing Psittacidae.

But you will soon understand me. - Putting it shortly, there is reason enough, is there not, for us **psychologists** [] nowadays **never to get away from a certain mistrust of our own selves?** Probably even we ourselves are still "too good" for our work; probably, whatever contempt we feel for this popular craze for morality, we ourselves are perhaps none the less its victims, prey, and slaves; probably it infects even *us*. (Nietzsche 1921: 149-150)

Does the dentist worry about and treat her teeth? *Mõtleja ametihai-gused*. Parallelism with the opening sentence of the book.

The ascetic ideal in the service of projected emotional excess: - he who remembers the previous essay will already partially anticipate the essential meaning com-

pressed into these above ten words. The thorough unswitching of the human soul, the plunging of it into terror, frost, ardour, rapture, so as **to free it, as through some lightning shock, from all the smallness and pettiness** of unhappiness, depression, and discomfort: what ways lead to *this* goal? (Nietzsche 1921: 150)

If you recall what he has written about freedom for the philosopher ([ante, 108-109](#)) and the context of his discussing his pragmatic theory in relation with lightning ([ante, 27-28](#)), you may realise that the subtext here is about producing an atmosphere of "terror, frost, ardour, rapture", so as to unify a community through "liberation" from other small and petty things in favour of the goals of the larger community. Not pretty. This one does not bring joy.

And which of these ways does so most safely? ...At bottom all great emotions have this power, provided that they find a sudden outlet - emotions such as rage, fear, lust, revenge, hope, triumph, despair, cruelty; and, in sooth, **the ascetic priest has had no scruples in taking into his service the whole pack of hounds that rage in the human kennel**, unleashing now these and now those, with the same constant object of waking man out of his protracted melancholy, of chasing away, at any rate for a time, his dull pain, his shrinking misery, but always under the sanction [!] of a religious interpretation and justification. (Nietzsche 1921: 150-151)

In other words, the herd leader may arouse strong negative, aggressive, and violent passions, emotions, and sentiments because his conscience does not bar him from doing so. He is not against turning humans into wolves, watching intently for any sign of enmity, for the discernible hint of a growl.

The keynote by which the ascetic priest was enabled **to get every kind of agonising and ecstatic music to play on the fibres of the human soul** - was, as every one

knows, **the exploitation of the feeling of "guilt."** I was already indicated in the previous essay the origin of this feeling - as **a piece of animal psychology and nothing else:** we were thus confronted with the feeling of "guilt," in its crude state, as it were. IT was first in the hands of the priest, real artist that he was in the feeling of guilt, that it took shape - oh, what a shape! (Nietzsche 1921: 151)

One of those occasions on which he sounds nearly reasonable. Guilt, one cannot not notice, is a regular player in this type of moral philosophy. Pity might be closely related, and altruism and tender sympathies creep in.

[...] everywhere mute pain, extreme fear, the agony of a tortured heart, the spasms of an unknown happiness, the shriek for "redemption." In point of fact, thanks to this system of procedure, the old depression, dullness, and fatigue were absolutely conquered, life itself became *very* interesting again, awake, eternally awake, sleepless, glowing, burnt away, exhausted and yet not tired - such was the figure cut by man, "the sinner," who was **initiated into these mysteries.** This grand old wizard of an ascetic priest fighting with depression - he had clearly triumphed, *his* kingdom had come: men no longer grumbled at pain, men *panted* after pain: "*More pain! More pain!*" (Nietzsche 1921: 153)

Extreme hyperbole but no matter. What I dislike about the Firthian-Laverian emphasis on ritual in communion is that it makes social interaction to much into a mystery to be initiated into with knowing the correct greeting and verbal routines. It is pragmatic, but not to its favour.

At any rate, some understanding should be come to as to the expression "**be of use.**" If you only wish to express that such a system of treatment has *reformed* man, I do not gainsay it: I merely add that "**reformed**" **conveys**

to my mind much as "tamed," "weakened," "discouraged," "refined," "daintified," "emasculated" (and thus it means almost as much as **injured**). (Nietzsche 1921: 154)

More on the domestication of human beings. Society makes man sick, depressed, and oppressed creatures, eh? This I hope to find out when I turn to Le Bon and McDougall's *Group Mind* (1920), to seek for an explanation of Malinowski's preference for differentiation and reversion to communization. There is definitely something *aristocratic* about it.

Similarly ask history. In every body politic where the ascetic priest has established this treatment of the sick, disease has on every occasion spread with sinister speed throughout its length and breadth. What was always the "result"? A shattered nervous system, in addition to the existing malady, and this in the greatest as in the smallest, in the individuals as in masses. We find, in consequence of the penance and redemption-training, awful epileptic epidemics, the greatest known to history, such as the St. Vitus and St. John dances of the [] Middle Ages; we find, as another phase of its aftereffect, frightful mutilations and chronic depressions, by means of which **the temperament of a nation or a city** (Geneva, Bâle) is **turned once for all into its opposite**; - this *training*, again, is responsible for the witch-hysteria, a phenomenon analogous to somnambulism (eight great epidemic outbursts of this only between 1564 and 1605); - we find similarly in its train those delirious deathcravings of large masses, whose awful "shriek," "*evviva la morte!*" was heard over the whole of Europe, now interrupted by voluptuous variations and anon by a rage for destruction, just as the same emotional sequence with the same intermittencies and **sudden changes** is now universally observed in every case where the ascetic doctrine of sin scores once more a great success (religious neurosis *ap-*

pears as a manifestation of the devil, there is no doubt of it. What is it? *Quæritur*). (Nietzsche 1921: 154-155)

A key juncture where national characteristics and national atmosphere intersect. The keyword, in truth, is *political atmosphere*, or what we today would call some city or nation's *geopolitical situation*. Isn't that new pop-psychological invention, the *Trump Derangement Syndrome*, a manifestation of "emotional excess"?

The ascetic priest has, wherever he has obtained the mastery, **corrupted the health of the soul**, he has consequently also corrupted *taste in artibus et litteris* - he corrupts it still. (Nietzsche 1921: 156)

Soul searching or just looking for fights? *Keel ja kirjandus*.

In the very midst of the Græco-Roman splendour, which was also a splendour of books, face to face with an ancient world of writings which had not yet fallen into decay and ruin, at a time when certain books were still to be read, to possess which we would give nowadays half our literature in exchange, at that time **the simplicity and vanity of Christian agitators** (they rae generally called Fathers of the Church) dared to declare: "We too have our classical literature, *wo do not need that of the Greeks*" - and meanwhile they proudly pointed to their books of legends, their letters of apostles, and their apologetic tractlets, just in the same way that to-day the English "Salvation Army" wages its fight against Shakespeare and other "heathens" with an analogous literature. (Nietzsche 1921: 156)

There is an easy and natural connection between simplicity (even, primitiveness) and vanity (egocentric, unreflexive). On the whole, is this the typical pessimism of literary criticism? Aren't they all crying about the quality of new books when everyone can see that both amount and quality of writing has increased and improved. It's not

news if the dog bites man (nor, in the U.S., when the police kill 10,000 dogs a year).

You already guess it, I do not like the "New Testament"; it almost upset me that I stand so isolated in my taste so far as concerns this valued, this over-valued Scripture; the taste of two thousand years is [] *against* me; but what boots it! "Here I stand! I cannot help myself" - I have the courage of my bad taste. The *Old Testament* - yes, that is something quite different, all honour to the Old Testament! I find therein great men, an heroic landscape, and one of the rarest phenomena in the world, the incompatible naïveté *of tho strong heart*; further still, I find a people. In the New, on the contrary, just a hostel of petty sects, pure rococo of the soul, twisting angles and fancy touches, nothing but conventicle air, not to forget **an occasional whiff of bucolic sweetness which appertains to the epoch (and the Roman province) and is less Jewish than Hellenistic.** (Nietzsche 1921: 156-157)

I mean, his nose is not wrong, the *New Testament* is first and foremost the allegorical religious literature of a Hellenized jewish sect, even more confusingly extolling the virtues and miracles of a Syriac speaking jew from a watchtower settlement. Christianity is wack, no doubt about it. But why be 14 and *so deep* about it?

Meekness and braggadocio cheek by jowl; an emotional garrulousness that almost deafens; **passionate hysteria, but no passion**; painful pantomime; here manifestly every one lacked good breeding. How dare any one make so much fuss about their little failings as do these pious little fellows! No one cares a straw about it - let alone God. (Nietzsche 1921: 157)

Nothing but a clever turn of a phrase, at best an *additional* seductive fascination, some *lingual instinct* in a groggy bag of bones.

Luther's opposition to the mediæval saints of the Church (in particular, against "that devil's hog, the Pope"), was, there is no doubt, at bottom the opposition of a boor, who was offended at the *good etiquette* of the Church, **that worship-etiquette of the sacerdotal code**, which only admits to the holy of holies the initiated and the silent, and shuts the door against the boors. (Nietzsche 1921: 158)

Something along the lines of "moral codes", language as "a more tedious, code", and morality law as "an arbitrary extra-natural code" in Trotter (114-115; 119-120; and 123-123).

The ascetic ideal, you will guess, was at no time and in no place, a school of good taste, still less of good manners - at the best it was a school for sacerdotal manners: that is, it contains in itself something which was a deadly enemy to all good [] manners. **Lack of measure, opposition to measure** it is itself a "*non plus ultra*." (Nietzsche 1921: 158-159)

"Rarely is a writer so impressed by one of these laws that he is moved to collect the evidence in its favour, as was Montaigne in respect of the law that difficulty gives all things their value" ([Shand 1914: 73](#)). This "measured" manner, I thought for a moment, has something to do with self-control, self-denial, self-discipline - as well as with the more obvious aspect of being "civilized" or "cultured" to abstention and delay - even, distance.

The ascetic ideal has an aim - this goal is, putting it generally, that **all the other interests of human life should, measured by its standard, appear petty and narrow**; it explains epochs, nations, men, in reference to this one end; it forbids any other interpretation, any other end; **it repudiates, denies, affirms, confirms, only in the sense of its own interpretation** (and [] was there ever a more thoroughly elaborated system of interpreta-

tion?); it subjects itself to no power, rather does it believe in its own precedence over every power - **it believes that nothing powerful exists in the world that has not first got to receive from "it" a meaning**, a right to exist, a vaule, as **being an instrument in its work**, a way and means to its end, to one end. (Nietzsche 1921: 159-160)

Reads like a description of totalizing systems in cultural semiotics, i.e. defines everything contrary to its interests as either meaningless or its mortal enemy.

Oh, what does all science not cover to-day? How much, at any rate, does it not try to cover? The diligence of our best scholars, their senseless industry, their **burning the candle of their brain at both ends** - their very mastery in their handiwork - how often is the real meaning of all that to prevent themselves continuing to see a certain thing? Science as a self-atæsthetic: *do you know that?* (Nietzsche 1921: 161)

I do not know that, but I do like the image. *Parimad õpetlased põletavad oma ajuküünlaid mõlemast otsast korraga.*

We "knowers" have grown by degrees suspicious of all kinds of believers, our suspicion has step by step habituated us to draw just the opposite conclusions to what people have drawn before; that is to say, wherever the strength of a belief is particularly prominent to draw the conclusion of the difficulty of proving what is believed, the conclusion of its actual *improbability*. We do not again deny that "faith produces salvation": *for that very reason* we do deny that gaith *proves* anything, - **a strong faith, which produces happiness, causes suspicion of the object of that faith, it does not establish its "truth," it does establish a certain probability of - illusion.** (Nietzsche 1921: 162)

Fallibilism and certitude. Ratiocinating statistics.

If I am in any way a reader of riddles, then I will be one with this sentence: for some time past there have been no *free spirit*; *for they still believe in truth*. (Nietzsche 1921: 163)

Post-truth. (Continued shortly on p. 166.)

Considered physiologically, moreover, science rests on the same basis as does the ascetic ideal: a certain *impoverishment of life* is the presupposition of the latter as of the former - add, frigidity of the emotions, slackening [] of the *tempo*, **the substitution of dialectic for instinct**, *seriousness* impressed on mien and gesture (seriousness, that more unmistakable sign of strenuous metabolism, of struggling, toiling life). (Nietzsche 1921: 167-168)

Is that what science really achieves? "Well, Terry Eagleton encourages us to let Marxism breathe in our new century by allowing for things which Karl Marx, frankly, had no opinion on, by letting the guidelines of the Great Dialectic, or the Grand Narrative, guide us towards moral and not moralist thinking." - Trotsky, probably.

Has, perchance, man grown *less in control* of a transcendental solution of his riddle of existence, because since that time this existence has become more **random, casual, and superfluous** in the *visible* order of the universe? (Nietzsche 1921: 169)

Lexical equivalents for non-consecutiveness, informality, and triviality.

Since Copernicus man seems to have fallen on to a steep plane - he rolls faster and faster away from the centre - whither? into nothingness? *into the "thrilling sensation of his own nothingness"*? - Well! this would be the straight way - to the *old* ideal? (Nietzsche 1921: 169)

Trippy. *Vt. ka mäenõlvakult välja hüütud laviin.* "'Well!' the young man said.

It is certain that **from the time of Kant every type of transcendentalist is playing a winning game** - they are emancipated from the theologians; what luck! - he has revealed to them that secret art, by which they can now pursue their "heart's desire" on their own responsibility, and with all the respectability of science. (Nietzsche 1921: 170)

Looks like a candidate for Malinowski's objections (doth protesteth much too much) to collective mind, the supra-individual organism, body politick, etc.

You see in the historian a gloomy, hard, but determined gaze, - an eye that *looks out* as an isolated North Pole explorer looks out perhaps so as not to look within, so as not to look back?) - there is snow - here is life silenced, the last crows which we saw here are called "whither?" "Vanity," "Nada" - here is nothing more flourishes and grows, at the most **the meta-politics of St. Petersburg and the "pity" of Tolstoi.** (Nietzsche 1921: 171)

"Metapolitics"? In Carol Diethe's translation: "You see a sad, hard but determined gaze, - an eye *peers out*, like a lone explorer at the North Pole (perhaps so as not to peer in? or peer back? [...]). Here there is snow, here life is silenced; the last crows heard here are called 'what for?', 'in vain', '*nada*' - here nothing flourishes or grows any more, except, perhaps, for St Petersburg metapolitics and Tolstoi's 'compassion'."

This Nature, who gave to the steer its horn, to the lion its *χάσμι' οδόντων*, **for what purpose did Nature give me my foot? - To kick, by St. Anacreon, and not merely to run away!** (Nietzsche 1921: 172)

With no context, this is possibly one of the best sentences I've ever read.

The invariable success of *every* kind intellectual charlatanism in present-day Germany hangs together with the almost indisputable and already quite palpable desolation of the German mind, whose cause I look for in a too exclusive diet, of papers, politics, beer, and Wagnerian music, not forgetting the condition precedent of this diet, **the national exclusiveness and vanity**, the strong but narrow principle, "Germany, Germany above everything," and finally the *paralysis agitans* of "modern ideas". (Nietzsche 1921: 173)

A self-hating German! Otherwise, national feeling meets vanity. Manifest destiny? The special destiny of Russia?

Europe nowadays is, above all, wealthy and ingenious in means of excitement; it appears has no more crying necessity than *stimulantia* and alcohol. Hence the enormous **counterfeiting of ideals**, those most fiery spirits of the mind; hence too the repulsive, evil-smelling, perjured, pseudo-alcoholic air everywhere. (Nietzsche 1921: 173)

Complementary to "countersign of thought". Europe is decadent, we get it.

All great things go to ruin by reason of themselves, by reason of an act of self-dissolution: so wills the law of life, the law of *necessary* "self-mastery" even in the essence of life - ever is the law-giver finally exposed to the cry, "*patere legem quam ipse tulisti*"; in thus wise did Christianity *go to ruin as a dogma*, through its own morality; in thus wise must Christianity go again to ruin to-day as a morality - we are standing on the threshold of this event. (Nietzsche 1921: 176)

Too absolutist. Has *life* gone to ruin? Or will it go to ruin by reason of itself? Our sun will dim and make life for our species intolerable, but there is also no certitude in Earth being the only harbinger of life in the universe (we may be accidents of [cosmic dust](#)). The threshold was the moral *interregnum* of the 19th century.

And here again do I touch on my problem, on our problem, my **unknown friend (for as yet I know of no friends)**: what sense has our whole being, if it does not mean that in our own selves that will for truth has come to its own consciousness *as a problem*? (Nietzsche 1921: 176)

Virtual addressees - instead of an actual circle of society as an immediate audience he is addressing the circle of society *in futuro* as the emerging mediated audience; he is projecting other minds interested in the same problem. The anticipative (as opposed to the mnemonic or concurrent) type of autocommunication. What is actually anticipated by Nietzsche, is surprisingly slow - Europe will go to pieces in two centuries. No *Eesti 200*.

If you except the ascetic ideal, the *animal man* [[]] has no meaning. His existence on earth contained no end; "What is the purpose of man at all?" was a question without answer; the *will* for man and the world was lacking; **behind every great human destiny rang as a refrain a still greater "Vanity!"** The ascetic ideal simply means this: that something *was lacking*, that a tremendous *void* encircled man - he did not know how to justify himself, to explain himself, **to affirm himself**, he *suffered* from **the problem of his own meaning**. He suffered also in other ways, he was in the main a *diseased* animal; but his problem was not suffering itself, but the lack of an answer to that crying question, "*To what purpose do we suffer?*" (Nietzsche 1921: 176-177)

A dive into the deep end. Our being tired of man, of man's sickness, as he would put it, amounts to an existential dread of the meaninglessness of life. This "vanity" is alternatively formulated as *The Selfish Gene*. It would help to dive deeper for the etymology and uses of "vanity". Likewise with affirmation (*phatikos?*), which levels up from yes-men to saying "yes" to life. There is only one really serious philosophical problem, eh?

[...] but in spite of all that - man was *saved* thereby, he had a *meaning*, and from henceforth was no more like a leaf in the wind, **a shuttle-cock of change**, of nonsense, he could now "will" something - absolutely immaterial [] to what end, to what purpos, with what means he wished: *the will itself was saved*. (Nietzsche 1921: 177-178)

Juhuse sulgpall.

The Europeans now imagine themselves as representing, in the main, the highest types of men on earth. (Nietzsche 1921: 179)

Blunt Description Trauma.

I rate Michael Angelo higher than Raphael, because, through all the Christian clouds and prejudices of his time, he saw the ideal of **a culture nobler** than the Christo-Raphaelian: whilst Raphael truly and modestly glorified only the values handed down to him, and did not carry within himself any inquiry, yearning instincts. (Nietzsche 1921: 180)

Perhaps indicative of what he means by "the pathos of nobility and distance" beyond the blue-eyed aryan barbarians. His views of history are still obscure because they appear so ahistorical, more mythical than anything.

Michael Angelo, on the other hand, saw and felt the problem of the law-giver of new values: the problem of

the conqueror made perfect, who first had to subdue the "hero within himself," the man exalted to his highest pedestal, **master even of his pity**, who mercilessly shatters and annihilates everything that does not bear his own stamp, shining in Olympian divinity. (Nietzsche 1921: 180)

From what can be seen throughout the book, mastering one's pity is a prime candidate for the subtraction of symmetry from sympathy. The hard-hearted are spurious and one-sided in their expressions of sympathy, i.e. pity and condolences, because they deny themselves active sympathy with the other, the stranger, the not-self.

The problem of truthfulness is quite a new one. I am astonished. From this standpoint we regard such natures as Bismarck as culpable out of careness, such as Richard Wagner out of want of modesty; we would condemn Plato for his *pia fraus*, Kant for the derivation of his Categorical Imperative, his own belief certainly not having come to him from this source. **Finally, even doubt turns against itself: doubt in doubt.** And the question as to the *value* of truthfulness and its extent lies *there*. (Nietzsche 1921: 181)

Since I have nothing to do with truth, nothing but cursory interest in it, and don't operate with truthfulness as much as chance and certitude, I cannot even begin to verify how old Truth as a philosophical problem is. That it is not so new as is suggested by its opposite, doubt, which has been a problem since Descartes, at the very least. In any case, "doubting doubt" is an apt descriptor of reading about Peirce and Clay on this issue; the nagging feeling is that our modern "new problem" with post-truthfulness is not so new after all but a well-trodden philosophical path of unknown age.

The real German Mephistopheles crosses the Alps, and believes that everything there belongs to him. Then he recovers himself, like Winkelmann, like Mozart. He

looks upon Faust and Hamlet as caricatures, invented to be laughed at, and upon Luther also. Goethe had his good *German* moments, when he laughed inwardly at all these things. But then he **fell back again into his cloudy moods**. (Nietzsche 1921: 182)

Bce наше! There is something terrorizing on shudders to when one takes in the map of Nazi Germany at its height circa 1943. This brooding, hard-hearted and herd-minded disciplinarian would have reigned over so many different peoples. It is a short step from there to look at a map of the world coloured blue and red after preference for Fortnite and PUBG, and realize that it's a near straight line dividing the East and West, with the red herring dick of Sahel penetrating the other side (by [u/xmansiphone](#)).

The Germans are **a dangerous people**: they are experts at inventing intoxicants. Gothic, rococo (according to Semper), the historical sense and exoticism, Hegel, Richard [[] Wagner - **Leibniz, too (dangerous at the present day)** - (they even idealised the serving soul as the virtue of scholars and soldiers, also as the simple mind). The Germans may well be the most composite people on earth. (Nietzsche 1921: 182-183)

The German's national characteristic of cloudy moods "is not a reassuring factor, but, on the contrary, something alarming and dangerous" (PC 4.1). Leibniz's [New essays concerning human understanding](#) is only 900 pages of thick scribble (*tihe kribu-krabu*).

The smallness and baseness of the German soul were not and are not consequences of the system of small states; for **it is well known that the inhabitants of much smaller states were proud and independent: and it is not a large state *per se* that makes souls freer and more manly**. The man whose soul obeys the slavish command: "Thou shalt and must kneel!" in whose body there is an involuntary bowing and scraping to titles, orders, gracious

glances from above - well, such a man in an "Empire" will only bow all the more deeply and lick the dust more fervently in the presence of the great sovereign than in the presence of the lesser: this cannot be doubted. (Nietzsche 1921: 183)

"Rahva suuruse määrab ära tema unistuste suurus" - [Lennart Meri, Anu Lambi suu läbi](#) // Also, see "toading" and the over-emphasized lack of social hierarchy in Malinowski's phatic communion, as opposed to Barton's treatment of salutations.

Van Dyck was nobler in this respect: who in all those whom he painted **added a certain amount of what he himself most highly valued**: he did not descend from himself, but rather lifted up others to himself when he "rendered." (Nietzsche 1921: 184)

A flair of insight on annotation, fair use, and originality; for meta-blogging.

We could at any time have counted on the fingers of one hand those German learned men who possessed wit. the remainder have understanding, and a few of them, happily, that famous "**childlike character**" which divines. [.|] As **Frenchmen reflect the politeness and esprit of French society**, so do Germans reflect something of the deep, pensive earnestness of their mystics and musicians, and also of their **silly childishness**. The Italian exhibits a great deal of republican distinction and art, and can **show himself to be noble and proud without vanity**. (Nietzsche 1921: 184-185)

I expect to find out about these reflections in due time, beginning with Tarde and Le Bon. The description of German character here calls to mind Malinowski as an Austrian subject, with his mystical ties to the other white colonial powers and remembered by the natives later as "the singer", known to have sung Wagner when out

and about. As to nobleness and proudness without vanity, see the art of conversation ([Mahaffy 1887](#)).

A larger number of the higher and better-endowed men will, I hope, have in the end **so much self-restraint as to be able to get rid of their bad taste for affection and sentimental darkness**, and so turn against Richard Wagner as much as against Schopenhauer. These two Germans are leading us to ruin; they flattered our dangerous qualities. **A stronger future** is prepared for us in Goethe, Beethoven, and Bismarck than in these racial aberrations. **We have had no philosophers yet.** (Nietzsche 1921: 185)

Demonstrating my superficiality, I am not interested if there is a specific technical term in rhetoric, sociology, or communication studies for pandering to future generations. Sounds like something that could interest literary theorists employing Jakobsonian addressivity to draw out signs of influence (or, to take a recent political illustration, for Trump to hint to Russia to get Hillary's e-mails and to reframe it as "joking" after the fact when it hits the fan). Also, what is malicious tenderness?

The peasant is the commonest type of noblesse, for he is dependent upon himself most of all. **Peasant blood is still the best blood in Germany** - for example, Luther, Niebuhr, Bismarck. (Nietzsche 1921: 185)

Salt of the earth! Figes' *A People's Tragedy* and Huxley's *Island* have made me realise that Winston taking exception to the proles and writing "If there is hope, it lies in the proles" had much to do with the inner turbulence of Russian revolution, as that was perhaps the most significant difference between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was that Lenin thought it possible to skip the road of industrialism, capitalism, and open market towards communism, and Trotsky's minority thought it necessary to aid aid and educate the

peasantry into a middle class first. In other words, expediency was preferred to devastating results, as comrade Ulyanov realized when dictating his will through the wall, only to have it locked up, too, until the long overdue revolutionary experiment fell down with the crumbling of another wall.

That the manliest men shall rule: this is only **the natural order of things**. (Nietzsche 1921: 186)

Writes a respected naturalist, apparently in all seriousness.

The future of German culture rests with the sons of the Prussian officers. (Nietzsche 1921: 186)

"Eesti kultuuri tulevik sõltub Saksa juhi järglastest" - Riigikogu liige, kes visatakse Zavoodist välja, tõenäoliselt.

Ruling, and **helping the highest thoughts to victory** - the only things that can make me interested in Germany. England's small-mindedness is the great danger now on earth. I observe **more inclination towards greatness in the feelings of the Russian Nihilists than in those of the English Utilitarians**. We require an intergrowth of the German and Slav races, and we require, too, the cleverest financiers, the Jews, for us to become masters of the world. (Nietzsche 1921: 187)

Why is *greatness* still so loaded? Make Russian Nihilists Great Again? It is odd to see so little change in almost 150 years.

A giving-up of the English principle of the people's right of representation. We require **the representation of the great interests**. (Nietzsche 1921: 187)

Hey! Corporations are people too!

We require **an unconditional union with Russia**, together with a mutual plan of action which shall not per-

mit any English schemata to obtain mastery in Russia. No American future! (Nietzsche 1921: 188)

A Molotov-Ribbentrop Union.

A national system of politics is untenable, and embarrassment by Christian views is a very great evil. In Europe all sensible people are sceptics, whether they say so or not. [...] I see over and beyond all these national wars, new "empires," and whatever else lies in the foreground. What I am concerned with - for I see it preparing itself slowly and hesitatingly - is **the United Europe**. (Nietzsche 1921: 188)

Much conservative self-contradictions. A national system is untenable and international unions of small nations not to be preferred over an unconditional union with another empire, while in the same breath bemoaning new empires! It is amazing how the sensible European sceptics become Euro-sceptics. A United Europe? But... but... we are not like the French! *Pweas no steppy*.

But to the help of such minds as feel the need of a new unity there comes a great explanatory economic fact: **the small States of Europe** - I refer to all our present kingdoms and "empires" - will in a short time become [] economically untenable, owing to the mad, uncontrolled struggle for the possession of local and international trade. Money is even now compelling European nations to amalgamate into one Power. In order, however, that Europe may enter into the battle for **the mastery of the world with good prespects of victory** (it is easy to perceive against whom this battle will be waged), she must probably "come to an understanding" with England. (Nietzsche 1921: 188-189)

My inner conspiracy theorist was bouncing up and down with joy at the Atlantean attitude towards international diplomacy.

The English colonies are needed for this struggle, just as much as modern Germany, to play her new rôle of broker and middleman, requires the colonial possessions of Holland. For no one any longer believes that England alone is strong enough to continue to act her old part for fifty years more; the impossibility of shutting out *homines novi* from the government will ruin her, and her continual change of political parties is a fatal obstacle to the carrying out of any tasks which require to be spread out over a long period of time. (Nietzsche 1921: 189)

Having recently rewatched *Muriel's Wedding*, what I see here is the Scramble for Africa play out. Germany needs South-Africa and *New Holland* for its territories.

Nation - men who speak one language and read the same newspapers. These men now call themselves "nations," and would far too readily trace their descent from the same source and through the same history; which, however, even with the assistance of the most malignant lying in the past, they have not succeeded in doing. (Nietzsche 1921: 190)

An invaluable definition for tying together gossip, curiosity, and the herd instinct with national characteristics, political unity, and communion of knowledge.

What **quagmires and mendacity** must there be about if it is possible, in the modern European hotch-potch, to raise **questions of "race"!** (It being premised that the origin of such writers is not in Horneo and Borneo.) [...] Maxim: **To associate with no man who takes any part in the mendacious race swindle.** (Nietzsche 1921: 190)

Not sure if good advice or four-dimensional chess race baiting.

With the freedom of travel now existing, groups of men of the same kindred can join together and establish communal habits and customs. The overcoming of "nations." [...] To make Europe **a centre of culture**, national stupidities [[]] should not make us blind to the fact that in the higher regions there is already **a continuous reciprocal dependence**. France and German philosophy. Richard Wagner and Paris (1830-50). Goethe and Greece. All things are impelled towards a synthesis of the European past in the highest types of mind. (Nietzsche 1921: 190-191)

Group (or community, even a small circle of society) can create novelty and form new traditions, all due to the new means of communication and transportation. Technology and culture.

This is **our distrust**, which recurs again and again; our care, which never lets us sleep; our question, which no one listens to or wishes to listen to; our Sphinx, near which there is more than one precipice: we believe that the men of present-day Europe are **deceived** in regard to the things which we love best, and **a pitiless demon** (no, not pitiless, only **indifferent and puerile**) - plays with our hearts and their **enthusiasm**, as it may perhaps have already played with everything that lived and loved; I believe that everything which we Europeans of to-day are in the habit of admiring as the values of all these respected things called **"humanity," "mankind," "sympathy," "pity,"** may be of some value as **the debilitation and moderating of certain powerful and dangerous primitive impulses**. Nevertheless, in the long run **all these things are nothing else than the [[]] belittlement of the entire type "man,"** his mediocrisation, if in such a desperate situation I may make use of such **a desperate expression**. (Nietzsche 1921: 191-192)

The pathos of nobility and distance find themselves duped by the Will to Power embodied in tender feelings given to charity, oneness

with other human-like "creatures", feeling what they feel, feeling pity for them. It is recognizing the modification of impulses brought about by the social instinct, which the oh-so-despised utilitarians connected with the origins of altruism and society. These instincts are powerful and dangerous. Is that not Malinowski's point? With the bedside knowledge of Shand's ethnographic psychology, Malinowski (PC 3.2-3) related "Many instincts and innate trends", to "the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company", including "fear", "pugnacity", "ambition", "vanity", "passion for power and wealth", and possibly more (McDougall also relates the sex instinct and "flirting"). For belittlement, see my rants about PC being a slur and *sympathia malevolens* generally.

I think that the *commedia umana* for an epicurean spectator-god must consist in this: that the Europeans, by virtue of their growing morality, believe in all their **innocence and vanity** that they are rising higher and higher, whereas the truth is that they are sinking lower and lower - *i.e.*, through **the cultivation of all the virtues which are useful to a herd**, and through the repression of the other and contrary virtues which give rise to a new, higher, stronger, masterful race of men - the first-named **virtues merely develop the herd-animal in man and stabilize the animal "man,"** for until now man has been "the animal as yet unstabilized." (Nietzsche 1921: 192)


Lets we forget that Nietzsche is also an embodiment of edgy theories in the philosophy of culture. See domestication and "taming", all the rants on ascetic priests as the herdsman.

For this is the danger of to-day: **everything that we loved when we were young has betrayed us.** Our last love - the love which makes us acknowledge her, our love

for Truth - let us take care that she, too, does not betray
us! (Nietzsche 1921: 193)

After seeing the recent adaptation of *Truth and Justice* in a crowded cinema, this passage is reminiscent of Andres's inner pain and his intoxication from scripture. It is his love for Truth that stokes his resentful bouts of Justice.

The Art of Conversation



Mahaffy, John Pentland 1892. *The Principles of the Art of Conversation*. Second Edition. Philadelphia: The Penn Publishing Company.

The generality of the treatment may perhaps mislead [] the reader to think that there is nothing but speculation attempted. This is not so, each single case of general description being drawn from instances under the author's own observation, so that not a few will be recognized by those who have moved in the same society. **But if justly drawn, they ought to be founded in every society.** (Mahaffy 1892: v-vi)

Upon [the first reading](#) I noted that this is how Mahaffy achieves the claim of universality, repeated in Malinowski. After Fox (1944), the criticism must point out that neither scholar attempted a comparative approach. Sadly, performing such a thing today on the basis of literature employing the term "phatic" would be misguided by the

variety of conceptions it has garnered - a study following Jakobson's formulation would completely neglect the social psychological aspects relevant for Malinowski.

Conversation

1. **is** universal;
2. is **necessary**; and therefore
3. Is it an art?
4. Can it be improved?

The great difficulty is this: that it must seem to be natural, and not an art. Hence -

5. Analogy of the arts of logic and rhetoric, viz. -
 - a. They can never be taught without natural gifts to receive them.
 - b. They can always be greatly improved in those who possess these gifts.
 - c. They **must not be paraded**, or they cease to be arts in the brighter sense, for
 - d. The highest art is to attain perfect nature.

So also -

1. No teaching by mere specimens and by memory is possible.
2. **All the general rules are obvious**, and yet
3. Natural gifts are necessary to apply them with skill.

I. THE MANNER OF CONVERSATION.
Subjective *Conditions,*
(A) in the speaker, and these are either. -

- a. Physical, viz.
 1. **A sweet tone of voice.**
 2. Absence of local accent.

3. Absence of tricks and catchwords.

or

b. Mental, viz.

1. Knowledge, which may be either Special (general topics, the topic of the day) - or General (books, men),
2. **Quickness**.

or

c. Moral, viz.

1. Modesty.
2. **Simplicity** - digression on Shyness and Reserve.
3. **Unselfishness**.
4. **Sympathy**.
5. Tact.

Digression as regards Conditions -

- a. too general - Moral Worth and Truthfulness.
- b. too special - Wit and Humor.

Objective

Conditions,

(B) in the hearers, which are either in -

1. Quantity, for we speak with (a) one, (b) a few, digressions on **gossip** and ladies' schools, (c) many.
2. Quality, for we speak with (a) equals, (b) superiors, (c) inferiors, digression on **bilingual societies**.
3. Differences (A) of age, (1) older, (2) younger, (3) equal; (B), of sex - men and women.
4. Degrees of Intimacy, (a) relations, (b) friends, (c) **acquaintances** (familiar, slight).

II. THE MATTER OF CONVERSATION, or
(C) The Topics, which are either -

- In Quantity - infinite.
- In Quality - serious or **trivial**.

- In Relation - personal or general.

(D) The handling of the Topics must be either -

- Deliberative, or by all the company.
- Controversial, or by two speakers.
- **Epideictic**, or by one.

(Mahaffy 1892: vii-ix)

It is a duty; good conversation is not *vain*; the principles are intuitive; it should be relaxed; automatic; and simple; there should be reciprocity; and active sympathy; ordinary gossip; linguistic communities; social union; trivial everyday topics; collective monologue.

There can be no doubt that of all the accomplishments **prized** in modern society, that of being agreeable in conversation is the very first. (Mahaffy 1892: 11)

"There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use" (PC 6.1). How can it be new if it is widely *prized*? It's like *discovering* America. Thus, there is real doubt if it is indeed a new type of linguistic use.

An agreeable young woman will always carry away the palm in the long run from the most brilliant player or singer who **has nothing to say**. (Mahaffy 1892: 12)

"Indeed there need not or perhaps even there must not be anything to communicate" (PC 9.4). The difference lies in the brilliant player or singer *not knowing* what to say, and the situation *requiring* nothing to be said.

But quite apart from all these serious profits, and better than them all, is the daily **pleasure** derived from good

conversation by those who can **contribute** it themselves or **enjoy** it in others. (Mahaffy 1892: 12)

The asymmetry partly does away with *contributing* - what is left is merely "enjoy[ing] each other's company".

It is a perpetual **intellectual feast**, it is an ever-ready recreation, a deep and lasting **comfort**, costing no outlay but that of time, requiring [] no appointments but a small company, limited neither to any age nor any sex, the delight of prosperity, the solace of adversity, the eternal and essential expression of that **social instinct** which is one of the strongest and best features in human nature. (Mahaffy 1892: 12-13)

Different: good conversation is an intellectual feasts, that is, provides new information and possibly even reflection. Same: small talk relieves anxiety and distress felt in the company of strangers. Similar: the social instinct is more diffuse in Malinowski's text, instead being relegated to "social sentiments". The exact relationship between instinct and sentiments still somewhat elusive.

If such be the universality and the necessity of conversation in modern society, it seems an obvious inquiry whether it can be taught or acquired by any fixed method; or rather, as everybody has to practice it in some way, **not as a mere ornament, but as a necessity of life**, it may be asked: Is there any method by which we can improve our conversation? (Mahaffy 1892: 13)

Another difference: PC is something "superfluous"; it is as if Malinowski's ideal society could do without free and social intercourse. Was even the Third Reich in this sense "Spartan"?

Now this runs counter to one of the strongest convictions among intelligent men and women, that **if anything in the world [] ought to be spontaneous it is conversation**. How can a thing be defined by rules which

consists in **following the chances of the moment, drifting with the temper of the company**, suiting the discourse to whatever subject may turn up? (Mahaffy 1892: 13-14)

This begs the question, how can formulae be spontaneous? Or the Goffmanian quirk of having a ready stock of insignificant stories? In following chances and drifting in a medley, non-consecutiveness and unreflexiveness is evoked - "small" talk is distinguished from serious talk by not having to stick to the subject at hand.

For it is the natural easy flow of talk, drifting with the current of thought in its changing eddies, which is indeed the perfection of what we seek. Didactic teaching, humorous anecdotes, clever argument - these may take their part in social intercourse, but **they are not its real essence, as I understand it.** (Mahaffy 1892: 14)

In the previous edition: "these may take their part in social intercourse, but they are not its perfection" (Mahaffy 1888: 5). Did he give up on achieving some sort of "perfection"?

Yet the best reasoner is not the man who **parades his logic and thrusts syllogisms upon his opponents**, but he who states his arguments as if they arose spontaneously and followed one another by natural suggestion. (Mahaffy 1892: 16)

Is this reflection? Fox (1944) reiterates it several times in the pragmatic key as relying on past experience and in some way anticipating the future. It is not out of the question that in some sense, the *logic* of reflection is exactly that - an insistence on syllogism.

Here, too, the untutored speaker is always conventional and conscious awkward; it is the trained orator who is easy and graceful; he is, in fact, **at home not only**

with his audience, but, if I may say so, with himself.
(Mahaffy 1892: 18)

The double orientation of *comfort*; having both self-confidence the audience's confidence.

But hence also the fact that such an analysis is very much needed, and that **conversation generally is at a far lower level than it might be.** (Mahaffy 1892: 19)

A point not to be neglected when treating the pejorative/malicious aspect of PC: good conversation so often degenerates into phatic communion because the art and theory of conversation are not undertaken with sufficient seriousness.

In general, good public speakers are also agreeable in conversation; the art of persuading people from a platform is nearly akin to that of pleasing them in **social discourse**, though there are of course some men only fit for the greater and more serious mission, and some who are perfect enough in the lesser, yet who cannot rise to the importance of the greater task. (Mahaffy 1892: 19)

It can be surmised from Mahaffy's *Greek Antiquities* (1897) that he viewed "social intercourse" as something bloader than the strictly linguistic "social discourse".

What are called natural gifts start one man far ahead of another. And yet these external qualities may be out-run by a larger mental gift, which overcomes weakness of voice and poverty of frame and **makes a man whose presence is mean, and whose speech at first contemptible, fascinate great audiences with his genius.** We may be unable to define what this peculiar quality is in the case of conversation, but we must take care to recognize its presence from the very outset. (Mahaffy 1892: 21)

Good conversationalists can "grasp" the attention of the audience.

But when any one comes to consider by what conditions conversation can be improved, and turns first of all to his own side, to see what he can do for himself in that direction, he will find that certain natural gifts which he may possess, or the absence of which he may regret, are of no small importance in making him more agreeable to **those whom he meets in society**. (Mahaffy 1892: 22)

Hence, not family or friends, but acquaintances.

The habit of wrangling with people who will not listen without interruption, and who try to shout down their company, nay even the habit of losing one's temper, engenders a noisy and harsh way of speaking, which naturally causes **a prejudice against the talker in good society**. (Mahaffy 1892: 23)

Another note on pejorativeness/maliciousness - PC may be an expression of such natural prejudice. Good society condemns the speech of uneducated classes.

Even the dogmatic or overconfident temper which asserts opinions loudly, and looks round to command approval or challenge contradiction, chills good conversation by setting people against the speaker, whom they presume to be a social bully and **wanting in sympathy**. (Mahaffy 1892: 23)

The overbearing or commanding speaker, in other words, hinders "the development of the sentiment of affection between equals" ([McDougall 1916: 168](#)).

Similarly the presence of a strong local accent, though there are cases where it gives raciness to wit and pungency to satire, is usually a hindrance to conversation, especially at its outset, and among strangers. It marks a man as provincial, and hence is akin to vulgarity

and narrowness of mind. It suggests too that the speaker has not moved much about the world, or even in the best society of his native country, in which such provincialism is carefully avoided, and set down as **an index of mind and manners below the proper level**. (Mahaffy 1892: 24)

What is the proper level of mind? It would appear that accent make a "pretension to reason" ([Trotter 1921: 120](#)).

However apt a **man's internal furniture** may be for conversation, he may make it useless by being externally disagreeable, and how often when we praise a friend as a good talker do we hear the reply: I should like him well enough if he did not worry me with his *don't you know*, or his *what*, or his *exactly so*, or something else so **childishly small**, that we shudder to think how easily a man may forfeit his position or popularity among civilized men in their daily intercourse. (Mahaffy 1892: 25)

The metaphor is neat, but the "want of meaning" (triviality) in utterances "childishly small" brings it once again in relation with the non-standard speakers (children, aphasics, parrots, etc.).

On the other hand, if a man or woman be overdressed, and ostentatiously neat, **the public at once infers triviality or shallowness of character**; and such a person will find difficulty in proving that he has **serious views of life**, and is **trustworthy in the conduct of weighty affairs**. (Mahaffy 1892: 26)

These serious views of weighty affairs are the exact opposite of "personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history" (PC 5.4).

Akin to this is the advantage of having seen and conversed with **the greatest men of the day** - a feature which lends the principal charm to those volumes of autobiography or of *Recollections*, [] which **approach nearer than**

any other kind of book to the conditions of a mere conversation. (Mahaffy 1892: 28-29)

The distinction between general and special knowledge thus follows the lines of a "community of knowledge" (cf. Trotter), though the opposing side would be something like "uncommon knowledge", or knowledge in which there is no community. As to books approaching conversation, depending upon the "mereness", could include those manuals of conversation called "phrasebooks".

Of course the danger with either of these specialists, the specialist of a day or the specialist of years, is that **he will not leave his subject when it has been sufficiently discussed**, as he will probably gauge the interest of others by his own pre-occupation, and so may become not a blessing but a bore to his company. (Mahaffy 1892: 29)

Did Toby ever tell you about the Scranton Strangler case?

Neither of these mental conditions, which are distinctly valuable in society, includes the case of specialists on **topics which are of no universal or no permanent interest**. Thus there are English society men devoted to one particular sport or one narrow pursuit, upon which they can talk with authority indeed, and with interest, but only to those who have received the same training. (Mahaffy 1892: 29)

These topics of universal and permanent interests are "one's views on the weather, on fresh air and draughts, on the Government and on uric acid" ([Trotter 1921: 119-120](#)).

A party of fox-hunters, or racing-men, or [[]] college dons, or stockbrokers, who rehearse again in the evening what they have been doing all day, may indeed **amuse themselves with talk**, but in no sense is it good conversation. One specialist, as I have said, may be of the greatest use in conversation. A set of specialists when they get to-

gether are either **unintelligible to the average mind or exceedingly tedious**. (Mahaffy 1892: 29-30)

I object! In what sense is the talk of specialists not a good conversation if they can easily contribute and reap pleasure from their discussion? Is setting the standard for good conversation on the basis of "the average mind" not dumbing down the concept and limiting it unnecessarily? To evoke Dell Hymes, the mothers may talk about their babies and anthropologists about their respective fieldwork, but their conversation is no worse off for the anthropologists having no interest in their babies and the mothers ditto for fieldwork. Who sets the standard of the average mind?

But it is surely a bad sign of any society to find men's parties considered more agreeable than those of both sexes, for it is a sign either of license in men's talk or of **narrowness in women's education**. (Mahaffy 1892: 30)

Then how can that one Russian author claim that "women's talk is phatic" at a time when education is coed?

A great mistake lies at the root of such an opinion, which assumes that **the first object of conversation is not to please but to instruct**. (Mahaffy 1892: 31)

This great mistake is the birthplace of phatic communion, and besides here, also in Dewey and Trotter. It is possible that there are many other instances of this mistake being called out, and hopefully in due time I will find other such occasions in the literature. Note, too, that this plays on the substratum of most communication models, that the sender is a *preceptor* or instructor and the receiver a *novice* or instructee (cf. [Shands 1970: 2](#)).

Of course to instruct or to be instructed is often very pleasant, and so far knowledge, general or special, is a very useful help to conversation, but **it is as talk, not as a lesson, that we must here regard it**. (Mahaffy 1892: 31)

A meritorious concession. Knowledge can be a great aid but is not the primary object of social intercourse. It is meritorious, deserves praise, because it overcomes the absolutism of functional typologies which set formal lessons and casual talk out as extremes and not as intermingling affairs; no-one, after all, objects to being given *information* in small talk. To say that there is *no exchange of information* in phatic communion is the most blatant folly of many who work with the concept - they neglect the *hierarchy* of functions.

The advantage of general above special knowledge for our purpose is that **it can be applied in a greater number of cases, and used to interest a greater number of people**. The man of general knowledge can suit himself to various company, and, if he is not able to speak with the authority of the specialist, can at least **help and stimulate in many cases where the latter is likely to be silent**. If therefore we **exclude the object of gaining information**, which many people estimate, not, indeed, above its intrinsic importance, but above its importance in conversation, regarded **not as a lesson, but a recreation**, we must decide that general information is the better condition to promote agreeable social intercourse. (Mahaffy 1892: 31-32)

General knowledge has wider appeal, and can more easily break the silence. Conversation, as a form of recreation, does not exclude the object of gaining information but it is not its primary aim, its so-called "function-role". It does not satisfy the need for knowledge, but need for company.

We may even say with truth that no man can attain to general knowledge nowadays without reading many books. The danger of a desultory habit, very likely to arise from skimming the mass of ephemeral literature now gushing from the press is, that the facts acquired will not be set in order, and will come out as **untidy scraps**, not as the details of a proper system of study. (Mahaffy 1892: 32)

Stops scrolling the feed and utters a disgruntled "Huh?"

The books which a man reads may either be the great masters, which are perhaps rather useful for cultivating his **deeper self** than for ordinary converse, or the newest authors, whose merits are still [[]] upon trial, and who therefore afford an excellent field for discussion and criticism. (Mahaffy 1892: 32-33)

Well, I think that the true Self, that original Self, that first Self, is a real, mensurate, quantifiable thing, tangible and incarnate, and I'm going to find the fucker... in the books I read.

There is, however, another kind of general knowledge which is not so easy to acquire, for it requires long experience, a certain position in society, and means for foreign travel. I mean **the general knowledge of remarkable men**, concerning whom the speaker can tell his recollections. There is often a man of no great learning or ability whose officila position, tact, or private means have brought him into relation with the great minds about whom every detail is interesting. Such a man's general knowledge should always make him an agreeable member of society. **Akin to this man is the experienced traveller who has wandered through many lands and seen the cities and the ways of men.** (Mahaffy 1892: 33)

Having firsthand experiences of "remarkable men" must have been quite a bit more common when there was only ~1.5 billion people in the world and most of them without education and any technological means of transportation and communication. Would books about said remarkable men (e.g. [Galton](#)) do? Personally I find other peoples' travel stories boring.

The man of books, on the contrary, has **to acquire his store in the silence of his study**, and hence by a process which rather untrains him for talking, so that even though his knowledge when acquired may be of more

solid and permanent value, his way of producing it may put him at a disadvantage. (Mahaffy 1892: 34)

Not unlike that notable excerpt from Plato, "Those who acquire [writing] will cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful; they will rely on writing to bring things to their remembrance by external signs instead of on their own internal resources" (cf. [Lotman 1990](#): 251).

The tourist who formerly went through Italy with his *vetturino*, and saw every village and road deliberately, talking with the people and observing national life, is now whirled [[]] through tunnels and by night from one capital to another, where he sees what Cook or Murray chooses him to see, just as the man who trusts the newspapers for his knowledge gets scraps, perversions, even lies, served up for him by way of **universal information**. (Mahaffy 1892: 34-35)

And now we have Wikipedia, though scrappy, not that fraudulent.

For this is the mental quality which is the foundation of wit, and a joker who merely consults his own amusement, or the amusement of some of his hearers at the expense of others, is not a good converser. The tendency of a very quick intellect is also akin to **impatience**, and so it will interfere with and cow more modest [[]] minds, which might have contributed well to the feast of talk had they been allowed to work without hurry or pressure. So strong do we often find this contrast that it is unadvisable, in choosing a set of people for conversation, to bring together very slow and very quick intellects. While the former and more dazzled and confused than pleased, **the latter feel the delay of listening to long and deliberate sentences intolerable**; and so a company in which all the members are socially excellent may fail to be pleasant on account of the mental contrasts of its members. (Mahaffy 1892: 36-37)

This is the case of "the hearer [who] listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak" (PC 5.4). Evidently differences in "mental quality" account for some of the failure of PC to amount to a good conversation.

Let me illustrate it by an extreme case. Who would think of introducing a young brilliant flashing sceptic into a society of grave and sober orthodoxy? If the conversation did not soon degenerate into acrid controversy - the very **lees** of social intercourse - it would result in contemptuous silence on one side or other, probably with the contempt so transparent as to challenge harsh over-statement from the talker by way of challenge or reply to unspoken censure. (Mahaffy 1892: 37)

Define:lees - "the sediment of wine in the barrel; dregs" and "the most worthless part or parts of something".

I need hardly insist that the man or woman who displays modesty by constantly apologizing for native ignorance or stupidity injures conversation, and can only amuse a company by becoming ridiculous. (Mahaffy 1892: 42)

Reminds me of the "Sorry for bad English, not a native speaker" seen online, which is wholly unnecessary in our world of Squantos and comes across as a solicitation for compliments.

What we want to learn from each member is his **free opinion** on [] the subject in hand, not his own estimate of the value of that opinion. (Mahaffy 1892: 42-43)

Another take on the "free" in "free, aimless, social intercourse".

There is, for example, the *enfant terrible*, who upsets everybody and causes shocking shame and confusion by the indiscreet directness of his inquiries. The very same

kind of mistake is made by grown people who are ignorant of the ways of society, such as country girls, or girls of an inferior rank, who are married into a cultivated society, and who are allowed such liberties, either for their beauty's sak, or for novelty's [] sake, that they announce whatever comes into their head, and **disturb conversation by their irrelevancy and shallowness**, if not by suggesting subjects undesirable in general society. (Mahaffy 1892: 43-44)

I recall a lecture room which, with my exception, was wholly female, and one girl bringing up sex and her keen interest in it. So *quirky!*

But when all has been said that can be said on either side, it will remain certain that the man who appears [] simple, and who therefore affects his company with the impression that they are in direct contact with his mind, has a distinct advantage over those who, either from conceits of style, or over-delicacy of sentiment, or education in **an artificial atmosphere**, appear with their minds as it were dressed or tattooed, and not in the purity of nature. (Mahaffy 1892: 45-46)

As opposed to a natural atmosphere, the "atmosphere of sociability" (PC 7.5).

If he is narrating, for example, a traffic history, or story of adventure in which he has taken part, while modesty will prevent him from **magnifying his own share in the matter**, and so trying to the utmost the faith of his hearers, simplicity will prevent him from unduly concealing his action, and [] will ensure that he tells the whole truth, so far as he knows it. (Mahaffy 1892: 46-47)

This is "the usual boasting and exaggerations" ([Malinowski 1922: 146](#)), related to "vanity and desire to be renowned and well spoken of" (Malinowski 1922: 117-118).

So shy people as a rule rather "fancy themselves"; for though they urge their peculiarity as an excuse for social defects, there lies deeper a secret conviction that they at least have escaped the vice of forwardness, or of that **coarseness of mental fibre** which is implied in forwardness. (Mahaffy 1892: 48)

Phraseology.

There are of course cases of children who are allowed **to run away whenever a stranger appears**, as if nature were a state of war, and man the natural enemy of man. Such children will require training to be cured of their own and their parents' stupidity, and must be taught that **every stranger is not a bogey**. (Mahaffy 1892: 49)

Yet another way in which primitive people are viewed as if they were children (or, at the very least, childish or child-minded).

In almost all the cases which occur there is therefore modesty without simplicity, a conscious and almost guilty air; it is often nothing better than **vanity**, which fears the result of conversation; which **desires to be thought well of**, and which from mistrust of itself puts on the garb of modesty. (Mahaffy 1892: 50)

Nearly word-for-word, "vanity and desire to be renowned and well spoken of" (Malinowski 1922: 117-118), which is described as a characteristic "feature of the Trobriand social psychology" (*ibid.*).

How can any conversation be **easy and natural**, how can it **range from topic to topic**, and **bring out the tempers and the characters of the speakers**, if any of them displays this vice by **dogged silence**, by conscious blushing when any personal topic arises, or by **the awkwardness which always accompanies this preoccupation with one's self**? If then the capital conditions of **pleasant intercourse** are modesty and simplicity, this defect,

which always contradicts the latter, and generally both of them, is to be regarded as the most prevalent and injurious **anti-social** **vice**. The only high quality which may be concealed, or perhaps even displayed by shyness, is a delicate sensitiveness, which shy people generally postulate in themselves, but which has far better and nobler ways of affecting society than by **impeding conversation**. (Mahaffy 1892: 50-51)

Last time I missed the point here. He is discussing shyness (alias *taciturnity*), which is an anti-social vice and impedes conversation. Note that ease and naturalness, as well as non-consecutiveness (ranging from topic to topic) is already accounted for, whereas bringing out "the characters of the speakers" is unaccounted for, or only manifest in the egocentric involvement with personal views and life-history.

Next to modesty and simplicity I class **the moral virtue of unselfishness**. It is very characteristic that we have no other word for this noble quality than the mere negation of its opposite - the most prevalent vice in the world. Why can we not describe it better? (Mahaffy 1892: 52)

Note that *vainness* is a synonym of selfishness (*amour-propre* also catches the eye).

This is **the man too who interrupts others**, who refuses to exercise for a moment that patience which he so often exacts. I set down these people as failures, and such they really are in the truest and highest sense, for they certainly **kill more conversation than they create**, nor do they understand that **the very meaning of the word implies a contribution-feast, an *eranos***, as the Greeks would say, not the entertainment provided by a single host. (Mahaffy 1892: 53)

This is where things get really interesting. An Oxford Dictionary note on [eranos](#) says that it "was essentially concerned with *reciprocity*: at first of food, and later of money. In *Homer*, *eranos* refers to a meal for which each diner contributed a share". [Another source](#) defines it as "a meeting of the minds for elite intellectuals", which is what most search results have to do with. Especially interesting is the possible connection with "the communion of food", as in the summary of the book titled *Eranos*, "The Eranos Meetings" are "named after the Greek word for a banquet where the guests bring the food".

He has perhaps still one place of refuge; he may become a high priest in that great modern temple of selfishness - his club; but even there his popularity has waned, and he sinks into that old age **unfriended and unsocial** - ἀφιλου ἀπροσόμιλου - which Sophocles regarded as one of the tragic features in the life of man. (Mahaffy 1892: 54)

Greek be damned! No Greek word I've ever tried to Google has yielded anything of value.

I turn now to a far more common, but less observed and less censured case of social selfishness, which requires urgently to be brought into the light of criticism. No man requires to practice unselfishness more than **the silent man**; for as everybody is able to contribute and ought to contribute something, so **the man who thrusts himself into society to enjoy the talk of others, and will take no trouble to help, to suggest, or to encourage**, is really a serious offender. (Mahaffy 1892: 54)

The silent man is selfish because he does not contribute. This is a frequent complaint nowadays in online dating (e.g. on Tinder), such as [this screencap](#) of a guy's back "hurting super bad [...] probably from carrying this conversation".

Many a time have I seen an unknown and obscure person drawn out in this way become the leading feature in a delightful evening; for fresh and curious knowledge, which suddenly springs from an unexpected source, can hardly fail to be profoundly [] interesting, and **to stimulate all the active minds** that hear it. (Mahaffy 1892: 56-57)

Stimulating the mind ~ arousing reflection.

The higher condition which now comes before us is, that [] **the speaker**, apart from the matter of conversation, **feels an interest in his hearers as distinct persons**, whose opinions and feelings he desires to know. (Mahaffy 1892: 58-59)

Something to add to the "unreliable informant" hypothesis, the implication being that the ethnographer did not really feel an interest in his informants as distinct persons.

Thus **prsonal beauty secures the sympathy of any company**; so much so, that even when found out to be a mere shell, with no mental force behind it, the attraction lasts, and lends some charm to what would otherwise be called trivial and stupid. (Mahaffy 1892: 59)

Mahaffy again evoking the [physical attractiveness stereotype](#).

And as in every conversation **there must not only be good talking but good listening**, the intellectual gifts which make the talker are often marred if he has not **the sympathy which makes the listener**. (Mahaffy 1892: 60)

And "the reciprocity is established by the change of rôles" (PC 5.6).

I have known a clever woman maintain a deservedly high character for her conversation who really said very little, but **was so sympathetic** that she made her guests eloquent, and thus so thoroughly pleased with them-

selves, that she was lit up by the glow of their satisfaction, an dearned very justly the credit for talking well simply because she made others talk. There is probably no social talent higher than this - or rarer. (Mahaffy 1892: 60b)

This is the secondary meaning of sympathetic, "(of a person) attracting the liking of others"; synonymous with "likeable, pleasant, agreeable, congenial, friendly, genial, companionable, easy to get along with, simpatico".

It was said with truth that no man is really worth having as a companion with whom you [] could not **contendedly walk or stay in silence**. This is of course a **sign of close intimacy**, and perfect freedom on both sides to meditate apart, even when together, without giving or taking any offence. Among real friends silence is no sign of estrangement, and it secures that the conversation which arises is perfectly spontaneous, which is, alas! impossible, if we are in **the society of mere acquaintances who will construe our silence as rudeness**. (Mahaffy 1892: 60-61)

Something to this effect has passed through this blog numerous times. One instance reframes it as "phatic silence", exemplified in the negative: "Tamar noticed that she had never met a person she felt so comfortable being silent with" (Grossman; in [Ephratt 2008](#): 1924).

Sympathy must not be excessive in quality, which **makes it demonstrative**, [] and therefore likely to repel its object. We have an excellent word which describes the over-sympathetic person, and marks the judgment of society, when we say that he or she is *gushing*. Of course as women are more frequently endowed with this virtue than men, they also err more frequently in the excess, at least in Teutonic races, for among Latin races a gushing man is quite a common phenomenon. This sort of person

not only volunteers to show his sympathy before it is required, and often spoils conversation at the outset, but is **ever ready to agree with everybody**, so making discussion, which implies differences in opinion, impossible. There results a social impression of a mixed kind, which is even more disagreeable than downright dislike, and therefore socially worse - I mean that of feeling a dislike, and even something like contempt, for a person who is known to be full of goodness and benevolence. Many people resent being obliged to confuse their judgment in this way, and feel a stronger **antipathy** to this marred goodness than to proclaimed evil. (Mahaffy 1892: 61-62)

Could this be the key to unlocking "bonds of antipathy" and "affirmation"? The two do appear in the same sentence: "Always the same emphasis on affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy" (PC 5.3).

These and many similar observations, which will occur to the intelligent reader, will indicate how important are **the limitations of sympathy**, and how essential it is that this, like every other social virtue, should be carefully husbanded, and not squandered at random without regard to its value. (Mahaffy 1892: 63)

Could be a headline.

I should add that the foregoing remarks are specially applicable to English (I do not mean English-speaking) society. There is no people more **distant and reserved** in social intercourse, or that more **resents any display of feeling, especially of sympathy**, without a careful introduction of it, and without considerable intimacy among the company. [] Thus those who are accustomed to **freer and more outspoken societies**, not to say French and Italian life, may make social mistake in England on the score of sympathy, which are sins only in **the heavy at-**

mosphere of Anglo-Saxon manners. (Mahaffy 1892: 63-64)

See "the pathos of nobility and distance" ([Nietzsche 1921: 4](#)). Could it be that, in the final analysis, sympathy is subtracted of symmetry due to the English' resentment of "any display of feeling"? Is there an equivalence between free/outspoken and free/aimless?

As its name implies, it [tact] is a sensitive touch in social matters, which **feels small changes of temperature**, and so guesses at changes of temper; which sees the passing cloud on the expression of one face, or the eagerness of another that desires to bring out something person for others to enjoy. (Mahaffy 1892: 65)

"Nor is anyone fooled into believing that an exchange of polite opinions about the weather between two thoroughly sober people has any real concern with or bearing upon current or proximate meteorological events: in this, people are taking the temperature and assessing the humidity of the inter-individual weather, not the earthly." ([La Barre 1954](#): 167-168)

But quite apart from instinct, an experienced man who is going to tell a story which may **have too much point for some of those present**, [] will look round and consider each member of the party, and if there be **a single stranger there whose views are not familiar to him**, he will forego the pleasure of telling the story rather than make the social mistake of hurting even one of the guests. (Mahaffy 1892: 66-67)

Yet another twist on the stranger.

It is perhaps more practical to observe that an over-seriousness in morals may be detrimental to **the ease and grace, above all to the playfulness, of talk**. (Mahaffy 1892: 69)

Playfulness confirmed.

But on the other hand there is such a thing - Aristotle saw it long ago - as being over-scrupulous in truthfulness, when we are indulging in **the relaxation of easy conversation**. Even a consummate liar, though generally vulgar, and therefore offensive, will contribute more pleasantly to a conversation than the scrupulously truthful man, who weighs every statement, questions every fact, and corrects every inaccuracy. In the presence of such a social scourge I have heard a witty talker pronounce it **the golden rule of conversation to know nothing accurately**. Far more important is it, in my mind, to *demand* no accuracy. There is no greater or more common blunder in society than to express disbelief or scepticism in a story told *for the amusement of the company*. (Mahaffy 1892: 70)

This golden rule is mirrored in lack of need to say anything. The scourge of someone weighing every statement Mahaffy attributes in *Greek Antiquities* to "sycophancy".

There may have been times and nations where conversation was regarded as a serious and important an engine of education, **that sound argument, brilliant illustration, and ample information, took the highest place as qualities of talk**. Perhaps they do in some cases now, as, for example, everybody who knows him will concede to Mr. Gladstone the palm as a very charming man in society by reason of these qualities. But **among hard-working and somewhat fatigued people, who have been pursuing information of various kinds in all their working hours, conversation must be of the nature of relaxation**; it must be amusing first, instructive afterwards, and so it is that nowadays no qualities however valuable, rank so high in popular estimation for **social purposes**, as wit and humor. (Mahaffy 1892: 72)

Unlike others mentioned above Mahaffy thus has a justification for bringing up that mistaken conception: conversation should be a *release* from communicating information. The social purpose, thus, is recreation.

The excesses of the humorist are perhaps rather those of **a complacent selfishness, which does not desist to monopolize the company with long stories** in which all do not feel an interest. (Mahaffy 1892: 79)

Define: complacent - "showing smug or uncritical satisfaction with oneself or one's achievements".

But, beyond the considerations above indicated, we cannot bring it into any **systematic doctrine of social intercourse**. (Mahaffy 1892: 80)

A statement of purpose.

Thus a colloquy with a single person, which is the easiest form, for it is usually with some one who is not a stranger, and it allows far more personality, will best consist in **a direct interchange of serious opinion**, in which each seeks to make the other speak out in confidence his inmost character. The better talker will **turn the conversation upon the other's life, inquire into his or her history**, so far as that can be done with good taste and without impertinence, and so encourage him (or her) to give personal recollections or confessions, which are to the teller of them generally of the deepest interest. (Mahaffy 1892: 81)

This is where Malinowski achieves his most blatant reversals: instead of one speaker pontificating upon his own "views and life history", a good conversationalist elicits these from the other.

As our manners and customs determine these things, it is not usual to have a long *tête-à-tête* with another per-

son of the same sex without choosing your companion and seeking out the opportunity; but, on the contrary, two people of different sexes are often brought together and ordered (so to speak) to converse, for no other reason than **the command of society**. Thus a young man is introduced to a partner at a ball, or a man of soberer age is directed to take a lady down to dinner. Here, though the company is large, the conversation is really of the kind before us - a dialogue between two persons only, of different sexes, and often comparative strangers. There is no case more frequent **where conversation is imperative, and where failures are common and conspicuous**. (Mahaffy 1892: 82)

This must be the manner in which agreeable communication is a "duty".

People of serious temper and philosophic habit will be able to confine themselves [[]] to large ethical views, and the general dealings of men; but to average people, both men and women, and perhaps most of all to busy men, **who desire to find in society relaxation from their toil**, that lighter and more personal kind of criticism on human affairs will prevail which is known as *gossip*. (Mahaffy 1892: 89-90)

Conversation, especially gossip, thus, is a recreation "after all the daily tasks are over" (PC 1.2).

It is usual for all people, especially those who must indulge in it, to censure gossip as a crime, as a violation of the Ninth Commandment, as **a proof of idleness and vain curiosity**, as a frivolous waste of the time given us for mental improvement. Yet the censure is seldom serious. (Mahaffy 1892: 90)

"Vain curiosity" is an especially pungent expression.

All the funny sketches of life and character which have made *Punch* so admirable a mirror of society for the last fifty years, are of the character of gossip, subtracting the mischievous element of personality; and though most people will think this latter an essential feature in our meaning when we talk of gossip, it is not so; **it is merely the trivial and passing, the unproven and suspected, which constitutes gossip**, for it is quite possible to bring any story under the notion while suppressing the names of the actors. (Mahaffy 1892: 92)

A workable definition of gossip.

The only excuse I can find for this widespread outrage upon the social rights of the young, is the old tradition [] of universities, still pursued in convent schools and Roman Catholic seminaries, that a portino of Scripture, or of some edifying book, should be read out during meals, so that the pupils may take in spiritual good along with their dinners, and avoid the crime of **light and trivial conversation**. (Mahaffy 1892: 94-95)

A variation of free and aimless, noticeably more pertinent qualities selected for the purpose.

For here the talk is not really with many at a time, nor again is it the conversation with one person, in which **the main element is the sustaining of interest** for a considerable time; it is a series of brief successive dialogues, in which the two great difficulties of conversation, the starting of it and the breaking off, are perpetually recurring. (Mahaffy 1892: 97)

Anticipating "maintaining attention".

The speaker is even debarred from the use of any fixed rule or method of overcoming these difficulties, for the people addressed will be sure to compar notes, and [] will **reject as insincere any politeness which are admin-**

istered according to a formula, however graceful it may appear. (Mahaffy 1892: 97-98)

Touching upon the spurious one-sidedness of expressions of sympathy, especially when - as must be emphasized - these are "admin-istered according to a formula".

However this may be, the knowledge, inspired or acquired, of the name and circumstances of an inferior is the great key ot smoothing over **the difficulty of beginning a conversation**, for any personal question will be taken as a compliment, and evidence of a friendly interest on the part of the prince. **The breaking off with ease and grace** is more difficult, for I do not count the formal bow of dismissal or the prearranged interruption by a new presentation as more than awkward subterfuges. (Mahaffy 1892: 99)

Another surprising Jakobsonianism!

If he had thought more upon the subject, or if he had been allowed to give us the results of his thinking, he might have told us that the secret in all cases, and [] **the sine qua non of good conversation, is to establish equality, at least momentarily, if you like fictions, but at all costs equality, among the members of the company who make up the party**. The man who keeps asserting his superiority, or confessing his inferiority, is never agreeable. (Mahaffy 1892: 101-102)

A great point.

We need hardly add that the greatest stress must here be placed on tact, for to presume on either kind of superiority will cause offence, and so spoil every attempt at **breaking the bonds set around us by the grades of the social hierarchy**. (Mahaffy 1892: 104)

It is extremely curious that Malinowski talks of establishing bonds, Mahaffy of breaking them.


The most successful conversations with old men are, however, not those with the old *raconteur*, who is in the habit of narrating his experiences and expects to be asked to do so, but with some modest and apparently dull old person who is successfully **probed by intelligent and sympathetic questions, till he is actually reminded of long-forgotten scenes, which have perhaps not been suggested to him for years, and then he draws from his memory**, with the help of further questions, some passage of life and adventure of the highest interest. (Mahaffy 1892: 116)

This reads like a passage from Malinowski's *Argonauts* quoted in Fox (1944), as to how he managed to elucidate valuable information from old informants.

So important and so neglected is this social duty of **probing for the strong point of others**, which is naturally brought forward in connection with the effort to talk with the young and inexperienced, that I am disposed to lay this down as a practical rule: ***if you find the company dull, blame yourself***. With more skill and more patience on your part it is almost certain you would have found it agreeable. If even two or three people in a company acted on this rule, how seldom would our social meetings prove a failure! (Mahaffy 1892: 120)

Perhaps the final statement of the folly of phatic communion. If you find your communication conveying no new information, it is your own fault. This book will in all probability incur a third reading.

The Principles of the Art of Conversation



Mahaffy, John Pentland 1887. *The Principles of the Art of Conversation*. London: Macmillan and Co.

[The present author] has thought a long time and with much care about it, and this, for a theorist, is sufficient vindication. But it may fairly be added that a writer on the principles of conversation ought to live in **a country where the practice of it is confessedly on a high level**, and where the average man is able to talk well. (Mahaffy 1888: vii)

disgruntled sign - "national character" in the very first paragraph? // Less disgruntled by this [when reading the second edition](#).

This is not so, **each single case of general description being drawn from instances under the author's own observation**, so that not a few will be recognised by those who have moved in the same society. But, **if justly**

drawn, they ought to be found in every society. (Mahaffy 1888: viii)

Still on national character but on another rhetorical level: "savage and civilized alike" (PC 9.4), and "though the examples discussed were taken from savage life, we would find among ourselves exact parallels to every type of linguistic use so far discussed" (PC 8.1). // As a bold aside, I just thought of a subtitle for this work: "The Origin of Malinowski's Phatic Communion: An Adventure in Linguistic Anthropology"

§1. There can be no doubt that of all the accomplishments prized in modern society that of **being agreeable in conversation is the very first**. It may be called the social result of Western civilization, beginning with the Greeks. Whatever contempt the North American Indian or the Mohammedan Tartar may feel for **talking as mere chatter**, it is agreed among us that people must meet frequently, both men and women, and that not only is it agreeable to talk, but that it is a matter of common courtesy to say something, even when there is hardly anything to say. (Mahaffy 1888: 1)

"Always the same emphasis on affirmation and consent" (PR 5.3), and "when they chat, resting from work, or when they accompany some mere manual work by gossip" (PC 1.2).

Every civilised man and woman feels, or ought to feel, this duty; it is the universal accomplishment which all must practice, ad as **those who fail signally to attain it are punished by the dislike and neglect of society**, so those who succeed beyond the average receive a just reward, not only in **the constant pleasure they reap from it**, but in **their esteem which they gain from their fellows**. (Mahaffy 1888: 2)

I don't have a trope for ostracizing yet - currently these quotes are under "the stranger". For 'contant pleasure" and "esteem [...] gain[ed]" cf. "social pleasure and self-enhancement" (PC 5.5).

And though men are supposed to succeed in life by dead knowledge, or by acquaintance with business, it is often by their **social qualities**, by their **agreeable way of putting things**, and not by their more ponderous merits that they prevail. (Mahaffy 1888: 2)

Agreeable way of putting things is related to affirmation and consent, again. For social qualities cf. Lemon's phatic qualia, particularly because the very following page says "In the high profession of **diplomacy**, both home and foreign, this is pre-eminently the case." (*ibid*, 3).

But quite apart from all these serious profits, and better than them all, is **the daily pleasure derived from good conversation** by those who can attain to it themselves or enjoy it in others. **It is a perpetual intellectual feast, it is an even-ready recreation, a deep and lasting comfort, costing no outlay but that of time, requiring no appointments but a small company**, limited neither to any age nor any sex, the design of prosperity, the solace of adversity [...] (Mahaffy 1888: 3)

Evidently this is a major source for the pleasure principle in PC. Though it is much more idealistic and hopeful. By the looks of it it even seems like Malinowski did his usual thing with the "theory of conversation" here and turned it upside down, made it into something quasi-negative.

[...] the eternal and essential expression of that **social instinct** which is one of **the strongest and best features in human nature**. [↔] §2. If such be **the universality and the necessity of conversation** in modern society, it seems an obvious inquiry whether it can be taught or ac-

quired by any fixed method; or rather, as everybody has to practice it [] in some way, not as **a mere ornament**, but as **a necessity of life**, it may be asked: Is there any method by which we can improve our conversation? (Mahaffy 1888: 3-4)

Being "one of the bedrock aspects of man's nature in society" (P 3.1), it a universal necessity, though Malinowski appears to treat it as if it were a mere ornament, i.e. "mere sociabilities".

To assert that there is some such systematic analysis of conversation possible is to assert that it is an *Art* - a practical science like the art of reasoning called Logic, or the art of eloquence called Rhetoric. Now this runs counter to one of the strongest convictions of all intelligent men and women, that **if anything in the world ought to be spontaneous it is conversation**. (Mahaffy 1888: 4)

Hence the idiosyncrasy of "formulae of greeting or approach" (PC 2.4), which runs counter to spontaneity.

The instant any one is felt to be talking by rules all the charm of his society vanishes, and he becomes the worst of social culprits - a bore. For it is **the natural easy flow of talk** which is indeed the perfection of what we seek. (Mahaffy 1888: 5)

The case of one Dale Carnegie, and "After the first formula, there comes *a flow of language*" (PC 5.1).

Didacting teaching, humorous anecdotes, clever argument - these may take their part in social intercourse, but they are not **its perfection**. (Mahaffy 1888: 5)

An odd stretch of the peripatetic triad. Note that Malinowski doesn't view conversation in its "perfection" but on the contrary as

the most imperfect means of communication (asymmetry later attributed here to the humourist).

To take up what others say in easy comment, **to give in return something which will please, to stimulate the silent and the morose** out of their vapours and **surprise them into good humour**, to lead while one seems to follow - this is the real aim of good conversation. (Mahaffy 1888: 5)

PC tropes are here maligned: something pleasing in return instead of slightly veiled impatience; stimulating the silent into good mood rather than viewing him as an enemy.

How can such a Protean impalpable acquirement be in any way an art depending on rules? Does it not altogether depend on natural gifts, on **a ready power of expression**, on a sanguine temperament, on **a quick power of sympathy**, [!] on a placid temper? Is there not a risk, nay a certainty, that in dissecting it we shall slay its life and destroy its beauty? (Mahaffy 1888: 5-6)

Perhaps an aspect of why Malinowski views sympathy and expression of it as a negative thing (e.g. "avowedly suprious on one side", PC 2.3).

§3. However natural and reasonable this objection, it is based on the mistake that art is opposed to nature, that natural means *merely what is spontaneous and unprepared*, and artistic what is *manifestly* studied and artificial. (Mahaffy 1888: 6)

If PC is the primitive function of speech, "primitive" can probably read as "natural" in this sense, though in sociabilities and formulae spontaneity and unpreparedness is twisted somehow: spontaneous because always ready, unprepared because unthinking.

This is one of the commonest and most widely-spread popular errors. **If such were the real meaning of *natural*, it might be argued that nothing was natural in man above the condition of the lowest savage** - the *Natur-mensch*, as the Germans call him. (Mahaffy 1888: 6)

Malinowski's savage, primitive, and natural are confusingly entangled. TBH the point of this utterance eludes me. Is it rhetorical?

It is a curious reflection that **conventionality and awkwardness seem the most universal inheritance, and so far thoroughly natural to men**, that it requires either conscious art or the unconsciousness attending some violent emotion to keep them clear of it. (Mahaffy 1888: 6-7)

I'm reading this as *nothing is more natural to humans than conventionality and awkwardness*, which would have profound implications on the general outline of PC.

The savage has it strongly marked in him; the most enlightened societies are encumbered with it. (Mahaffy 1888: 7)

Cf. "savage and civilized alike" (PC 9.4).

Yet the best reasoner is not the man who parades his logic and thrusts syllogism upon his opponents, but he who states his arguments as if they came spontaneously and followed one another by natural suggestion. In fact, **the man who parades his logic is one of those poor and narrow thinkers whose over-attention to form mars his comprehension of the matter**, and so leads him astray. [...] The fact that he goes wrong on every practical question is not due to logic, but to the man's narrowness of vision or **his vanity in parading an art that does not admit of parade in its proper use**. (Mahaffy 1888: 8)

Vanity. Neither too much "communicating ideas" nor excessive vanity is the proper mode of conversation is Mahaffy's point.

The case is still clearer with Rhetoric, or the science of **speaking persuasively in public**. (Mahaffy 1888: 8-9)

The case of the demon of oratorical inspiration.

[...] the fact of this very conquest shows that **a fund of power or of passion** lay concealed beneath these hindrances. No stupid or idle person, no **person without any flow of ideas** ever was, or could be made, an effective speaker by studying rhetoric. (Mahaffy 1888: 9)

Similar to "passion for power and wealth" (PC 3.3).

In general, good public speakers are also agreeable in conversation; **the art of persuading people from a platform is nearly akin to that of pleasing them in social discourse**, [...] (Mahaffy 1888: 12)

"This is the explanation of the particular attitude of a man speaking to a crowd, at least if he has succeeded in entering into communion with it." (Durkheim 1915: 210)

But in the case of conversation, except to point out some notable examples in great authors, any teaching by special cases is quite illusory. It would at once tempt the learner to force the train of the discourse into the vein he has practiced, and **to force conversation is in other words to spoil it**. (Mahaffy 1888: 13)

The case of one Dale Carnegie, who used "techniques of speaking" consciously (taught to do so), and recited passages from his book in everyday conversation. As to the feeling of being forced for PC in general cf. Malinowski on the puzzle of obligatory pleasure.

The broad foundations of logic are nothing but truisms; the rules of rhetoric are founded on these truisms,

combined with psychological observations neither subtle nor deep. (Mahaffy 1888: 13)

A valid criticism of Malinowski's PC in general, similar statements from others (explicitly about Malinowski's writing or style).

So we may be certain that the laws of good conversation, being such as can be practiced by all, are no witchery, but **something simple and commonplace**, perhaps neglected on account of their very plainness. (Mahaffy 1888: 13-14)

Approximating "free, aimless".

What are called natural gifts start one man far ahead of another. And yet these external qualities may be out-run by a larger mental gift, which overcomes weakness of voice, and poverty of frame, and makes **a man whose presence is mean, and whose speech at first contemptible.** (Mahaffy 1888: 14)

Natural enemy, awkwardness.

We will not define what this peculiar quality is in the case of conversation, but it is necessary to feel its presence from the very outset. (Mahaffy 1888: 14)

Intuitiveness. Atmosphere.

The old Greeks set it down as an axiom that a loud or harsh voice betokens **bad breeding**, and any one who hears **the lower classes** discussing any topic at **the corners of the streets**, may notice not merely their coarseness and rudeness in expression, but also the loudness and harshness of their voices, in support of this observation. (Mahaffy 1888: 16)

Cf. "directly a bad character" (PC 4.3), and "our own uneducated classes" (also PC 4.3).

The habit of **wrangling with people who will not listen without interruption**, and who try to shout down their company, nay even the habit of losing one's temper, engenders a **noisy and harsh way of speaking, which naturally causes a prejudice against the talker in good society**. (Mahaffy 1888: 16)

"The stranger who cannot speak the language" (PC 4.2), and "waiting till his own turn arrives to speak" (PC 5.4).

Even the dogmatic or **over-confident temper** which **asserts opinions loudly**, and **looks around to command approval or challenge contradictions**, chills good conversation by setting people against the speaker, whom they presume to be a social bully and **wanting in sympathy**. (Mahaffy 1888: 16)

"Always the same emphasis on affirmation and consent" (PC 5.3) and "personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history" (PC 5.4).

[...] a soft and sweet tone of voice [...] is to be classed with personal beauty, which disposes every one to favour the speaker, and listen to him or her with **sympathy and attention**. (Mahaffy 1888: 17)

A clue as to how to achieve a connection between Mal-Jak.

Similarly **the presence of a strong local accent**, though there are cases where it gives raciness to wit and pungency to satire, is usually a **hindrance in conversation**, especially at its outset, and **among strangers**. (Mahaffy 1888: 17)

The qualities of the stranger. Here linguistic, as opposed to the ideological in Zygmunt Mauman's *Culture* (1973).

§7. There is yet another almost physical disability or damage to conversation, which is akin to provincialism,

and which consists in disagreeable tricks in conversation, such as **the constant and meaningless repetition of catchwords and phrases**, such as the unmeaning oaths of our grandfathers, such as **inarticulate sounds of assent**, such as contortions of the face, which **so annoy the hearer by their very want of meaning and triviality** as to excite quite a disproportionate dislike to the speaker, and to require great and sterling qualities to counterbalance it. (Mahaffy 1888: 19)

This is where mere "formulae of greeting and approach" becomes "a profuse exchange of ritualized formulas" (Jakobson 1960d: 24).

The handsomest man or woman, even with the sweetest tones of human voice, will soon be found out, if **dull or unsympathetic**, and then there advantages all go for nothing. (Mahaffy 1888: 20)

Psychological symptoms.

Intelligent questions will draw from the astronomer, from the chemist, possibly from the pure mathematician, curious facts and interesting views on the progress of discovery, which will **pleasantly beguile the time even in a light-minded and frivolous company**. (Mahaffy 1888: 22)

Similar conclusion reached through Malinowski's PC by Kenneth Burke: "The asking of questions is obviously a masterly shortcut for the establishment [of personal union]" (*Attitudes Towards History*, 1937: 80).

This opens a field for conversation which is inaccessible if there be no one present to explain or to speak with authority, and so no invitation is more frequent or more welcome than to come and meet a man celebrated in his own line and of wide reputation. **The very fact of meeting such a man disposes the company to be sympa-**

thetic, and to draw from him the secrets of his knowledge. (Mahaffy 1888: 22)

To the astronomer, chemist, or pure mathematician we can probably add "ethnologist":

This kind of vantage-ground may be occupied by a man of no original capacity or deep learning, if accident has made him intimate with some exciting or absorbing subject of the day. **The man who has just escaped a shipwreck**, or fought in a famous battle, or survived some catastrophe, has for the moment **the advantage of being endowed with special knowledge, which everybody wants to talk about**, and to learn particulars from the actual eyewitness. (Mahaffy 1888: 23)

Pair this with Ashley Montagu's first meeting of Malinowski and the feeling of discovering human nature together. The general point vies with Malinowski's field-work materials where people discuss with interest the merits of canoes and other such stuff (gossip without the negative connotations).

If other topics **flag an appeal** to this abundant source will always introduce **a new current of talk**, and often of the most agreeable kind. (Mahaffy 1888: 24)

Relevance for the three-legged stool: the actual rough ground of conversation can present such flags of appeal to all three legs and inspire a new current of talk.

§10. We come now to the broader condition of General Knowledge. This, in the minds of many, sums up in itself all the conditions of good conversation, and yet it is so partial a truth as to be practically misleading. A great mistake lies at the root of such an opinion, which assumes that **the first object of conversation is not to please but to instruct**. I could produce one hundred Irish peasants more agreeable than many a highly-informed []

Englishman, and yet these peasants might in many cases be unable to read or write. (Mahaffy 1888: 26-27)

This amounts to the general point of PC, that it "does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas". Here, Malinowski is in one mind with Mahaffy, whereas on the concrete details he appears contrarian.

If therefore we exclude **the object of gaining information, which many people estimate above its importance** in our present subject, we must decide that general information is the better condition to promote **agreeable social intercourse**. (Mahaffy 1888: 27)

The same point in different garment. This is oddly in line with the rather simplified approaches which take the opposite of phatic communion to be the communication of "information", e.g. "not in order to inform" (PC 2.2).

There is often a man of no great learning or ability whose official position, tact, or private means have brought him into contact with the great minds about whom every detail is interesting. Such a man's general knowledge should always make him an agreeable member of society. **Akin to this man is the experienced traveller who has wandered through many lands and seen the cities and the ways of men**. (Mahaffy 1888: 29)

More on the enchanting ethnologist. If I were to construct a narrative of PC in line with Malinowski's style I'd use this phraseology.

§12. What has hitherto been said about knowledge in a man of conversation has left out of all account the way of producing it, and merely considered **the mental store from which conversation may be supplied**. But almost as important as these materials, is **the faculty of producing them without effort**. This quality may be called intellectual *quickness*, as distinguished from solidity; and of

all the conditions we have yet discussed, this seems most due to nature, and unattainable by education. It is indeed sometimes **a characteristic of nations**. (Mahaffy 1888: 32)

National character and the economy of mental effort or habit in the dimension of conversation topics.

But quite apart from it, **a selfish man, who has no sympathy for his company**, may, by the quickness of his intellect, show brilliantly in conversation, while his more solid and worthy fellow is considered a bore. (Mahaffy 1888: 33)

On "the man linguistically active" (PC 5.5).

Let me illustrate it by an extreme case. Who would think of introducing a young brilliant flashing sceptic into a society of grave and sober orthodoxy? If the conversation did not soon degenerate into acrid controversy - the very lees of social intercourse - it would result in **contemptuous [] silence** on one side or other, probably with the contempt so transparent as to challenge harsh overstatement from the talker by way of challenge or reply to **unspoken censure**. Could anything be more ruinous to the object we have in view? (Mahaffy 1888: 34-35)

"I made on or two coarse jokes, and one *bloody [native]* made a disapproving remark, whereupon I cursed them and was highly irritated."

But if the quality under consideration is valuable at all times, it is so peculiarly **when a number of strangers meet together**, or when it is the lot of men and women to be **obliged to talk together** in dialogue, upon a stray or sudden occasion. Then it is, when for example you go down to dinner with **a strange man** or woman whose name you have not caught, that quickness of intellect be-

comes the prime agent in starting a **pleasant conversation**. There are, indeed, even here many easy rules which may help **to get over the initial difficulty**, without those **initial chords about the weather** whereby so many people, otherwise really intelligent, hide themselves at the outset under the prelude of commonplace. (Mahaffy 1888: 35-36)

A lot of PC tropes but the most significant is probably the weather.

But as they are qualities enjoined upon us by moralists, and are in any case analogous to moral virtues, we may in **this book, which does not affect precise philosophy**, class them as moral. (Mahaffy 1888: 37)

Not precise philosophy, no, but some crucial points in this book have made their way, through Malinowski and Jakobson, to Foucault and even Žižek, who may be said to practice loose philosophy.

For example, **the instinct of sociality**, which is really the same as the **gregarious** instinct in birds and animals, is not the same as the love [] of our neighbour enjoined by the Gospel, but is closely connected with it, for to be social without being civil is not possible, and **civility is at least the imitation of friendship**, if it be not friendship or **benevolence in outward acts of social intercourse**. This, too, appears to be the reason why a particular class of social instincts is so agreeable to men, and so honoured in society - their close relationship to moral virtues. (Mahaffy 1888: 37-38)

First Aristotle on friendship (civility - goodwill); secondly Dorothy Lee's futility of gifts in Trobriand culture.

[...] the children of **incessant talkers** are so bored with this **social vice** that they never think of practicing talk [...] (Mahaffy 1888: 39)

The slightly veiled patience. The whole situation described by Malinowski in that instance is a social vice, a contrarian approach to the theory presented here.

§17. There are of course cases of children who are allowed to run away whenever a stranger appears, **as if nature were a state of war, and man the natural enemy of man.** (Mahaffy 1888: 50)

"A world of living creatures that fear and hate, shun and attack one another without restraint, is not a fact of observation. It is a pure a priori creation of the "pure" reason." (Giddings 1896: 79)

Or else you may find a youth, who jumps over a hedge to avoid meeting a party of his acquaintances on a country road, anything but modest in low society, thus showing that it is **a consciousness of unfitness for good company and a fear of being criticised** which dominate him. (Mahaffy 1888: 51)

The opposite pole of Giddings' consciousness of kind. "[Malinowski] was, as he often noted, filled with "Dostoevskian thoughts," extremely ambivalent feelings of longing and aversion" (Payne 1981: 433).

In almost all the cases which occur there is therefore modesty without simplicity, a conscious and almost guilty air; it is often nothing better than **vanity** which **fears the result of conversation, which desires to be thought well of**, and which from mistrust of itself puts on the garb of modesty. (Mahaffy 1888: 51-52)

Finally, *vanity* in detail, and a the psychological symptom of internalization. To be thought well is D. Lee's renown".

How can any conversation be easy and natural, **how can it range from topic to topic, and bring out the tempers and the characters of the speakers**, if any of them

displays this vice by **dogged silence**, by consciou blushing when any personal topic arises, or by the awkwardness which always accompanies this noisome **preoccupation with one's self**? If then the capital conditions of **pleasant intercourse** are modesty and simplicity, this defect which always contradicts the latter, and generally both of them, is to be regarded as the most prevalent and destructive anti-social vice. (Mahaffy 1888: 52)

Again, Mahaffy's message is positive and uplifting (anyone can have something interesting to say) while Malinowski's is negative, almost a praise of this social vice (egocentric speech, collective monologue).

§18. Reserve, which few venture to claim for themselves, is a far higher and better feeling, for it implies that the unwillingness to enter upon conversation arises from some deliberate judgment as to the relative positions of the speaker and his company - often a correct judgment, saving us from

Curiously in line with Malinowski's sentiment around "a tone of jocular familiarity".

It may indeed act as a check on licence, and so by bringing the company back from some aberration, start it afresh on nobler and pleasanter topics. This is so indirect **a mode of action**, and may be so much more easily attained in other ways, that I need only mention it for completeness' sake. (Mahaffy 1888: 54)

"But can we regard it as a mode of action?" (PC 7.1). Now I need to find "The technique of speaking".

The good talker who monopolises conversation, who insists on keeping other people waiting that he may finish his story, who tells anecdotes which are evidently unpleasant to some of the company, but will not

forego his joke for the sake of others - the social bully who makes butts of the more retiring, and sallies at their expense, is the most obvious case of **a man failing from selfishness**, and losing the great [] natural advantage he possesses through want of the opposite quality. (Mahaffy 1888: 55-56)

Very crucial to the "slightly veiled impatience" and other social vices.

I have spoken of these people as failures, and such they really are, in the truest and highest sense, for they certainly kill more conversation than they create, nor do they understand that the very meaning of the word implies **a contribution-feast**, an *eranos* as the Greeks would say, not the entertainment provided by a single host. (Mahaffy 1888: 56)

Another piece to the puzzle of "communion": "The word 'Eranos', in Greek language, applies to a banquet, both spiritual and material, which lasts thanks to the contributions each participant makes." ἐρανος is "public contribution; fund, collection". Vrd. "osadus".

In every company there may be people either socially or intellectually inferior to the rest, who feel themselves somewhat *out of it* (to use a vulgar phrase), and whom **the selfish man, the big talker, the ambitious man** is apt to ignore. (Mahaffy 1888: 60)

The man whose speech Malinowski, effectively, describes as "phatic".

§22. The great **Adam Smith**, in a book called **Moral Sentiments**, which he seems to have thought out as a sort of antidote to the selfishness of the *Wealth of Nations*, managed to deduce all the virtues from this one root of sympathy. (Mahaffy 1888: 62)

Well, my need for Spencer's "The Comparative Psychology of Man" now goes out the window as something unnecessary. If Malinowski read this then he probably didn't have to read Spencer nor Smith. In future, should I go deeper into this, I must include Smith's *Moral Sentiments* in my readings.

Starting from the fact that **man is a gregarious animal, with social instincts**, he showed that **the desire to be in sympathy with our fellow-creatures**, and so command their love and respect, made us watch them, consider what they felt about us, and avoid everything which might shock or hurt their opinions or their feelings. It was this **indefinite and impersonal public opinion** which was by degrees made a part of ourselves, and under the name of **conscience** was set up as 'a man within the breast' of each of us to approve and disapprove even our most secret actions. (Mahaffy 1888: 62)

The social instinct is "the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man" (PC 3.3). Instinct is "one of those fine words which are chiefly used to cover over what is not understood" (Jespersen 1922: 128). Sympathy and fellowship are here tied with the imitative tendency (cf. mention of G. Tarde in *Argonauts*) and what amounts to the looking glass self (Cooley). The indefinite and impersonal public opinion or conscience amounts to the - was it? - superego in psychoanalysis.

The first condition of any conversation at all, is that **people should have their minds so far in sympathy that they are willing to talk upon the same subject**, and to hear what each member of the company thinks about it. The higher condition which now comes before us is, that the speaker, apart from the matter of the conversation, feels an interest in his hearers as distinct persons, whose opinions and feelings he desires to know. (Mahaffy 1888: 63)

This is the social vice of the selfish man who speaks but doesn't listen.

And as in every conversation **there must not only be good talking but good listening**, the intellectual gifts which make the talker are often **marred if he has not the sympathy** which makes the listener. (Mahaffy 1888: 65)

The asymmetry of sympathy: "But though the hearing given to such utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share, it is quite essential for his pleasure, and the reciprocity is established by the change of rôles" (PC 5.6).

§23. Buh I suppose no one will be disposed to dispute this, or **to underrate the value of sympathy as a quality for conversation**. (Mahaffy 1888: 66)

You'd suppose wrong, as Malinowski demonstrates.

Sympathy must not be excessive in quality, which makes it demonstrative, and therefore likely to repel its object. We have an excellent word which describes the over-sympathetic person, and marks the judgment of society, when we say that he or she is *gushing*. (Mahaffy 1888: 66-67)

The subject of sincerity: "where [common sentiment] purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly suprious on one side" (PC 2.3).

The most seductive way of conveying your sympathy to another is to join with him in some strong antipathy, thus showing that all the world cannot claim your friendship, but that you distribute your likes and dislike with judgement and discrimination. (Mahaffy 1888: 68)

The social mind works on small groups this way. In-group bias?

I should add that the foregoing remarks are specially applicable to **English** (I do not mean English-speaking) **society**. There is no people more distant and reserved in social intercourse, or that more resents any display of feeling, most of all of sympathy, without a careful introduction and considerable intimacy among the company. Thus those who are accustomed to freer and more outspoken societies, not so say French and Italian life, may make social mistakes in English on the score of sympathy, which are sins only in **the heavy atmosphere of Anglo-Saxon manners**. (Mahaffy 1888: 69)

Perhaps some of his twists upon this material is due to him writing to an English audience?

In nothing is it more useful than in preparing the right conditions for **a pleasant society** in choosing the people who will be in **mutual sympathy**, in thinking over pleasant subjects of talk and suggesting them, in seeing that all disturbing conditions are kept out, and that the members who are to converse should be all without those small inconveniences which damage society so vastly out of proportion to their intrinsic importance. (Mahaffy 1888: 72)

This is the culmination of the "national character" passages in the very beginning. It also includes the passages tagged here with "natural enemy". An ideal conversation partner is able to speak clearly, knows the language, doesn't have an annoying accent, has manners, has ideas and interesting knowledge of his own to contribute as well as know the art of conversation or the technique of speaking (rhetorically, humorously) to goad others to speak their minds and open their character as well.

Every company of men ought to import two or three grave and revered people into their circle for **the purpose of checking such ruinous excesses**, if there be any prob-

ability that the conversation may stray into this slough of mire. (Mahaffy 1888: 77-78)

Checking impulses.

Far more important is it, in my mind, to *demand* no accuracy. There is no greater or more common blunder in society than to express disbelief or scepticism in **a story told for the amusement of the company**. (Mahaffy 1888: 78)

This should be the ideal type of speech for social communion; besides formulae and an egocentric or trivial flow of language. Probably a good replacement for the purpose of informing (or instructing).

The great and good man must unbend; he must acquiesce in being amused; he must even connive at inaccuracies, and smile at what he considers investigations; **he must for the nonce regard recreation as his direct object**. (Mahaffy 1888: 80)

Dorothy Lee's non-utility, or futility.

The effect of knowing this is to detract greatly from[] **the enjoyment of the company**, and still more from **the reputation of the speaker**. (Mahaffy 1888: 83-84)

Hm, "to enjoy each other's company" (PC 3.2) and Dorothy Lee's "renown".

[...] humour is the sustained side of the ridiculous, the comic way of looking at things and people, which may be manifested either in **comment upon the statements made by others** or in **narrating one's own experiences**. (Mahaffy 1888: 87)

These are positive aspects of "personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history" (PC 5.4).

The humourist is the only good and effective storyteller; for if he is **to monopolise a conversation, and require others to listen to him**, it must be by presenting human life under the fresh and piquant aspects - in fact, as a little comedy. (Mahaffy 1888: 88)

The social vice of monopolising the conversation. Turn-taking. Requiring others to listen is the sign of selfishness.

The excesses of the humourist are perhaps rather those of **a complacent selfishness**, which does not hesitate **to monopolise the company with long stories in which all do not feel an interest**. (Mahaffy 1888: 90)

Slightly veiled impatience, as in "the manner in which such type of narrative would be told over camp fires, the same subject being over and over again repeated by the same man, and listened to by the same audience" (Malinowski 1922: 248).

But beyond the necessary cautions above indicated, **we cannot bring it into any systematic doctrine of social intercourse**. (Mahaffy 1888: 91-92)

Did Malinowski do that? Is there a phatic theory?

You should turn the conversation upon the other person's life, **inquire into his or her history**, so far as that can be done with good taste and without impertinence, and so induce him (or her) to give **personal recollections or confessions**, which are to the teller of them generally of the deepest interest. But you will not elicit these without some frankness on your own part, sometimes without volunteering some slight confession which may induce the other to open **the flood-gates of his inner life**. When this is once attained there must ensue good conversation;

for to have a volume of human character said open before you, and to turn over its pages []at leisure, is one of the highest and most intense recreations known to an intelligent mind. (Mahaffy 1888: 93)

A positively minded version of "personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history" (PC 5.4). The flood-gates of inner life is like opening a person's character (here a book metaphor) and volunteering some personal confession amounts to a gift of personal character (lineal and non-lineal attitudes towards human interaction: deepening a bump vs following a line to some end).

It is bad enough to begin with truisms about the weather - an excusable exordium; it is far worse and more disgraceful to end with them, and positively many people get no further. (Mahaffy 1888: 95)

The commonplace of comments about weather. It's a social vice to talk *only* about the weather.

He and I had apparently not a single interest in common. But when the right vein was touched one had **to supply nothing but assent**, or an occasional question; the man flowed on with an almost natural eloquence. People said that others had found him morose and unapproachable. It was certainly their fault. (Mahaffy 1888: 96)

The technique of speaking. Oriented towards the addressee with an appeal to open themselves. People who supply nothing but assent are "yes-men", and hence not real conversation partners. Affirmation and consent.

[...] the **people are really ready to talk, but don't know how. The beginning is evidently the difficulty**, and surely here, if anywhere, people who [] have no natural facility should think out **some way of opening the**

conversation, just as chessplayers have agreed on several formal openings in their game. (Mahaffy 1888: 96-97)

The origin of formulae of greeting and approach, "The breaking of silence," (PC 4.5), how "Stereotyped formulas [are] a means of establishing contact" (Gardiner 1932: 45-46), and "messages primarily serving to establish [...] communication [...] by a profuse exchange of ritualized formulas" (Jakobson 1960d: 24).

Their very virtues in home life have dulled their interests in outer things, and **the best of mothers have sometimes forgotten to talk about anything except the education of their children.** (Mahaffy 1888: 97)

And do anthropologists sometimes forget to talk about anything except their field-work?

But it is always better worth probing a sound nature than hearing **the ready chatter of idleness.** For this reason, some serious topics ought to be the best, even for talking with a stranger, since our **conversation errs more frequently through frivolity** than through gravity. (Mahaffy 1888: 97)

Malinowski the contrarian left this one out. IRL people talk about things grand as well as small, the visibly present as well as the abstract and general. There's variability.

A brilliant thing said at the very start, which sets people laughing, and **makes them forget that they are waiting,** may alter the whole complexion of the party, **may make the silent and distant people feel themselves drawn into the sympathy of common merriment,** and thaw the iciness which so often fetters Anglo-Saxon society. (Mahaffy 1888: 102)

The ludic moment combined with the image of (cramped) waiting spaces. The sympathy of common merriment sounds like the prototype of "the atmosphere of sociability" (PC 7.5).

The topic which ought to be common to both and always interesting, is the discussion of character and human motives. (Mahaffy 1888: 104)

Montagu discovering human nature.

People of serious temper and philosophic habit will be able to confine themselves to large ethical views, and the general dealings of men; but to average people, both men and women, and perhaps most of all the busy men, who desire to find in society relaxation from their toil, that **lighter and more personal kind of criticism on human affairs** will prevail which is known as *gossip*. (Mahaffy 1888: 105)

A positive conception of gossip.

§36. This may, therefore, be the suitable moment to consider **the place of gossip in the theory of conversation**; for though gossip is not only possible but usual in the private discourse of two people, and possible too in a large society., its real home and natural exercising ground is **the society of a few people intimate with the same surroundings**. (Mahaffy 1888: 105)

Sadly, Malinowski did not make room for gossip in his PC. It is mentioned on 6 accounts but not explained *infra*. The context of gossip is in *Argonauts*. In the (nearly) hundred years only a few instances have considered "rumo(u)r", for example (one study in the 70s comes to mind). As to the situation of context, this right here is really the answer to the rather rhetorical question, "But what can we consider as *situation* when a number of people aimlessly gossip together?" (PC 7.4) - this situation is that of mutual acquaintance and

mutual confiding. The "surroundings" here is the network of social relations, all else falling into the "surrounding penumbra" (Gardiner 1932: 56).

These people cannot but feel obscurely what they are either afraid to speak out or have not duly considered, that **the main object of conversation is neither instruction nor moral improvement but recreation**. (Mahaffy 1888: 106)

Again, reflexivity or futility.

But the main and direct object is recreation, mental relaxation, happy idleness; and from this point of view it is impossible for any sound theory of conversation to ignore or depreciate **gossip**, which is perhaps **the main factor in agreeable talk throughout society**. (Mahaffy 1888: 106)

I have to say Mahaffy's theory of conversation lends itself much more effortlessly to Annette Holba's theory of leisure, for which I have here found a new respect. Likewise, I think all this talk of rank, hierarchy, manners and vanity in this thread that it should lend itself more readily towards Marija Liudvika Drazdauskienė's doctoral thesis on honorifics.

It will be conceded that the one thing absolutely essential to the education of a lady is that she should talk agreeably at meals. **It is the natural meeting time**, not only of the household, but of friends, and **conversation is then as essential as food**. Yet, what is the habit of many of [[]] our schools? They either enforce silence at this period, or they compel the wretched pupils to speak in a foreign language, in which they can only labour out **spasmodic commonplaces, without any interchange or play of thought**. (Mahaffy 1888: 110)

The communion of food. And perfunctory execution (spasmodic commonplaces) vs interchange or play of thought (lively exchange).

This worthy man did his best under a system devised to bring up young people in silence and in fear, not in **free and friendly intercourse** with their instructors.
(Mahaffy 1888: 112)

Is being "friendly", for Malinowski, "aimless"?